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Glossary of Terms 
 
Annuity A fixed sum paid to someone typically for the rest of their 
lives. 
 
Consols Short for consolidated annuity meaning a British Government 
bond without a maturity date.  
 
Death duty Tax levied on property after the owner’s death. Also, called 
Estate duty or Succession duty.  
 
Entail Restriction, especially on land, limiting the inheritance to the 
owner’s lineal descendants or to a particular class thereof. 
 
Fee simple A permanent and absolute tenure in land with freedom to 
dispose of it at will. Also, known as a freehold interest. 
 
In-globo In the context of this study the in-globo concept was 
introduced in Section 6 (2) of the Irish Land Act 1903. It 
meant that on estates where three-quarters of tenants, in 
number and value, agreed to purchase their holdings the 
remainder were compelled to purchase or vacate their land. 
  
Jointure A property settled on a woman in consideration of marriage, 
to be owned by her after her husband’s death. 
 
Mortgage A legal agreement whereby a lender gives a loan for a fixed 
period, at an agreed rate of interest and which is secured on a 
specific property should the borrower default. 
 
Nominal Return Return on an investment before deducting inflation. 
 
x 
 
Option An option is a financial derivative that represents a contract 
which entitles, but does not obligate, the option holder to buy 
or sell a security at an agreed price during a specified period. 
 
Portfolio Describes a selection of shares owned by an individual or 
institution. 
 
Quitclaim deed A legal instrument which is used to transfer interest in real 
property. The entity transferring its interest is called the 
grantor and the recipient is called the grantee. 
 
Real property  Property consisting of land or buildings. 
 
Real return The balance after subtracting the rate of inflation for a given 
period from the nominal rate of return. For example, if money 
on deposit in a bank earned a nominal return of 5% per annum 
and the inflation rate for the year was 3%, the real return on 
the money is 2%. 
 
Residuary trust A trust where all the property of a trust that has not been 
transferred to other beneficiaries is settled on a named 
individual. It effectively means that the residuary party 
receives everything that is left after all the trust’s obligations 
are met. 
 
Security Tradeable financial asset such as shares, bonds, banknotes, 
debentures, government stock. 
 
Settled trust A deed where land or other property is given by a settlor into 
trust so that the beneficiary only has limited right to the 
property (for example his life), but usually has no right to 
transfer or sell the land to another. 
 
xi 
 
Trust A fiduciary relationship in which one party, known as the 
trustor, gives another party, the trustee, the right to hold title 
to property or assets for the benefit of a third party, the 
beneficiary. 
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Introduction 
 
‘In terms of preferment and prestige, power and property, pride and panache, their 
position was essentially unrivalled. Yet within the space of one hundred years, they 
were to be eclipsed as the economic elite, undermined as the most glamourous social 
group and superseded as the governing class.’ 
David Cannadine1  
 
‘The Russian nobility, after receiving considerable capital from the state as 
compensation for the lost serfs cared little as to how to invest that capital wisely. It 
spent unskilfully an impressive amount of capital.’ 
Anatole Mazour 2 
 
The decline of Irish landlords in the post-Famine period has been the subject of 
much scholarly research.3 The subject has been examined by historians through a 
range of historical prisms and timeframes. This has contributed to a more 
comprehensive and nuanced understanding of both the reasons for, and the nature of, 
their demise. Much of this research has been focussed on examining landlords in a 
political and social context and, to a lesser extent, on their personal financial 
histories. While historians may attribute different reasons for the decline, there is 
broad agreement that the Irish Land Act of 1903 played a significant part in the story 
and in the lives of landlords and their former tenants.4 There are, however, several 
historical lacunae that exist, particularly in the areas of pre-Wyndham Act estate 
management practices, the impact of taxation on landlord finances, understanding of 
                                                 
1 David Cannadine, The decline and fall of the British aristocracy (London, 1990), p. 25. 
2 Anatole G. Mazour, ‘Economic decline of landlordism in Russia’ in The Historian, vol. 8, 
issue 2 (Mar. 1946), pp 156-62. 
3 John E. Pomfret, The struggle for land in Ireland 1800-1923 (Princeton, New Jersey, 
1930); Barbara Lewis Solow, The land question and the Irish economy 1870-1903 (Harvard, 
1971); James S. Donnelly Jr., The land and the people of nineteenth-century Cork. The rural 
economy and the land question (London, 1975); Paul Bew, Conflict and conciliation in 
Ireland, 1890-1910, Parnellites and radical agrarians (Oxford, 1987); W.E. Vaughan, 
Landlords in mid-Victorian Ireland (Oxford, 1994); Philip Bull, Land, politics and 
nationalism: a study of the Irish land question (Dublin, 1996); Alvin Jackson, Ireland, 1798-
1998 (Oxford, 1999); Terence Dooley, The decline of the big house in Ireland, a study of 
landed families 1860-1960 (Dublin, 2001); Fergus Campbell, Land and revolution: 
nationalist politics in the west of Ireland 1891-1921 (Oxford, 2005); Olwen Purdue, The big 
house in the north of Ireland: land, power and social elites, 1878-1960 (Dublin, 2009). 
4 The Irish Land Act 1903 [3 Ed. VII, c. 37.] (14 Aug. 1903), hereafter referred to as either 
the Wyndham Act 1903 or the 1903 Act. 
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the financial provisions of the Wyndham Act, the act’s day-to-day operation and 
most significantly, regarding the wealth management practices of landlords post the 
sale of their estates.  The aim of this thesis is to address these lacunae and, therefore, 
expand the understanding of the economic decline of the landed elite as they 
transitioned from landlords to rentiers during the period 1903 to 1933. This latter 
date closes this thesis because it encompasses a number of significant developments 
that had a bearing on investment markets in the period, such as the hyper-inflation of 
the First World War, the deflation of the 1920s, the ongoing decline in bond markets 
and the stock market crash of 1929. 
 
This study will address a number of questions including: what conditions contributed 
to the loss of landlords’ economic (and by extension social and political) power? 
Could they have been more efficient and effective landlords? What were George 
Wyndham’s motivations in introducing his land act in 1903? How was such a 
measure structured and financed? Did the Wyndham Act achieve its objectives? 
What did landlords do with the money received from the sale of their estates? The 
thesis begins by describing the economic and personal financial contexts of Irish 
landlords prevailing at the time the Irish Land Bill 1903 was introduced. It then 
examines the motivations of George Wyndham in bringing the legislation forward 
and the act’s financial provisions and its operation. Finally, this thesis looks at the 
economic consequences the act had for landlords particularly with regard to how 
they managed the monies received from the sale of their estates under the Wyndham 
Act and subsequent amending legislation during the turbulent period from 1903 to 
1933.5 In the context of this thesis, the Wyndham Act is a fulcrum around which the 
majority of Ireland’s landed class transitioned themselves from landlords to rentiers. 
 
One of the first works to examine in detail the place of land in nineteenth- and early- 
twentieth century Irish history was J.E. Pomfret’s The struggle for land in Ireland 
1800-1923. Published in 1930, Pomfret’s approach was to view land as ‘destined to 
be a source of conflict between the classes’ and, by deduction, that the relationship 
                                                 
5 The reference to amending legislation refers to the Irish Land Act, 1904 [4 Ed. VII, c. 34] 
(15 Aug. 1904), Evicted Tenants (Ireland) Act, 1907 [7 Ed. VII, c.56] (28 Aug. 1907), 
Evicted Tenants (Ireland) Act, 1908 [8 Ed. VII, c. 22] (1 Aug. 1908) and the Irish Land Act, 
1909 [9 Ed. VII, c. 42] (3 Dec. 1909). 
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between landlord and tenant was part of a class warfare, with each side holding sway 
before the eventual victory of the tenant class.6 Pomfret saw the Wyndham Act as 
technically flawed and requiring correction which was applied through the enactment 
of the Birrell Land Act, 1909, but also concluded that it had, by 1922, resulted in 
Ireland being converted into ‘a country of peasant proprietors’.7 The rather 
traditional image of avaricious, rack-renting, absentee landlords that prevailed in 
nationalist historical discourse for much of the last century, is in part due to 
Pomfret’s work. This view, which Vaughan described as: ‘three generations of 
muddle, exaggeration and tendentiousness’, remained largely unchallenged until 
Barbara Solow published her The land question and the Irish economy 1870-1903 in 
1971, which provided a statistical framework against which Pomfret’s conclusions 
on rent levels, evictions and absenteeism could be re-examined and re-assessed.8 
While Pomfret’s work has received much criticism, this author argues that his 
coverage of the Wyndham Act remains one of the most informative and insightful 
accounts of its genesis and passage through parliament in Irish historiography.  
 
The central thesis of Solow’s work was that the tenure system, for all its negative 
influences, was not the root cause of Ireland’s ills.9 Referring to the Famine for 
instance, she argued that ‘no tenure system that man could devise would have 
materially altered the tragic course of Irish history in the 1840s’.10 The strength of 
her argument rested on strong statistical evidence garnered mainly from 
parliamentary reports and statistical papers which she used to debunk many of the 
myths that had grown in relation to landlords’ approaches to rent increases, the 
treatment of errant tenants, and the levels of evictions. Solow did not deal to any 
great extent with the Wyndham Act other than to note that it ‘made by far the 
greatest contribution’ to land transfers but saw it, and indeed the whole land struggle, 
as a ‘tragic irrelevance’ in the context of what unfolded in the opening decades of the 
twentieth century.11  
                                                 
6 Pomfret, The struggle for land in Ireland, ix. 
7 Ibid. p.306. The formal title of the Birrel Act of 1909 is The Irish Land Act 1909 [9 Ed. VII 
c. 42.]. 
8 Vaughan, Landlords in mid-Victorian Ireland, ix. 
9 Barbara Lewis Solow, The land question and the Irish economy 1870-1903 (Harvard, 
1971), p. 2. 
10 Ibid. p. 12. 
11 Ibid. p 193. 
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James S. Donnelly Jr’s The land and the people of nineteenth-century Cork (1975) 
brought a human dimension to many of Solow’s arid statistical findings by providing 
a myriad of examples from a wide range of Cork-based estates covering the whole of 
the nineteenth century. Given the subtext to Donnelly’s work, The rural economy 
and the land question, there is a strong focus on these two interrelated themes. He 
argued that Cork was representative of Ireland as a whole and as such the findings 
were broadly representative.12 A key contention of Donnelly was that the land 
agitation in the closing decades of the nineteenth century was not a function of the 
deprived tenantry but rather the opposite in that the improvement in economic 
conditions, ‘created a favourable atmosphere for a great assault against 
landlordism’.13 He concluded that the land agitation from 1870 onwards did not 
produce a solution to the land question but it did lead to the ‘eventual disintegration 
of Irish landlordism’. 14 This study agrees with this conclusion. 
 
Dealing with the mid-Victorian period, W.E. Vaughan’s Landlords and tenants in 
mid-Victorian Ireland (1994) gave support to Solow’s and Donnelly’s findings.  By 
examining in detail the records of fifty Irish estates from the 1850s onwards, 
Vaughan was able to contradict what he referred to as Pomfret’s ‘comfortable 
aphorisms’.15 His work provided concrete evidence that the image of landlords as 
malignant, engaging in capricious evictions, needed to be challenged, and that rent 
increases and the aggressive collection of rent arrears was not an accurate 
representation of landlord behaviour. Vaughan’s work suggested the need for a long 
history approach in considering the final demise of landlords as a class. 
 
Paul Bew’s Conflict and conciliation in Ireland 1890-1910 (1987) places the land 
question in the context of a struggle between constitutional nationalists and the more 
militant factions in Irish politics in the post-Parnell era.16 On the 1903 Act, Bew was 
strident in his view that Wyndham was not pressurised by United Irish League 
                                                 
12 Donnelly Jr., The land and the people of nineteenth-century Cork, p. 2. 
13 Ibid. p.7. 
14 Ibid. p. 377. 
15 Vaughan, Landlords and tenants, viii. 
16 Paul Bew, Conflict and conciliation in Ireland, 1890-1910, Parnellites and radical 
agrarians (Oxford, 1987). 
5 
 
(U.I.L.) agitation.17 Instead, he argues that Wyndham saw his act as an opportunity 
‘to settle the Irish land problem – in Unionist eyes – the Irish question – for all 
time’.18 In stating this he firmly places the Wyndham Act in the context of the policy 
of constructive unionism. 
 
Philip Bull in his Land, politics and nationalism: a study of the Irish land question 
(1996) sought to place the land question in a broader political context encompassing 
the Act of Union, Catholic Emancipation, the Famine and the early interventionist 
stage of the British government in addressing landlord indebtedness through the 
Encumbered Estates Act of 1849.19 In particular, he examined the changing 
dynamics of interaction between landlords, tenants and government as the 
politicisation of the land question emerged from its convergence with the national 
question from 1850 onwards. His contention that the various interventions by 
government served only to redefine rather than resolve the problem was supported 
by the shift in emphasis by the British government post-1870 from a landlord centric 
perspective to a much more tenant focussed one, culminating in the Wyndham Act of 
1903. Alvin Jackson, Ireland, 1798-1998 (1999) takes a similar view with regard to 
the Wyndham Act and saw it as ‘the centre-piece of the conciliation achievement’.20 
 
Terence Dooley’s The decline of the big house in Ireland (2001) is based on a 
detailed study of the estate and personal papers of over 100 landed families. It relates 
the history of the economic, social and political decline of the landed class from the 
immediate post-Famine era right up to 1960.The picture painted is of an alienated 
and isolated caste struggling to maintain a position in a dramatically changing world, 
particularly after 1903. Olwen Purdue in her work The big house in the north of 
Ireland (2009) explored similar ground to Dooley but with an Ulster focus, 
highlighting the differences between the north and the twenty-six- county area 
covered by Dooley. The key difference between the two parts of the island was that 
landlords in the North was that most landlords shared the same religion, culture and 
indeed politics as their tenants and continued to play an important part in Unionist 
                                                 
17 Ibid. p. 98. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Bull, Land, politics and nationalism: a study of the Irish land question. 
20 Alvin Jackson, Ireland, 1798-1998 (Oxford, 1999), p. 158. 
6 
 
politics far into the twentieth century. They also maintained strong links with the 
Ulster business community in start contrast to their southern counterparts.21 Dooley 
later saw the 1903 Act in terms of a ‘bailout’ for landlords.22 He contended that the 
act had failed in its objective of bringing a final solution to the Irish land question, 
and pointed to the fact that a number of subsequent amending acts were required in 
post-independence Ireland to complete the process of land transfer and other land-
related issues such as the relief of congestion and the plight of the landless and 
evicted tenants.23 
 
Fergus Campbell’s Land and revolution, nationalist politics in the west of Ireland 
1891-1921 (2005) provides an insight into the intense nature of agrarian conflict 
from the perspective of tenant farmers in the west of Ireland.24 In adopting such an 
approach, Campbell is very much following the model devised by E.P. Thompson 
and Eric Hobsbawn in Britain of telling history through the lives of ordinary people. 
Campbell focussed on the role played by two political movements the U.I.L. and 
Sinn Féin. Like Donnelly who argued that Cork was representative of the country, 
Campbell made a similar claim for the west of Ireland. In contrast to Bew, Campbell 
saw the 1903 Act as a consequence of U.I.L.-led agitation  
 
In his Ph.D. thesis, Patrick Cosgrove, ‘The Wyndham Land Act, 1903: The final 
solution to the Irish land question’ (2008), saw the origins of the act in U.I.L 
agitation and more significantly, Wyndham’s fears concerning Thomas Russell’s 
‘compulsory purchase’ campaign in Ulster.25 Like Dooley he contended that the act 
failed to achieve a final solution to the land question. Furthermore, Cosgrove argued 
that the act ‘succeeded in magnifying the plight of the uneconomic holders, evicted 
                                                 
21 Campell, Fergus, The Irish establishment, 1879-1914 (Oxford, 2009), p.50. 
22 Terence Dooley, The decline and fall of the dukes of Leinster 1872-1948, love, war, debt 
and madness (Dublin, 2014), p. 122. 
23 Terence Dooley, ‘Land and politics in independent Ireland, 1923-45: the case for 
reappraisal’ in Irish Historical Studies, xxxiv, no. 134 (Nov. 2004), p. 178; Terence Dooley, 
Land for the people, the land question in independent Ireland (Dublin, 2004), p. 30. 
24 Fergus Campbell, Land and revolution: nationalist politics in the west of Ireland 1891-
1921 (Oxford, 2005). 
25 The author would like to thank Patrick Cosgrove for a copy of his unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis; Patrick John Cosgrove, ‘The Wyndham Land Act, 1903: The final solution to the 
Irish land question?’ (Ph.D. thesis, N.U.I Maynooth, 2008) 
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tenants, agricultural labourers and the sons of farmers or other landless elements’.26 
Tony Varley (2016), while acknowledging the claims of Campbell and Cosgrove 
with regard to Wyndham’s motivation in bringing forward his 1903 legislation, also 
contended that ‘Given Wyndham’s prominence , and that he achieved what he 
wanted in the end, it would therefore be hard to attribute the full substance of the 
1903 Land Act to land agitation.’27 
 
This thesis accepts that arguments put forward by historians regarding the 
motivations, timing and form of the 1903 legislation are valid and defensible. 
However, the author contends that there are also a number of other interpretations 
that can be put forward which have not been debated in historiography and which are 
equally defensible and valid. Firstly, in terms of motivation the legislation can be 
looked at in the context of an attempt by Wyndham to solve the Irish land problem 
and in so doing to advance his own political ambitions. He was aided in this by his 
close relationship with his political mentor and patron, Arthur Balfour, and, through 
him to successive chancellors of the exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks Beach and 
Charles Ritchie, without whose support it would not have been possible to bring 
forward the legislation. In response to many of the criticisms levelled at the act, this 
study argues that it needs to be looked at as a package of measures grounded in the 
practices of realpolitik designed to achieve a broad objective by addressing the 
conflicting and up to that time, irreconcilable demands of a range of parties. In this 
context, failings in individual elements of the act need to be looked at in terms of the 
overall package. Furthermore, the act should be viewed as a means of providing 
landlords with a way of making a dignified and economically viable exit from their 
ever-worsening financial predicament brought on by their own malpractices, 
proclivities, adverse economic forces and the intervention in the Irish land rental 
market by successive British governments since 1870. Finally, it was a piece of 
financial legislation of unprecedented scale and scope which differentiated Irish land 
reform from any of its European counterparts. Justification for these contentions will 
be explored and validated in the course of this study. 
                                                 
26 Ibid. p. 361. 
27 Tony Varley, ‘Gaining ground, losing ground: the politics of land reform in twentieth- 
century Ireland’ in Fergus Campbell and Tony Varley (eds), Land questions in modern 
Ireland (Manchester, 2016), p. 29.  
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This study has benefited from access to a wide range of primary sources including 
several sets of estate papers, a number of which have not been accessed or examined 
in the past such as the Dopping Hepenstall collection in the National Library of 
Ireland (N.L.I.) and the Brookes family papers obtained from a private source. The 
importance of these sources is the level of detail they contain. They afforded for the 
first time an opportunity to examine in detail how the money realised from the sale 
of their estates following the 1903 Act was invested and the insight they gave to the 
financial circumstances of the families concerned. Records relating to investment 
transactions, portfolio valuations, tax returns of individuals and death duty 
declarations have not previously been examined. With over forty years’ experience 
as a qualified accountant and private client stockbroker, the author was uniquely 
positioned to carry out research into these oftentimes, highly technical documents. 
The family papers provided the opportunity to see how investment practices and the 
structure of portfolios changed in the twenty years after the sale of the estates, 
thereby providing much necessary context as to the families’ financial health in the 
post-sale era. There are several clear trends that emerged from this examination of 
the papers including, how decisions were made as regards whether to sell estates, the 
exercises that were undertaken to forecast how the families would fare financially 
post the sale of their properties, their approaches to investing the proceeds and the 
nature and type of professional advisors consulted. The research enabled, for the first 
time a profile to be compiled as to the wealth management practices of Irish 
landlords in the opening three decades of the twentieth century.  
The material also afforded the opportunity to see how both large (Leinster and 
Clonbrock) estates and small (Dopping Hepenstall and Brookes) dealt with the 
complexities of selling their properties. The examination of these papers enabled, for 
the first time, a case study to be compiled showing the processes involved in the sale 
of the Dopping Hepenstall Longford and Wicklow estates, highlighting the nature of 
landlord-tenant negotiations, the complex and long drawn out legal and 
administrative dealings between the vendor and the Land Commission, and the 
importance of the part played by professional advisors in bringing the transaction to 
a completion. In the case of the Dopping Hepenstall and the Clonbrock estates this 
process took almost ten years to complete. 
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In addition, the work has benefited from private personal papers, most notably the 
correspondence between Wyndham and Arthur Balfour, the British prime minister 
during the period when the former was chief secretary of Ireland. Housed in the 
British Library these papers provided significant insight into Wyndham’s thinking 
when drafting the legislation. Wyndham was a prolific letter writer and much of this 
has been published in two volumes within which there are letters to friends detailing 
his thinking on Irish affairs. Parliamentary papers also provided a rich vein of 
evidence not just in relation to the aborted 1902 Irish Land Bill and the 1903 Act but 
also for many other financial bills that were introduced such as the Finance Act 1894 
which extended the scope and extent of death duties. In the same vein the Treasury 
reports, archived at the National Archives in Kew provided much insight into the 
reactions and conflicts between the Treasury mandarins and the Irish administration 
in relation to the funding of the various land purchase schemes of the early 
twentieth-century. Contemporary newspapers supplied not just information and 
comment but also colour and shade to developments as did the minutes and 
transactional papers of the Irish Land Convention of 1902 and the Irish Land 
Conference held later that year. The Shawe Taylor papers housed in Galway County 
Council Archives also provided significant insight into his role in the Land 
Conference and his dealings with his fellow landlords and with the administration.    
 
Much of the statistical information used in the thesis came from a wide range of 
parliamentary reports (agricultural statistical reports, various commissions of enquiry 
into land-related issues, reports of the estates commissioners charged with 
transferring land ownership, and banking commissions and so on) as well as 
parliamentary debates. A systematic analysis of various acts (land acts, annual 
finance acts) was also undertaken.  
 
These primary sources were supplemented by a variety of longitudinal studies 
undertaken by various authoritative sources such as the work on Irish agricultural 
prices from 1750 to 1914 carried out by Kennedy and Solar (2007), the report on 
agricultural statistics for the period 1845 to 1926 (1927), a study of interest and bond 
yields carried out by Homer and Sylla (2004) and the Barclays equity-gilt study 
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1900-2016 (2016)28 Data from these and other sources has been extrapolated and 
incorporated into various tables and graphs to provide a comprehensive statistical 
background to the narrative.  
 
The study would have benefited greatly and possibly opened new avenues of 
investigation had its request to gain access to the records of the former Irish Land 
Commission records been granted. Similarly, a request to the Grosvenor family for 
access to certain unpublished correspondence of George Wyndham was not met.   
 
This study is set out in three distinct but interconnected parts. Chapter 1 examines 
the estate management practices of Irish landlords in terms of their relationships with 
middlemen, land agents and their tenantry. It also looks at the level of their 
investment in improving their estates, personal indebtedness and estate rentals in the 
context of fluctuating agricultural fortunes. The impact of external factors such as 
taxation, the effect of new supply sources on agricultural product prices and the 
depression in agriculture from 1877 onwards are also examined. The aim of chapter 
1 therefore is to put the financial position of Irish landlords in context in the period 
leading up to the introduction of the Wyndham Act. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 make up the 
second part of the thesis and explore a number of aspects of the 1903 legislation. 
Chapter 2 concerns itself with George Wyndham and looks at his background, 
possible motivations for introducing the act and explores its genesis including what 
was learned from the failure of his Irish Land Bill 1902 and how this laid the ground 
work for his successful 1903 Bill. Chapter 3 analyses the financial sections of the 
Irish Land Act 1903 and particularly how Wyndham engineered factors such as 
price, the bonus, rental zones, annuity rates and guarantee provisions to bring about a 
package of measures capable of being accepted by a range of parties with 
significantly divergent demands. Chapter 4 examines how the transfer of property 
was transacted under the act’s mechanisms using a case study methodology 
focussing on the Dopping Hepenstall estates. 
                                                 
28 Liam Kennedy & Peter M. Solar, Irish agriculture: a price history from the mid-
eighteenth century to the eve of the First World War (Dublin, 2007); Saorstát Éireann, 
Agricultural Statistics 1927-1933, compiled by the Department of Industry and Commerce 
(Dublin, 1935); Sidney Homer & Richard Sylla, A history of interest rates (New Jersey, 
2004); Barclays equity-gilt study (London, 2016).  
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The third part of the thesis focusses on the wealth management practices of Irish 
landed families as they transitioned themselves from landlords to rentiers following 
the sale of their estates. Chapter 5 examines the investment environment which faced 
landlords in the opening decades of the twentieth century. Based on a detailed 
analysis of the financial records of four estates supplemented by a number of others, 
Chapter 6 examines how landlords managed their wealth in the post-sale period. 
Using portfolio valuations, correspondence with investment advisors and a range of 
other sources such as personal tax returns and death duty declarations, it was 
possible to build up a profile as to how landlords went about managing their wealth. 
While accepting the limitations imposed by a small number of sample cases it is 
nonetheless contended that they provide definitive answers to questions not 
heretofore asked, particularly as to how landlords sought to generate income and 
protect their capital. Clear and definite trends emerged from the estates examined in 
terms of approaches to investment. The material examined, particularly letters from 
leading stockbrokers to their clients, point to the fact that landlords were collectively 
following the prevailing wisdom of the time in terms of investment advice. All of 
these topics are elucidated in the chapters that follow. 
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Chapter 1: The declining fortunes of Irish landlords 1815-1903 
 
1.1: Introduction 
 
Reading The Times on Thursday, 22 June 1815, the typical Irish landlord could well 
have been forgiven for feeling that he did indeed belong to God’s chosen people or 
what Cannadine has termed ‘God’s elect’.1 For The Times that morning reported: 
 
The Duke of Wellington, Dispatch, dated Waterloo, the 19th of June, states 
that on the preceding day, Bonaparte attacked, with his whole force, the 
British line, supported by a corps of Prussians; which attack, after a long and 
sanguinary conflict, terminated in the complete Overthrow of the Enemy’s 
Army, with the loss of one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon and two 
eagles. ... The Allied Armies continued to pursue the enemy. Two French 
Generals were taken.2  
 
The occasion was the victory of the Allied army under the leadership of Arthur 
Wellesley, duke of Wellington. Wellesley’s Irish origins, while not for the man 
himself, were a source of great pride to the Anglo-Irish ascendancy class and served 
to emphasise the sense that Ireland was, indeed, a significant and integral part of the 
expanding British Empire. The fact also that three Irish regiments, the 27th 
Inniskilling Foot, the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons along with 18th Kings Irish Hussars 
played important roles in the victory and further that three Irish generals, all scions 
of landed families, Sir Dennis Pack (9th British Infantry), Sir William Ponsonby (2nd 
British Cavalry) and Major General Sir Ormsby Vandelur (4th British Cavalry) were 
prominent in the Wellington command structure sought to reinforce the importance 
of their class to the empire.3 It is unlikely that any of the ‘lords of the earth’ who 
read The Times on that day would have realised or even considered that the great 
victory achieved on a Belgium field would represent the tipping point in their 
fortunes and that the succeeding eighty-five years would see their political, social, 
and financial power eclipsed to the point of obliteration. 
 
                                                 
1 Cannadine, The decline and fall of the British aristocracy, p. 2 
2 The Times, 22 Jun. 1815. 
3 Peter Molly, ‘Ireland and the Waterloo campaign of 1815’ (M.A. thesis, National 
University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2011), pp 24-30.  
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For Irish landlords could have been forgiven for feeling that the world was, indeed, a 
good place. The French Revolutionary / Napoleonic Wars which had raged on and 
off since 1793 until Wellington’s victory at Waterloo had been good for a food 
producing country such as Ireland. Cullen maintained that the period from 1793 to 
1815 was ‘a remarkably prosperous period’ and represented the culmination of a 
period of expansion in the Irish economy in general and agriculture in particular 
which dated back to the 1740s.4 Writing of his travels in Ireland in 1779, Arthur 
Young, the English agricultural economist, observed that ‘[Ireland] made as great 
advances as could possibly be expected, perhaps greater than any other country in 
Europe’.5 
 
Such economic progress manifested itself in the great building boom which saw the 
construction of major infrastructural works such as the Grand (1756-1804) and 
Royal (1790-1817) canals; the opening of Europe’s largest water-powered flour mill, 
Jebbs Mill, in Slane (1768); and Locks Mills (1769) in Limerick. David Dickson has 
contended that during the second half of the eighteenth century, Irish landlords were 
focussed on infrastructural investment such as the development of canals and the 
building of flour-mills so it is likely that they would have looked on the above as a 
reflection of their increasing economic status.6 It also saw Dublin become the second 
city of the empire in what Peter Somerville-Large has termed the ‘triumph of 
elegance’ period with the development of iconic stately buildings such as Leinster 
House (1744); the west front or College Green entrance of Trinity College (1752); 
Merrion Square (1762-1790); City Hall (1769); Powerscourt House (1771); the Vice 
Regal Lodge (1782); the Custom House (1791); O’Connell Bridge (1795); the Four 
Courts (1802); Nelson’s Pillar (1808); the General Post Office (1814); and the Pro-
Cathedral (1825). 7  
 
The year 1815 represented the ‘high water mark’ in terms of the fortunes of Irish 
landlords. Dickson has argued that Ireland had become ‘commercialised’ particularly 
from 1750 onwards. In support of this he cited an eleven-fold increase in the value of 
                                                 
4 L.M. Cullen, An economic history of Ireland since 1660 (London, 1972), p. 100. 
5 David Dickson, New foundations, Ireland 1660-1800 (Dublin, 2000), p. 116 
6 Dickson, New foundations, pp 122-3. 
7 Peter Somerville Large, Dublin – The fair city (London, 1996), p. 152. 
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exports between 1660 and 1797 partially due to the expansion of Britain’s Atlantic 
economy and the development of the linen industry in Ulster, the development of 
sea-ports, the significant increase in the numbers of fairs held from 503 in 1684 to 
over 3,000 in the 1770s and an expansion in the use of money rather than barter as a 
means of completing transactions.8 Fuelled by the demands of the Napoleonic Wars, 
the demand for agricultural goods had risen rapidly in the previous decades. Cullen 
has estimated that the volume of agricultural product exported grew by 40 per cent 
between 1793 and 1815 while prices rose by over 120 per cent in the same period.9 
Such an extended period of economic growth generated great confidence and gave 
rise to a situation which Cullen describes as an ‘excessive creation of credit 
encouraged by the speculative and heady market conditions in many of the war 
years’.10 
 
Buoyed by this confidence, many Irish landlords embarked on ‘great house’ building 
programmes which Terence Dooley opined: ‘were built to inspire awe in social 
equals and, indeed, deference in the lower social classes.’11 The big house reflected 
robust financial status and, in many cases, new-found social and political status 
following Pitt’s large scale awarding of new peerages at the end of the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries.12 As is so often the case, in such moments of 
economic well-being and perceived invincibility are the seeds of destruction sown. 
As landlords were about to discover, the Irish landed class in keeping with many of 
their British and continental counterparts, had, indeed, reached the zenith of their 
power and their fortunes had entered a slow but inexorable decline that would in the 
case of so many culminate in the sale of their estates under the Wyndham Land Act 
of 1903. 
 
Historians such as J.E. Pomfret, Paul Bew, Philip Bull and Fergus Campbell have 
largely considered the decline of the Irish landed class in the context of the political 
milieu and in particular the Great Famine and the agrarian unrest resulting from the 
                                                 
8 Dickson, New foundations, pp 109-123. 
9 Cullen, An economic history of Ireland, p. 100.; http://safalra.com/other/historical-uk-
inflation-price-conversion/ Accessed 11 Aug. 2014. 
10 Cullen, An economic history of Ireland, p.102. 
11 Dooley, The decline of the big house, p. 9. 
12 F.M.L. Thompson, English landed society in the nineteenth century (London, 1971), p.9. 
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politicisation of the land question. While political events impacted on landowners 
and unquestionably made their lives more difficult, it was the more profound 
economic changes that fundamentally led to their demise. The objective of this 
chapter is to identify these trends and show how they impacted on landowners in the 
nineteenth century and in so doing to provide a context from which to examine the 
introduction of the Wyndham Land Act of 1903 and its economic consequences for 
landlords.  
 
The central argument of this chapter is that the economic decline of the Irish landed 
class was due to a combination of personal failings, poor estate management 
practices, and a wider range of economic, demographic, political and technological 
forces emanating from a rapidly industrialising British economy from the late 
eighteenth century onwards. While more pronounced in Britain, industrialisation and 
its economic, social and political consequences were being felt in many other 
countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and, as the nineteenth century 
progressed, in the United States of America.  The decline, therefore, needs to be 
placed in an international context in that the changes that occurred represented early 
examples of globalisation and that while there were numerous localised issues 
pertaining to the Irish situation, the fundamental point remains that it was macro 
trends and the lack of preparedness and failure of landlords to adjust their position to 
this new economic paradigm that led to their demise as the nineteenth century 
unfolded. As Purdue has contended: ‘economic necessity was ultimately a much 
stronger force than tradition or sentiment.’13  
 
While a number of historians have examined the impact of economics when 
assessing how this once all-powerful elite fell from power, little attention has been 
paid to their business acumen in managing the asset class know as land and in 
protecting and positioning their business to meet the challenges posed by a dynamic 
and shifting economic environment. Understandably there is a tendency to classify 
landlords as a ‘class’ rather than view them as ‘asset managers’ in the business sense 
which is in essence what landlords were and, indeed, still are. A question that can be 
                                                 
13 Purdue, The big house in the north of Ireland, p. 66.  
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posed, however, is whether landlords in the nineteenth century would have seen 
themselves as businessmen or managers of an asset?  
 
This chapter concerns itself with four aspects of landlord life that were within their 
own control: their estate management practices: investment in their estates: landlord 
indebtedness and their rent policies particularly in the context farm produce pricing 
trends. In addition, the chapter will examine how changing taxation policies 
impacted on both their income and more importantly the value of their estates.   
 
1.2: Estate management practices 
 
Writing about landlords at the turn of the eighteenth century, Cormac Ó Gráda 
stated: ‘landlords conformed more to the traditional stereotype than their successors 
in the post-famine era. As a group, they were more improvident, they evicted more 
often, and they took a less active interest in their properties.14 His reference to the 
post famine era points to a significant change in how they managed their estates and 
provides a loose, before and after time frame, for this study to examine this aspect of 
landlord life. 
 
The period prior to the Famine saw many landlords administer their estates through 
the use of middlemen. Middlemen were in effect intermediate landlords, operating 
between the actual owner of the land and the end tenant. Often, there were numerous 
layers of middlemen involved with a particular parcel of land. Raymond Crotty 
attributed the origin of the middleman system to the development of pastoral farming 
during the period 1660 to 1760, when landowners who were reluctant or unable to 
invest in building up cattle herds, granted long leases of up to ninety-nine years at 
relatively low rents to financially substantial individuals who could be relied on to 
discharge their rent obligations. Some of these middlemen were grazier farmers who 
farmed the land themselves. David Dickson also attributes the development of the 
middleman system, to a reluctance by landlords, in the eighteenth century to invest 
in their estates and a preference to let their lands to ‘strong farmers’ who could 
                                                 
14 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Poverty, population, and agriculture 1801-1845’ in W.E. Vaughan 
(ed.), A new history of Ireland, v, Ireland under the union 1801-70 (Oxford, 2010), p. 128.  
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withstand the ‘violent fluctuations’ in agriculture.15 These strong farmers tended to 
lease whole townlands usually consisting of 200 to 300 acre holdings from 
landlords.16 While many farmed these acres themselves others granted sub-tenancies 
to individual dairymen and herds men. The period 1660 and the late 1790s saw a 
significant increase in the demand for land due to a combination of forces such as 
growing export markets, improved access to wholesale markets, improvements in 
farming methods resulting in greater productivity and increasingly from 1740 
onwards, a rapidly growing population. As a result, land values rose ‘spectacularly’ 
with rents increasing ten-fold.17 While some of these uplifts did go to landlords, 
much went to the tiarnaí beaga or squireens as middlemen were often called.18 
 
Table 1.1 Ireland Population 1741-1841 
   
Source: The figures used in this table have come from the following sources: (1) 
Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland: A new economic history 1780-1939 (Oxford, 1995), p. 4; 
(2) Margaret Crawford, Counting the people (Dublin, 2003), p. 13; (3) 
http://www.libraryireland.com/articles/CensusIrelandDUM23-137/. Accessed 23 
Apr 2015. 
  
The population growth evident in Table 1.1 brought with it a shift to tillage and, as 
the eighteenth century drew to a close, an ever-greater dependency on the potato 
crop. While not homogenised, Irish agriculture particularly in the west, was largely 
subsistence based. The increasing number of early marriages, the absence of any 
financially viable alternative means of supporting a family gave rise to an ever-
                                                 
15 Dickson, New foundations, p. 118. 
16 Ibid. p. 123. 
17 Ibid. p. 120. 
18 Ibid. p. 112. 
Year Population Source 
   
1741 2,200,000 1 
1800 5,000,000 1 
1813 5,937,856 2 
1821 6,801,827 3 
1831 7,767,401 3 
1841 8,175,124 3 
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increasing demand for land which was met by middlemen granting further sub-
tenancies. The great era of sub-division had begun. An account written in 1797 
described how the middleman system operated and the impact it had on landlords 
and tenants: 
   
The misery of the people is generally attributed to the manner in which 
estates are let. A rich man who does not wish to trouble himself with details 
will let a large extent of ground to a single man, whose intention is not to 
work, but to underlet perhaps to 20 persons; they again will let to perhaps 
100 peasants moderately well off; and these once again will let at an 
exorbitant rent to perhaps 1,000 poor labourers ... they cultivate the greater 
part of it in potatoes which serve to nourish a family, and to fatten a great pig 
and a few fowls, by the sale of which they commonly find the money to pay 
their rents. It can be easily understood that with all these 'cascades' it is 
possible that the proprietor receives not more than a third of the money which 
the lowest tenants are obliged to pay, and the remainder goes to the profit of 
the rent farmers.19 
 
While there are no official statistics available, the extent of the middleman system 
can be gauged by looking at the situation on various estates. James Donnelly Jr., 
cites several such examples like the earl of Bandon who in 1821 obtained 65 per cent 
of his rental income of £23,000 from leases granted to middlemen of two, three or 
four lives, 22 per cent from even longer leases, and only 13 per cent from yearly 
tenancies. Similarly, Viscount Midleton derived 83 per cent of his £15,000 annual 
rents from long leases.20 Lord Audley’s west Cork estate was let entirely to a 
middleman on a ninety-nine-year lease from 1755.21 Evidence of the widespread 
nature of the system can be seen throughout the country. Kerby Miller illustrates the 
situation that prevailed on Valentia Island in County Kerry on the estate of Lord 
Fitzgerald. In 1795, when the population of the island was 400 people, Fitzgerald 
granted long leases to thirteen middlemen. These individuals granted numerous sub-
leases so that by time of the famine in 1847 the island’s population had risen to 
                                                 
19 Bougtenet de Latognaye, (Translated by John Stevenson), A Frenchman’s walk through 
Ireland 1796-7 (Dublin, 1917), pp 126-7. 
https://archive.org/stream/frenchmanswalkth00latouoft/frenchmanswalkth00latouoft_djvu.tx
t accessed 28 Apr 2017. 
20 Donnelly, Jr., The land and the people of nineteenth-century Cork, p. 12. 
21 W.N. Hancock, On the causes of distress at Skull and Skibbereen during the famine in 
Ireland: a paper read before the statistical section of the British Association at Edinburgh, 2 
August 1850 (Dublin, 1850), p. 5.  
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3,000.22  Ciaran Reilly in his study of land agents in Kings County estimated that in 
1841 more than 13,000 holdings situated in the county were of less than one acre, 
one third of the holdings were less than five acres and only two per cent were over 
200 acres.23 A similar if not worse situation pertained in Lord Palmerston’s estate in 
Mullaghmore, Co. Sligo, where 135 tenants lived on 201 acres.24 
   
Most middlemen were ‘lower and middling protestant gentlemen’; others, 
particularly post 1778, following repeal of the Penal Laws were ‘Catholic nouveaux 
riches’.25 William Lecky wrote that ‘They were commonly the small gentry’ and ‘a 
harsh and rapacious and dissipated class, living with an extravagance that could only 
be met with by the most grinding exactations [sic].’26 While not overly typical in 
terms of scale, the case of James Scully gives an indication of how a middleman 
operated and of their place in society at the time. Born in 1737 into a Catholic family 
whose father was a strong farmer in the Kilfeacle area of Co. Tipperary. Leaving 
school at thirteen he went to work in the Ballinasloe cattle market. On his marriage 
to Catherine Lyons from Limerick in 1760, he received a dowry of £1,500 from his 
father and a further £1,000 from his father-in-law. With this money, he acquired two 
farms and on the retirement of his father he took over the running of the family farm 
in Kilfeacle, which the Scully’s had farmed since 1774 on a ninety-nine-year lease. 
By 1792 he had over 4,000 acres under lease. He farmed half of these himself and 
sub-let the remainder. In 1802, he was of sufficient wealth and social standing to 
establish, along with his son James, the Tipperary Bank which achieved notoriety 
when it collapsed in 1856. In 1806 and 1808 he bought for £19,380 the freehold of 
two farms on the Clanwilliam estate that he farmed himself and in 1809 he paid 
£33,200 for the freehold of the Mathew estate. In both cases, he took advantage of 
                                                 
22 Kerby A. Miller, Emigrants and exiles. Ireland and the Irish exodus to North America 
(Oxford, 1985), p. 47. 
23 Ciaran Reilly, The Irish land agent, 1830-60, The case of Kings County (Dublin, 2014), p. 
26.  
24 Gerard Moran, Sir Robert Gore Booth and his landed estate in County Sligo, 1814-76 
(Dublin, 2006), p. 15. 
25 Miller, Emigrants and exiles, p. 46. 
26 William E.H. Lecky, A history of Ireland in the eighteenth century, Vol 5 (London, 1898), 
p. 292.  
20 
 
the indebtedness of the incumbent landlords.27 The significance of this example is 
that it highlights how, from what Dickson referred to as the ‘veneer of strong 
farmers’ that existed in the late seventeenth century, emerged the middlemen of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century.28     
 
The level of profitability achieved by middlemen is evidenced in a further example 
and illustrates how these individuals would have been prepared to live with any 
social odium that might have prevailed towards them. Writing in 1812, Edward 
Wakefield, the English statistician, cited the example of the earl of Kenmare who 
held over 91,000 acres in County Kerry. In one of his estates consisting of 35,000 
acres let to various middlemen, he received annual rents totalling £8,000 whereas his 
sub-tenants were paying £40,000.29 It was this type of financial success that, to quote 
James Donnelly Jr.: ‘must have been unrelieved agony to those proprietors whose 
rent rolls were largely frozen by long leases’ that made them a target for landlords 
who from the late eighteenth century onwards sought to win back control of their 
properties and grab a greater share of the increasing rent rolls.30        
 
But wanting to, and being able to, terminate middleman agreements were two 
different things. Middlemen had the law on their side because of the nature and 
duration of their leases. This meant that, despite the best efforts of many landlords, 
the system endured until the natural termination of the lease or in many cases the 
exigencies of the Great Famine and the impact of the wider downturn in European 
agriculture in 1849-52.31 Interestingly, the middleman system did not prevail in 
England. Historians such as David Cannadine, F.M. L. Thompson and David Spring 
who have written extensively about landlordism make no references to the topic in 
their texts. Samuel Clark in his State and status (1995) when commenting on the 
                                                 
27 The material is drawn from a number of sources: C.J. Woods, ‘Scully, James’ in DIB, pp 
816-7; J.A. O’Donoghue, ‘The Scullys of Kilfeacle’, Tipperary Historical Journal (1989), 
pp 38-51; Irish Times, 20 Nov. 2013. 
28 Dickson, New foundations, p.112. 
29 Edward Wakefield, An account of Ireland, statistical and political, ii (London, 1812), p. 
412. Edward Wakefield (1774-1854) was an English farmer, land agent, philanthropist and 
statistician  
30 Donnelly, The land and the people of nineteenth-century Cork, p. 51; James S. Donnelly, 
‘Landlords and tenants’ in W.E. Vaughan (ed.), A new history of Ireland, v: Ireland under 
the Union 1801-70 (Oxford, 2010), p. 333. 
31 Donnelly, ‘Landlords and tenants’, A new history of Ireland, p. 333. 
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differences between Ireland and Britain in the eighteenth century wrote, ‘The first 
was the practice of granting long leases. In England during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, landlords generally tried to reduce the number of years for 
which the lease was granted… This did not occur in Ireland. Second, the subletting 
of land was more common in Ireland.’32 
 
The impact of the middleman system on Irish landlords and indeed on tenants was 
profound and its legacy long protracted. In the first instance, landlords lost out on the 
growth in rents during the boom years for Irish agriculture particularly from 1793 to 
1815. Secondly, the middleman with the emphasis on maximising rents through the 
proliferation of sub-division acted as a block on investment in estate improvement 
with the result that land was less productive than it might otherwise have been. 
Finally, when the system started to crumble from the 1820s onwards it left landlords 
and their agents with the hugely difficult task of trying to consolidate estates into 
more viable units. The long decline in landlords’ fortunes which started with the end 
of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 had entered a new phase.  
 
The taking back of control of estates by landlords was a slow and long drawn out 
process and undoing the damage caused by the middleman system even more 
difficult and tortuous. James Donnelly dates the wrestling to retake control to the 
post Napoleonic War period which coincided with a significant downturn in 
agriculture.33 For many landlords it was a matter of waiting until the long lease to the 
middleman reached its natural expiry as the following contribution by land agent 
Christopher Gallawey to the Devon Commission, in 1844, highlights: ‘Lord 
Kenmare laid down as rules for my future guidance, that whenever a middleman’s 
lease fell in, I should re-let the lands to such of the resident tenantry, of good 
character and industrious habits, as I found upon the land. That in future there should 
be no tenant between himself and the actual occupier of the soil.’34   
 
                                                 
32Samuel Clark, State and status: The rise of the state and aristocratic power in Western 
Europe (London, 1995), p. 210.  
33 Donnelly, The land and the people of nineteenth-century Cork, p. 52. 
34 Evidence taken before her majesty’s commissioners of inquiry into the state of the law and 
practice in respect of the occupation of land in Ireland, pt. iii [657], H.C. 1845, xxi, 1. p. 
736. 
22 
 
Not surprisingly, middlemen hung on stubbornly to their interests in various estates 
and it was not until the Famine and the agricultural depression of 1849-52 that they 
finally ceased to be a prominent feature in the Irish land tenure system.35 Regaining 
control of their estates did not mean that landlords ran their estates personally. For 
all but the smallest estates, that role fell to the land agent. Land agents were not a 
new feature of Irish landed estates management having been active since 
Cromwellian times.36 Their influence, however, increased greatly from 1815 
onwards when landlords took back control of their properties. 
 
The management of an estate in the nineteenth century was a complicated business 
involving a range of disciplines ranging from legal, accounting, taxation, civil 
engineering and a capacity to deal with people. The choice of land agent was 
therefore vitally important in terms of administering an estate and hence well-
established land agents such as William Trench, Samuel Hussey and Francis Berry 
could command significant fees for their services. The role of the land agent in Irish 
life is well documented by Ciaran Reilly in, The Irish land agent, 1830-60 (2014). 
This book, which examines how land agents operated in Kings County, details the 
extent of their roles, backgrounds and their interactions with their employers, their 
tenants and the wider communities in which they lived and their position in folklore 
and popular culture. As such this study will not replicate this profile but rather focus 
on some of the more strategic aspects of estate management and how these impacted 
on the financial health of their employers. 
 
The appointment of William Steuart Trench and his son, Thomas as land agents to 
the Digby estate in Kings County in 1857 serves well to illustrate the role and the 
approaches adopted.37 The Digby estate consisted of 29,722 acres with an annual 
valuation of £12,745.38   The estate had been badly run by the second Earl Digby, an 
                                                 
35 Donnelly, ‘Landlords and tenants’, A new history of Ireland, p. 333. 
36 Reilly, The Irish land agent, p. 37.  
37 Much of the material for this section comes from Mary Delaney, William Steuart Trench 
and his management of the Digby estate, Kings County, 1857-71 (Dublin,2012). 
38 Land owners in Ireland: return of owners of land of one acre and upwards in the several 
counties, counties of cities, and counties of towns in Ireland, showing the names of such 
owners arranged alphabetically in each county; their addresses - as far as could be 
ascertained the extent in statute acres, and the valuation in each case; together with the 
number of owners in each county of less than one statute acre in extent; and the total area 
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absentee landlord who died in 1856. His successor appointed the Trenches who had 
developed a significant reputation for themselves on the Shirley estate in Monaghan 
and the Lansdowne estate in Kerry. The agent was, in this instance, granted full 
powers of attorney to manage the estate on behalf of the 9th Lord Digby. His report 
for 1857, describes the estate as: ‘one of the most wretched and discouraging in 
Ireland.’ The annual rent was £15,000 but arrears totalled £40,948.39   Trench’s plans 
for improving this situation are interesting and provide a roadmap as to what actions 
landlords needed to carry out to make their estates more efficient and financially 
viable. They also serve to illustrate how the laissez faire approach of many landlords 
to their estate management practices played a significant part in their weak financial 
positions. Trench’s actions were clear and strident. For tenants who failed to pay rent 
arrears he adopted a hard-line approach and advocated the use of the ‘hanging 
gale’.40 He proposed a plan to consolidate many of the estates holdings into larger 
units ‘by removing the worst characters or weeding them out’. He identified those 
tenants with long leases and put in place a plan to break these although he accepted 
that this process might result in ‘violence, bloodshed and murder’. He proposed 
investment in estate infrastructure particularly roads but recommended that these be 
paid for by the ratepayers. Finally, he put forward a plan to drain wet moorlands and 
recommended that a sum of £500 to £1,000 be set aside annually for this purpose.41 
Such actions did little to make the father and son popular in the locality; the local 
parish priest, Fr Kinsella referred to them as ‘armed assassins’.42 
 
Of all the problems Trench sought to address, the most difficult one was sub-
division. In his 1857 report to his employer he stated: ‘Where an estate which has for 
a long time being neglected or let alone and where subdivision of land has been 
                                                 
and valuation of such properties; and the grand total of area and valuation for all owners of 
property in each county, county of a city, or county of a town. To which is added a summary 
for each province and for all Ireland. (Authors, Local Government Board for Ireland), 
[Cmd. 1492] 1876. Herein after referred to as ‘Landlords in Ireland 1876’. p. 45. 
39 William Steuart Trench to Lord Digby annual reports, 1857-71 (in private possession) 
40 The ‘hanging gale’ was a term used to describe a situation where if a tenant failed to pay 
an arrears of rent that was outstanding for six months the landlord could seize livestock and 
sell it to make good the debt. 
41 Delaney, William Steuart Trench, p. 15. 
42 Leinster Journal, 23 Jan.1858. 
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permitted to proceed unchecked, it will under ordinary circumstances take many 
years to remedy the evils, if indeed they can ever be remedied.’43  
 
Given the widespread nature of subdivision, as evidenced by Table 1.2, it is clear 
that landlords faced a huge challenge to get their estates in order and while the 
exigency of the Famine did bring about a significant reduction in those holdings of 
less than five acres, addressing the problem of subdivision was critical to 
establishing viable estates. One approach to this was to provide what was referred to 
as ‘assisted passage’ for former tenants to emigrate with their families, usually to 
North America. Trench had experience in this area from his Lansdowne estate days 
where he financed the movement of 4,000 people to the United States and Canada.44    
 
Table 1.2. Size of agricultural holdings 1841-1867 in Ireland 
 
Holding size Number of holdings in 
 
1841 1851 1861 1867 
1 > 5 acres 310,430 88,083 85,400 78,004 
5 > 15 acres 252,799 101,854 183,031 173,475 
15 > 30 acres 79,842 141,311 141,251 136,503 
30 > 100 acres 48,025 120,038 126,882 126,537 
Above 100 acres (note 1) 
 
29,057 31,451 31,800 
Rounding adjustment (note 2) 106 89,995 469 129 
Total 691,202 570,338 568,484 546,448 
 
Note 1: The classification of holdings in 1841 did not extend to those ‘above 
100 acres’. 
Note 2: The rounding adjustment has been added by the author to balance 
the table contained in the Return. 
 
Source: Returns of agricultural holdings in Ireland in 1841, 1851, 1861 and 
1867. HCP 1867-68 (287), p. 1.  
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44 Delaney, William Steuart Trench, p. 10. 
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Charles Bailey, land agent to the Midleton estate, was a strong advocate of assisted 
emigration. Having established that an adult might be shipped to Canada for £3 and a 
child for £1, he suggested that £2,000 spent for this purpose ‘would be judiciously 
and profitably laid out.’45  One of the first instances of an ‘assisted package’ was 
carried out by the earl of Kingston who in 1835 assisted 200 tenants to relocate to 
Canada from his Cork estate.46 Sir Roger Gore Booth of Lissadell in County Sligo 
was another landlord who encouraged and provided assistance for his tenants to 
move their families to North America.47 It was estimated that 1,300 people were 
given assistance to leave the Shirley estate in Monaghan between the years 1842 to 
1852.48 Paying for the emigration of tenants and their families, afforded not just the 
opportunity to consolidate holdings into more viable units but also generally avoided 
the backlash that evictions might give rise to. The practice also took destitute 
families out of the Poor Law system, which following the enactment of the Poor Law 
Act 1838 was funded by ratepayers, the largest proportion of whom were landlords. 
A bonus was that if addressed properly, some of the more troublesome and 
belligerent tenants could be permanently removed from a locality, thus reducing the 
potential for agitation on an estate. Accurate statistics relating to landlord-assisted 
emigration in the nineteenth century are not available, but Gerard Moran estimated 
that between 1835 and 1855 upwards of 100,000 people received landlord support to 
emigrate.49 
 
Table 1.2 indicates that while there was a significant reduction in the number of 
holdings of less than fifteen acres between 1841 (563,229 or 81.5 per cent) and 1867 
(251,479 or 46 per cent), subdivision remained a problem. In 1881, George Trench, 
land agent of the Talbot-Crosbie estate in Co. Kerry wrote: ‘resisting and correcting 
subdivision involved for the landlords of Ireland, the long and odious task which 
constitutes their principal difficulty to this day.’50 Despite the obvious problems for 
                                                 
45 Donnelly, The land and the people of nineteenth-century Cork, p. 55. 
46 Ibid. p. 56. 
47 Moran, Sir Robert Gore Booth, p. 33. 
48 Patrick J. Duffy, ‘Assisted emigration from the Shirley estate 1843-54’ in Clogher 
Historical Review, vol.14, No. 2 (1992), p. 16.  
49 Gerard Moran, Sending out Ireland’s poor, assisted emigration to North America in the 
nineteenth-century (Dublin, 2013), p. 203. 
50 George French, The land question: are the landlords worth preserving? Or forty years’ 
management of an Irish estate (Dublin, 1881), p. 15 
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estate management associated with subdivision, many landlords failed to address the 
issue. As testimonies from landlords given to the Bessborough Commission 
highlight, the failure to act was influenced by fear of a hostile reaction from tenants 
and a growing sense of isolation. A Mayo landlord stated that the reason for his 
failure to address over-subdivision of his estate was because: ‘no man’s life would 
be worth sixpence purchase if he attempted to do what would be necessary.’ 51 A 
landlord from Co. Meath stated that ‘Some people might say if I turned out these 
men and let it for grazing... I would have got more money, meanwhile I might not be 
here to give evidence.’52 While such attitudes are understandable they represent an 
abdication of economic responsibility and good estate management practices. While 
most landlords faced this dilemma, there were some such as William Scully, William 
Bence Jones, William Talbot-Crosbie and Allan Pollok who met them head on and 
managed to reconfigure their estates into more economically viable entities. 
 
The case of William Scully referred to above is interesting in that it highlights how 
an individual landlord could thrive by making difficult and unpopular decisions to 
improve his estate and by taking himself and his skills in land management to 
another country. In so doing he made a huge fortune and amassed huge estates in 
Kansas, Nebraska and Illinois that exists to this day. Scully was born in Co. 
Tipperary in 1821, the ninth child and fifth son of James Scully who was discussed 
earlier in this chapter.53 In 1850, Scully went to the United States and made his first 
land purchases. Unusual for the time, he travelled back and forth between Ireland 
and America for many years managing his estates in both countries. His estate 
management techniques earned him a fearsome reputation as a harsh and cruel 
landlord. US historian, Paul Gates, wrote that ‘No frontier landlord in the entire 
country caused as much unrest among his tenants and was the subject of as much ill 
feeling and political agitation as William Scully.’54 In Ireland following evictions in 
Gurtnagap and Ballycohey, Co. Kilkenny, in 1865 which resulted in the shooting 
dead of a police constable and a bailiff and the wounding of Scully, he was 
                                                 
51 Report of the Commission of inquiry into the working of the Landlord and Tenant 
(Ireland) Act 1870 and amending Acts. [Bessborough Commission], 16521  
52 Bessborough Commission, 1145 
53 Homer E. Socolofsky, ‘William Scully: Ireland and America 1840-1900’ in Agricultural 
History, vol. 48, No.1. Farming in the Midwest, A symposium (Jan.1974), pp. 155-175 
54 Paul W. Gates, Frontier landlords and pioneer tenants (New York, 1945), p. 34.  
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upbraided by local newspapers; one commented that he exhibited ‘an amount of over 
zeal which excited an irritable temper, and led to the consequences under which he is 
now suffering.’ 55 He imposed heavy responsibilities on his tenants to maintain their 
holdings in terms of fertilising, maintaining and installing drainage systems and even 
insisted that tenants could not sell their crops until all rent was paid.56 Scully made 
no attempt to court popularity and administered his estates to generate long-term 
return and value. Thus, by the time of his death in 1906 his US estate of 225,000 
acres was valued at $10 million and he held investments and other wealth estimated 
at $25 million. 57 Scully’s success was down to managing his estates as a business, 
expected to generate an investment return, and his willingness to uproot himself and 
find an outlet for his entrepreneurial skills in a foreign country. While Scully was an 
exceptional individual in terms of his work ethic, the focus and determination he 
brought to his actions and his willingness to expand his sphere of operations from 
Ireland to North America, the same opportunities he seized were open to most Irish 
landlords but very few grasped them like he did.  
 
A lack of business acumen was not, of course, the sole preserve of Irish landlords. 
John Stuart Mill the British philosopher and political economist held his compatriot 
landlords in a low standing when he observed: ‘The truth is, that any very general 
improvement of land by landlords is hardly compatible with a law or custom of 
primogeniture....Were they ever so much inclined, those alone can prudently do it, 
who have seriously studied the principles of scientific agriculture: and great 
landlords have seldom seriously studied anything.’58 Later, the historian F.M.L. 
Thompson argued that, ‘The lack of uniformity in administrative arrangements, and 
the absence of a business-like approach on many estates, was in part a reflection of 
the persistent idea that an estate was primarily a unit of consumption rather than a 
unit of management.’59 
 
                                                 
55 Kilkenny Journal, 5 Aug. 1865. 
56 Gates, Frontier landlords, pp 49-50. 
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Whether by reason of their upbringing, education or social backgrounds, landlords, 
with few exceptions, were ill equipped to administer their estates in the way that they 
needed to if they were to have any hope of surviving the challenges they would face 
in the final decades of the nineteenth century. The legacies of their antecedents in 
passing control of their estates to middlemen who reaped the benefits of the golden 
period for Irish agriculture up to 1815 robbed them of both opportunity and capital. 
How this impacted on their investment in their estates is where this story now turns.    
 
1.3: Landlord investment in their estates 
 
Precise information relating to landlord investment is patchy particularly for the pre-
Famine period. Lines of demarcation between expenditure on the big house, the 
home farm, the demesne and on the wider estate were often unclear. The great house 
building programmes of the early nineteenth century certainly absorbed significant 
amounts of investment. Not many could boast like the earl of Dunraven, who placed 
a plaque on the wall of Adare Manor in the early 1820s, bearing an inscription which 
read: ‘This goodly house was erected by Windham Henry Earl of Dunraven and 
Caroline his Countess without borrowing, selling or leaving a debt.’60  His situation 
had more to do with a significant injection of capital into the family coffers as a 
result of the discovery of coal on one of Countess Caroline’s inherited  Welsh estates 
than any great probity on the part of the earl or his family. 
 
‘Investment’ in land or estates is generally taken to mean expenditure on such factors 
as the drainage of wet lands, reclamation of marginal lands, installation of arterial 
drainage schemes, erection of boundary fences and walls, removal of rocks from 
fields, erection of farm buildings and houses, laying of access roads, land 
fertilisation projects, spreading of lime and so on. In addition to these infrastructural 
type projects, the term ‘investment’ in this context can also include the provision of 
training and technical education programmes to tenants or the establishment of local 
co-operative groups to assist in the marketing of farm produce or craft works. 
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29 
 
Both Solow and Ó Gráda have provided some insight into the areas of investment 
made by Irish landlords on their estates in the nineteenth century, as do a number of 
the Royal Commissions that were undertaken in the period such as, Devon (1845) 
and Bessborough (1881). A note of caution must be sounded, however, regarding the 
latter sources in that much of the testimonies from landlords and tenants are 
contradictory. However, the overall impression that emerges is that investment by 
landlords was relatively minor and was more the exception to the rule as the 
following conclusion from the Devon report highlights: 
 
It is admitted on all hands, that according to the general practice in Ireland, 
the landlord builds neither dwelling-houses nor farm buildings, nor puts 
fences, gates, etc. into good order, before he lets his land to the tenant. The 
cases in which a landlord does any of those things are the exceptions.61 
 
Given that the Devon Commission concerned itself with the pre-1844 period, when 
the middleman system had been the prevalent form of estate administration, it is not 
surprising that there was little evidence of landlord investment in their estates. There 
were exceptions such as the £4,000 invested by Roger Gore Booth on his estate in 
the period 1834-1842.62 Or the £15,000 allocated by Lord Palmerston for the 
development the harbour in Mullaghmore, Co. Sligo, to encourage the fishing 
industry and thus provide alternate employment opportunities for many of his 
tenants.63 Investment such as the above in the pre-Famine era, seem to have been the 
exception and infers that the conclusion of the Devon Commission in this regard was 
representative.  The situation thereafter is somewhat more varied and reflects  
William E. Vaughan’s assessment that ‘Irish landlords were by no means a 
homogenous class.’64 Reflective of this was the approach to investment in their 
estates and indeed the communities where they lived. The village of Geashill which 
was situated on the Digby estate was virtually rebuilt in the 1860s. Under land agent 
William Trench the village’s thatched houses were fitted with slate roofs, mud-
walled houses were knocked and replaced by stone structures and 106 tenants’ 
                                                 
61 Report from H.M. Commissioners of Inquiry into the state of law and practice in respect 
to the occupation of land in Ireland. H.C. 1845 (605), xix, p. 16 
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houses were refurbished. Recognising the value of education, a new school was built 
in 1862. Over a ten-year period £14,000 was spent on estate improvements including 
the reclaiming of over 600 acres of wet lands.65 On the Colthurst estate near 
Ballyvourney, County Cork, the landlord under the guidance of his land agent, 
Samuel Hussey, re-roofed over 100 tenants’ houses with slate, laid fifty miles of 
roads and planted over 400 acres of trees at a cost up to 1880, of £34,000.66 The 
duke of Devonshire spent £23,000 on drainage schemes on his Cork and Waterford 
estates in the period 1848 to 1880 and a further £35,000 on farm improvements.67 
Devonshire’s investment in his estate came at a time when his English estates were 
hugely encumbered. When the seventh duke succeeded to the title in 1858, debts 
stood at £1,000,000 and net rents were £115,00 a year before interest and other 
charges of £60,000. He even contemplated selling his Irish estates but was dissuaded 
by the duke of Bedford. However, the duke’s fortunes changed for the better from 
1860 when dividends from his investments in a number of businesses in Barrow on 
Furness dwarfed his rental income and hence he could fund the estate improvements. 
68 Viscount Midleton adopted a different approach to investment in that he 
encouraged his tenants to pay for their own improvements and then gave them a 
reduction in their rents to compensate.69 Many landlords used Board of Works loans 
to cover the cost of improvements. Lord Dunraven borrowed £14,850 between 1858 
and 1871 to cover the cost of various drainage schemes.70 While individual examples 
abound these convey little sense of the overall level of investment by landlords in 
their estates. However, research undertaken by Barbara Solow and Cormac Ó Gráda 
do provide some sense of aggregate investment levels.  
 
Solow extrapolated information from a survey conducted by the Irish Land 
Committee carried out in 1881. The survey findings were based on returns from 
1,300 Irish landlords out of a total of approximately 8,000. The survey was 
conducted to inform the Bessborough Commission as to the level of landlord 
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investment in estates. It concluded that between 1840 and 1881 upwards of £3.5 
million was spent by the 1,300 responding landlords in improving their estates and if 
this was applied to the larger estate population then the overall expenditure would be 
of the order of £20 million.71 Testimony given to the Bessborough Commission 
made it clear that loans of £3.5 million were provided in the same period by the 
Board of Works under the Land Improvement Act 1847 so taking this into account 
and based on Solow’s extrapolated figure, net landlord investment from 1840 to 
1881 was £16.5 million.72 Ó Gráda, however, has questioned this figure by pointing 
out that The Land Committee witness to the Bessborough commission, Colonel 
Tottenham, accepted that their figures were not representative of landlords as a 
whole and that most of the investment came from loans provided by the Board of 
Works scheme.73  
 
Ó Gráda estimated a lower level of investment by landlords than that of Solow. He 
put a figure of £7 million to £8 million on investment in improvements by landlords 
in the period between 1850 and 1879. Based on estimated total gross rental receipts 
of £260 million in the period and investment of £8 million (£3.5 million of which 
came from the Land Improvement Act loans) he calculated that landlords spent 3-4 
per cent of their total annual rent receipts on improvements.74 However, based on a 
sample of fifteen estates he found average annual investment spends ranging from 20 
per cent to 1 per cent of rents. He did enter the caveat that the figures for the 
individual estates needed to be treated with ‘extreme caution’ due to interpretations 
of expenditure. 
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Table 1.3. Investment in improvements as a percentage of rents on selected 
estates in Ireland 1850-1880 
 
Estate Period Years 
% of Rent 
on improvement 
Rents received 
(annual average) 
   
Per cent £000 
Monteagle 1862-70 8 12.00% 9.00 
Devon 1850-75 25 15.80% 40.00 
Lord Ashdown 1872-74 2 5.50% 13.50 
Fowler 1853-67 14 1.00% 7.50 
Boulick 1863-71 8 1.60% 1.00 
Crofton 1862-80 18 5.50% 6.00 
Ashtown 1852-73 21 14.10% 10.00 
St George 1850-70 20 8.30% 6.00 
Cloncurry 1860-80 20 4.50% 12.00 
Devonshire 1848-66 18 5.00% 60.00 
London companies 1850-70 20 20.00% 30.00 
W. Bence-Jones 1850-80 30 10.00% 8.00 
Muckross 1853-79 26 8.50% 13.00 
Powerscourt 1861-63 2 8.50% 20.00 
Robert French 1860-80 20 5.00% 4.00 
 
Source: Cormac Ó’Gráda, The investment behaviour of Irish landlords, 1850-75, 
some preliminary findings, Irish Agricultural Review, 23 (2), p. 152. 
   
 
William Vaughan in a study of nine estates in the period 1850 to 1880 found that 
expenditures on improvements ranged from 6 per cent of rents in the case of the 
Ranfurly estate to 27 per cent on the Murray Stewart estate in Donegal.  
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Table 1.4. Expenditure on improvements in selected Irish estates as a 
percentage of rent 1850-1880 
 
Estate 1850s 1860s 1870s 1851 -1880 
 
% % % % 
Ashtown 18 14 8 13 
Clonbrock 10 11 * 11 
Crofton 21 10 12 14 
Erne 10 9 5 8 
Hall 9 12 7 9 
Hodson * 6 5 6 
Inchiquin 7 5 5 6 
Murray Stewart 40 14 * 27 
Ranfurly 4 7 8 6 
 
Note: * denotes no data available 
 
Source: Adapted by the author from W.E. Vaughan, Landlords and tenants 
in mid-Victorian Ireland (Oxford, 1994), pp 277-8.  
 
Vaughan sounded a note of caution in interpreting the figures contained in Table 1.4 
in terms of the definition of expenditures and the range of possible inclusions such as 
improvements to the demesnes and home farms and the occurrence of exceptional 
items of expenditure such as the building of roads in the Murray Stewart, remote 
Donegal estate in the 1850s.75 
 
Ó Gráda has argued that post Famine expenditure by substantial landlords ‘was not 
too different from that of their counterparts across the Irish Sea’.76 David Cannadine 
uses an estimate provided by John Clapham to show that expenditure on estate 
improvements in Britain in the years 1846 to 1876 was £24 million.77 If this figure is 
representative and Ó Gráda’s figure of £8 million is likewise, then his contention 
regarding Irish landlords is reasonable. However, R.J. Thompson claimed that estate 
improvement expenditure on English estates prior to the start of the agricultural 
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depression in 1880 was 27 per cent of rents.78 Richard Perren estimated that the 
figure was closer to 20 per cent.79 Regardless to the variations in methods of 
calculation and definitions, the range of figures would strongly suggest that Irish 
landlords lagged behind their British counterparts in terms of investment in their 
estates.    
 
Were Irish landlords right or wrong in investing relatively small amounts in their 
estates? Vaughan expressed the view that landlords ‘were wise not to invest huge 
sums in their estates because the returns on agricultural investment were small.’80 
The answers to questions change relative to the timeframe one looks at. And so, it is 
with regard to this question and Irish land. If one asked the question as to whether 
landlords were right to invest in their estates looking at the period 1850 to 1880, the 
answer is likely to have been a qualified yes, as rents in general rose and returns 
improved. If the same question was extended to cover the period from 1880 
onwards, which bore the brunt of judicial rents reductions, land agitation and the 
effects of the agricultural depression, the answer would be a most definite, no. If we 
take it to its conclusion in the post Wyndham era and examine it in the light of the 
prices obtained for improved estates versus unimproved estates under the 1903 Act, 
the answer would also be, no. In this context, landlords who did not invest 
significant sums in improving their estates were, from an economic perspective, 
wise. 
 
1.4: Landlord indebtedness 
 
A general study of landlord indebtedness during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century is hampered by a lack of authoritative sources. Individual estate records 
provide details of indebtedness of specific families but there is little by way of 
aggregated national statistics available. There are, however, a number of studies 
which have been undertaken such as those by L.P. Curtis and Terence Dooley and 
                                                 
78 R.J. Thompson, ‘An inquiry into the rent of agricultural lands in England and Wales 
during the nineteenth century’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, No. 70 (Dec. 1907), 
p. 603.  
79 Richard Perren, ‘The landlord and agricultural transformation, 1870-1900’, in Agricultural 
Historical Review, no. 18 (1970), pp. 41-42. 
80 Vaughan, Landlords and tenants, p. 128. 
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when combined with this author’s examination of several sets of estate papers and 
secondary sources, a reasonable profile of landlord indebtedness in the second half 
of the nineteenth century emerges. 
 
In the earlier part of the nineteenth century, banks did not engage to any serious 
degree in providing long-term mortgages secured on land. For instance, the Bank of 
Ireland, which was by far the largest bank throughout the nineteenth century, was by 
law prevented from such lending until 1860 when the inelegantly entitled ‘An Act to 
repeal a certain enactment from restraining the Governor and Company of the Bank 
of Ireland from lending money on mortgage’ was enacted.81 The complexity of 
securing title due to the ‘strict settlement’ system involving life interests, family 
charges, and various other legal entanglements meant that private banks shied away 
from land secured mortgages. The advent of the joint stock banks from the 1820s 
onwards did see some change in their approach but for much of the century mortgage 
lending was undertaken by successful merchants and business people such as Robert 
Shaw and Luke White, and institutions like British life insurance companies such as 
Scottish Widows, Norwich Union, Law Life Assurance, Eagle Life Assurance and 
the Royal Exchange Assurance Company.82 As the century progressed, other lenders 
such as the Representative Church Body (RCB), The Presbyterian Church in Ireland 
and St. Patrick’s College, Maynooth, entered the mortgage market. These church 
lenders were seeking a secure outlet for large sums paid to them by the British 
government in compensation for legislative changes. Apart from the RCB, whose 
advances peaked at about £3.5 million, their involvement in the sector was quite 
small.83 As illustrated in the case of William Scully, borrowing from friends and 
family was also common. Scully is said to have borrowed £10,000 from his brother 
                                                 
81 F.G. Hall, The Bank of Ireland, 1783-1946 (Dublin, 1948), pp 236-9. 
82 Padraig Lane, ‘The management of estates by financial corporations in Ireland after the 
Famine’ in Studia Hibernica, vol. 14, (1974), pp. 67-89. Robert Shaw was a successful grain 
merchant and Dublin land and property owner who had an estate in Terenure, Dublin. His 
son, also Robert, was M.P. for Dublin and founded the Royal Bank in 1826. Luke White was 
a wealthy Dublin merchant and landowner who was said to have amassed a fortune of over 
£500,000 and from selling lottery tickets in the late eighteenth century. In 1799, he 
purchased Lord Carhampton’s estate at Lutterelstown, near Lucan in West Dublin. (Tony 
McCarthy, The Shaws of Terenure, A nineteenth century Dublin merchant family (Dublin, 
2010), pp 15-16 and Rowena Dudley, The Irish lottery, 1780-1801 (Dublin, 2005), p. 35.  
83 L.P. Curtis, ‘Landed indebtedness in post-Famine Ireland’, in The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, (Apr.,1980), p. 360.  
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Thomas in 1851, and used this money to purchase lands in Illinois.84 A transaction 
such as this, was unlikely to appear on any register anywhere and highlights the 
difficulties in estimating the overall levels of indebtedness.   
 
The focus of this section is on landlord indebtedness from 1850 up to the 
introduction of the Wyndham land Act 1903. It thus largely ignores the debt crisis 
emanating from the famine and the follow-on workings of the Encumbered Estates 
Court. Such an approach ignores debt carried forward from pre-Famine times but in 
the context of the Wyndham Act what is of more relevance is the build-up of debt in 
the fifty years since the Famine.  
  
An indication of the level and nature of indebtedness of Irish landlords in the second 
half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century can be gleaned from a study 
undertaken by L.P. Curtis in the early 1980s.85 Using data from two sources, the 
RCB and a sample of 105 Final Schedule of Encumbrances (FSI) obtained from the 
Irish Land Commission records, Curtis was able to provide an insight into the nature 
and extent of borrowings by Irish landed estates. The picture that emerges is one of 
widespread indebtedness. Curtis states that ‘Few landowners managed to avoid 
borrowing at some stage in their lives.’86 The debt burden ratio defined by 
expressing the annual interest bill as a percentage of annual rental income varied 
depending on the size of the estate. While the larger estates borrowed much larger 
sums, the debt burden on the smaller estate was significantly greater. It was this debt 
burden rate that was the critical indicator of financial strength. The higher the 
percentage debt burden the less equipped the borrower was to deal with any 
downturn in his economic circumstance. For example, looking at the data in Table 
1.5 below, the most striking feature is the debt burden ratio of 70.9 per cent 
associated with the borrowers with small estates of between £100 and £1,000 annual 
rental valuation. It is worth probing into this figure further so as best to understand 
these borrowers’ predicament. Assuming an annual gross rent roll of £1,000, a debt 
burden ratio of 70.9 per cent meant that the borrower was paying £709 in interest to 
the RCB leaving him £291 to run his estate and fund his and his family’s lifestyle. 
                                                 
84 Socolofsky, ‘William Scully, p. 159. 
85 Curtis, ‘Landed indebtedness in post-Famine Ireland’, pp 332-67. 
86 Ibid. p. 336. 
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Given the level of taxes such as rates and income taxes along with head and quit 
rents where applicable, it meant that there was little available for the basic costs of 
providing for a family. Also, the data does not consider that there may have been 
other borrowings with other lenders which would make the landlord’s position even 
more unviable. Nor does it take account of the fact that eventually loans must be 
repaid. A landlord in such a predicament would have found it extremely difficult if 
not impossible to survive the judicial rent reductions introduced by the Land Law 
(Ireland) Act 1881 or any delay or withholding of rent payments from tenants, both 
of which, were features of life in late nineteenth century Ireland. For a landlord in 
this situation there were only two options: sell up or go bankrupt. 
 
Table 1.5. Mortgage loans of the Representative Church Body, 1871-1907 
 
Estate Number Total Total Ratio of Annual Average Debt 
Valuation of Valuation Mortgage Mortgage Interest Rate of Burden 
 
Estates 
 
Loans Valuation Due Interest 
 
£ 
 
£ £ Times £ % % 
Small   
 
  
 
  
 
  
100-1,000 34 18,938.80 299,176.50 15.8 13,420.00 4.49 70.90 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
Medium   
 
  
 
  
 
  
1,000-5,000 63 147,998.70 1,350,050.40 9.1 60,112.50 4.45 40.60 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
Large   
 
  
 
  
 
  
5,000-15,000 11 111,566.00 678,198.50 6.1 28,688.20 4.23 25.70 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
Great   
 
  
 
  
 
  
Over 15,000 12 321,584.50 1,484,365.00 4.6 62,390.50 4.20 19.40 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
Total               
All estates 120 600,088.00 3,811,790.40 6.4 164,611.20 4.32 27.4 
 
Source: L.P. Curtis, ‘Landed indebtedness in post-Famine Ireland’, in The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, (Apr.,1980), p. 344. 
  
It should be noted that Curtis’s analysis of 105 Final Schedule of Incumbrances 
(F.S.I.) (see Table 1.6) which include family and other charges, indicate a 
significantly lower debt burden ratio for smaller estates. Albeit they are from 
different data sets, it might have been expected that the more aggregated F.S.I. 
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figures would show higher overall debt burden ratios.87 A more detailed analysis of 
the source data would perhaps reveal the reasons for this apparent anomaly. For the 
purposes of this study however the figures as presented are important in that they 
convey not just the extent of indebtedness of the sample but also the variations 
according to borrower category. 
 
Table 1.6. Debt burden ratio of 105 estates based on final schedule of 
incumbrances (F.S.I.) 1903-19 
Estate Number Total Total Ratio of Annual Debt 
Valuation of Valuation incumbrances incumbrance / Interest Burden 
 
Estates 
  
Valuation Due 
 
£ 
 
£ £ Times £ % 
Small   
 
  
 
    
100-1,000 33 12,721.40 84,147.70 6.6 3,786.60 29.8 
       
Medium   
 
  
 
    
1,000-5,000 33 92,320.10 475,469.80 5.2 21,396.10 23.2 
       
Large   
 
  
 
    
5,000-15,000 24 235,715.00 1,107,486.80 4.7 49,836.90 21.1 
       
Great   
 
  
 
    
Over 15,000 15 368,896.10 907,617.00 2.5 40,842.80 11.1 
       
Total             
All estates 105 709,652.60 2,574,721.30 3.6 115,862.40 16.3 
 
Source: Taken from L.P. Curtis, ‘Landed indebtedness in post-Famine Ireland’, in 
The American Historical Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, (Apr.,1980), p. 350. 
 
                                                 
87 A Final Schedule of Incumbrance (F.S.I.) was a document prepared by the Land 
Commission where an estate was being sold under a land act. The document recorded all 
charges, mortgages or claims lodged against an estate and the amount that were required to 
be paid to each of the claimants. The document was lodged with the Land Registry Office. 
The reference in the chapter to the F.S.I. being ‘more aggregated’ than the R.C.B. figures is 
that in the case of the former all claims on the estate are shown whereas with latter only the 
debt owed to the R.C.B. is shown.  The rules pertaining to the completion of the F.S.I. were 
set out in procedure note ‘Irish Land Commission; Land purchases acts; Directions as to the 
preparation, settlement and vouching of final schedules of incumbrances. 16th January,1901. 
http://www.dippam.ac.uk/eppi/documents/20305/page/558683. Accessed 12 May 2017. 
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The trend is similar in both data sets in terms of the debt burden for smaller estates is 
higher than that for larger estates.88  A separate analysis of the indebtedness of ten 
individual estates indicated an overall debt burden ratio of 27.0 per cent identical to 
the RCB figure.89  
 
Based on his analysis of 270 F.S.I.s, Curtis extrapolated that the largest portion of 
nineteenth century landlord borrowing took place in the decades between 1850 and 
1880.90 Sir Robert Giffen the Scottish economist, estimated that British insurance 
companies such as Scottish Widows, Norwich Union and the Equitable had loaned 
over £12 million to Irish landlords up to 1880.91 These same companies were not 
slow to call in these loans as the fortunes of landowners waned under the pressures 
of the agricultural depression and sporadic land agitation in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. David Cannadine cites the example of the Scottish Widows in 
1890 applying pressure on the duke of Devonshire with regard to loans of £80,000 
he had on his Irish estates and forcing him to repay the loans at a rate of £10,000 a 
year.92 This demand was on a man, whose credit rating in 1869, had been described 
by Lord Granville as: ‘being very nearly as good as that of the state’93     
 
The reasons why landowners borrowed were many. Cannadine set out four reasons 
why landlords borrowed in nineteenth-century Britain, three of which are applicable 
in the case of Ireland. 94 The first category relates to the borrowing of money to cover 
the cost of making various types of ‘family settlements’. The arrangement known as 
‘strict settlement’ came into common usage in the mid-seventeenth century and 
lasted until the introduction of the Settled Estates Act in 1882.95 The system was 
devised to address two problems encountered by landed families namely the 
transmission of property from one generation to the next and the making of financial 
                                                 
88 Curtis, ‘Landed indebtedness in post-Famine Ireland’, p. 354. 
89 Ibid. p. 356. 
90 Ibid. p. 362. 
91 Robert Giffen, ‘The economic value of Ireland to Great Britain’ in Economic inquiries 
and studies (1904), vol. I, p. 445. 
92 Cannadine, ‘The landowner as millionaire’, p. 87. 
93 Granville to Gladstone, 26 May 1869. Quoted in Cannadine, ‘The landowner as 
millionaire’, p. 84. 
94 Cannadine, Aristocratic indebtedness, p. 638. 
95 John Habakkuk, Marriage, debt and the estates system, English landownership 1650-1950 
(Oxford, 1994), p. 1. 
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provisions for family members who were not the beneficiaries of a landed or 
monetary bequest or transfer. The arrangement operated in conjunction with the 
practice of primogeniture whereby it was normally the eldest son who took on 
responsibility for the estate under a ‘tenancy for life’ type arrangement. This 
mechanism was repeated through the generations on a father to eldest son basis and 
even assumed that yet unborn eldest sons inherited in tail. The first consequence of 
this arrangement was that the nominal owner of the property did not have the legal 
right to sell it as he was in effect a custodian of the estate for the next generation. 
The unintended consequence of this form of settlement was that it made land less 
attractive to lenders as a form of security although the strict settlement oftentimes 
was not quite as strict as might be inferred particularly regarding outlying estates or 
holdings.  
 
The obvious unfairness whereby one individual inherited the entire estate was offset 
by the making of family settlements or financial arrangements with the rest of the 
family. Thus, it was common practice for siblings or parents to be awarded family 
settlements whereby they were guaranteed a certain income, oftentimes for life, 
usually funded from the income generated by the estate. Family charges were 
important considerations in two of the estates examined by this study. The 
Clonbrock estate was in 1905 (see Table 6.1, Chapter 6), subject to a number of 
family charges in relation to the 4th baron’s siblings. Amounts ranging from £5,000 
to £500 were set aside from the sales consideration to meet the obligations under 
these charges. Similarly, on the death of the 5th baron in 1926, amounts were set 
aside to cover the life interests of his three sisters.96 In the case of the Leinster estate, 
there were nine family charges registered at the date of sale and an amount of 
£36,634 was set aside to provide for these.97 In relation to the Verner family in 
Armagh, the estate was charged with making fixed annual payments of £2,000 to the 
Dowager Lady Verner and £1,200 to Lady Mary Verner. The effect of such an 
arrangement was that out of total annual rental income of approximately £10,000, 
£3,200 had to be allocated to meeting the annuity payments of family members.98 In 
general these arrangements were funded out of the income of the estate which meant 
                                                 
96 For more details see chapter 6. 
97 Leinster estate papers (P.R.O.N.I. SM 23: Mic 541, Reel 15, D3078/2/15/10) 
98 Purdue, The big house in the North of Ireland, pp 74-5. 
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that in bad years borrowing was required to serve any shortfall where it arose. When 
the family was large such settlements could be very demanding and when 
accompanied by the payment of dowries it could be extremely expensive. It is 
interesting to compare the typical family arrangement with the more sophisticated 
form of arrangement entered into by a more professional Dublin-based merchant 
family, the Shaws of Terenure. Robert Shaw was a wealthy grain merchant and 
private money lender. In 1786, he made settlements on three of his children, Robert 
Junior (£800p.a.), Bernard Shaw (£700p.a.) and Mary Shaw (£250p.a.). He provided 
for such annual sums by purchasing a share in the proceeds of patent income licence 
and furthermore hedged his risk by taking out life cover, totalling £8,500 from Royal 
Exchange on the lives of the three children for a cost of £194 11s.99 This option was 
open to landed families making similar arrangements but this study has not found 
any evidence to suggest that other landed families entered into this type of 
transaction which, while somewhat sophisticated, afforded a significantly greater 
degree of financial freedom. 
 
The extent of family charges on an estate was in many ways down to luck in terms of 
the longevity of a beneficiary or the number of children in a family. An example of 
this would be that of Georgiana, the countess of Longford, who survived her 
husband by forty-five years receiving a jointure of £2,000 per annum.100 Similarly, 
the fourth duke of Leinster had seven children which meant that six had to receive 
portions giving rise to an encumbrance of £154,000 on the estate.101 In the case of 
the estate of the duke of Abercorn, family charges in the mid-1880s amounted to 
£14,447 per annum while rents totalled £35,936.102 On the other hand, the Clonbrock 
estate in 1912 had family charges of just £645 per annum against a rent roll of 
£9,861.103 Similarly the Bellew estate had family charges of only £500 per annum in 
1912 against an annual rental income of almost £4,500.104  
 
                                                 
99 Tony McCarthy, The Shaws of Terenure, A nineteenth century Dublin merchant family 
(Dublin, 2010), pp 26-7. 
100 Curtis, ‘Landed indebtedness in post-Famine Ireland’, p. 358. 
101 Ibid.  p. 360. 
102 Abercorn papers, PRONI, MSS, D.1932/4/33-34. 
103 G. Mahon to Lord Clonbrock, 18 Aug. 1905 (N.L.I. Clonbrock papers, MS 35,721.3)  
104 James Robinson to Sir Henry Bellew, Jan.1912 (N.L.I. Bellew Papers, MS 27290 [2]) 
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For families with daughters the cost of a dowry could give rise to a need to borrow. 
Marriage dowries could be significant and placed considerable financial pressure on 
families. To be only able to pay a small dowry was a declaration of poverty and 
impacted on the quality of the potential husband’s status which meant that poorer 
landed families were condemned to generational poverty due to the failure to marry 
off a daughter to a socially superior family. An indication of the scale of marriage 
settlement can be seen in the case of the Shaw family. In 1796 Abraham Wilkinson 
gave a dowry of £10,000 along with substantial property transfers when his 
daughter, Maria, married Robert Shaw subject to an £800 jointure 105  A similar 
dowry was paid when Caroline King, the daughter of Viscount Lorton of Boyle, 
married Sir Robert Gore Booth in 1827.106 Cannadine maintained that marriage 
settlements, while placing some pressures on family finances, were not overly 
burdensome.107  
 
A second reason for borrowing was to cover the cost of house building. The need to 
project wealth, social status and lineage was particularly compelling during times of 
economic prosperity such as that which pertained during the Napoleonic war period 
and its immediate aftermath, when many of Ireland’s Great Houses were built or 
significantly improved such as Gosford Castle (1812), Buttevant Castle (1810), 
Adare Manor (1820), Ducketts Grove (1820), Mount Talbot House (1820), 
Clonbrock House (1824) and Lissadell House (1830). Lissadell House was built by 
Sir Robert Gore Booth at a cost of £11,701 and was funded by the dowry of £10,000 
received when he married Caroline King in 1827.108 Even as the century progressed 
and the economy became less vibrant, house building and remodelling continued 
albeit at a slower pace. Houses built and expanded during this period included 
Powerscourt Gardens (1843), Carrigmore House (1842), Mayfield House (1849), 
Kilkenny Castle (1854) and Killashee House (1885). A notable example of late 
nineteenth century house building was that of the earl of Kenmare who spent 
£100,000 in constructing Killarney House.109 Nor was expenditure on housing of a 
                                                 
105 McCarthy, The Shaws of Terenure, p. 20. 
106 Moran, Sir Robert Gore Booth, p. 10. 
107 Cannadine, Aristocratic indebtedness, p. 639. 
108 Moran, Sir Robert Gore Booth, p. 12 
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‘once-off nature’; for instance, according to Terence Dooley the Ormondes spent 
37.7 per cent of aggregated rental income from 1870 to 1877 on the upkeep of 
Kilkenny Castle and gardens.110 The furnishing of these houses and the building up 
of collections was also significant in terms of expenditure. As to how much of this 
building was financed by debt is impossible to say in aggregate terms, but Cannadine 
has ventured the view, that in England, house building represented a significant 
source of debt and that it was the agricultural depression of the 1880s that brought it 
to a conclusion rather than any new-found sense of propriety or the influence of 
evangelical righteousness.111    
 
The final area that Cannadine identified as a cause of borrowing related to 
investments in ‘non-agricultural enterprises’. Evidence would suggest that this type 
of investment was more common in Britain than in Ireland, particularly among the 
ducal families such as the Devonshires, the Westminsters and the Sutherlands who 
invested in commercial property, railway shares and properties in the New World.112 
Irish landlords were not totally alien to the concept of non-agricultural investment. 
The family papers of Bernard Fitzpatrick (1848-1937), the 2nd baron of Castletown 
whose estate of 22,000 acres in Queens County, contain many examples of 
investments in mining companies, real estate, ranches and railway investments in 
such places as South Africa, Canada, Australia and the USA.113 The aforementioned 
William Scully became one of the largest landowners in the American Midwest. 
Except for a small group of aristocratic families such as lords Pembroke, Meath, De 
Vesci, Longford and Carysfort all of whom owned property in Dublin, few held 
urban property.114 Curtis contended that no more than 1 per cent of Irish landlords 
held external assets such as interests in coalmines or urban property.115  
 
                                                 
110 Dooley, The decline of the big house, p. 35. 
111 Cannadine, Aristocratic indebtedness, p. 639. 
112 Cannadine, The decline and fall, pp 134-6. 
113 Letters to Lord Castletown relating to investments and financial matters, (N.L.I. Lord 
Castletown papers. MS 35,309, 1-10)  
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One cannot address the issue of indebtedness without examining the impact of 
interest rates on debt. For borrowers, as landowners were for the greater part of the 
nineteenth century, the interest rate environment was positive. 
 
Figure 1.1 Yields on long term British Government bonds 1800-1900 
(Decennial averages) 
 
 
 
Source: Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A history of interest rates (New Jersey, 
2005), pp 192-4. 
 
 
The century started with the trauma of the Napoleonic wars with British consols 
yielding almost 5.0 per cent due to the need for the government to raise funding to 
cover the cost of the war. The need to fund wars was the principal reason the British 
government sought to raise finance and apart from the Crimea campaign in the mid-
century and the Boer War at the very end of it, the century was relatively peaceful 
and as a result the requirement to raise funds was low. The consequence of this was 
that interest rates reduced as the century progressed which was good news for 
borrowers. The impact of headline interest rates as shown in Figure 1.1 above may 
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have been somewhat muted because the strict settlement arrangement prevailed 
throughout most of the nineteenth century and mitigated against using land as a 
security against borrowings. 116 Thus, landowners used a range of borrowing devices 
such as annuities for the life of the buyer or indeed seller, reversionary interests and 
the mortgaging of an estate out of settlement. The primary impact of these devices 
was higher interest charges but as the agricultural depression worsened from 1880 
due to low cost imports from North America and Australasia, coupled with increased 
land agitation, there were no lenders willing to advance money to Irish landlords at 
any price. Samuel Hussey, land agent to the earl of Kenmare, used a phrase in 
relation to the passing of the 1881 Land Act that ‘No capitalist will now lend on Irish 
estates’.117  Landlords had run out of credit and their room for manoeuvre was 
getting smaller and smaller. Illustrative of this situation was the significant decline in 
land transactions under the 1896 Land Act. In 1898 there were 8,000 sales, 1900 saw 
5,000 transactions and by 1901 the number had fallen to less than 3,000. The market 
for Irish land was grinding to a halt.118 The fall-off in transactions was accompanied 
by a reduction in the average prices being paid for land, in terms of the number of 
years’ purchase for sales in the years 1901 and 1902 were 18.1 and 17.9 
respectively.119  
 
For the purpose of this study, the family papers of five individual estates were 
scrutinised. The examination covered a broader range of liabilities than looked at by 
Curtis and as such is more comprehensive. Their examination highlights that a 
number of factors need to be taken account in interpreting indebtedness. In the first 
instance, one needs to define indebtedness. To be meaningful it needs to include any 
charge with a claim on the estate and not just borrowings. It should include, 
therefore, family charges, Board of Works charges for loans advanced for land 
improvements, tithe rent charges, head rent redemption charges, quit rent redemption 
charges and other claims on the estate. These charges mounted up. Thus, in the case 
                                                 
116 Homer and Sylla. A history of interest rates, pp 192-4. 
117 Irish Times, 9 Feb. 1882. 
118 Wyndham, ‘Cabinet memorandum on the Irish land question’, 8 Oct. 1902 (T.N.A., CAB 
37/62/139), p. 3. 
119 ‘Return showing by counties the average number of years’ purchase under the Ashbourne 
Act for years 1901 and 1902, and under the act of 1903, to the 31st July, 1908, in the 
different counties of Ireland’ (356) HC 1908, xc, 1411. 
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of the Bellew Estate, in 1912, there were borrowings of £11,185 (all incidentally 
from individuals) but other charges on the estate of £34,215.120 This information 
comes from Table 4.1 in chapter 4. When deciding whether to sell an estate or not, a 
landlord would usually have a schedule similar to that shown in Table 4.1 prepared 
by the estate accountant or solicitor showing the expected gross sales less all the 
loans, charges and costs that would have to be discharged resulting in an expected 
net sales consideration. The reason for preparing the schedule was to provide the 
landlord with a clear view of what funds he would have at his disposal post a 
potential sale. In the case of the Bellew estate, the estimated gross consideration was 
shown as £113,494 with total claims against the estate of £46,900. This equates to an 
overall debt burden of 40 per cent against the expected proceeds of a sale. Using the 
methodology applied by Curtis in the case of the RCB mortgages, the debt burden 
ratio would have been 9.9 per cent. The Clonbrock Estate at the time of its sale in 
1914 was not subject to any borrowing therefore the debt burden ratio under the 
Curtis model would have been 0 per cent whereas taking family and other charges 
into account the debt burden ratio was 20.5 per cent.121 Likewise, the Leinster estate 
at the time of the sale in 1903 had no external debt. This was because in 1890, the 
fifth duke of Leinster had sold 19,200 acres of land from his Kildare and Rathangan 
estates realising £246,400 and used these proceeds to pay down large encumbrances 
that had built up on the estate over the years.122 Curtis estimated that over half of the 
debt of £292,077 that the fifth duke inherited when he succeeded his father to the 
title in 1887 was because of portions being made for his six younger children.123 
Thus, when the remainder of the Leinster estate was sold under the Wyndham Act in 
1903, the only liability apart from the costs associated with the sale were family 
charges totalling £78,831 meaning that the debt burden ratio was 10.3 per cent of the 
sales proceeds of £766,647.124 These examples serve only to illustrate that caution 
needs to be exercised in looking at data regarding aggregated indebtedness figures. 
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However, despite the caveats there are conclusions that can be drawn from the 
various strands of information that exist regarding landed debt in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. In the first instance, some level of debt was common for 
most landed families. The reasons for this will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Secondly, the debt burden was more pressing on landlords of smaller estates. This 
was due to two main reasons. The first was that the cost of borrowing was higher for 
less secure smaller borrowers than it was for those of larger estates. Table 1.5 above 
shows the owners of small estates paying average interest of 4.5 per cent whereas 
those of the larger estates were paying 4.2 per cent. The second issue was that the 
cost of maintaining a lifestyle for a landlord with an annual rental income of say 
£1,000 was most likely the same as that of a more substantial estate owner inferring 
a greater tendency to borrow to pay for it. A third conclusion that can be reached is 
that from about 1850 to the onset of the agricultural depression in 1877 there was no 
shortage of mortgage lenders seeking to obtain a higher rate of return than available 
from bank deposits or investing in consols.125 Post 1880, however, these sources 
dried up and many institutions sought to call in their loans. Another factor that 
influenced the willingness to borrow was the relaxed attitude to debt among the 
landed classes as evidenced by the observation that ‘the fact that in an aristocratic 
society little social stigma attached to debts, even when they were heavy and the 
result of extravagance.’126 Reflective of this attitude was a comment by the duke of 
Bedford to the sixth duke of Devonshire, who had sought his advice about selling off 
lands to reduce mounting debts, ’of the relative insignificance of purely financial 
considerations when compared with the question of the family’s social and political 
standing.’127   Estates with high debt burden ratios at the start of the agricultural 
depression would have found themselves in a downward debt spiral as their rents fell 
or stalled because of land agitation giving rise to a need for more borrowings at even 
higher interest rates. The conclusion that can be drawn is that while indebtedness 
was widespread, the levels varied quite significantly. Any suggestion, therefore, that 
                                                 
125 Consol is short for ‘Consolidated stock’ is the name given to certain British Government 
bonds. These bonds are usually perpetual in nature in that they are redeemable at the option 
of the Treasury. The term Consol came about when in 1752 the British Government 
converted all then outstanding bonds in a single consolidated issue. 
126 John Habakkuk, Marriage, debt, and the estates system – English landownership 1650-
1950, (Oxford, 1994), p. 303. 
127 Cannadine, ‘The landowner as millionaire’, p. 84. 
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landlords were financially doomed as a class because of indebtedness would be as 
inaccurate as saying that all Irish people were financially bankrupt in 2008. The 
reality was that some were, but many were not.  
 
1.5: Estate rentals 
 
Rent is the economic return on property and is the very lifeblood of a landed estate. 
It is at the centre of the landlord – tenant relationship. In that context its non-
payment can, as Irish history bears testimony to, become the principal weapon in any 
conflict between landlords and tenants. For a topic, so central to one of the dominant 
themes of Irish history, land, particularly in the nineteenth century, it is perhaps 
surprising that so little aggregate data exists relating to the whole island similar to 
that compiled by Liam Kennedy and Peter Solar with regard to farm produce prices 
for the period 1750 to 1913.128 Using a combination of primary and secondary 
sources the study has looked at nineteenth century rents through five-time periods or 
phases.  
 
The first phase is that from 1793 to 1815. This period which was dominated by the 
Napoleonic wars was characterised by rising agricultural prices, rising population 
and an insatiable appetite for land. As a result, rents rose but because of the 
middleman system much of the benefits flowed to these intermediate landlords rather 
than the real owners of the land. However, those landlords who maintained control 
over some or all of their own lands did benefit significantly. Phase 2 covered the 
thirty years from 1816 to 1845, a period dominated by a depression in agriculture 
brought about by the end of the European wars and the attempts by landlords to 
wrest back control of their estates from the middlemen. The third and shortest phase 
(1846 to 1850), which was brought about by the Great Famine and a general 
downturn in European agriculture, was the most dramatic in terms of its impact on 
highly encumbered estates and those with high levels of subdivision. This phase also 
brought about the final eradication of the middleman system and the re-establishing 
                                                 
128 Liam Kennedy & Peter M. Solar, Irish agriculture: A price history from the mid-
eighteenth century to the eve of the First World War (Dublin, 2007).  
49 
 
of control of those original owners who survived the worst economic consequences 
of the famine. 
 
Of more relevance, however, to this study is the situation in the last half of the 
nineteenth century. Apart from the occasional interruption due for example, weather-
induced bad harvests such as those of 1861 to 1864, the period 1850 to 1877 was 
good for all connected with Irish agriculture. The prices of agricultural products such 
as cereals, milk, and beef (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3) rose at a faster rate than rents and 
to quote Ó Gráda, ‘if the farm has not been run out, and no big leak like drink exists 
the average tenant could ride out the worst years.’129 Louis Cullen supports this 
view: ‘Rising rural prosperity was evident in post-famine Ireland. The farmer gained; 
so too, to an extent, did the farm labourer. Apart from a sharp depression in the late 
1850s and early 1860s, bank deposits, a sensitive barometer of agricultural incomes, 
rose rapidly. They doubled from £8 million in 1845 to £16 million in 1859 and 
despite a small drop in 1861 they stood at £33 million in 1876.’130 Like Ó Gráda, 
Cullen maintained that ‘the rise in rents was moderate’ and estimated that ‘[they] did 
not exceed £12 million and that they were therefore not significantly higher than 
they had been at the end of the Napoleonic wars.’131 This improvement in economic 
conditions was reflected in the value of land as evidenced by the sale of the Castle 
Hyde estate in Cork. Purchased in 1851 for £14,425 from the Encumbered Estates 
Court, the estate was sold in 1860 for £45,000.132  This estate had been purchased by 
Vincent Scully, M.P. for Cork, son of the James Scully and brother of William 
Scully both referred to earlier in this chapter.133 Similarly, the Holybrook estate that 
                                                 
129 Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland: A new economic history, 1780-1939 (Oxford, 1994) p. 256. 
130 Cullen, An economic history of Ireland, p.137. 
131 Ibid. p.138. 
132 Donnelly, ‘Landlords and tenants’, A new history of Ireland, p. 347. 
133 Vincent Scully (1810-71) was a barrister, landowner, banker and politician. Of a Catholic 
landowning family in County Tipperary, he was educated in Oscott, a public school in 
Staffordshire and in Trinity College, Cambridge. He was called to the Bar in 1833 and 
became a Queen’s Counsel in 1849. He had succeeded to the family estate in Kilfeacle 
following the murder of his elder brother, James in 1842 in a land dispute related incident. 
He was a director of The Tipperary Savings Bank which had been established by his father, 
James, in 1802 (see earlier in chapter). This bank which collapsed amid much scandal in 
1856 was managed by Scully’s cousin, John Sadlier. His younger brother William became 
one of the largest landowners in North America. [note compiled from C.J. Woods in DIB, pp 
816-820. and Socolofsky, ‘William Scully’, pp 155-75. 
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was purchased in 1853 for £1,950 and sold in 1859 for £4,050.134 When the earl of 
Thomond sold his 48,000-acre estate in Clare and Cork in 1857 he received 
£360,000 representing 26.7 times the annual rental of £13,500.135 Landlords fortunes 
had turned for the better, and the fact that with the demise of the middleman system, 
they were now in a position to reap the benefits for themselves unlike during the 
1793 to 1815 period. 
 
As suggested by Cullen and Ó Gráda, rents moved upwards but at a moderate pace. 
The evidence from various estate records supports this contention although 
significant variations existed. Barbara Solow has argued that Griffith’s valuation 
completed in 1852 was reasonably accurate in determining rents at that time but that 
by 1865 was some 15 per cent lower than real values. She further calculated that 
between 1865 and 1880 that rents rose by on average 12 per cent.136 Putting this in 
context, however, a report based on a survey of 1,300 estates by the Irish Land 
Committee carried out in 1880 found that over 40 per cent of rents prevailing that 
year had been fixed before 1851.137  
 
On an individual estate basis, the evidence substantiates the general variations 
suggested above. Rents on the Headfort estate in Meath rose by just 4 per cent in the 
twenty years between 1855 and 1875.138 An examination of the Powerscourt 
Wicklow estate rental records shows that rents increased by 23 percent between 1847 
and 1857.139 Samuel Hussey, a landowner and one of the country’s most experienced 
land agents, in a letter to the duke of Argyle wrote: ‘The rent of arable land in 
Ireland is less than in 1840’140 Terence Dooley on the other hand cites the examples 
of the Clonbrock estate where rents between 1854 and 1869 increased by 13 per cent 
and a further 11 percent in the period 1869 to 1880.141 William Vaughan provides 
numerous examples of wide variations in rental levels on individual estates. He cited 
                                                 
134 Donnelly, ‘Landlords and tenants’, A new history of Ireland, p. 347. 
135 A.M. Sullivan, New Ireland (London, 1877) vol. i, p. 286. 
136 Solow, The land question, pp 66-69. 
137 Donnelly, The land and the people of nineteenth-century Cork, p. 189. 
138 Joe Mooney, The changing fortunes of the Headfort estates, 1870-1928 (Dublin, 2012), p. 
13. 
139 Powerscourt estate rentals (N.L.I., Powerscourt papers, MSS 19,202; 19,246).  
140 Donnelly, The land and the people of nineteenth-century Cork, p. 188. 
141 Dooley, The decline of the big house, p. 33. 
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evidence from the Bessborough Commission regarding the Salters estate in Co. 
Derry where ‘rents were unchanged from 1852 to 1878’.142 Vaughan also gives the 
example of the Downshire estate where rents in 1880 were 33 per cent less than 
Griffith’s valuation, which as stated above, was by 1865, 15 per cent lower than real 
values.143 More representative was Vaughan’s analysis of fifty estate rental records 
which showed that rents increased by an average of 20 per cent during the period 
1851 and 1879.144 His more detailed analysis of eleven estates, while producing the 
same overall average rate of increase, also recorded wide variation between the 
estates such as on the Hamilton’s ( – 5 per cent) to the Garvagh estate (+25 per 
cent).145  
 
Drawing the various strands of evidence together would suggest that rent increases 
between 1850 and 1880 were of the order of 20 to 30 per cent. Price movements of 
agricultural output rose much more significantly, however, during the period 1850 to 
1875; Beef (+62.6 per cent); Mutton (+59.4 per cent); and 3-year-old cattle (+48.9 
per cent). 
Figure 1.2 Irish meat prices 1800-1900 
 
 
Source: Chart prepared by the author from data extrapolated from, Liam 
Kennedy and Peter Solar, Irish agriculture: A price history (Dublin, 2007), pp 168-
183. 
                                                 
142 Vaughan, Landlords and tenants, p. 44. 
143 Ibid. p. 45. 
144 W.E. Vaughan, ‘A study of landlord and tenant relations in Ireland between the famine 
and the Land War’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Dublin, 1974), p. 49 
145 Vaughan, Landlords and tenants, pp 239-240. 
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Tillage crops did not however enjoy such price growth with wheat falling by 8.8 per 
cent in the same period.146 
 
Figure 1.3 Irish cereal prices 1800-1900 
 
 
 
Source: Chart prepared by the author from data extrapolated from, Liam 
Kennedy and Peter Solar, Irish agriculture: A price history (Dublin, 2007), pp 131-
55. 
 
While these prices feed into rents it is clear that farmers benefitted more from the 
uptake in agriculture than landlords during the period reflected in the aforementioned 
increase in bank deposits, and placing them in a better position to deal with what was 
to follow than most landowners.  
 
The final rent phase of the nineteenth century, commenced with the onset of the 
agricultural depression in 1879. The catalyst for the downturn was a series of bad 
harvests in the late 1870s, culminating in one of the wettest years on record in 
1879.147 In that respect it was much the same as any other cyclical slump that had 
occurred many times over the centuries. The difference, however, between this and 
anything that had gone before was that this was a structural rather than cyclical 
decline brought about by a fundamental change in supply patterns that would change 
not just Irish but world agriculture forever. There is some debate among economic 
historians regarding the impact of new supply markets on European agriculture with 
                                                 
146 These price movements have been extrapolated by the author from: Liam Kennedy and 
Peter Solar, Irish agriculture: A price history, pp 133-82. 
147 Perren, Agriculture in depression, p. 7. 
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some such as Stephen Broadberry, Giovanni Ferderico and Alexander Klein arguing 
that gross output across Europe particularly Russia, Greece and the Austro-
Hungarian empire recorded above average output growth in the period 1870 to 
1913.148   Whereas others such as Richard Perren, argued that the growth in imports 
from new markets was universally bad for European agriculture.149 
 
The opening up of new supply markets from the 1870s onwards was a function of 
two developments. The first was related to the changing demographic situation in an 
industrialising Europe, particularly Britain. The growth in urban populations 
necessary to staff the factories and mills of Britain and mainland Europe brought 
with it a requirement to provide cheap and nutritious food. This became a political 
and social priority and was one faced up to by the British government by removing 
in the 1840s two significant obstacles to international trade; the Corn Laws (1815-
1846) and the Navigation Acts (1651-1849). The second and most important 
development was related to the technological developments of the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Advances in transport, refrigeration and packaging technologies 
were to play a major part facilitating the sourcing of agricultural foodstuffs from the 
new markets of North and South America and the Antipodes. The advent of steam 
ships meant that voyages that previously took months now took days. Prior to steam 
it took on average two months for a ship to journey from Liverpool to New York but 
by 1900, the Maritania could complete the trip in four days. The opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869 reduced the journey from London to India by over 4,300 miles. 
Developments in refrigeration followed rapidly after 1877 when the SS Paraguay 
first transported a consignment of frozen beef from Buenos Aries to France. 150 
Similarly developments in canning and glass containers meant that location and 
distance from source were no longer significant issues. Food markets had become 
global.  
 
                                                 
148 Stephen Broadberry, Giovanni Ferderico, Alexander Klein, ‘Sectoral developments, 
1870-1914’ in Stephen Broadberry and Kevin O’Rourke (eds.), The Cambridge economic 
history of modern Europe: 1870 to the present, vol ii (Cambridge, 2012), pp 64-5. 
149 Perren, Agriculture in depression, p. 68.  
150 Liner transatlantic crossing times, 1833-1952,  
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/linertransatlantic.html 
accessed 1 Jan. 2015. 
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The impact of these developments is demonstrated by Table .1 below which shows 
the growth in British imports of meat and wheat for the period 1872 to 1912. 
 
Table 1.7. Supply sources for meat and wheat in Britain 1872-1912 
 
 
1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 
Source of product Cwt Cwt Cwt Cwt Cwt 
 
Millions Millions Millions Millions Millions 
Meat 
     
Home production 26.6 25.6 28.2 29.1 29.7 
Imports 4.2 9.0 13.5 20.3 21.8 
Total 30.8 34.6 41.7 49.4 51.5 
Per cent imports 13.6 26.0 32.3 41.1 42.3 
Wheat 
     
Home production 50.7 44.7 33.6 32.2 31.1 
Imports 47.4 80.7 95.6 107.9 131.1 
Total 98.1 125.4 129.2 140.1 162.2 
Per cent imports 48.3 64.4 73.4 77 80.8 
 
Source: These figures used in this table have been extrapolated by the author 
from data in Richard Perren, Agriculture in depression, 1870-1940 
(Cambridge, 1995), pp 8-16. 
 
 While the opening up of new supply markets for foodstuffs was good for society as 
a whole but was bad for British and Irish agriculture and by extension landlords. Ó 
Gráda estimated that between 1880 and 1902, British landlords, suffered a decline in 
their income of almost 30 per cent due to reductions in their rental and home farm 
incomes.151 
 
                                                 
151 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Agricultural decline 1860-1914’ in R. Floud and D. McCloskey (eds.), 
The economic history of Britain since the 1700s: 1860 to the 1970s, vol. ii (Cambridge, 
2009), p. 179. 
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The situation of Irish landlords was far worse than that of their British counterparts 
for two interconnected reasons. Firstly, the politicisation of the land question and the 
spread of orchestrated agrarian agitation culminating in the Land War (1879-81) and 
the Plan of Campaign (1886-91) meant that the financial wellbeing of landlords was 
affected by rent strikes, and the consequent fall in the value of their estates which led 
to an unwillingness by funders to lend. Coupled with these threats, was the British 
governments reaction, which was to introduce a series of land acts between 1870 and 
1896 designed to appease tenants and defuse political anger. Ireland had changed, 
and the era of landlords was about to enter its final phase. Crotty described the new 
landscape well when he wrote: 
 
During the Great Famine and the following decades, the character of the Irish 
rural population changed from predominantly proletariat to predominantly 
bourgeoise. The bourgeoise presented a more formidable opposition to the 
tenure system and, assisted by a changed political climate and political 
situation in Britain, succeeded in overthrowing the landlord-tenant system of 
tenure. The land was vested in the occupying farmers on exceedingly 
favourable terms.152  
 
Tenants were quick to seek rent reductions and abatements. James Donnelly 
recounted how tenants in Cork sought abatements on the first gale day of 1879 
which were rejected by most landlords. A similar plea on the November gale day 
met with a more favourable response when forty landlords reduced their rents by an 
average of 25 per cent.153 These reductions seem high relative to those granted by 
other landlords and may reflect specific issues. Terence Dooley estimated that Lord 
Clonbrock granted reductions to his tenants in each of the three years to 1883 of 2.3 
per cent, 5.3 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively.154 Rent reductions on a number 
of the eleven estates reviewed by William Vaughan covering the years 1880 to 1886 
show a relatively modest level of reductions ranging from 7.2 per cent in the case of 
the Garvagh estate to 1.7 per cent on the Erne estate.155 
 
                                                 
152 Raymond Crotty, Irish agricultural production: Its volume and structure (Cork, 1966), p. 
83. 
153 Donnelly, The land and the people of nineteenth-century Cork, pp 254-255. 
154 Dooley, The decline of the Big House, p. 93. 
155 Vaughan, Landlords and tenants, pp 239-240. 
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What was of much more significance, however, to landlords, was the level of rent 
reductions brought about by the introduction of the judicial rent review process in 
part 2, section 8 of the Land Law (Ireland) Act 1881. While intended to be a two-
way process which would allow either landlords or tenants to appeal a rent increase 
or decrease, because of the political situation it turned out to be generally a one-way 
process whereby tenants made little effort to agree rents directly with landlords and 
instead chose to appeal to the Land Commission courts to adjudicate on a fair rent. 
Once fixed in this way, the rent was set for a period (first term rent) of fifteen years. 
On expiry of that first-term. the tenant or the landlord could apply to the court again 
for a rent to be fixed for a further fifteen years (second-term rent). After another 
fifteen years, the process was repeated, and a rent fixed for a further fifteen years 
(third term rent). The judicial rent provision was intended to deal with exceptional 
cases where agreement could not be reached between landlord and tenant but as 
events transpired tenants preferred to use the court process as a matter of form. As a 
consequence, the courts became swamped in applications and the ‘rage for litigation’ 
referred to by Wyndham in introducing his 1902 and 1903 bills had begun.156 The 
judicial rent process effectively removed normal rent market conditions. Coupled 
with the effective introduction of dual ownership through the concession of the 
Three Fs, the 1881 legislation meant that the position of Irish landlords became even 
more untenable.157 
 
The impact of the judicial rent review process was extremely painful for landlords. 
Bailey calculated that 457,368, first term rents were set by the courts in the period up 
to 31 March 1916 and that the average reduction across the country was 20.7 per 
cent. In addition, a further 164,291 second term cases were dealt with, in the same 
time period, and the average reduction was 19.3 per cent. Only 5,007 third term rents 
were adjudicated on by March 1916 and these showed an average reduction of 9.2 
per cent.158 The mathematics of this meant that landlords, who had been through 
three judicial rent reviews, had to absorb an overall reduction of 41.6 per cent in 
                                                 
156 Hansard 4, cxx, 184 (25 Mar. 1903). 
157 Land law (Ireland) Act 1881 
158 William Frederick Bailey, The Irish land acts. A short sketch of their history and 
development (Dublin, 1917), p. 20. 
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their rental incomes from their 1881 levels. Few if any businesses could absorb this 
level of reduction in their income and landlords were no exception. 
 
To illustrate the predicament landlords found themselves in as a result of the judicial 
rent provisions of the 1881 Act, this study has taken as a starting point the research 
undertaken by Vaughan in his Landlords and tenants in mid-Victorian Ireland in 
relation to the expenditure on nine estates and as presented in Appendix 18 of that 
work. Vaughan based his research on family papers relating to nine estates between 
the years 1850 and 1880. He expressed expenditure as a percentage of rental income. 
Taking Vaughan’s average expenditure figure for the period 1850-1880, and 
assuming them to be fixed this study then offset them against judicial rent figures 
based on W.F. Bailey’s estimates set out above, thus making it possible to calculate a 
projected profitability for each estate over a forty-five-year period (three, fifteen-
year rent terms). The results of this exercise are set out in Appendix 1.1. The 
situation is best explained by looking at the example of the Clonbrock estate, 
extracted from Appendix 1.1. 
 
Table 1.8. Projected impact of judicial rent reductions on Clonbrock estate 
1880-1910 
 
Estate Description 1851-80 First-term 
Second -
term 
Third-
term 
  Average Rent rent Rent 
   Reduction reduction Reduction 
   20.70% 19.30% 9.20% 
  % % % % 
  Rents 100.0 79.3 64.0 58.1 
  Taxes -16.0 -16.0 -16.0 -16.0 
  Management -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 
Clonbrock Improvements -11.0 -11.0 -11.0 -11.0 
  Interest -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 
  House costs -16.0 -16.0 -16.0 -16.0 
  Total costs -50.0 -50.0 -50.0 -50.0 
  Profit 50.0 29.3 14.0 8.1 
            
Source: This table is an extract taken from Appendix 1.1. The assumptions 
underpinning the data are set out more fully in the appendix.    
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In the case of the Clonbrock estate, the figures show how the profitability of a 
significant, well-run and little encumbered estate would have been seriously 
undermined by the workings of the judicial rent system. Landlord reaction to 
declining profitability would have involved cutbacks in estate improvements and 
household expenses. If an estate such as that of Lord Clonbrock’s, could suffer in 
this way it is not difficult to understand how highly encumbered and less well 
managed estates would have fared.  
 
In terms of understanding the relationship between farm produce prices and estate 
rentals Figure 1.2 is instructive. It demonstrates that the two are almost perfectly 
correlated to the rent phases referred to in this section. From the highs of the 
Napoleonic wars period (phase 1), through the fall-off in the post war period (phase 
2), the precipitous fall as a result of the famine (phase 3) followed by the increases 
experienced in the 1850-1879 period (phase 4) and the declines in the post 1880 
period brought on by the Great Agricultural Depression (phase 5). It demonstrates 
how regardless to the political and other interventions, the fortunes of landlords and 
indeed their tenants are linked to economic forces more than any other influence.  In 
a situation where input costs such as labour and interest charges at best remained 
static and post the 1850s-productivity levelled off, there were only a limited number 
of options available to farmers including getting out of farming, changing from 
tillage to pasture and seeking significant rent reductions, or better still from a 
tenants’ perspective, not paying rent at all.159 The options for landlords were even 
fewer.   
 
If declining incomes and mounting debts were not sufficient challenges to deal with, 
there were also a number of developments in the wider environment that were 
having an impact on the already difficult financial lives of Irish landlords. Chief 
among these was the British governments changing taxation policies. 
 
 
                                                 
159 Thomas Barrington, ‘A review of Irish agricultural prices’ in Journal of the Statistical 
and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. xiv, No. 4 (1925-1927), p. 255. 
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1.6: Taxation policy 
 
At the start of the nineteenth century taxation was not really an issue for Irish 
landlords. Income tax when temporarily introduced in 1799 to fund the war effort did 
not apply to Ireland. What quasi taxes that did exist such as tithes, county cess and 
Poor Law rates from 1838, were largely levied on the occupiers of land rather than 
the owners. While this situation changed somewhat from the late 1830s whereby 
landlords gradually became liable for the collection and payment of these taxes, and 
even after the introduction of income tax to Ireland in 1853, tax was still not a major 
issue. 
 
It was however with the introduction of death duties in 1894 that tax began to 
impinge on the lives or more appropriately the deaths of Irish landlords. Income tax 
was dependent on the variability of income and thus could be discharged from same. 
Death duties on the other hand were payable on the capital value of an often illiquid 
and indivisible asset. Its imposition, on asset rich but cash poor, landowning families 
spelt disaster and led in many instances to the sale of large parts of estates both in 
Britain and Ireland. The introduction of death duties was to quote Cannadine ‘the 
first deliberate attempt to tax landed wealth.’160 Quite apart from the financial 
consequences for landlords of its introduction it signalled in a very clear and 
unambiguous way that the political order had changed.  
 
Succession duties which were in effect death or estate duties had been introduced by 
Gladstone in 1853 by means of the Succession Duty Act. This act imposed duties for 
the first time on the death of the owner of certain assets. The tax was paid by the 
beneficiary and the rate payable depended firstly on the value of the benefit received 
and secondly on the relationship between the beneficiary and the deceased person as 
provided for by section 10 of the Act.161  
 
 
                                                 
160 Cannadine, The decline and fall, p. 69. 
161 An Act for granting to Her Majesty duties on succession to property, and for altering 
certain provisions of the Acts charging duties on legacies and shares of personal estates, 
enacted 4th August 1853 herein after referred to as the Succession Duty Act 1853. 
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Table 1.9. Succession duty rates - Section 10 of the Succession Duty Act 1853 
 
Relationship between the Successor and Predecessor Rate of Duty 
 
Per cent 
Son, daughter, grandchild, grandparent 1.00% 
Brother, sister or descendant thereof 3.00% 
Uncle, aunt or first cousin 5.00% 
Uncle, aunts once removed or second cousins 6.00% 
No blood or marriage relationship  10.00% 
 
Source: An Act for granting to Her Majesty duties on succession to property, 
and for altering certain provisions of the Acts charging duties on legacies 
and shares of personal estates, HC, 4 August 1853. 
 
While the act covered both types of property i.e. real and personal, the act’s 
provisions meant that real property was excluded from a liability for succession duty. 
This effectively meant that where a person inherited land subject to him or her taking 
a life interest or a reversion was not liable to pay the duty. Given most landed estates 
were subject to life interests or reversions it essentially exempted land from 
succession duty. On the basis that real property represented the vast bulk of 
landowners’ estates it meant they were largely outside the scope of the tax whereas 
merchant and other wealthy professional classes, whose property was of a personal 
variety, were liable. This was to change as a result of the extensive changes made to 
Death Duties in terms of their application and scope, by the Finance Act 1894.  
 
Apart from bringing real property within the remit for tax, the 1894 Act contained 
several other important measures that were to make death duties pernicious as 
regards to the financial health of landowners. The first provision was that property 
was to be valued at effectively its open market value (O.M.V.).162 Prior to this, real 
property was taxed based on a multiple of the annual rent received. Thus, if a family 
farmed a large estate and did not pay rent it had no liability to death duties. The 
                                                 
162 Open market value (O.M.V.) is an estimate of the likely price that an asset will realise if 
sold in a competitive market where there is a willing seller and a willing buyer. In the 
absence of an actual sale the value is usually estimated by a valuation expert. 
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Finance Act 1894 assessed the land on its open market value regardless to the 
passing rent. 
 
The second was that the relationship provisions were removed in that the rate of tax 
payable was no longer dependent on the relationship between the deceased and the 
beneficiary as provided for in the 1853 Act. Under the Finance Act 1894, the same 
death duty was paid by an eldest son inheriting as would be paid by a total stranger. 
Another important feature introduced was the principle of graduation. Graduation 
meant that the rate of estate duty payable would vary depending on the value of the 
asset inherited. Recognising the difficulties posed on those estates made up of 
illiquid assets such as land the executors could make an application under Section 
6(8) of the act to pay the duty over an eight-year period by annual equal instalments 
or sixteen half yearly equal instalments. Failing this the duty was payable six months 
after the death [S.6(7)]. 
 
Table 1.10. Schedule of estate (death) duties introduced in the 1894 Act 
 
Where the principal value of the estate 
Estate Duty paid at the 
rate of 
£  
Exceeds - 100 and does not exceed 500 1.0 per cent 
Exceeds - 500 and does not exceed 1,000 2.0 per cent 
Exceeds - 1,000 and does not exceed 10,000 3.0 per cent 
Exceeds - 10,000 and does not exceed 25,000 4.0 per cent 
Exceeds - 25,000 and does not exceed 50,000 4.5 per cent 
Exceeds - 50,000 and does not exceed 75,000 5.0 per cent 
Exceeds - 75,000 and does not exceed 100,000 5.5 per cent 
Exceeds - 100,000 and does not exceed 150,000 6.0 per cent 
Exceeds - 150,000 and does not exceed 250,000 6.5 per cent 
Exceeds - 250,000 and does not exceed 500,000 7.0 per cent 
Exceeds - 500,000 and does not exceed 1,000,000 7.5 per cent 
Exceeds - 1,000,000 8.0 per cent 
 
 
Source: Section 17 of An Act to grant certain duties of customs and Inland 
Revenue, to alter other duties and to amend the law relating to customs and 
Inland Revenue, and to make other provision for the financial arrangements 
of the year. HC 31 July 1894. 
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Following on from the Finance Act 1894 successive governments sought to increase 
the revenue from this source by increasing the rates of duty. Notably, David Lloyd 
George when chancellor, saw death duties as a means of attacking the landed classes 
whom he despised.163 His famous 1909 Peoples Budget increased the rates of duty 
significantly, for example he increased the duty on estates of over £1 million from 
8.0 per cent to 15.0 per cent while at the same time introducing a range of additional 
duties on land such as increment value duty (20 per cent), reversionary duty (10 per 
cent), undeveloped land duty (1/2d in £1 annual charge) and mineral rights duty (5 
per cent).164 By 1919, the top rate of duty had risen to 40 per cent and by 1939 it was 
levied at 60 per cent. To make matters more difficult for taxpayers the Inland 
Revenue would not accept land in specie as payment for the duty owed.165 Thus, 
trustees were forced to sell land to discharge the liability, oftentimes in periods were 
land prices were severally depressed or were forced to borrow. 
 
Byron Dexter, writing in Foreign Affairs Journal described the introduction of estate 
duties in the following terms ‘Harcourt’s tax completed the destruction of the 
economic base of the old ruling class’ and emphasised that the measures had 
‘Brought a formal end to the privileged position of the British landed aristocracy.’166 
The impact of their introduction was not lost on popular culture of the day as 
evidenced by Oscar Wilde’s play The importance of being earnest which premiered 
in London on St Valentine’s day 1895, just ten months after the introduction of 
estate duties. In one scene Lady Bracknell laments; 
 
What between the duties expected of one during one’s lifetime, and the duties 
exacted from one after one’s death, land has ceased to be either a profit or a 
pleasure. It gives one a position, and prevents one from keeping it up. That’s 
all that can be said about land.167 
                                                 
163 Speaking at Limehouse, Manchester, Lloyd George said, ‘Who made ten thousand people 
owners of the soil, and the rest of us trespassers in the land of our birth?’ cited in Ian Packer, 
Lloyd George (London, 1998), p. 26. 
164 Finance (1909-10) Act 1910,  
165 In the above context, the term in specie refers to a situation where the Inland Revenue 
would, in settlement of a liability of, for example, £10,000 owing to them in respect of 
Death Duties, accept a parcel of land worth this amount in satisfaction of the debt. The 1894 
Act specified that no in specie payments would be accepted in payment of a liability. 
166 Byron Dexter, ‘The conservative approach to politics’ in Foreign Affairs (April 1949) pp 
44-69 
167 Oscar Wilde, The Importance of being earnest (London, 2013), act 1, line 510, p. 68. 
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Tax in all its guises but particularly Death Duties played an important part in 
undermining the financial health of the landed classes. The weakening of their 
political power as the nineteenth century progressed was underscored by there being 
drawn further and further into the tax net. The illiquid nature of their primary asset 
meant that the breakup of their holdings was inevitable. In that context, it is perhaps 
not unfair to conclude that measures such as the 1894 Finance Act was a clear 
example of where taxation would henceforth be used as an instrument of social 
policy in a society that placed little value on landlords. 
 
1.7: Conclusion 
 
The themes and trends identified in this chapter, both in terms of individual landlord 
behaviours and those in the wider external environment, were the primary reasons 
for their decline and ultimate demise. Politicised agrarian aggression such as that 
visited upon landlords by the Land League and the later Plan of Campaign did, of 
course, play a significant part particularly in encouraging the British government to 
bring forward land legislation that undermined landlords’ rights and powers. While 
possibly unintended, the judicial rent review process introduced by the 1881 Act was 
fundamental in reducing their future incomes and dealt a fatal blow to landlordism in 
Ireland.  
 
The demise of the Irish landed class should be viewed in a wider international 
context both politically and economically. The changes wrought by the seismic shifts 
in economic structures, initially as a consequence of the industrial revolution and 
subsequently by the emergence of new economic powers such as the United States, 
were both systemic and profound. The great tragedy for Ireland as a country was that 
those of the landed classes who held power for most of the nineteenth century were 
so inept and self-absorbed that they failed to grasp any opportunity to capitalise on 
these developments and instead, through incompetence and failure to take 
responsibility, condemned the country and its people to over a century of near 
economic paralysis and misery. 
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While part of a wider international context, the story of the Irish landed class is 
different than its British or European counterparts. This difference stems from two 
government interventions. The first, brought about by the orchestrated politicisation 
of the land issue, saw the British government intervene directly in the land tenure 
system through the enactment of a series of land measures from 1870 to 1895. These 
fundamentally altered property rights in favour of tenants and in so doing profoundly 
and irreversibly undermined the rights of landowners. The second intervention was 
the introduction of the Irish Land Act of 1903 by George Wyndham. This act 
provided Irish landlords with an opportunity to make a dignified and financially 
viable exit from landlordism. It is with this act and its financial implications for 
landlords that the rest of this thesis is concerned. 
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Chapter 2: George Wyndham and the Irish Land Act, 19031  
 
2.1: Introduction 
Commencing in 1870 successive British governments enacted a series of land acts 
that were to have a profound effect on Irish landlord-tenant relations. These pieces of 
legislation can be classified under two broad headings, namely those dealing with 
landlord-tenant relations and land purchase acts. The acts of 1870 and 1881 
(Gladstone Act) fell under the heading of landlord-tenant relations in that they 
sought to regulate the two parties interacted and their respective rights. The 1870 
Act, which provided limited compensation to tenants for both disturbance suffered 
and redress for improvements made to holdings in the event of being forced to quit a 
tenancy.2 The act largely failed due to vagueness in its interpretation and 
administrative and legal difficulty in its application. It’s significance however rested 
in that it marked the beginning of a new era land relations in Ireland.3  
 
The 1881 land act (Gladstone Act) was to have a more profound effect on landlords 
than the 1870 Act.4 In giving legal standing to the ‘Three Fs’, free sale, fixity of 
tenure and fair rent, it effectively introduced the concept of ‘dual ownership’ into 
Irish land relations. The act’s judicial rent provisions were to have an enormously 
detrimental impact on the financial lives of landlords over the next twenty-two years 
up to the enactment of the Wyndham Act. 
 
Land acts in 1885 (Ashbourne Act) and 1891 and 1896 (Balfour Acts) were 
primarily introduced to provide finance to tenants to purchase their holdings.5 While 
successful in facilitating transactions, they were both limited in the finance made 
available and the conditions attaching to them to have any significant effect on 
                                                 
1 Irish Land Act, 1903 [3 Ed. VII, c. 37] (14 Aug. 1903). Hereinafter referred to as The 
Wyndham Land Act or the Wyndham Act. 
2 Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act 1870 [33 & 34 Vict. c.46] (1 Aug. 1870). 
3 William Frederick Bailey, The Irish land acts. A short sketch of their history and 
development (Dublin, 1917), p. 18. 
4 Land Law (Ireland) Act 1881 [44 & 45 Vict. c. 49] (18 Aug. 1881). 
5 Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act 1885 [48 & 49 Vict. c. 73] (14 Aug. 1885]. Purchase of 
Land (Ireland) Act 1891 [54 & 55 Vict. c. 48] (5 Aug. 1891). Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1896 
[59 & 60 Vict. c. 25] (15 Aug. 1896).  
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overall land ownership structures. This would not come about until Wyndham’s 
great initiative in 1903.  
 
This chapter explores the reasons why the Wyndham Land Act 1903 was introduced 
and why it took the form it did. It examines Wyndham’s personal motivations in 
bringing the legislation and the part played by a number of key players such as 
Arthur Balfour, the Treasury, the various landlord and tenants representative groups 
and Irish newspapers. 
 
The chapter examines aspects of George Wyndham’s background and personality 
that might explain his approach to the issue of Irish land reform and in particular the 
importance of his relationship with his political mentor and patron, Arthur Balfour. 
In exploring the influences underpinning the genesis of the act it seeks to provide 
clarity to the confusion that surrounds the act’s introduction. The section also 
highlights the importance of the lessons learned from the failed 1902 Land Bill and 
how these influenced Wyndham’s plans for his 1903 equivalent. 
 
The 1902 Land Conference played a significant part in preparing the ground for the 
introduction of the 1903 Bill, as did the appointment of Anthony MacDonnell as 
under-secretary, and these developments are investigated and evaluated as is the 
little-known commissioning of a report prepared by William Bailey into the situation 
on those estates where land sales were made under previous land acts. 
 
The chapter draws heavily on the Balfour papers held in the British Library for 
correspondence between Wyndham and Balfour, contemporary newspapers, personal 
memoirs and records of parliamentary debates to provide background and context. 
 
 
2.2: George Wyndham 
 
George Wyndham was born in London in 1863, the eldest son of Percy Scawen 
Wyndham and Madeline Eden (nee Campbell). He was the second eldest in a family 
of three daughters and two sons. The Wyndhams were a landed gentry family with 
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origins dating back into the middle ages. Wyndham’s father was a landowner and a 
Conservative M.P. for West Cumberland for twenty-five years, having succeeded his 
uncle, Sir Henry Wyndham in 1860.6 
 
Wyndham had ancestral connections to Ireland on both his mother’s and his father’s 
side. His father was the second son of Lord Leconfield who owned extensive estates 
in Co. Clare (37,292 acres, rateable valuation £15,699) and Co. Limerick (6,629 
acres, rateable valuation £4,820).7 His mother was the daughter of Sir Guy Campbell 
and Pamela FitzGerald who was the grand-daughter of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, the 
rebel leader of the 1798 rebellion. His uncle, Richard Bourke, 6th earl of Mayo was 
three times chief secretary for Ireland and viceroy of India from 1869 until his 
assassination in 1872 in the Andaman Islands.8 The 7th earl of Mayo, Dermot Robert 
Wyndham Burke, was Wyndham’s first cousin. He held estates in Co. Kildare and 
Co. Meath and became one of the four landlord representatives at the 1902 Irish 
Land Conference.9 Wyndham was related to Windham Thomas Wyndham-Quin, the 
4th earl of Dunraven who also was a landlord representative at the 1902 Conference. 
 
George Wyndham was as a child a precocious talent. Indulged by his parents he was 
said to be ‘a beautiful young man’ who ‘Even in his teens was treated like a genius.’ 
and ‘… was said to be the most gifted young man of his generation.’10 Wyndham’s 
first schooling was under the supervision of the Rev. C.G. Chittenden (1874-77) who 
also taught Arthur Balfour who was fifteen years his senior. Following the family 
tradition, he went to Eton (1877-80) and Sandhurst Military college (1881-84). On 
leaving Sandhurst he joined the 16th Lancers before joining his father’s old regiment, 
the Coldstream Guards. He saw active service in Egypt and the Sudan.11 
                                                 
6 John Biggs Davison, George Wyndham, A study in Toryism (London, 1951), p. 8. 
7 Return of owners of land of one acre and upwards in the several counties, counties of 
cities, and counties of town in Ireland (Baltimore, 1988), pp 111,150. 
8 W.W. Hunter, The life of the Earl of Mayo – Fourth Viceroy of India (London, 1876), i, p. 
221. 
9 Alvin Jackson, ‘Wyndham, George’ in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.jproxy.nuim.ie/view/article/37052 accessed 13 Apr. 2017.  
10 Jane Ridley and Clayre Percy (eds), The letters of Arthur Balfour and Lady Elcho, 1885-
1917 (London, 1992), p. 12.  
11 Patrick Maume, ‘Wyndham, George’ in Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009), 
Vol. 9, p.1063. 
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In 1887, he married Sibell Mary, the Countess of Grosvenor who was daughter of 
the 9th earl of Scarborough and the widow of Victor Alexander Grosvenor heir to the 
dukedom of Westminster. Sibell who was ten years older than Wyndham had three 
children from her first marriage, one of whom, Hugh Richard Arthur Grosvenor, 
became the 2nd duke of Westminster on his majority in 1899. As heir to the family 
fortune based on significant land holdings in central London, Bendor Grosvenor, as 
he was known, was one of the wealthiest men in the world. The couple had one son 
of their own, Percy who was killed in action in France in 1914.      
 
Wyndham’s parents were members of a group known as the Souls. The group which 
came into being around 1885 consisted mainly of aristocratic intellectuals and art 
lovers like the Wyndhams and others such as Arthur Balfour, Margot Asquith, Hugo 
Charteris, Lord Curzon and Alfred Lyttelton.12 Wyndham and his four siblings 
became prominent members of this coterie and as a result George’s relationship with 
Arthur Balfour flourished. Indicative of the strength of the networks that developed 
from this grouping was that four of Balfour’s cabinet in 1903 were Souls: Balfour 
himself, George Wyndham, St John Brodrick and Alfred Lyttelton.13 So it was that 
while on his honeymoon in 1887, George Wyndham received a letter from Arthur 
Balfour, the newly appointed chief secretary for Ireland, asking him to become his 
private secretary, a position which Wyndham was delighted to accept given the fact 
that he ‘hero worshiped’ Balfour and was ‘mesmerised by him’.14 Thus began 
Wyndham’s relationship with Ireland. 
 
As secretary to Balfour, Wyndham was involved in counteracting the Plan of 
Campaign of the late 1880s. T.P. O’Connor described Wyndham’s role as ‘…[he] 
writes his most impudent letters, concocts his most unreliable statistics, and 
generally outdoes his chief for … impudence and vulgarity.’15 In 1889 he 
commenced his parliamentary career when at the age of twenty-six he was elected 
M.P. for Dover. Working as Balfour’s unofficial cabinet secretary for most of the 
                                                 
12 Angela Lambert, Unquiet Souls: The Indian summer of the British aristocracy, 1880-1918 
(London, 1984), pp 87-94.  
13 Jane Ridley and Clayre Percy (eds), The letters of Arthur Balfour and Lady Elcho, 1885-
1917 (London, 1992), p. 197. 
14 Ibid, p. 35. 
15 Patrick Maume , ‘Wyndham, George’ in DIB, p. 1063. 
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1890s he received his first ministerial office when he was appointed by Balfour’s 
uncle, Lord Salisbury, as under-secretary for war in 1898. Because the secretary for 
war, the marquess of Lansdowne, sat in the Lords this allowed Wyndham significant 
profile, as he dealt with all war related matters in the Commons.  In 1900, he was 
appointed chief secretary for Ireland and in 1902, following the appointment of 
Balfour as prime minister, was given a seat at cabinet.16 
 
As a man, Wyndham was a complex figure. His biographers portray him as an 
urbane, and romantic character, as someone with aesthetic tastes, a lover of literature 
and music and a product of the best of British aristocracy and nobility.17 To others he 
was a ‘sentimentalist who hasn’t  the hard sense to do strong things’ with ‘no settled 
convictions’.18 He was an aristocrat who felt gentlemen of his class were fit by 
education and habits to rule the state and by so doing would provide a model that 
middleclass men could emulate.19 Even his friend Wilfred Scawen Blunt described 
him as ‘George represents all that is most brutal in modern English politics and it 
marks the decline of the higher traditions to find one like him proclaiming and 
defending it.’20 Arthur Lee gave an insight into how he was regarded by his fellow 
politicians: ‘… the rank and file [of the party] had never cottoned to his dandified 
and over-polished parliamentary manners, which led one old Tory member to mutter 
in my hearing after one of Wyndham’s Burke-conscious perorations, ‘damn that 
fellow, he pirouettes like a dancing master’21 
 
While Wyndham may not have held the affections of the ordinary members of the 
party he did of its two most senior members the prime minister and the chancellor of 
                                                 
16 The Times, 9 Aug. 1902. 
17 This image emerges from a number of biographical works such as John Biggs-Davidson, 
George Wyndham, A study in Toryism, (London,1951) and in particular Charles T. Gatty, 
George Wyndham – Recognita (London, 1917). 
18 Letter to Mary Curzon in J.W. Mackail and Guy. Wyndham (eds), Life and letters of 
George Wyndham, (New York, 1977), vol, i, p. 151. and Almeric Fitzroy, Memoirs, (2 vols, 
London, n.d.), I, p. 243.   
19 Nancy W. Ellenberger, ‘Constructing George Wyndham: Narratives of aristocratic 
masculinity in Fin-de-Siécle England’, in Journal of British Studies, vol. 39, no. 4 (Oct. 
2000), p. 490. 
20 Elizabeth Longford, A pilgrimage of passion: the life of Wilfred Scawen Blunt (London, 
1979), pp 343-4.  
21 Arthur Hamiliton Lee, A good innings: the private papers of Viscount Lee of Fareham 
(London, 1974), pp 128-9. 
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the exchequer and these would be critical in his attempts to move forward his 
legislative proposals. 
 
2.3: The genesis of the Wyndham Land Act 
 
In historiography, the genesis and timing of the Irish Land Act 1903 has been 
clouded in confusion, with historians attributing its enactment to various factors. 
Pomfret (1930) saw the act as the result of a combination of circumstances, ‘the most 
sympathetic and understanding of Irish chief secretaries [Wyndham] and who with 
Redmond and Plunkett ushered in a new era in Ireland’, ‘[The Conference] effect on 
public opinion of all kinds’, the ‘miracle that had been performed in Ireland’ 
referring to the bringing about of agreement between unionist and nationalists on the 
issue of land reform and the support of Arthur Balfour for the measure.22 F.S.L. 
Lyons (1963) saw the Wyndham Act as part of a government policy that ‘moved 
inexorably towards the ending of landlordism’.23 While stating that the 1902 Land 
Conference, ‘formed the basis of the Land Act that Wyndham triumphantly passed 
through parliament’, he also saw the act as being built on ‘the edifice of constructive 
unionism’24 In a separate work he stated that the act ‘represented the climax of what 
might be called ‘constructive unionism’.25  Furthermore, Lyons speculated that the 
cultural renaissance movement of people such as Shawe-Taylor, Horace Plunkett, 
George Russell, Betty Balfour, and orchestrated by Lady Gregory, contributed 
significantly to the creation of an environment suitable for the act’s passing.26  
Cannadine (1990)  who disagreed with this latter claim, also noted the role of 
Shawe-Taylor in driving the Land Conference ‘the results [of which] were embodied 
into the Wyndham land Act of 1903.’27 
 
Bew (1987) saw the act in the context of ‘war weariness’ by both sides in the land 
conflict and the Land Conference as an attempt by landlords ‘to launch a conciliatory 
                                                 
22 John E. Pomfret, The struggle for land in Ireland, 1800-1923 (New York, 1930), pp 276-
291. 
23 Lyons, F.S.L., Ireland since the famine (London,1973), p.80. 
24 Ibid., pp 218-219. 
25 F.S.L. Lyons, ‘The aftermath of Parnell, 1891-1903’ in W.E. Vaughan (ed), A new history 
of Ireland, vi: Ireland under the Union, 1870-1921 (Oxford, 2010), p. 97. 
26 Lyons, Ireland since the famine, pp 233-4. 
27 Cannadine, The decline and fall of the British aristocracy, p. 478.  
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initiative’ This war weariness was not brought about by agitation but ‘by the 
automatic action of recurring litigation.’ Like Lyons, Bew also saw the legislation as 
part of the process of constructive unionism. Bew also expressed the view that 
Wyndham’s ‘extravagant and ambitious personality … could not resist the 
opportunity to give constructive unionism a more radical tinge’ 28 A somewhat 
similar motivation was ascribed to Wyndham by Gaily (1987) when he referred to 
‘Wyndham’s opportunistic manipulation of Irish politics’.29   While not devoting too 
much attention to the act, Foster (1988) saw the Wyndham Act as part of a process 
that began ‘in the upheavals of 1879-82’ and climaxed in 1903.30 Bull (1996), while 
seeing the unanimity that emerged from the Land Conference as important, laid 
emphasise on the fact that the Wyndham Act ‘in all aspects, must not be seen as an 
isolated piece of legislation.,’ but rather as a ‘cumulative outcome of a whole series 
of legislative actions dating back to at least 1870.’ Bull also saw Wyndham’s 
measure in more high politics terms in that he considered the agreement between 
landlords and tenants manifested through the Land Conference as part of 
‘transformation from a colonised to a self-managing polity, from a pre-modern to a 
capitalist agricultural system’. 31 Dooley (2001) saw the legislation being influenced 
greatly by the report of the Land Conference in that it laid down a basis which would 
enable landlords to sell and tenants to buy their holdings.32   
 
A different reason for Wyndham’s drive to enact the legislation is put forward by 
Campbell (2005). Based on a study of the United Irish League (U.I.L.) activities, 
particularly in Co. Galway but also further afield, Campbell argued that Wyndham’s 
hand was forced: ‘the introduction of the Act needs to be explained in the context of 
U.I.L.’s agitation for compulsory land purchase; and the effect which that agitation 
had on the government, the Irish landlords and Captain John Shawe-Taylor.’33 While 
agreeing the validity of Campbell’s claim regarding U.I.L. agitation Cosgrove (2008) 
also gave prominence to the part played by T.W. Russell’s campaign for compulsory 
                                                 
28 Bew, Conflict and conciliation in Ireland 1890-1910, pp 96-100. 
29 Andrew Gailey, Ireland and the death of kindness: the experience of constructive 
unionism, 1890-1905 (Cork, 1987), p. 192. 
30 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (London, 1988), p. 414. 
31 Bull, Land, politics & nationalism, pp 152-5. 
32 Dooley, The decline of the big house, p. 113. 
33 Fergus Campbell, ‘Irish popular politics and the making of the Wyndham Land Act, 1901-
1903’ in The Historical Journal, vol. 45 (Dec. 2002), p. 773. 
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purchase in Ulster as a major factor on the timing  and form of Wyndham’s 
introduction of his legislation.34 Credibility is given to these arguments by a 
contemporary article by Bastable who stated in 1903: ‘Two influences were, 
however, of peculiar importance in hastening on the act of 1903. One was the strong 
movement in favour of compulsory purchase initiated by Mr. T. W. Russell, and 
supported by the Protestant and Unionist farmers of the North. Another was the 
increasing difficulty experienced in keeping up the agitation connected with the Irish 
party’s policy.’35  
 
The existence of such divergent views from historians might be explained by 
reference to the timescales being looked at and the contexts involved, be they high or 
more grassroot politics perspectives. In a broader context, the Wyndham Act, was as 
suggested by Lyons, Bew, Bull and Foster, part of a wider process of constructive 
unionism initiated by Gladstone in the 1870s and designed to pacify Ireland and 
ensure that it remained a loyal part of the empire. This argument is valid but one that 
this study regards as providing more context than actual motivation. John Biggs 
Davidson, one of Wyndham’s biographers, maintained that ‘Wyndham’s plan was a 
means of euthanasia for Home Rule.’36 Support for such a view comes from Alvin 
Jackson who cites John Dillon as advising an American politician ‘If this Act (of 
1903) is allowed to work ... there will be an end to the national movement before 12 
months are over.’ 37 
 
The confluence of circumstances, including the nature of Wyndham’s ambitious 
personality advanced by Pomfret, Bew and Gaily, is true in a more medium-term 
timescale perspective. The issue of agitation put forward by Campbell and Cosgrove 
has in the opinion of this study more to do with timing than the more substantive 
issue of its form. That such diversity exists is not surprising, particularly in the light 
of what Wyndham himself had to say in relation to his motivations in bringing the 
legislation forward, much of which will be evident in the remainder of this chapter.  
                                                 
34 Patrick Cosgrove, ‘The Wyndham Land Act, 1903: The final solution to the Irish land 
question?’ (Ph.D. thesis, N.U.I. Maynooth, 2008) p. 11. 
35 C.F. Bastable, ‘The Irish land purchase act of 1903’, in The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 18, no. 1, (Nov.1903), p. 5.   
36 Biggs Davidson, George Wyndham, p. 132. 
37 Alvin Jackson, Ireland 1798-1998, p. 153. 
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Based on the research undertaken and a wide range of sources examined this study 
has come to its own conclusions as to what Wyndham’s motivations were in 
introducing the act and why it took the form it did, and these will be explored 
further.  
 
2.4: Wyndham as chief secretary 
 
In taking up his appointment as chief secretary in 1900 Wyndham could have been 
forgiven for believing that his political career was on a fast-upward path, repeating 
that of a number of his predecessors in the post such as Arthur Wellesley, Robert 
Peel and Arthur Balfour, all whom became prime minister.  
 
As early as February 1890, when George Wyndham made his maiden speech in 
parliament, it was clear that he had an in-depth knowledge and understanding of the 
intricacies and subtleties of Irish land legislation. In a detailed response to William 
O’Brien, the debutant member displayed such ability and intimacy with the subject 
that an opposition member, Sir Joseph Pease (Liberal) declared: 
 
I think I may be allowed to congratulate the hon. Gentleman who has just sat 
down on the able manner in which he has addressed the House in a maiden 
speech. I trust that there will ever exist in this House that feeling of esprit de 
corps which enables us to congratulate hon Gentlemen, especially those 
young of years, who on their entrance to this House give so abundant a 
promise of becoming valuable additions to its debating power.’38  
 
Wyndham’s knowledge of the Irish land question was greatly enhanced by his period 
as private secretary to Arthur Balfour, the chief secretary for Ireland (1887-1891). 
When in October 1900 Balfour as Leader of the House was looking to appoint his 
own chief secretary, he showed little hesitation in appointing Wyndham to the 
position. Wyndham and Balfour had remained close friends as the copious 
correspondence between the two indicates.39 Wyndham saw Balfour as his mentor 
                                                 
38 Hansard 3, cccxli, 492 (17 Feb. 1890). 
39 The friendship between Arthur Balfour and George Wyndham appears to have developed 
through familial connections. Biggs Davidson, Wyndham’s biographer, makes references to 
Balfour attending Wyndham family gatherings prior to his appointing George as his private 
secretary in 1887 when George was twenty-four. The two had much in common. Both 
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and sought his advice on a range of matters both professional and personal.40 Indeed 
it was a two-way process in that Balfour sought Wyndham’s advice on such diverse 
matters as the appointment of a poet laureate and the political situation in South 
Africa.41 42 It is clear also from correspondence that the two communicated on a 
private and confidential basis. For example, in a briefing document while chief 
secretary, Wyndham wrote with reference to Cadogan and Ashbourne’s proposals, 
‘Before touching on the merits I should like to give you and you only the life history 
of this letter.’43 Wyndham knew he was on relatively safe ground in this regard as 
Balfour disliked lord Ashbourne intensely. Referring to him, Balfour stated: ‘There 
is one Irishman whose tongue I am afraid of and that is Ashbourne. I had rather carry 
on serious business in the middle of a Manchester cotton mill than within reach of 
that man’s voice!’44 This relationship with Balfour and indeed those with the 
chancellors of the exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks Beach and in particular his 
successor Charles Ritchie, were to prove very valuable in soliciting support for his 
land bills of 1902 and 1903. 
 
In 1900, Ireland was of crucial importance to the British Empire. For an empire that 
was in the process of spending £250 million and expending 30,000 lives in 
defending its interests in South Africa the prospect of further disintegration would 
have had profound consequences. John Biggs Davidson summarised the situation 
well when he wrote: ‘The World was becoming a dangerous place for the richest of 
Empires, and the benevolence of Ireland was as necessary to Great Britain as was 
that of France.’45  Similarly, writing about the period shortly after he became chief 
secretary for Ireland, Wyndham stated: ‘But Parliamentary power depended not upon 
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imperialism or social reform but upon the question of Ireland.’46 This was the 
environment into which George Wyndham became chief secretary for Ireland. 
While the factors identified by historians and discussed above all contributed to a 
greater or lesser extent to the shape, form and timing of its introduction, the Irish 
Land Act 1903, it can be argued that the legislation owes more to its originator, 
George Wyndham, than to any other set of circumstances that historiography has 
identified. In all probability land act legislation, would have continued along the 
lines of earlier measures but it was Wyndham’s personal drive and ambition that saw 
the introduction of the expansive and expensive legislation that is known as the 
Wyndham Land Act. For Wyndham, this was an important step along the path of 
pacifying Ireland and in so doing enhancing his political reputation and positioning 
him to become a future prime minister. In November 1901, he told his brother Guy, 
‘I want to smash agitation, introduce the land bill, get money for harbour-fishing 
policy in the west and float a catholic university.’47 
 
2.5: The Irish Land Bill 1902 
 
Historians have paid little attention to the 1902 Land Bill other than to say that it 
satisfied few and was wisely withdrawn by Wyndham when he realised that it had 
little support and was unlikely to be passed.48 Even Wyndham’s biographer John 
Biggs Davidson treats the subject tersely when concluding ‘[It was] first shot 
misfired. The Land Bill 1902 pleased nobody and was dropped. Wyndham 
proceeded to reload.’49 While this may be a succinct reading it belies the insight that 
the preparation and the passage of the bill provided Wyndham with and how it 
helped him formulate the successful 1903 bill. It also afforded Wyndham an 
opportunity to gauge the reaction of parliamentarians and the wider Irish and British 
publics to the measures. From the correspondence between Wyndham and Balfour it 
is also evident that Wyndham’s hand was forced with regard to the introduction of 
the 1902 Bill by internal Tory party politics and to a lesser extent by the U.I.L. land 
agitation campaign.    
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Even prior to his formal swearing in as chief secretary, Wyndham set out his 
intentions to his prime minister. In a letter to Balfour dated 26 October 1900 he 
stated: ‘Are we then to do nothing. In my opinion, subject to reflection, things must 
be done, not now but in the course of the next three years.’50 In this letter he refers to 
the U.I.L. in the following way: ‘Redmond discouraged it. Healy stabbed it. The 
priests fought it in the election. It won hands down.’  He went on to categorise the 
attitude of unionists and nationalists to the land issue as ‘The only material 
difference between Unionist and Nationalists is that the former want [to give] fair 
prices and the latter unfair prices to the landlords.’  His assessment of the political 
situation in Ireland was encapsulated in the following paragraph: ‘All, friends and 
foes, are strangely cut off from British sentiment. They believe that in spite of War 
taxation and Imperial politics, Ireland is going to bathe once more in the limelight.’ 
In a rather gloomy summation, but one nonetheless that provides an insight into the 
social context of the time, he wrote. ‘In a few years the small shopkeeper, the money 
lender, the village solicitor will buy out the crofter and the weary round will begin 
again.’ To counteract such a development Wyndham included in his 1903 Bill a 
clause that a part of the annuity representing a one-eight portion would remain in 
perpetuity and could not be repaid. The reason for this clause was to restrict the 
purchaser’s ability to mortgage or sublet the property without the permission of the 
Land Commission and thus allow the State to maintain some control over the asset 
by exercising a veto. The effect of this provision was to prevent moneylenders 
seeking to gain control of the asset. It turned out to be one of the most hotly 
contested provisions in the bill and was withdrawn at the committee stage. 51 
A noticeable feature of the correspondence between Wyndham and Balfour is the 
former’s thinly veiled antipathy toward the lord lieutenant, Lord Cadogan, and to 
Lord Ashbourne the Irish lord chancellor. Until 1902, Wyndham was not a member 
of the cabinet whereas both Cadogan and Ashbourne were. This clearly placed him 
at a disadvantage in presenting his views and may well have contributed to his 
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(Hansard 4, cxx, 194 (25 Mar 1903)   
77 
 
animosity towards the two peers. The fact that both gentlemen were working on land 
legislation at the same time as Wyndham without any semblance of cooperation 
would imply that there was political rivalry between the three British representatives 
in Ireland and no doubt this motivated Wyndham to push forward with his own 
measures. For instance, in a letter to Balfour on the 13 January 1901, just two 
months after his appointment as chief secretary, he stated: ‘I have been working 
away at the land question ... meanwhile Cadogan and Ashbourne have been working 
also at the same problem.’52  In another letter on the same date he stated: ‘I argued 
and wrote (to Cadogan) again urging that I doubted if there would be time for 
legislation this year...’ 53 In the same letter: ‘I do not think we are ready for 
legislation, the House and press are not ready for it, the proposals of lords Cadogan 
and Ashbourne would throw away our sops to the landlords without increasing 
purchase appreciably.’ As if to highlight the difficulties posed to Wyndham by not 
having a place at the cabinet table, Balfour on 18 January 1901, issued a thinly 
veiled rebuke to him for not keeping him informed when he wrote: ‘I was slightly 
embarrassed at cabinet today over Irish matters, since Ashbourne and Cadogan were 
inclined to press their views you know of and I was not in a position to say anything 
from you.’54 
 
Frustrations were very evident in a letter of 8 February 1901 when Wyndham 
advised Balfour that Cadogan had proposed a paragraph for inclusion in the king’s 
speech to parliament referring to ‘certain amendments of the law relating to the 
voluntary sale by landlords in Ireland to occupying tenants of their holdings.’ He 
went on to argue that this approach would undermine hopes of bringing in 
‘untenanted lands’ to [the] scheme. He advised Balfour if they subsequently had to 
bring untenanted lands into the legislation that this would be seen as a victory for 
Russell and O’Brien and the agitators. He signed off this letter with a postscript with 
the withering comment that ‘Cadogan’s proposed Bill is trifling and 
                                                 
52 Wyndham to Arthur Balfour, 13 Jan. 1901 (B.L., Arthur Balfour Papers, Add MS 
49803/151). 
53 Wyndham to Arthur Balfour, 13 Jan. 1901 (B.L., Arthur Balfour Papers, Add MS 
49803/179). 
54 Arthur Balfour to Wyndham, 18 Jan. 1901 (B.L., Arthur Balfour Papers, Add MS 49803). 
78 
 
impracticable.’55  Matters between Britain’s representatives in Ireland continued 
strained as evidenced by a letter from Wyndham to Balfour regarding Cadogan’s 
reluctant approach to further land reform ‘Londonderry, Cadogan and Ashbourne 
seem to take the view that we should habitually sport the white feather in Ulster.’ 56  
This series of correspondence points to a difficult relationship and an intense 
political rivalry between Wyndham and Cadogan. It also demonstrates how close his 
relationship was with Balfour and how important this was for his political ambitions. 
It is arguable if a chief secretary, without such support from his prime minister, 
would have contemplated introducing such expansive and expensive legislation as 
the 1903 Irish Land Act.  
 
The correspondence between the chief secretary and his prime minister is also 
interesting in terms of highlighting the tone and mood of the period. For instance, in 
a previously referred to letter from late 1900, Wyndham suggested that there is no 
great urgency regarding the introduction of land legislation and it should be looked 
at within three years (from October 1900) and that people are not yet ready for it at 
present (January 1901). By November 1901, however, he wrote to Balfour:  
 
I cannot say too earnestly how necessary I feel it to be that the cabinet should 
decide on a comprehensive land policy and place me in a position to speak 
early in the session or sooner. Every day that I give to studying the question 
convinces me that we must accept the ‘in globo’ principle and announce it 
soon. It would be a great calamity not to come out with our policy until the 
agitation has gone further.57  
 
Whether such a change of political tempo was brought about by U.I.L. agitation or 
political infighting in the Tory ranks or indeed Wyndham’s discovery of what he saw 
as the in globo principle is debatable.58 What is clear however is that Wyndham had 
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sufficient political influence to get his way but the haste was to reveal itself in terms 
of deficiencies in his 1902 Bill and its subsequent withdrawal. 
 
The passage of the 1902 Bill through the house had two significant implications. For 
the historian, it provides significant insight into the logic underpinning the need for 
such legislation. Moreover, and more importantly for Wyndham and Balfour it 
showed the weaknesses and deficiencies that were present and which needed to be 
rectified in the successful 1903 Bill. This study would argue that without the 1902 
Bill the Wyndham Land Act 1903 and the transformation of land ownership in 
Ireland would not have come to fruition.   
 
In introducing the 1902 Bill, Wyndham made it clear that the raison d’étre for the 
bill was to try and ensure that the needs of Ireland’s principal industry, agriculture, 
were addressed in such a way that did not require significant expenditure in policing. 
In the opening lines of his speech to parliament on the 25 March 1902 he justified 
the bill’s introduction in the following way: 
 
Agriculture is the principal industry of Ireland, and that industry, whether for 
these or other reasons is both controlled and safeguarded by the State at an 
enormous cost to the taxpayer. The Irish Land Commission ... cost to the 
taxpayer £140,000 [per annum]. The Royal Irish Constabulary are largely 
engaged in protecting their liberty at an annual cost of £1,350,000. And yet, 
in spite of these precautions ... no one can reasonably be expected to be 
satisfied either with the present state or the future prospect of agriculture in 
Ireland. We cannot leave it alone. We cannot trust in what is called the free 
play of competition and contract.59 
 
The 1902 Bill contained several important innovations that were to become integral 
to the 1903 Act. These included the payment of purchase consideration in cash rather 
than as heretofore, land bonds, the in globo purchase provision, the abolition of the 
‘decadal rent’ system, a reduction in the annuity rate from 4 per cent to 3.75 per cent, 
a price settlement procedure and several other innovative measures. Such measures 
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will be discussed in more detail when reviewing the eventual 1903 Act. Despite 
these innovations, the bill did not win sufficient support in parliament and was 
withdrawn on 10 June during the committee stage.60  
 
There were a number of reasons why the bill failed to attract support and an 
examination of these goes some way towards understanding why Wyndham went 
about preparing to introduce his 1903 Bill.   
 
The first criticism was that the bill had been prepared without any consultation with 
the Irish political representatives. John Redmond in his contribution to the debate 
stated: ‘... the English gentleman who goes over from this country to govern Ireland 
prepares a great measure which is to settle this question, and he prepares it without 
consulting one single representative of the people whose very lives are at stake.’61 
Redmond was not alone in making this criticism and it is hard not to reach the 
conclusion that the Land Convention which presaged the 1903 Bill had its origins in 
these types of criticisms 
 
A second objection put forward by Redmond related to the ‘Take it or leave it’ 
manner with which the bill was presented. Such an approach solicited a terse 
response from Redmond when he said: ‘he may take the bill back to Downing Street 
tonight’.62  Another Irish M.P., William Delany, one of the founders of the U.I.L, 
had no compunction in labelling the measure as ‘a landlords Bill’, and he believed 
‘the machinery embodied in it was quite inadequate.’63  The bill was described by Dr 
Robert Ambrose, M.P. for Mayo West, as purely an exercise in ‘tinkering’.64 Tim 
Healy described it as: ‘a limited Bill, and to some extent a small Bill’. 65 Emotively 
he termed the measures as a ‘bribe’ to landlords a term that would be used many 
times over when discussing the subsequent 1903 Bill.66 More substantial objections 
were made that the bill failed to address the issue of compulsory purchase, evicted 
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tenants, and the obdurate nature of the price fixing mechanisms to satisfy landlords 
with regard to price. 
 
Writing nineteen years after the bill’s withdrawal, lord Dunraven noted: 
 
This bill was not a very great advance upon earlier Land Purchase Acts. It did 
not provide for the completion of purchase on anything like an adequate scale 
nor did it afford any remedy for the sufferings of evicted tenants. It did not 
recognise the pressing problems of the Irish Land system, and it was 
condemned by the United Irish League and the great majority of the people.67 
 
The withdrawal of the bill represented a failure by Wyndham to recognise the 
political realities of the situation and to do the necessary ground work. Criticism can 
be made of Wyndham but a failure to learn from the situation would not be one of 
them. In drafting and, more particularly, preparing the political groundwork for his 
1903 Bill, Wyndham took on board the lessons learned during the unsuccessful 
passage of the 1902 Bill through parliament. He saw the weaknesses and in 
particular Redmond’s criticism that the bill had been introduced without any 
consultation with Irish representatives in parliament. Correcting this omission was to 
become a major feature in the preparation for what was to follow. 
 
2.6: Laying the groundwork for the 1903 Land Bill 
 
It could be argued that Wyndham’s biggest triumph with regard to the Irish Land 
Bill 1903 was that he managed to have it put before parliament in the first instance. 
The withdrawal of his 1902 Bill did not reflect well on him, or more importantly, his 
prime minister. Yet one year later, to the very day after the introduction of the 
aborted 1902 Bill, 25 March 1903, Wyndham introduced his Irish Land Bill 1903 
with the full support of his prime minister.  
The strength of Balfour’s support for the new bill was evident in a letter to King 
Edward VII: 
 
This [1903 Land Act] is a very far reaching measure; and the Irish 
government are sanguine that it will settle for all time the Irish land 
difficulty. The objections to it – and there are objections to all things – arise 
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from the fact that it makes a heavy call on British credit, already handicapped 
by the past war loans and the Transvaal borrowings; and that it will be 
represented as a great gift to the Irish tenants and landlords at the cost of the 
British taxpayer. The cabinet did not underrate the force either of the 
financial or the political argument, but they are clearly of the opinion that in 
the interests of great policy, minor difficulties must be ignored.68 
 
This letter is important in understanding the British government’s attitude to the 
Wyndham Act and the significance of the land issue to placating Ireland. It makes 
clear that Balfour saw the act as finally settling the Irish land question ‘for all time’. 
It is also evident that despite the fact that the cost and risks to the British taxpayer 
and the way in which it will be seen as pandering to Irish interests that the 
government feels these were prices worth paying ‘in the interests of great policy’. 
Given the nature of the communication between the prime minister and his monarch 
it is not difficult to understand Wyndham’s resolve and confidence regarding his 
proposed 1903 Bill.    
 
The foundations for a political victory are rarely laid on the day of victory but rather 
they are made in the long months before culmination. And so, it was in the case of 
the Irish Land Act 1903. The catalyst came from a well-documented letter from 
Captain John Shawe-Taylor to a number of newspapers in which he pleaded:  
 
... most earnestly invites the Duke of Abercorn. Mr John Redmond, Lord 
Barrymore, Col. Saunderson, the Lord Mayor of Dublin, the O’Connor Don, 
Mr William O’Brien and Mr T W Russell to a conference to be held in 
Dublin within one month from this date [3 September 1902], when an honest 
simple and practical solution of the present trouble will be submitted, and I 
am confident that a settlement on terms satisfactory to landlord and tenant 
will be arrived at. 69 
 
Why this letter should invoke such a reaction is an interesting question. 
Historiography puts this down to George Wyndham seizing upon the idea to call a 
land conference and this, indeed may have been the case but it ignores the fact that 
only one month earlier a similar request was made by a Kerry landlord, Lindsay 
Talbot Crosbie, which received wider coverage than Shawe-Taylor’s generated little 
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response. In addition to the letter to the newspapers, Talbot Crosbie went as far as to 
call a meeting in Ardfert and that meeting held on the 29 July 1902 passed a 
resolution calling for a land conference.70 The timing of both letters is interesting in 
that it came after the withdrawal of the 1902 Bill in June and significant land 
agitation resulting in several counties being proclaimed under the Prevention of 
Crimes Act, 1871.71 Reflecting on that summer, lord Dunraven wrote: ‘a certain 
vague, half-unconscious movement of public opinion towards a different solution of 
the problem than a ‘‘fight to the finish’’ began to manifest itself.’72 
 
The Irish Landowners Convention, a landlord representative body under the 
chairmanship of Lord Abercorn, was resolutely against the idea of a land conference. 
At a meeting on 27 August 1902 a resolution by Talbot-Crosbie calling for a land 
conference was withdrawn for lack of support.73 Despite this opposition the 
movement that Dunraven referred to was building a momentum with several national 
newspapers such as the Irish Independent. The Freemans Journal (who published 
Shawe-Taylor’s letter of 2 September 1902 calling for a land conference), the Irish 
Times and the Irish Examiner given prominence to articles calling for a conference.74 
A poll was taken by a newspaper in September of lieutenants and deputy lieutenants 
of Ireland which showed 103 in favour of a conference and 33 against.75 In early 
October the Catholic hierarchy called for a land conference to be held in a ‘spirit of 
conciliation’.76 Despite the growing popular demand for a conference, the Land 
Convention at a meeting on 10 October rejected the idea by 77 votes to 14.77 
Resulting from this vote a group of more liberal landlords, including Dunraven, 
Mayo and Colonel Hutcheson-Poe, established a provisional committee for the 
purposes of carrying out a poll of all the landlords in the country to ascertain what 
their views were as regards a land conference. Over 4,000 landlords were 
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approached and of the 1,706 who voted, 1128 were in favour and 578 against.78 This 
gave the moderates the mandate they needed, and encouraged by a favourable 
response from the government, they entered into discussion with John Redmond and 
William O’Brien regarding the arrangements for a conference. On 20 December 
details of the Land Conference were announced in the press.79  
 
Whether Wyndham knew Shawe-Taylor prior to the Land Conference is uncertain 
but both men shared a number of connections that could well have resulted in their 
meeting. Wyndham was three years older than Shawe-Taylor. Both men served in 
Cheshire regiments, Wyndham in the Yeomanry and Shawe-Taylor in the 1st 
Cheshires. Both saw service in the Egyptian campaign. Both were in South Africa at 
the same time, Wyndham as under-secretary of War and Shawe Taylor as aide de 
camp to General Sir John Davis who commanded the Southern District from 1893 to 
1898. It is known from correspondence with Balfour that Wyndham toured South 
Africa extensively during this period meeting the various military commands.80 It is 
possible, therefore, that he could have encountered Shawe-Taylor during these 
travels. It is also interesting that Shawe-Taylor was the nephew of Lady Gregory 
with whom Wyndham mixed as part of the Irish literary circle. Perhaps most 
interesting was that when Lord Abercorn refused Shawe-Taylor’s invitation to attend 
the Land Conference his next choice was Lord Dunraven who was a close friend and 
indeed, relation of George Wyndham.81 In a letter to Balfour on 19 September 1902, 
Wyndham wrote: ‘You can scarcely conceive what a hubbub there is here over the 
prospect of a settlement, the wisdom of a conference etc.etc.’82 Wyndham was 
conscious of the capacity of newspapers to influence public opinion. In a letter to a 
Ettie Grenfell in 1897 he wrote: ‘to accept journalism as a force of life we have got 
to live here and now – and positively to mould and direct it.’83 Whether Wyndham 
was instrumental in Shawe Taylor sending the letter to various papers is not 
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particularly relevant. What was important, however, was that the proposed Land 
Conference was called despite the Irish Land Convention’s opposition on the 
landlords’ side and that of John Dillon and Michael Davitt on the tenants’ side. 
In a paper entitled ‘A policy for Ireland’ prepared by Wyndham for cabinet in 
November 1902, and before the Land Conference was convened, he set out his 
arguments as to what he felt was the correct policy for Ireland. This document is 
interesting in that it provides a context for what was to follow, both in relation to 
dealing with the land question and the wider relations between the two countries.   
This paper opened with the following sentence which set out Britain’s aspiration for 
Ireland, and a reason why it had not been met so far: ‘The hopes whether of 
extending and confirming the loyalty of Ireland to the crown, or of making her a 
willing partner in the development of the Empire, are periodically frustrated by 
organised agitation.’84 
 
Wyndham suggested that there were three obstacles to achieving the aspiration: the 
land question, imperial and local burdens in the shape of taxes and rates, and access 
to higher education for Roman Catholics. Until these issues were resolved he advised 
that ‘Union will be thought intolerable by the majority’. Regarding the land question, 
he says that land acts have fallen into two categories: ‘One dealing with the 
relationships of landlords and tenants; the other abolishing those relations by 
enabling the tenant to become the owner and that the first set of acts have invariably 
failed whereas the second set have invariably succeeded.’ 
 
The first set which he calls ‘rent fixing acts’ were ‘made the subject of perpetual and 
universal litigation’. The policy paper affords an insight into Wyndham’s thinking 
on core elements of the Irish land question. He made the significant point that ‘The 
landlords are ruined financially ... and the tenants are ruined morally’. 
 
Later in ‘A policy for Ireland’ the paper Wyndham pointed out that he realised: ‘The 
landlord will not sell if a sale involves a material loss of gross income and the tenant 
won’t buy if [the] annuity is greater than rent or future rent.’ In this sentence, 
Wyndham encapsulated the conundrum he had to resolve: what was the price that 
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would persuade landlords to sell, and tenants to buy, while leaving both parties better 
off financially?  How Wyndham went about reconciling these conflicting demands, 
required a considerable feat of financial engineering.     
 
Referring to land agitation Wyndham contended that the activities of the U.I.L. were 
under control: ‘The present agitation shows signs of abating in consequence of the 
penalties which have been inflicted on those who have broken the law and the 
disgust which it arouses in the minds of all moderate men including a large section, 
indeed a majority, of Irish Home Rulers.’ 
 
The document, ‘A policy for Ireland’ set out what he deemed necessary to bring 
about a solution to the agitation issue but also sounded a note of caution if the matter 
is not resolved: 
 
 ... the discrepancy between the position of 70,000 tenants who have 
purchased their holdings, and some 400,000 who are debarred from 
purchasing will precipitate an agitation throughout Ireland of unprecedented 
magnitude. ... The cardinal question is, therefore the lowering of the 
instalment to £3-5-0. If that can be conceded the land question can be solved.  
 
The reference to the ‘lowering of the instalment to £3-5-0’ refers to the need to 
ensure that the annuity that the tenant would pay (including a sinking fund payment 
of 0.5 per cent) on his borrowing to purchase his holding would be 3.25 per cent. 
This was a clear call to the Treasury to find a way of providing what was at that time 
low cost funding. 
 
From the above extracts, it is easy to understand how historians such as Campbell 
could argue that the act was in response to U.I.L.- lead agitation. This document was 
intended to solicit support from the cabinet and the Treasury for his proposed 
initiative. It was not surprising therefore that he would convey the idea, that was the 
measure not to be supported, it could give rise to significant problems in the future.   
Regarding the thorny issue of compulsory purchase, Wyndham was adamant that it 
should not be entertained. He set out his position clearly; ‘A scheme of compulsory 
purchase may be dismissed as being outside the sphere of practical politics. The 
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problem is to expand the volume of voluntary sale.’85 Such an approach was 
consistent with his view expressed to Balfour in a letter of 11 January 1901: 
 
Compulsory purchase is not practical, nor even if practical a desirable policy. 
It would shatter credit in respect of Ireland’s chief asset – the land –  and it 
would stereotype a number of conditions which ruined the present and 
preceding land systems, which would even more surely ruin a system of 
universal peasant proprietary.86 
 
In this approach, he was very much setting his face against the demands of T.W. 
Russell and the U.I.L.s, William O’Brien, who campaigned strongly that compulsory 
purchase was a pre-requisite for land reform.  
 
Notably however, Wyndham’s document, ‘A policy for Ireland’ makes no reference 
to the component that would mark out the Wyndham Land Act from its predecessors 
and which more than any other provision laid the basis of its success – ‘The Bonus’.   
This innovative measure, which was a key element in addressing the conundrum 
relating to price, would not emerge until the Land Conference had done its work, and 
as such, it arguably can be seen as a product of the conference. 
 
2.7: The Land Conference  
 
The Land Conference was held in Dublin’s Mansion House from 20 to 23 December 
1902 and reported on 3 January 1903.   
 
The conference was important from several perspectives. It removed any potential 
criticism that might be made of the 1903 Bill that it had been framed without any 
consultation with Irish representatives, thus affording the legislation more legitimacy 
than its 1902 counterpart.  Moreover, many of its recommendations were to find 
their way into the bill’s provisions.  Most importantly the conference set a 
                                                 
85 The evidence suggests that Wyndham was intractably opposed to compulsory purchase a 
fact attested to by a quote from T.W. Russell who said, ‘To mention the word compulsion to 
the then Chief Secretary was to send him into a fury.’ See T.W. Russell, ‘The Irish land 
question; what remains to be done’ in W.T. Stead (ed.), Coming men on coming questions 
(London, 1905), p. 10. 
86 Wyndham to Balfour, 11 Jan. 1901 (B.L., Arthur Balfour Papers, Add MS 49803/161). 
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cooperative and harmonious tone for landlord and tenant representatives to follow. 
This was illustrated by a minute dated 7 January 1903 of the Irish Landowners 
Convention who as recently as the 10 October 1902 had voted against having a land 
conference and whose chairman, the duke of Abercorn, had refused Shawe-Taylor’s 
invitation to chair the conference: 
 
We have had under consideration the published Report of the Irish Land 
Conference, recently held at the Mansion House, Dublin. We recognise the 
Report as a valuable addition to the various suggestions that have been made 
for removing the grave difficulties of the Irish Land Question, by bringing 
the Land Purchase Acts into more general operation on the Voluntary 
principle. We observe that its proposals, so far as they relate to Irish 
landlords, are to a great extent identical with those adopted by the Irish 
Landowners Convention in October 10, 1902, and therefore likely to be 
widely acceptable to the landlords. We feel that this fact calls for 
acknowledgment from us to those members of the Conference who acted on 
behalf of the tenants and we are pleased to see that the terms on which they 
believe that the majority of tenants would be willing to purchase have at 
length been made known, as asked for by the Landowners Convention and 
that the Government now have in their possession ample information as to 
the views held by all parties in Ireland.87 
 
This minute approved by the executive which included such luminaries from the 
landlord side as lords Clonbrock, Cloncurry and Inchiquin as well as the earls of 
Westmeath and Drogheda must have pleased Wyndham. 
 
Wyndham would have taken further solace had he known of the sense of resignation 
felt by such a radical and intractable land campaigner as Michael Davitt who in a 
letter to John Dillon in September 1903 wrote: ‘I believe the constitutional 
movement – that which has struggled through the treacheries and tensions of the past 
twenty-five years – is dead. It died in the Mansion House, Dublin, poisoned by 
O’Brien with a big dose of Dunravenism.’88  This statement indicates that the more 
extreme elements of the nationalist side saw a resolution to the land question as 
undermining the broader thrust for self-determination by the Irish people of their 
                                                 
87 Return of the resolution and statement adopted by the Irish Landowners’ Convention on 
10th October,1902; and report of the Irish Land Conference, dated 3rd January,1903; and 
minute on Land Conference Report, adopted on 7th January,1903, by the executive 
committee of the Irish Landowners’ Convention, (89) H.C. 1903, lvii, 321.  
88 F.S.L. Lyons, John Dillon (London, 1968), p. 238. 
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own affairs. In that sense, they saw it as an important part of the British 
government’s policy of constructive unionism.    
 
The Land Conference report which contained eighteen recommendations was long 
on aspiration and short on specifics. For instance, regarding the important matter of 
the evicted tenants it simply proposed ‘That any project for solution of the Irish land 
Question should be accompanied by a settlement of the evicted tenants question 
upon an equitable basis.’89 Similarly, regarding inducements for tenants to purchase 
and landlords to sell, the report simply stated that each ‘should be given some 
inducements’. What form these inducements might take was not made clear. The 
report was also aspirational in terms of wanting landlords to remain in Ireland and 
ensuring that the proceeds of sale would be reinvested there. But aspirations are 
important in achieving understanding between contesting parties and in establishing 
common ground from which progress can be made. In that context, the report’s 
primary finding was critical, ‘That the only satisfactory settlement of the Land 
Question is to be effected by the substitution of an occupying proprietary in lieu of 
the existing system of dual ownership.’  This statement was a recognition that the 
landlord system which had prevailed in Ireland for centuries was no longer tenable. 
Henceforth, the debate would ultimately be about price and financial terms and not 
policy or political or social philosophy. Wyndham had succeeded in creating an 
environment whereby there was common ground to achieve a settlement and the 
efforts could be directed towards devising a formula for bringing about a solution to 
the Irish land question. 
 
While the Land Conference had been the subject of much attention two other factors 
initiated by Wyndham in late 1902 also played an important part in laying the 
groundwork for the successful introduction of the 1903 Irish Land Bill. The first of 
these was the appointment in October 1902 of Sir Anthony MacDonnell as under-
secretary for Ireland.  MacDonnell who hailed from one of the great hotbeds of Irish 
land agitation, Swinford in Co. Mayo, was the son of a Catholic landowner. A career 
civil servant he served in India where he earned a reputation for being a land reform 
expert. Described as a ‘liberal imperialist’ and ‘conscious of his Irishness’ he was 
                                                 
89 The Irish Land Conference Report, 3rd January 1903. 
90 
 
not, despite his familial connections (His brother Mark was a Home Rule M.P.) a 
Home Ruler.90 Being a Catholic and with strong familial connections to the Home 
Rule movement it was inevitable that MacDonnell’s appointment would generate 
debate, opposition and suspicion. Even Balfour expressed his concerns to Wyndham. 
In a letter dated 26 August 1902 he wrote: ‘I have heard nothing but good of Sir A 
MacDonnell as a man and as an administrator – but is he not a Home Ruler? If not 
his reputation belies him and his friends have done him a grievous injustice.’91 
Despite these concerns, Wyndham remained resolute and MacDonnell was 
appointed. MacDonnell only accepted the role on Wyndham agreeing to certain 
conditions. The first of these was that ‘he would play an active role in policy 
formulation aimed at producing a grand solution to Ireland’s problems’ and secondly 
that ‘he could return to the Indian civil service whenever he saw fit’.92 That such 
demands were conceded is indicative of the importance to Wyndham of the 
appointment and to MacDonnell’s negotiating skills. MacDonnell clearly had 
important connections. Patrick Maume stated that he acted as ‘a channel for 
unofficial communications between Wyndham and the Irish Parliamentary Party’.93  
On a different level he had connections into the highest echelons of British society, 
with Irish M.P. Tim Healy claiming that MacDonnell’s appointment ‘was entirely 
due to Edward VII’.94  
 
The second initiative that Wyndham introduced, and which gets little mention in the 
historiography of the time was the commissioning of William Frederick Bailey, the 
legal assistant commissioner and respected academic and land commissioner, to 
carry out an investigation entitled ‘Inquiry into the present condition of tenant 
purchasers who have acquired their holdings under the provisions of the Irish Land 
Purchase Acts’. This inquiry established in November 1902, had as its terms of 
reference: Establish the present condition of the holdings purchased not less than 
seven years ago, as regards general improvements, treatment and cultivation, and 
more particularly as regards permanent improvement works carried out since 
                                                 
90 Patrick Maume, ‘Mac Donnell, Anthony Patrick’ in DIB, p. 944.  
91 Balfour to Wyndham, 26 Aug. 1902 (B.L., Arthur Balfour papers, Add MS 49804). 
92 Patrick Maume, ‘Mac Donnell, Anthony Patrick’ in DIB, p. 944. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Cited in Biggs Davidson, George Wyndham, p. 125. 
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purchase; determine whether the tendency to sell, sublet, or subdivide had increased 
or diminished as a consequence of purchase; ascertain if the general solvency and 
credit of purchase have improved or not since purchase; investigate the effect 
generally of the land purchase system on the character and well-being of the tenant 
purchasers.95 
 
The importance of this report was that it provided Wyndham with empirical evidence 
upon which he built many of the arguments he used to support his 1903 Bill. The 
fact that it was prepared by one of the most respected experts on land in Ireland, 
William Bailey, gave it a significant credibility.96 The report, which took five 
months from commencement to publication (25 March 1903, the same day as the 
Land Bill was introduced), involved Bailey and his team visiting sixty-five 
individual estates representing 14,813 tenant purchase transactions throughout the 
entire country.97 The report’s key findings were: that apart from some local 
exceptions ‘That the holdings of tenant purchasers have largely improved in all parts 
of the country as regards cultivation, treatment, and general improvement is 
unquestionable.’; regarding subletting and subdivision ‘The answer to this is 
unequivocal. The tendency to sublet and subdivide ... has to a great extent either 
disappeared or lain dormant since purchase and the tendency to sell has largely 
diminished.’; in relation to solvency:  ‘The general consensus of opinion is that the 
credit and solvency of the occupiers has much improved as a consequence of 
purchase and that this is shown by the facts that they have paid off debts to bankers 
and shopkeepers and that they have largely increased their stock, and that they can 
get money more easily on loan.’ and that ‘... the purchase system has up to the 
present been unfruitful to the ‘gombeen’ man, who in many districts ... has 
disappeared altogether.’; regarding the general well-being and character of tenant 
purchasers while reporting a general improvement the report is not as emphatic as to 
the cause and effect relationship as it is for the other findings. The report concluded 
                                                 
95 W.F. Bailey, Inquiry into the present condition of tenant purchasers who have acquired 
their holdings under the provisions of the Irish Land Purchase Acts (London, 1903), p. 3.  
96 William Frederick Bailey (1857-1917) was a barrister, university lecturer (T.C.D.) and 
legal assistant commissioner under the land acts. He wrote several books and articles dealing 
with Irish land issues and gave evidence before a number of royal commissions. See Helen 
Andrews, ‘Baily, William Frederick’ in DIB, pp 224-5.  
97 Bailey, Inquiry into the present condition of tenant purchasers, p. 4. 
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that the improvement in economic welfare could also be attributable to the general 
improvement in agriculture in the opening years of the twentieth century but 
regarding general welfare it felt that land purchase had given ‘feeling of 
contentment’ to purchasers, citing improvements in diet and freedom from the threat 
of eviction as reasons for improved morale.  
 
The Bailey report painted owner occupation in a positive light and in that sense, its 
publication suited Wyndham’s cause and provided him with significant material to 
argue his case when presenting his bill to parliament. It was as, Bailey subsequently 
wrote, a case of ‘The magic of property had turned sand into gold.’98 It would have 
been interesting to see how Wyndham would have dealt with the report’s findings 
had it conveyed a negative image of land purchases.  
 
2.8: Conclusion 
 
One year to the day after the introduction of his failed 1902 Bill, George Wyndham 
stood before parliament and introduced the Irish Land Bill 1903. This time he was 
better prepared. He and his under-secretary, Anthony MacDonnell, had been 
assiduous in laying the ground-work for the bill’s successful passage through 
parliament. 
 
They had galvanised public and political opinion in Ireland through the workings of 
the Land Conference and behind-the-scenes negotiations with both landlord and 
tenant representatives. They had managed to put together a set of proposals that 
broached middle ground and led  to a situation where both landlords and tenants 
realised that the solution to the land question involved ‘occupying proprietary in lieu 
of the system of dual ownership’.99 Writing shortly after the act’s introduction, 
Bastable concluded that  ‘its chief significance lies in the fact that it definitely binds 
all parties in Great Britain and Ireland to that particular method of solving the land 
question often described as ‘’ the abolition of dual ownership.’’’.100  
                                                 
98 William Frederick Bailey, The Irish land acts. A short sketch of their history and 
development (Dublin, 1917), p. 26. 
99 Minutes of the Irish Land Conference Report, 7 Jan. 1903.  
100 Bastable, ‘The Irish land purchase act of 1903’, p. 5. 
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Wyndham also had the unwavering support of his prime minister, who as his letter to 
King Edward VII quoted earlier in this chapter highlights, saw the resolution of the 
land question as the solution to the more important Irish question. Most importantly 
Wyndham had the support of the Treasury and the backing of the chancellor, Sir 
Michael Hicks Beach and his successor Charles Ritchie. 
 
Wyndham believed that the bill he was about to introduce would represent a final 
solution to the Irish Land question. He also saw it as a measure of historical 
importance that raised the possibility that might earn him the right to succeed his 
mentor, Arthur Balfour, as Tory leader when he retired.101 
 
However, when he stood to speak on Wednesday, 25 March 1903, George Wyndham 
was not to know that he had reached the height of his political powers. Within two 
years, Ireland, that ‘exacting mistress, almost a vampire’ would as it had done to so 
many in the past suck the life out of his political career.102  
    
                                                 
101 Ellenberger, ‘Constructing George Wyndham’, p. 501. 
102 George Wyndham to George Curzon, 3 May 1903, cited in Mackail & Guy. Wyndham 
(eds), Life and letters of George Wyndham (New York, 1977), ii, p. 583.  
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Chapter 3: An analysis of the financial provisions of the Wyndham 
Land Act 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
The Wyndham Act set in train the biggest change in land ownership in Ireland since 
the confiscations of the seventeenth century. By the time the act and its follow-on 
legislation of 1904 and 1909 had run their course in 1921, 9,227,142 acres of land 
comprising of 256,735 holdings had changed hands at a cost of £82,283,180.1 
In terms of scale, the Wyndham project dwarfed any other economic initiative 
introduced in Ireland up to the bank bailout, of 2008.2 In social terms, it transformed 
the structure of landownership from a landlord-tenant based system to one of small 
proprietary occupier units and in so doing defined Irish agriculture for the next 
hundred years. 
 
While the bill attempted to address several areas of political and social importance 
such as issues pertaining to farm labourers, evicted tenants, compulsory purchase 
and congested districts, it was the finance provisions that the bill was built on and 
which this chapter will concentrate.3 Introducing his bill, Wyndham emphasised the 
financial nature of his proposals when he said: ‘for finance is the whole basis of the 
Bill: it is the foundation on which the whole superstructure is erected.’4  
 
When introducing his bill, Wyndham did not stray into the areas of political or moral 
philosophy in terms of justifying his placing the measure before the House. Instead, 
                                                 
1 Report of the Irish Land Commissioners for the year from 1 Apr., 1934 to 31 Mar., 1935. 
(Dublin, 1936), p. 10. 
2 Wyndham estimated that the cost of implementing the 1903 Act would be of the order of 
£100 million. While no official or exact National Income figures exist for Ireland in 1903, 
L.M. Cullen [extrapolated from Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland, A new economic history, 1780-
1939 (Oxford, 1994), pp 379-83] estimates that it was in the region of £100 to £115 million. 
The 2008 Bank Bailout has been estimated to have cost €84 billion but in the context of a 
national income figure of the order of €120 billion, the monetary level of the Wyndham 
programme was more significant as a percentage of national income.  
3 For an analysis of the social and political aspects of the Wyndham Act see Patrick 
Cosgrove, ‘The Wyndham Land Act, 1903: The final solution to the Irish land question?’ 
(Ph.D. thesis, N.U.I. Maynooth.2008) 
4 Hansard 4, cxx, 206 (25 Mar. 1903). 
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he focussed on the economic imperatives of such legislation. Setting the scene he 
stated: ‘If the prosperity of agriculture in Ireland shrinks, it induces stresses and 
contractions throughout every layer of society ... so that, there is a tendency towards 
disruption and catastrophe.’5 Appealing directly to his fellow English members of 
parliament he said: ‘it was to the material interest of this country [Britain] that the 
main interest of such a neighbour should be prosperous and secure instead of , as 
now, precarious and decadent.’6 Continuing with his economic theme he outlined the 
huge costs to British taxpayers of maintaining a police force largely required to 
protect landlords and their properties and state bodies such as the Land Commission 
and the Land Courts to deal with the incessant ‘rage for litigation’ amongst tenants 
and landlords as a result of the ‘failed’ rent fixing acts. The picture he painted was 
one of stasis and chaos which resulted in, ‘The landlords of Ireland being financially 
ruined; the tenants are being morally ruined,’ and ‘agriculture starved of capital and 
industry.’7 By implication therefore Wyndham was effectively stating that the 
previous land acts, including that brought in by his prime minister, Arthur Balfour in 
1891, had failed to address the Irish land question in a significant or effective way.  
 
As a contrast to this gloomy scenario, Wyndham put forth an alternative outlook 
which presented Irish agriculture in a much more dynamic context, the key driver of 
which was occupier proprietorship.  Wyndham’s central argument was that the 
Treasury, by lending its credit to a comprehensive land purchase scheme, could in 
the long run with very little, if any, risk to the Exchequer, solve the Irish land 
question. Drawing on the Bailey report he highlighted the fact that of the 73,000 
tenants who had purchased their holdings under the earlier land purchase acts, the 
State ‘had not lost a single penny’.8  He stated that ‘Public opinion supports the 
punctual repayment of purchase instalments, and that is a moral security which we 
ought not to underestimate.’9     
 
                                                 
5 Hansard 4, cxx, 184 (25 Mar.1903). 
6 Hansard 4, cxx, 184 (25 Mar. 1903). 
7 Hansard 4, cxx, 186 (25 Mar. 1903). 
8 Hansard 4, cxx, 186 (25 Mar. 1903). 
9 Hansard 4, cxx, 187 (25 Mar. 1903). 
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Wyndham’s address to parliament provides an excellent exposition of the reasons 
why the Irish land issue had become such an intractable problem and why without 
significant and radical intervention along the lines proposed, the system and, more 
importantly, Irish agriculture, the country’s only real industry, would become lost in 
a morass of civil unrest and economic paralysis. He argued that the absence of 
commercial bank lending meant that there was little chance for normal land purchase 
transactions occurring. The situation was one of almost complete paralysis with 
landlords facing further state-dictated rent reductions and inevitable financial ruin 
and tenants facing an uncertain and despondent future. The outlook was a 
continuation of the cycle of agitation and economic stagnation with what little 
resources that were available being subsumed by maintaining some form of civil 
order. The unintended consequence of the earlier judicial rent process meant that the 
rent appeals process had become bogged down in an ever increasing legal and 
administrative morass.   
 
Of perhaps most importance were his comments regarding the heavily indebted 
nature of estates: ‘I am afraid, the majority of Irish estates are somewhat heavily 
indebted.’ which meant that landlords were subject to ‘paramount interests’ and were 
in many cases ‘caretakers’ for these parties. A sale in such cases meant for the 
landlord ‘walking into the workhouse.’.10  These extracts from his opening address 
highlight succinctly the difficulties that many landlords found themselves in and for 
which the Wyndham Act was to provide a means of escape.    
 
While clearly a bill of great social importance it was also an impressive exercise in 
financial engineering which sought to devise a series of mechanisms to facilitate the 
transfer of land from landowners to their tenants. To bring about this required 
creative and complex financial provisioning. Of the final act’s 103 sections, 50 of 
them were direct finance provisions. This chapter concentrates on the four main 
areas underpinning the financial structure of the act namely, price, the bonus, the 
                                                 
10 In using these phrases, Wyndham was referring to situations where estates were so 
indebted that should they be sold and the debts paid off, landlords would be left with no 
capital, no income, no home and no means of support. In such instances, landlords would be 
better off not selling in that they would have a roof over their head and some means of 
surviving. 
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raising of finance and the safeguards built-in to protect the British taxpayer. 
However, before discussing the specific finance elements of the act, the initial 
reactions of members to the bill are examined in order to provide better context for 
the more detailed analysis that follows. 
 
3.2: Reactions to the Bill’s financial components 
 
Setting the scene, Wyndham acknowledged that many of the bill’s provisions would 
be difficult for members to understand. He proffered the opinion that ‘Finance is not 
a very engrossing subject, but it happens to be one which is of fundamental 
importance in this Bill.’11 He also acknowledged that ‘The subject is technical 
beyond belief.’12 The technical nature of the bill was evidenced in members’ 
responses. For instance, John Redmond in his contribution to the debate made the 
very honest admission that, ‘On the subject of finance I speak with great hesitation. 
It is a matter with which I am not competent to deal’13  A similar sentiment was 
expressed by Unionist M.P. Colonel Saunderson when he stated: ‘that it is the most 
complicated measure.’14  
 
Yet despite not understanding the financial complexities, John Redmond saw the 
1903 Bill ‘as an enormous advance on the proposals on the same question last year 
and deemed it ‘a great Bill’.15 A similar view was expressed by Thomas Russell, the 
Liberal Unionist M.P. from Ulster who said that the bill represented ‘Epoch making 
                                                 
11 Hansard 4, cxx, 205 (25 Mar. 1903). 
12 Hansard 4, cxx, 182 (25 Mar. 1903). 
13 Hansard 4, cxx, 213 (25 Mar. 1903). 
14 Hansard 4, cxx, 217 (25 Mar. 1903). 
15 Hansard 4, cxx, 216 (25 Mar. 1903). The ‘enormous advances’ referred to by Redmond 
between the 1903 Bill and it’s 1902 equivalent, included (1)the inclusion of the 12 per cent 
‘Bonus’ (Section, 48), (2) a provision whereby deals were concluded through negotiations 
between individual landlords and their tenants rather than the Land Commission having to 
determine the price to be paid (Section 1), (3) the inclusion of ‘rental zones’ (Section 1) 
designed to facilitate faster completion of sales transactions, (4) a reduction in the annuity 
rate from 3.75 per cent to 3.5 per cent (Section 24), (5) an increase from £5,000 to £7,000 in 
the maximum sum that could be advanced to borrowers (Section 1), (6) provisions in 
relation to ‘evicted tenants’ (Section 2 d), and (7) the ‘in-globo principle’ (Section 6). In 
addition to these important provisions the 1903 Act also contained sections pertaining to the 
vesting of mineral rights in the Land Commission (Section 13), increased powers of Estates 
Commissioners (Section 23) and a range of ‘guarantee provisions’ to protect the Treasury in 
the event of default of borrowers (Sections 27-40) that were not included in the 1902 Bill. 
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proposals – the start of a new era’ and further added: ‘I believe this is a great bill, 
designed for a great and beneficent work’.16 17 Even the normally acerbic Tim Healy 
was effusive in his praise for Wyndham: ‘I beg to congratulate the Chief Secretary 
on the genius, skill and courage which he has shown in the conduct of the Bill.’18  
Opposition to the bill was limited and came mainly from Liberal Party M.Ps. 
Interestingly, a number of these contributions were both prescient and insightful, and 
many of these related to the impact of the bill on the other national issue of Home 
Rule. Llewellyn Atterley-Jones M.P. for Durham put forth the view: ‘I believe that 
the Government have, by their Local Government Bill, and by this Bill, laid the 
foundations of the structure of self-government which they or we shall finish.’19 The 
same point was made by Tommy Gibson Bowles, M.P. for Lynn Regis: ‘It has been 
said or will be said that every vote given to this Bill is a vote for Home Rule.’20 The 
M.P. for Scarborough, Sir Joseph  Compton Rickett, proffered the view that: 
‘Nationalism will make a great stride forward in the direction of Home Rule.’21 In 
response to this claim a number of Irish M.P.s made the assertion that nationalist and 
unionist support for the bill would imply that it was neutral in terms of the issue of 
Home Rule. It is interesting to note the differing opinions on whether the Wyndham 
Land Act was to the advantage or detriment of Home Rule. As noted previously, by 
Davitt and Dillon showed major concern that the legislation would effectively 
mollify nationalist aspirations whereas the views set out above from English 
members point to the opposite. Such divergence highlights the difficulty in placing 
the Wyndham Land Act in the historical context of the time.   
 
Even though the bill was roundly supported, the debates around it were long and 
wide ranging. While many of the contributions were significant and relevant others 
were largely parochial. Typical of this was a contribution from Thomas O’Donnell, 
M.P. for Kerry West, who spoke at length on how Kerry had been discriminated 
against for years, citing that over 211,000 people had emigrated from the county and 
that ‘In Donegal one person in 151 was supported out of the poor rate, in Mayo one 
                                                 
16 Hansard 4, cxx, 222 (25 Mar. 1903). 
17 Hansard 4, cxx, 224 (25 Mar. 1903). 
18 Hansard 4, cxxv, 1086 (17 July 1903). 
19 Hansard 4, cxxii, 40 (7 May 1903).  
20 Hansard 4, cxx, 67 (25 Mar. 1903). 
21 Hansard 4, cxxii, 94 (7 May 1903). 
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in 58 and in Kerry one in 35! Was it not time that something was done for Kerry.’22 
A similar claim was made by John Roche, M.P. for Galway East, who demanded 
special treatment for east Galway where valuations were among the lowest in the 
country. He specifically targeted the graziers of the county, claiming that ‘The 
grazing system was in his opinion a greater curse to their country than 
landlordism.’23 Willie Redmond called for all of Clare to be included as a congested 
district.24 Despite reprimands from the Speaker of the House M.P. for Cork, James 
Gilhooly, persisted in raising the plight of the Castletown Bearhaven fishermen. 25 
But despite these early day examples of the Tip O’Neill dictum that ‘All politics is 
local’ much of the debates were concerned with important matters of economics and 
policy and the contributions provide significant insight to some of the most difficult 
and important issues that had made the Irish land question so intractable.26  
Of most significance was the fact that nationalist and unionist were united in their 
support for a measure affecting Ireland. This did not go unnoticed by several British 
members. Douglas Coghill, who opposed the bill and who made some very 
insightful and prescient contributions that will be covered later in this chapter, 
characterising the proposed land purchase measure as a gift from the British taxpayer 
to Ireland and noted: ‘We now find that there is a union between Orangemen and 
Nationalists, and all because there is an alluring prospect of a raid on the British 
Treasury.’27 Such unity would certainly undermine any suggestion that the bill was 
hastening in Home Rule but does suggest that economic considerations over-rode 
everything else. 
 
For a bill that was financial in nature there was relatively little debate around these 
aspects of its make-up.  
 
                                                 
22 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1537 (7 July 1903). 
23 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1538 (7 July 1903). 
24 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1544-1545 (7 Jul. 1903). 
25 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1560 (7 Jul. 1903).  
26 The phrase ‘All politics is local’ is attributed to the former Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. The term refers to the need for politicians to appeal to the simple, mundane 
matters that effect the everyday lives of their constituents rather than the more lofty and 
ideological political themes.   
27 Hansard 4, cxx, 228 (25 Mar. 1903). 
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3.3: Price 
 
The issue of price was central to Wyndham’s plans to bring about a solution to the 
Irish land question. It was important in two respects. Firstly, in solving the 
conundrum posed in Chapter 2 as to, what was the price that would persuade 
landlords to sell and tenants to buy while leaving both parties better off financially?  
And secondly, in the absence of normal commercial market conditions, was it 
possible to determine a price that allowed for bilateral negotiation between landlord 
and tenant which did not lead to indeterminable wrangling between the parties and 
investigation by lenders, particularly in the context of hundreds of thousands of 
transactions. In a normal competitive market environment with occasional 
transactions between willing buyers and sellers the question of price is relatively 
easy to determine in that it usually relates to the prices prevailing for the most recent 
sales. However, the market for land in early twentieth-century Ireland could not be 
said to be normal in any sense. Firstly, there was little funding available for 
purchasers to facilitate purchases and secondly the prospect of further government 
intervention in terms of land acts had stalled the market. Also, the number of 
transactions envisaged under the forthcoming legislation could not be construed in 
any sense as normal. In this context, it would have been impossible to determine a 
true open market price for land and hence some guidelines or mechanisms were 
required. 
 
In addition to the above was the complex nature of the rent review process as a result 
of the judicial rent system introduced under the 1881 Land Act. The likelihood of 
achieving a lower rent by going to the Land Courts meant that tenants invariably 
took that option. As result the courts were swamped with applications and a large 
backlog of cases existed. This was what Wyndham was referring to when he spoke 
of ‘a rage for litigation’.28  
 
Wyndham’s response to this dilemma was to introduce several novel features into 
the legislation such as rent zones, the bonus, the in globo principle, extended 
mortgage period and provisions relating to the redemption of mortgages. These 
                                                 
28 Hansard 4, cv, 1033 (25 Mar. 1902). 
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topics will be discussed below. While some of these measures, such as the bonus and 
the extended mortgage period were designed to make it financially attractive for 
landlords to sell and tenants to buy, others such as the rent zones and the in-globo 
principal were an attempt to simplify the sales process and ensure that transactions 
could be processed more efficiently. He also wanted to enshrine two principles into 
the legislation which were that bargains were to be struck between individual 
landlords and tenants and that the price would be a function of the rent payable on a 
holding. The other key feature was to make the Land Commission central to the 
transaction in terms of mortgage provider, ensuring securities were in place, dealing 
with all those with claims on an estate and distributing sales proceeds.  
Critics of the act tended to focus on individual components such as the level of 
prices paid, the necessity or otherwise of the bonus, the absence of compulsory 
powers and the likely impact of the guarantee provisions on Irish local authorities or 
the British taxpayer. While such criticisms might have been valid in isolation the 
Wyndham Land Act needs to be viewed as a package of measures designed to 
achieve a major outcome, namely the transfer of lands from landlords to their 
tenants, and individual aspects should be looked at in that context. 
 
As if to emphasise this, the price provisions were dealt with under section 1 of the 
bill. The essential features were that the price was to be agreed between the 
individual landlord and his tenant and that it would be based on the rents attaching to 
the holdings. The state, through the Estates Commissioners (a division of the Land 
Commission), was only to intervene in terms of facilitating the sale via the in-globo 
principle, administering the sale, ensuring the validity of the security, providing the 
purchase finances and the disbursement of sales proceeds to vendors and their 
creditors. The principle of private deals emanated from the Land Conference. Article 
II of the Conference’s official report concluded that ‘the settlement should be made 
between the owner and occupier, subject to the necessary investigation by the State 
as to title, rental and security.’29  
 
The concept of a private transaction is relatively simple in theory but its application 
in the context of Ireland in 1903 was a more complicated affair. Complications arose 
                                                 
29 The Irish Land Conference, Official Report, 3rd January 1903 (Dublin, 1903). 
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in three specific areas. Firstly, how many years rent purchases were to be used in 
determining price? Secondly what rent figure was to be used as the multiple? Was it 
the existing rent, a first-term rent that was due to expire on a specific date, a second-
term rent that was under appeal, or the third-term rents that were due to commence in 
1911.30 A further complication arose regarding purchasers who had acquired their 
holdings under the Land Law (Ireland) Act 1896 and who, in accordance with 
section 25 of this act, were subject to decadal reductions in the annuities they paid.31  
To address the above complications Wyndham’s Bill legislated that firstly the price 
would be determined by reference to second-term rents only. Third-term rents were 
simply abolished, as was the system of decadal annuity reductions. Section 1 of the 
bill introduced the concept of ‘rental zones’ which referred to whether a rent was 
second-term or earlier. The bill specified that the following range (or zones) of 
reductions would apply: In the case of a holding where the rent was second-term, a 
                                                 
30 Judicial rents were introduced under Section 8 of the Land Act (Ireland) Act 1881. Under 
the terms of this section any tenant or landlord (it was virtually always the tenant) who was 
dissatisfied with the rent he was paying could apply to the Land Court to have it reviewed. 
Once adjudicated on, the rent was fixed for a period of fifteen years, this was known as a 
first-term rent. After fifteen years, the process could be repeated and the revised rent set for a 
further 15 years (second term rent). On expiry of the second period, a further review could 
be undertaken and the rent fixed for another fifteen-year period (third term rent). While the 
reviews could in theory lead to an upward rent review, the reality was that virtually all such 
reviews resulted in downwards revisions. Frederick Bailey in The Irish Land Acts published 
in 1917 calculates the average rent reductions across the country because of the judicial rent 
review process as follows, first term reviews -20.7 per cent., second term reviews – 19.3 per 
cent., third term reviews -9.2 per cent. (p. 20). In practical terms this meant that a rent of say 
£100-00-00 immediately prior to the first review in 1881 would have fallen to £79-6-6, in 
1896 it would have further reduced to £64-00-00 and by 1911 it would be down to £58-2-2. 
The legislation was vague on specific guidelines as to the criteria for reviewing rents and the 
Land Commissioners were afforded significant latitude in determining rents. Thus, it was 
not surprising that the appeals morass that Wyndham referred to when introducing the bill 
had grown up. It was to address this problem that the so-called ‘rent zones’ referred to above 
came into being. 
31 The term ‘decadal reduction’ is often confused with judicial or statutory rent reductions 
such as those referred to above. They are not in fact connected. Decadal reductions which 
were introduced under section 25 of the 1896 Land Act. A decadal reduction refers to an 
adjustment to the annuity payable by a purchaser who acquired his land under the 1896 Act. 
It operated as follows. When a purchaser acquired the holding he paid an amount each year 
(an annuity) that would pay interest and an amount off against the capital sum. Without a 
decadal reduction, he would pay the same amount each year until the whole sum was repaid 
in say 49 years. This is similar to how modern mortgages operate. Under the decadal 
reduction provision after 10 years the annuity is recalculated based on the principle 
outstanding at the time. This clearly will result in a lower annuity being paid. Similarly, on 
the expiry of a further 10 years a new calculation is made and a revised annuity calculated 
and so on until the full loan is repaid. This has the effect of extending out the repayment 
period but resulted in an average reduction of 15 per cent in the annuity every 10 years.  
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reduction of between 10 and 30 per cent would apply; in the case of a holding 
subject to a first term or earlier rent a reduction of between 20 and 40 per cent would 
apply. To illustrate this taking a hypothetical example of two tenants with identical 
holdings except that one is paying rent of £100 per annum based on a second term 
judicial rent where the other is paying £120 based on a first term judicial rent. As 
they both hold exactly equivalent holdings it means that they should both pay the 
same amount for their lands. Table 3.1 below illustrates how the 1903 Act provisions 
were used to bring this about. 
 
Table 3.11. Workings of rent zone provisions of the Irish Land Act 1903 
 
Reference Col Calculation First term Second term 
 
Ref Formula rent rent 
Discount range - per 
Section 1 of Act A 
 
20% to 40% 10% to 30% 
Assumed rent B 
 
£120 £100 
Possible Rent range C B x A £96 to £72 £90 to £70 
Rent discount applied D 100%-E/B 33% 20.00% 
Discounted rent E B x D £80 £80 
Annuity rate – per 
Section 45 (1) of Act F 
 
3.25% 3.25% 
Purchase price – 
Assumed G 
 
£2,461 £2,461 
Number of years rent 
purchase H G/B 20.5 times 24.6 times 
 
Source: This table has been compiled by the author for the purpose of 
explaining the working of the rent zone provisions of the Wyndham Land 
Act. 
 
What Table 3.1 illustrates is that the Land Commission would sanction the two deals 
and that the landlord would receive the equivalent of 20.5 years for the holding 
subject to first-term rents and 24.6 times for the one subject to second term-rent.  
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Rental zones were designed to overcome many of the problems that had dogged 
previous land legislation. In the first instance, it was designed to provide pricing 
parameters within which deals could be negotiated. It did this by recognising the 
differing circumstances of tenants e.g. their status as judicial tenants. The second 
problem it addressed was how to streamline the lending process. Where a landlord 
and a tenant agreed a price that lay ‘within the zones’ the Land Commission could 
advance the mortgage to the tenant without having to carry out an inspection of the 
property to ensure that it provided adequate security for the loan advanced. In fact, 
where the mortgage was less than £3000 the Land Commission had no power to 
refuse the loan once it came within the zonal parameters. Section 1 (2) of the 1903 
Act, also removed the right of mortgagees and remaindermen to an estate objecting 
to a sale because the purchase price was not sufficient to allow for the discharge of 
all the encumbrances on the property.  The need to remove such a legal obstruction 
became imperative following a court case relating to the Bolton Estate in 1898, 
where it was held that where the proceeds of sale were insufficient to discharge in 
full a liability registered on an estate the sale could not proceed.32  Given the level of 
indebtedness of Irish landlords and the fact that many of them were simply acting as 
unpaid caretakers for lenders who did not want to force sales into depressed market 
conditions for land that prevailed in the opening years of the twentieth century, the 
removal of this impediment was important.   
 
The typical metric applied in determining the price of land was ‘the number of years’ 
purchase’ of a rent. Thus, if a rent was £100 per annum and a price of £2,000 was 
agreed, this represented 20 times purchase. Neither the bill nor the act specified what 
this figure should be. Like so many other aspects of the 1903 legislation, the 
outcome was designed to address a particular problem rather than based on open 
market conditions. In the case of the ‘price’ Wyndham sought to arrive at a solution 
that would enable landlords to sell without them suffering a significant reduction in 
their net incomes and encouraging tenants to purchase by advancing money at a level 
that afforded them a reduction in the amount they were already paying in rent.  
According to contemporary commentators and contributions to the parliamentary 
debates, the price provisions of the act were constructed so that a selling landlord 
                                                 
32 R.A. Walker, The law relating to land purchase in Ireland (Dublin, 1906), p. 2. 
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could achieve the same level of net income that he currently derived from his estate 
if the proceeds were invested in order to obtain a return of 3.5 per cent per annum. 33 
This amount included the bonus payment. While the individual payment was agreed 
between the landlord and tenant, and the above consideration would not have 
constituted any part of the negotiations, the parameters established by the zone 
provisions effectively dictated that it did influence the price paid. The effect of these 
measures on land prices (based on the number of years purchased) was: land subject 
to first-term rents were priced at between 18.5 to 24.5 times the annual passing rent; 
land subject to second-term rents, 21.5 to 27.7 times the passing rent.  
 
In the case of tenants the key objective was to incentivise purchase by ensuring that 
the annuity paid would be less than the current rent. This was achieved by three 
initiatives. Firstly the ‘in the zone’ reductions already referred to. Secondly, the 
provision of relatively low cost long-term finance advanced by the Treasury at an 
interest rate of just 3.25 per cent (including 0.5 per cent to cover the contribution to 
the sinking fund that would be used to repay the loan principal). Thirdly, by the 
advancement of loans with an unprecedented loan term of 68.5 years.34 This term 
was significantly longer than that afforded under previous land acts such as 1881 (35 
years), 1885 (49 years), 1891 (49 years). Even later intergenerational mortgages 
paled into insignificance with those granted under Wyndham. The extension of the 
term of the mortgage represented a piece of financial engineering that allowed for 
lower annual contributions thus ensuring lower annuities than rents.  
 
Contributions that were made to the debate on price sought to highlight the excessive 
level of prices that were to be paid to landlords. T.P. O’Connor, in a long and well-
argued speech, produced statistics to show that since 1886 the average price paid for 
land represented 16 times purchase compared to the 20 plus under the Wyndham 
Bill.35 In his contribution O’Connor highlighted the role of the Catholic clergy in 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p. xxxiv. 
34 The act did not specify a repayment term of 68.5 years. Section 45 (2) stated: ‘The 
purchase annuity shall be paid until the whole of the advance, in respect of which is payable, 
is ascertained in manner prescribed by the Treasury to have been repaid.’ The figure of 68.5 
years was based on how long it would take the sinking fund to accumulate to a position 
where it could paydown the principal. Based on the ½ per cent annual sinking fund 
contribution being invested at 3.25% it was estimated that this would take 68.5 years.   
35 Hansard 4, cxxii, 82 (7 May 1903). 
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advising their flock on the prices to be offered. He referred to the example of the 
bishop of Ross who wrote to tenants who were considering buying their properties 
under earlier land acts advising them on the prices to offer.36 O’Connor argued that 
‘the tenant has to be protected against himself   from the land hunger that drives him 
to want to purchase his holding’.37 He sounded a note of caution to the state when 
saying ‘The tenant that gives too many years purchase for his holding becomes a 
dangerous creditor to the State.’38 Herbert Robertson, Conservative M.P. for South 
Hackney who had strong connections with Ireland, argued that ‘even if the tenants 
have to pay a little more under this Bill, the price is worth it in the better spirit which 
has been generated by means of the Land Conference. I do not grudge the landlord 
the terms he has got, nor shall I incite any tenant not to give them.’39  Jasper Tully, 
the M.P. for South Leitrim, ‘hoped that tenants would not buy at the ridiculous prices 
provided for in the Bill.’40  
 
Such arguments were to be repeated by many in the years following the act’s 
introduction. In November 1904, Arnold White the journalist and political activist 
wrote: ‘There are already so many cases of an inordinate price being paid for the 
land that, although the process of transfer has only begun, inevitable trouble awaits 
the next generation, for the farmers, both Protestant and Catholics, are paying higher 
prices for the land then it is worth.’41 Given the timing of the article White would 
appear to have been referring to the price paid by tenants of the Leinster Estate 
which was one of the earliest sales under the act and as such was not representative 
of other sales.42 Of more note, however, was the comment from the estates 
commissioners in their 1906 report when they stated: 
 
Whether looked at from the point of view of the number of years’ purchase or 
the rate per acre, it is manifest that the prices now being paid by tenants for 
purchase of holdings show a very large increase on the prices which were 
paid before the passing of the act, while, when the ‘bonus’ of 12 per cent in 
                                                 
36 Hansard 4, cxxii, 83 (7 May 1903). 
37 Hansard 4, cxxii, 84 (7 May 1903). 
38 Hansard 4, cxxii, 83 (7 May 1903). 
39 Hansard 4, cxxii, 57 (7 May 1903). 
40 Hansard 4, cxxvii, 1060 (12 Aug. 1903). 
41 Arnold White, ‘What Ireland really wants’ in Fortnightly Review, lxxvi, no. 455 (Nov. 
1904), p. 838. 
42 For a wider discussion on the sale of the Leinster Estate see Chapter 7. 
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addition is taken into consideration, the increase of price obtained by the 
landlords is still greater.43 
 
Cosgrove calculated that the average price per acre under the various land acts was, 
Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1885 Act (£10.50), Purchase of Land (Ireland) 
Act,1891 and Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1896 Acts (£9.20) and that up to 31 March 
1906 the price paid under the 1903 Act was £13.30.44 However, based on figures in 
the Irish Land Commissioners Report for 1935 this author has calculated that the 
average price per acre paid under the 1903 Act and its follow-on legislation was 
£8.91.45 
 
Contributions on the pricing provisions of the bill not surprisingly involved a 
demand for some element of compulsory purchase. Perhaps one of the more 
compelling arguments in favour of compulsory purchase and which got to the heart 
of the matter was made by Francis Channing, the Liberal M.P. Channing, who had 
sat on the Royal Commission to consider the depression in agriculture from 1893 to 
1896, was well versed in land dealings. He argued that under the bill the price being 
paid for land including the bonus was £40 million more than it should be. He based 
his estimate on the prices paid under the Ashbourne Act (Purchase of Land (Ireland) 
Act, 1885 and what would be paid to landlords in England were their lands acquired 
compulsorily in the public interest. He estimated that the excess represented a 60 per 
cent premium on the true value of the land whereas the premium on the mainland 
would be no more than 10 per cent.46  The same point was argued by another Liberal 
M.P. who contended that the bill should provide for compulsory purchase and if so 
the price would be lower and the bonus unnecessary.47 Wyndham’s responses to the 
criticisms regarding the exclusion of compulsion were uncharacteristically weak. He 
said he did not wish to take up the time of the House with detailing ‘the extreme 
                                                 
43 Report of the estates commissioners for the year ending 31st March, 1906 and for the 
period from 1st November, 1903, to 31 March, 1906, xiv, [Cd. 3148], H.C. 1906, xxv, 237. 
44 Cosgrove, ‘The Wyndham Land Act, 1903’, pp 92-95. 
45 Report of the Irish land commissioners for the year from 1 Apr. 1934 to 31 Mar., 1935. 
(Dublin, 1936), p. 10. A schedule of advances in this report shows that a sum of £82,283,180 
was advanced by the Land Commission under the Wyndham Act 1903, the Evicted Tenants 
Act 1907 and the Birrell Act 1909 for a total of 9,227,142 acres representing an average 
price per acre of £8.91. 
46 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1098 (1 July 1903). 
47 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1097 (1 July 1903). 
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difficulty, if not the impossibility, of finding a practical plan for compulsion.’ 48 The 
response was that of a man who knew he had triumphed and felt it unnecessary to 
respond to such criticisms. 
Despite the protestations regarding the price guidelines set out in the bill the mood 
had been set by Wyndham and the Land Conference and all Irish MPs took the view 
that the overall prize that was on offer, namely a solution to the Irish land question, 
was such that compromise on price was worth making.    
 
3.4: The Bonus 
 
The provision that attracted most comment and generated most debate as the 1903 
Bill progressed through the House was the issue of the bonus. This provision, which 
represented the most significant change on his aborted 1902 Bill, was introduced by 
Wyndham in the opening lines of his speech: 
 
The point upon which interest is, perhaps unduly, focussed is whether the 
Government think it possible to deal successfully with the situation by use of 
credit alone, or whether the Government hold that, in addition to the credit 
operation, there must also be some cash aid. Well, Sir, the Government think 
that cash aid is necessary.49    
 
The cash aid referred to above is what came to be known as the bonus, although no 
mention of this term was contained in the act. Section 48 (1) refers to it in the 
following way: 
 
For the purpose of aiding the sale of estates under this Act, the Land 
Commission may, in the prescribed manner and at the prescribed time, out of 
advances by the National Debt Commissioners from the said fund, pay to the 
vendor of each estate sold a sum calculated at the rate of twelve per cent. on 
the amount of the purchase money advanced under the Land Purchase Acts.50  
 
This was not what Wyndham had intended. The bill when first introduced contained 
a provision which would have seen the bonus paid on a graduated basis, inversely 
related to the purchase price for the land. Starting from 15 per cent for estates of 
                                                 
48 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1099 (1 July 1903). 
49 Hansard 4, cxx, 182 (25 Mar. 1903). 
50 Irish Land Act 1903, Section 48 (1). 
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£5,000 or less and going down to 5 per cent for those estates worth over £40,000.51 
Eventually at the committee stage, a flat 12 per cent payment was agreed regardless 
to the size of the transaction. While Wyndham’s initial bill was amended as stated, 
section 48 (3) did contain a five-year review clause which one of his successors as 
chief secretary, Augustine Birrell would trigger when drafting his 1909 Act and 
implement a graduated bonus payment scheme.52  
 
In explaining the reasons for introducing the cash aid, Wyndham referred to the 
embarrassments attaching to land transactions in Ireland. These embarrassments 
included having to pay off debts, dealing with a significant fall in income and 
addressing the legal complications and costs attaching to complicated leases. 
Wyndham argued that these issues posed a major obstacle to landlords selling their 
properties. 
 
We think the justification for adding cash aid is to be found in these 
complicated legal embarrassments which up to this moment have stopped 
Irish land purchase in every case, except in the cases of men with other 
interests and other resources, who have sold their Irish property to be rid of 
it...53     
 
A key element of the bonus was that it was paid directly to the selling landowner and 
did not constitute part of the proceeds of sale, except in two circumstances.54 The 
significance of this was that encumbrances or indeed family settlement claims would 
not be deducted from it. In effect, it was a way of getting cash into the hands of the 
landlord without creditors being able to claim it. If the bonus had been paid as part of 
the proceeds of sale any creditor who had a security against the property could make 
a claim on it. As Wyndham noted, most Irish estates were significantly encumbered. 
The measure was designed to circumvent normal creditor rights.  
 
                                                 
51 Hansard 4, cxx, 206 (25 Mar. 1903). 
52 Irish Land Act 1909, Section 6 (1). 
53 Hansard 4th series, 25 Mar. 1903, vol. 120, col. 182. 
54 Section 48 (1) of the Irish Land Act 1903 specified that the bonus would not be paid in the 
situation where the estate was so encumbered that the landlord was not entitled to receive the 
rent for his own use. Nor under the same provision was it paid on sales ordered by the Land 
Court. Sub-section (2) of the same section stated that ‘in estimating the amount of purchase 
money on which the percentage is to be payable, the price of any land re-sold to the vendor 
of an estate shall be excluded.’ 
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The idea for the bonus emanated from the Land Conference, albeit referred to 
obliquely in proposal XII of the report. That proposal read: 
 
That the amount of the purchase money payable by the tenants should be 
extended over a series of years, and be at such a rate in respect of principal 
and interest as will at once secure a reduction of not less than 15 per cent., or 
more than 25 per cent. on second term rents or their fair equivalent, further 
periodical reductions as under existing Land Purchase Acts, until such time 
as the Treasury is satisfied that the loan has been repaid. This may involve 
some assistance from the State beyond the use of credit, which, under 
circumstances hereinafter mentioned, we consider may be reasonably 
granted.55 
 
 
It was interesting that most of the leading Irish Party members such as Redmond, 
Healy and Dillon all spoke strongly in favour of the bonus provision. Redmond saw 
the bonus as a great advance on the 1902 Bill and expressed his disappointment that 
the amount provided, i.e. £12 million, was not more. He advocated that it should be 
at least £20 million.56 Tim Healy argued that the bonus should be proportionately 
higher in the case of poorer estates and that it should only be paid to landlords who 
sold their estates within five years of the passing of the Bill. He added ‘I do not 
grudge this money being given to the landlord for the sake of peace, and ending an 
ancient feud.’57 Charles Devlin, M.P. for Galway, argued that ‘if the bonus 
disappeared from the Bill the measure would have no effect on Ireland, because the 
landlords would refuse to sell.’58 John Dillon’s view was: ‘I agree that the landlords 
were getting too much under the Bill. But there was no prospect of ending the land 
trouble in Ireland in any way than by offering this inducement to the landlords to 
sell.’59 To John Blake the bonus was necessary ‘to grease the wheels of purchase’. 60 
T.P. O’Connor, the Nationalist M.P. for Liverpool, went a step further and claimed 
that Irish tenants ‘are quite willing that out of their taxes for this bonus is Irish 
money the landlord should get a bonus which probably would not be given to any 
other class of the community.’61 The almost total accord amongst nationalist and 
                                                 
55 The Irish Land Conference, Official Report, 3rd January 1903 (Dublin, 1903). 
56 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1106 (1 July 1903). 
57 Hansard 4, cxx, 233 (25 Mar. 1903). 
58 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1102 (1 July 1903). 
59 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1101 (1 July 1903). 
60 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1114 (1 July 1903). 
61 Hansard 4, cxxii, 82 (7 May 1903). 
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unionist politicians was unprecedented and must have been a source of satisfaction to 
Wyndham and a positive reflection on the work done by himself and his under-
secretary Anthony MacDonnell from the time of the withdrawal of his 1902 Bill.     
 
The main opposition to the bonus provision came from members of the opposition 
who saw it as a bribe rather than as Wyndham claimed ‘a [matter] of public policy 
not a private deal’.62 In an article in the Irish Times, Henry Campbell Bannerman, 
former prime minister, and then leader of the opposition saw the £12 million as: ‘the 
enormity of a landlord’s bribe to landlords’.63   Thomas Ashton claimed that the 
bonus was: ‘the greatest blot on the Bill’ and that: ‘it [was] a bribe to satisfy the 
House of Lords’.64 In an interesting exchange between John Dillon and Ashton, the 
former agreed that it was a bribe but that there was no other way of bringing about 
an end to the land trouble in Ireland and in any event, it was better than spending the 
money on policing costs.65 This exchange contained all the ingredients of realpolitik.  
Douglas Coghill saw the bonus as ‘a free gift to Ireland ‘before adding prophetically 
‘I do not entertain the opinion that if the land question were settled the feeling of 
unrest would cease to exist in Ireland.’66  
 
3.5: The Act’s finance provisions 
 
While most of the attention surrounding the Wyndham Land Act centred on issues of 
price, the bonus, the absence of compulsory purchase and its sheer scale and scope, 
the foundation and what made the measure possible, was the financial provisions 
which underpinned it. Without what was in effect a government-backed mortgage 
scheme, land reform in Ireland would not have worked.  
 
What commentary that has been made around this aspect of the act has focussed on 
narrow technical details and have not provided a wider and more contextual overall 
                                                 
62 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1104 (1 July 1903). 
63 Irish Times, 25 April 1903 
64 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1097 (1 July 1903). 
65 Hansard 4, cxxiv, 1101 (1 July 1903). 
66 Hansard 4, cxx, 229 (25 Mar. 1903). 
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perspective of the importance of the act’s financial provisions.67 Before dealing with 
the specific aspects of this section of the act it is worth briefly placing these 
provisions in context. In broad terms, financial provisions relate to those parts of the 
act relating to money. They include such areas as the annual monetary limitations 
placed on the Land Commission in terms of transactions (Section 9), the rate of 
interest charged on advances to purchasers (Section 45), the mechanisms by which 
funds were raised to finance the purchase schemes (Section 28) and the various 
guarantee schemes underpinning the advances from the Treasury to fund the act’s 
activities (Sections 29 to 44). Many of these sections of the act were technically 
complex. The act’s financial provisions were important from several perspectives. 
Firstly, there was as already noted, no functioning credit markets whereby financial 
institutions would advance loans to people wishing to buy land and hence in order to 
deliver land reform direct government intervention in the mortgage market was 
required.68 Even if alternate sources did exist it would have been extremely unlikely 
that they would have advanced 100 per cent of the purchase price to individuals with 
no credit status. Secondly, to square the circle of making a price that would 
encourage landlords to sell and tenants to buy, while leaving both better-off 
financially, required raising money at a cost in the market via a placing on the 
London Stock Exchange, that would enable transactions to take place.69 The secret to 
addressing the above was to use the British government’s good name and reputation 
to borrow funds in the market and to lend these funds to tenant purchasers via the 
Land Commission to buy their holdings from landlords. To do this required 
Wyndham persuading a conservative and sceptical Treasury that the overall prize of 
resolving the Irish land question was worth their efforts and that the risks were 
relatively minimal.70 Without the Treasury agreeing to raise the funds there would 
have been no means of funding the purchases so, therefore, no Wyndham Act.  
                                                 
67 For commentary on this aspect of the 1903 Act see Cosgrove ‘The Wyndham Land Act, 
1903,’ pp 237-69; Nathan Foley-Fisher and Eoin Mc Laughlin, ‘Capitalising on the Irish 
land question: Land reform and state banking in Ireland, 1891-1938 in Financial History 
Review, 23.1 (2016), pp 71-109.  
  
68 Foley-Fisher and Mc Laughlin, ‘Capitalising on the Irish land question’, p. 82. 
69 A placing is the term that is used to describe issuing a security on the London Stock 
Exchange. 
70 See Andrew Gailey Ireland and the death of kindness: The experience of constructive 
unionism 1890-1905, (Cork, 1987), p. 84. Gailey further expressed the view that the 
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Were it not for the Treasury’s willingness to facilitate the transaction it would have 
been impossible to raise funds at a cost of 2.75 per cent. Even with the Treasury’s 
involvement by 1908 the discount applied to the issuance of £23,750,000 worth of 
2.75 per cent Guaranteed Irish Land Stock stood at £2,837, 388 which meant that the 
true cost of raising finance to fund the acts land purchases was 3.125 per cent. This 
represents a 13.6 per cent increase in the cost of funds.71 This situation would in the 
coming years further deteriorate as the volume of stock issued increased to meet the 
demands of landlords and tenants to avail of the terms offered by the Wyndham Act.  
If the Land Commission had to pay open market rates for these funds it would not 
have been able to provide finance to tenants at 2.75 per cent or afford to pay 
landlords a price for their lands representing an average of 22.2 times annual rent.72 
As Wyndham stated in introducing the bill: ‘finance is the whole basis of this bill: it 
is the foundation on which the whole superstructure is erected.’73   
 
Wyndham showed himself to be adroit in matters of high finance and the workings 
of the City. His approach in raising upwards of £100 million by means of a 2.75 per 
cent Guaranteed Irish Land Bond stock showed considerable adroitness in terms of 
financial engineering practice. To win the confidence of the City, he stated that his 
plan was to adopt a gradual approach to raising the capital to fund Irish land 
purchases by limiting the amount raised in the initial period, to not more than £5 
million in any one of the first three years of the scheme.74 In a period where the 
market was awash with Transvaal bonds, another substantial bond issue could 
encounter difficulties in being taken up.75 The background to this was that in May 
                                                 
Treasury later were concerned that the increased borrowing associated with Irish land 
purchases might ‘undermine the credibility of the government in the City’. p. 206.  
71 Report of the departmental committee appointed to enquire into Irish land purchase 
finance in connection with the provision of funds required for the purposes of the Irish Land 
Act, 1903, 7, [Cd. 4005] H.C. 1908 xxiii, 267. This report, which was better known as the 
Runciman committee report after its chairman, Walter Runciman, financial secretary, was 
commissioned due to concerns in government regarding the workings of the 1903 Act. The 
above calculation is based on the discount that 2 ¾ stock had to be issued at to ensure that 
the market purchased it.  
72 Report of the estates commissioners for the year ending 31st March 1920, H.C. xiv, 661. 
73 Hansard 4, cxx, 206 (25 Mar. 1903). 
74 Hansard 4, cxx, 201 (25 Mar. 1903). 
75 Transvaal Government Guaranteed 3 per cent loan stock was raised by the Transvaal 
Government to repay war debt, to finance the building of railways and a land resettlement 
programme. The first issue was in May 1903 and raised £30 million and there was a further 
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1903, the Transvaal Government raised £30 million through the issue of a 3 per cent 
guaranteed loan stock in order to repay the British government’s war debts, fund a 
land resettlement programme and finance the building of a railway network. A 
further £5 million was raised in June. The impact of this was to absorb a significant 
amount of liquidity from the market with the result that investors and institutions had 
little appetite or cash for Irish land stock. Coupled with this was a mistrust in certain 
quarters of the market of Irish land bonds, as evidenced by their being described as 
‘bog stock’.76 And the fact, that they were only paying 2.75 per cent on the bond was 
clearly also a factor. It would made it difficult to raise a large sum offering such a 
low level of return to bond purchasers even if it was a British Treasury issue. A 
review of bond prices on the 25 March 1903 (date of introduction of the bill) showed 
that investors could acquire yields in excess of the 2.75 per cent in the market, for 
example, Cape Bond (3.3 per cent), New South Wales (3.5 per cent), New Zealand 
(3.3 per cent), Manchester municipal (3.1 per cent).77 In this environment it would 
have been challenging for the Treasury to successfully place a large issue of Irish 
land bonds at a yield of 2.75 per cent., hence the decision to limit the issue to £5 
million for each of the first three years of the act’s operation. Wyndham felt that 
when the City got used to these new bonds that ‘it will be possible and desirable to 
mend the pace.’78  Clearly his strategy worked as by the time the purchases under the 
act had exhausted itself by 1919 over £82 million had been raised although this 
required an increase in the coupon to 3 per cent under the Irish Land Act,1909.79  
 
A vital aspect of Wyndham’s proposals was that vendors would be paid in cash and 
not as heretofore in land bonds. As set out in chapter 2 the value of bonds (not just 
land bonds) had been falling significantly from around 1900. As the table below 
illustrates a bond purchased (say a 10 year 2.5 per cent consol) in 1896 for £110-17-
6 would by 1903 have fallen in value to £90-18-9 or just over 18 per cent. 
 
                                                 
£5 million raised in June. See Jeremy Wormell, The management of the national debt of the 
United Kingdom, 1900-1932, (London, 2004), p. 45.   
76 A remark made by William Moore M.P. for North Antrim in parliament in 1909, cited in 
Foley-Fisher and Mc Laughlin, ‘Capitalising on the Irish land question’, p. 85.  
77 The Times, 25 Mar. 1903. 
78 Hansard 4, cxx, 201 (25 Mar. 1903). 
79 Report of the Irish Land Commissioners for the year from 1 Apr., 1934 to 31 Mar., 1935 
(Dublin, 1936), p. 10. 
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Table 3.12. Average price of 10 Year 3 per cent consols 1896-1903 
 
Year Avg. Price £ 
1896 110.875 
1897 112.250 
1898 110.875 
1899 107.000 
1900 99.625 
1901 94.187 
1902 94.500 
1903 90.937 
 
Source: Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A history of interest rates, (New 
Jersey, 2005), pp 194 & 446. 
 
The practical consequences of such a decline in the value of bonds for someone who, 
for example, sold his estate under the Land Law (Ireland) Act,1896, for £5,000, and 
who held on to the land bonds, was that they would be worth only £4,100 in 1903. In 
such circumstances, it is not surprising that landlords would have been reluctant to 
continue to accept this form of payment and would instead insist on receiving cash. 
While they would not have been aware of it at the time, landlords’ insistence on cash 
was a very wise decision, as the value of consols fell dramatically over the next 100 
years because of massive fundraising demands caused by the two world wars, a 
significant rise in interest rates and the growth of inflation in the 1970s. For 
example, a 2.5 per cent consols which traded at an average price of approximately 
£90 in 1903 was worth less than £29 in 1989.80  
 
The difficulty that a cash payment posed for the Treasury was the challenge of 
sourcing upwards of £100 million in cash by issuing bonds to the City and other 
institutional investors. Given the declining value of bonds since 1896 to do so at a 
rate of 2.75 per cent would have been impossible to achieve even for the most 
powerful financial institution in the world, the British Treasury. That they were 
                                                 
80 Barclays equity / gilt study 2016 (61st Edition, London), pp 74-6. 
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prepared to countenance it in the first instance and to agree to do so at such a 
competitive rate of 2.75 per cent was testimony to the British government’s 
commitment to resolving the Irish land question and to Wyndham’s powers of 
persuasion and influence, and his relationship with Charles Ritchie the chancellor of 
the Exchequer. Moreover, regardless of Wyndham’s personal relationships and 
qualities, without the backing of Arthur Balfour the Treasury support would not have 
been forthcoming. 
 
Despite Wyndham’s arguments regarding the ‘moral security’ afforded by 
willingness of purchasers to meet their obligations and the guarantee afforded by the 
‘Irish Land Purchase Fund’ the passing of the act entailed certain risks for the British 
taxpayer, a point noted by a number of the contributors.81  One of the key opposition 
voices was that of Tommy Gibson Bowles the M.P. for Lynn Regis and the owner of 
the widely circulated social magazines Vanity Fair and The Lady. Bowles, in a long 
and significant contribution to the debate, argued that the exposure of the British 
taxpayer was unlimited: ‘there is absolutely no limit to the advances under the bill ... 
it may be £100,000,000 or it may be £150,000,000; but there is no limit.’82 In 1908 
the Runciman committee estimated that were the terms of the Wyndham Land Act to 
remain unchanged and the programme it started run to its conclusion that the cost 
would be £160,000,000 due to the rising cost of raising funds in the market.83 
Gibson Bowles was particularly critical of the bill’s financial provisions referring to 
them as: ‘Patagonian finance. It is not only novel; it is grotesque.’84 He sought to 
undermine Wyndham’s assertions about the security provided, arguing the land was 
not worth what was being paid for it and that in the event of another famine or a 
succession of bad harvests that regardless to the moral obligation to pay their 
annuities they simply would not be able to do so, and the Treasury would not be able 
to recover the loans. He highlighted one of the main deficiencies of the bill which 
                                                 
81 Hansard 4, cxx, 187 (25 Mar. 1903); Irish Land Act 1903, section 47. 
82 Hansard 4, cxxii, 68-69 (7 May 1903). 
83 Report of the departmental committee appointed to enquire into Irish land purchase 
finance in connection with the provision of funds required for the purposes of the Irish Land 
Act, 1903, 7, [Cd. 4005] H.C. 1908 xxiii, 267. 
84 Hansard 4, cxxii, 69 (7 May 1903). The reference to Patagonian finance was a derogatory 
term and originated from a number of schemes to mine guano in South America in the late 
nineteenth century. Many of these fundraising schemes which emanated out of London 
turned out to be fraudulent or reckless and investors lost their investments. 
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was the absence of any working capital finance facility that could be provided to 
tenant purchasers to cover short-term seasonal cash difficulties that might arise. To 
Bowles the bill represented: ‘a crazy scheme founded on crazed finance’.85  
 
Bowles’s comments were re-echoed by Llewellyn Atherly Jones, the Liberal Party 
M.P. for Durham, who expressed his: ‘very great repugnance to the financial 
provisions of this Bill’.86 Arguing that Wyndham’s bill, when coupled with the 1898 
Local Government Act, had: ‘laid the foundations of the structure of self-government 
which they [Tories] or we [Liberals] shall finish.’87 Making the same point Compton 
Rickett stated that because of this act and the greater ties of people to the land that 
‘Nationalism will make a great stride forward in the direction of Home Rule.’88 With 
great prescience towards the Economic War some thirty years later he advised 
parliament that:  
 
there will be an irresistible temptation to put pressure on the Government of 
this country to secure more political concessions. It has been shown again 
and again that the Government could not resist a strike on a large scale 
against rent. You could not evict a country. 89 
 
A similar point was made by James Coghill M.P., when asking: ‘But supposing a 
feeling of tension arises again between Ireland and this country, what will happen in 
regard to the payments under this Bill?’90  
 
In terms of its financial provisions the act became a victim of its own success. 
Applications to the Land Commission far exceeded the funds available and its 
                                                 
85 Hansard 4, cxxii, 74 (7 May 1903). 
86 Hansard 4, cxxii, 9 (7 May 1903). 
87 Hansard 4, cxxii, 40 (7 May 1903). 
88 Hansard 4, cxxii, 95 (7 May 1903). 
89 Hansard 4, cxxii, 94 (7 May 1903). The reference refers to the Anglo-Irish Trade War of 
1932-36. The difficulties were triggered by a decision of the first Fianna Fáil government to 
withhold the land annuities due to the British Treasury under previous land acts. The action 
triggered retaliatory economic sanctions such as the imposition of tariffs and trade 
embargoes. After four years and significant damage to the Irish economy in particular, an 
agreement was concluded between the two countries which saw a return to normal trade 
relations and a one-off payment of £10 million by the Irish government as a full and final 
settlement of all outstanding land annuities.  See Brian Girvan, ‘The republicanisation of 
Irish society, 1932-48’ in J.R. Hill (ed.), A new history of Ireland, vii: Ireland, 1921-84 
(Oxford, 2010), pp 146-8. 
90 Hansard 4, cxx, 227 (25 Mar. 1903). 
118 
 
capacity to process the volume of transactions. As early as 31 December 1904, just 
over one year following the act’s passing, the Land Commission had received 
applications of over £19 million but only £4.2 million had been advanced.91 Given 
that Wyndham had only committed to raising £5 million per annum for the first 
three-years, backlogs were inevitable. As will be seen later in this study when the 
sales of individual estates are examined, delays of up to ten years in completing a 
transaction were not uncommon despite changes in amending legislation and 
increases in staffing levels in the Land Commission.  
 
These delays could be problematic for both landlords and tenants. This was 
particularly so in the case of heavily indebted estates. In such cases once the 
application was made to and accepted by the Land Commission a landlord received 
an interest payment of 3.5 per cent of the agreed consideration in lieu of rent from 
the Commission which was then responsible for collecting the rent from the tenants. 
This arrangement might remain in place for many years before the Land Commission 
had sufficient funds to complete the transaction. As the following comment from the 
president of the Incorporated Law Society, Edward Mac Laughlin in November 
1904, highlights the delay was a major problem for a landlord who had to service 
significant debt: 
 
If the limitation [five million annually] of the money available was adhered 
to, estates under the act could not be sold with the same rapidity as during the 
past twelve months…. In the meantime, they [landlords] would have to [bear] 
heavy rates of interest upon the charges on the estates. The rates of interest 
probably varied from 4 to 6 per cent.92 
 
 
There is no doubt that the financial workings of the act had their failings and these 
became manifest early in its operation. The fact that Wyndham was attempting to 
engage with so many parties with conflicting demands made this inevitable. The 
fundamental problem however, was the lack of funding available to finance land 
purchases. 
 
                                                 
91 Interim report of the estates commissioners for the period from 1st November, 1903, to 31st 
December. 1904, 50, [Cd. 2471], H.C. 1905, xxii, 177. 
92 Freemans Journal, 29 Nov. 1904. 
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One of the parties that he needed to bring on board was the British taxpayer in the 
guise of the Treasury. To achieve this, he needed to minimise their sense of risk and 
this he achieved by building into the legislation a series of financial structures that 
this study refers to as guarantee provisions. 
 
3.6: The Act’s guarantee provisions 
 
Wyndham’s approach to allaying the fears of the British taxpayer was threefold. 
Firstly, in his introductory remarks he argued that it was ‘to the material interest’ of 
Britain to have a contented and prosperous Ireland.93 Secondly, he minimised the 
risks associated with bad debt citing that ‘Public opinion supports the punctual 
repayment of the purchase instalments, and that is a moral security which we ought 
not to underestimate’.94 Thirdly, the provision of guarantees that were aimed at 
providing comfort to the British public that they would not be liable should Irish 
tenants default on their loans. 
 
The first security in the event of default was the land itself. Should the tenant default 
in his repayments the Land Commission was empowered to foreclose on the 
mortgage and sell the land to pay off the debt. This was the practice at an individual 
borrower level but in terms of satisfying the British taxpayer a more complex 
structure was required. The effect of these measures was to place the responsibility 
for any repayment shortfall on the Irish taxpayer.  
 
The essential features of this system of indemnities were as follows. Section 27 of 
the Wyndham Act established what was called the Irish Land Purchase Fund 
(I.L.P.F.). This fund was administered by the National Debt Commissioners, an 
organisation akin to the modern National Treasury Management Agency. When the 
Treasury issued 2.75 per cent Guaranteed Irish Land stock the gross proceeds were 
passed to the I.L.P.F. who would in turn pass these on to the Land Commission to 
fund the land purchases they had approved. Any Irish land stock issued to fund land 
purchases under the 1903 Act by the Treasury was guaranteed by it, but was secured 
                                                 
93 Hansard, 4, cxx, 183 (25 Mar. 1903). 
94 Hansard, 4, cxx, 187 (25 Mar. 1903). 
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against the assets of the I.L.P.F. Section 38 provided that if there was any shortfall in 
terms of meeting interest, capital repayments, or, more pertinently, the discount 
payable on the issuance of stock that could not be met out of the I.L.P.F. in the first 
instance they would be charged against the Irish Development Grant Fund.95 In the 
event of this Fund not having sufficient funds to meet shortfalls, claims would be 
made against the Irish Probate Duty Grant Fund or the Irish Death Duty incomes 
Fund (These funds represented the income to the Irish administration from probates 
and death duties). If a shortfall remained it would be claimed against the Agricultural 
Grants Fund paid under the Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898. The effect of 
these measures was to place the onus of meeting any shortfall in funding on the 
general Irish taxpayer and not his British counterpart. A similar arrangement 
pertained to the Irish Land Purchase Aid fund established under Section 47 of the 
Act for the purposes of funding the cost of the bonus paid to landlords. 
 
Cosgrove provides an example of how these measures impacted on taxpayers. he 
cites that of Kildare County Council which in 1907, suffered a withholding of £8,454 
from their Death Duty Grant and the Agricultural Grant due to it because of the 
charges incurred by the I.L.P.F. as a result of the sale of the Leinster Estate in 1904 
for £766,647.96 The unfairness of this situation whereby some people such as 
merchants and professionals who had not benefitted in any way from the 
introduction of the 1903 Act were being asked to pay was recognised by the new 
Liberal government in 1907 following representations from the Irish Party and 
thereafter shortfalls were met by the central exchequer. The guarantee safeguards for 
the British taxpayer introduced by Wyndham in 1903 had therefore effectively been 
made null and void but their inclusion in the original act removed a possible reason 
for its rejection by parliament and on that basis, they can be said to have achieved 
their objective. 
                                                 
95 The Irish Development Grant Act 1903 was enacted to provide funding for a range of 
agencies such as the Congested Districts Board, The Office of Public Works and The 
Commissioners of Education and Training. According to the Report of the Lord Lieutenant 
of all his proceedings under the Ireland Development Grant Act, 1903, for the financial year 
ending 31st March,1905, H.C. [Cd. 705] a total of £95,000 was paid out and of this £75,000 
pertained to the 1903 Land Act.   
96 Cosgrove ‘The Wyndham Land Act, 1903’, p. 250. 
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3.7: Conclusion 
 
How the Wyndham Act is interpreted and the subsequent amending legislation, is a 
matter of perspective. From a political standpoint, the act did go a long way towards 
addressing the land question but as events turned out had little impact on the more 
overarching Irish question so in that light it was largely a failure. From a strategic 
perspective, it represented a missed opportunity to restructure Irish agriculture. From 
the viewpoint of the unfortunate landless, it was a total failure. In terms of land 
reform, it more than any other state sponsored initiative delivered on its promise. 
From a landlord perspective, it provided an opportunity to sell an estate at a price 
that allowed a standard of living to be maintained. It afforded tenants the opportunity 
to finally purchase their holdings and become masters of their own soil.    
 
From the perspective of George Wyndham, it can be argued that despite its many 
weaknesses and failings it represented a great triumph. The problems that arose with 
regard to the operation of the act were principally around the lack of availability of a 
sufficient source of capital at the rate provided for by Wyndham at 2.75 per cent. 
The stresses placed on the scheme by the commitment to pay cash instead of land 
bonds to landlords, the decision to ensure that annuities were significantly below rent 
levels, and the scope and scale of the measure all placed enormous strain on the 
operation of the act. The achievement in putting together a highly complex piece of 
legislation capable of meeting the conflicting demands of landlords, tenants, 
intractably opposed political enemies, the British taxpayer and the Treasury, merits 
much praise. Had Wyndham lived until 1920, he might have responded to critics that 
despite all the failings and weaknesses in the legislation it had largely achieved his 
objective of solving the Irish land question. While the act did not succeed in bringing 
about a total transfer of all the land of the country it did succeed to the point where it 
was a realistic proposition for Free State governments to introduce their own 
legislation and thus complete the process. Had the Wyndham Act not been so 
successful this would not have been possible. Thus, it can be argued that it did 
achieve its overall objective and in that sense, should be viewed as a great success. 
In terms of winners and losers it is difficult to gauge and is dependent on the 
timescale. For instance, tenants would have benefitted significantly from their fixed 
rate annuities during the inflationary period of the First World War but suffered in 
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the deflationary dominated 1920s and 1930s. Irish ratepayers bore the cost of 
funding shortfall costs in the early years of the act’s operation and the British 
Exchequer and by extension the British public would have lost heavily following the 
decision by Eamon de Valera, Taoiseach, to withhold the land annuities in 1932. 
 
What then of the remaining players in the whole process namely Irish landlords? If, 
tenants paid too high a price for their holdings then it is reasonable to deduce that 
landlords were paid too much and as such were winners under Wyndham’s Act.  
While this is true to some extent, it needs to be borne in mind that by any objective 
assessment landlords had since the introduction of the Land Law (Ireland) Act,1881 
suffered both severely and unjustly at the altar of political expedience. The state’s 
intervention in the market whereby dual ownership was given effect by the 1881 Act, 
institutionalised long term (forty-five years) rent reductions through the introduction 
of Judicial rent reviews and compulsory compensation to tenants for improvements 
made to their holdings and all this without any recompense being paid to landlords. 
Such measures could not be enacted today without major legal challenge as the 
recent episode regarding upward only rent reviews in Ireland went to show. 97  
 
Arguably, landlords were treated extremely badly and the value of their assets and 
their capacity to manage them and leverage them virtually wiped out without any 
compensation being made. In this context, it might be argued that the generous 
Wyndham provisions to landlords were in some regard a recognition that 
compensation was due for the serious diminution in the value of their asset caused by 
previous land acts. As such in accessing how landlords fared under Wyndham it is 
important to examine this with a wider lens not just in terms of the impact of 
                                                 
97 In their 2011 election manifesto (Section 15.10) the Fine Gael party gave a commitment to 
pass legislation abolishing what is known as upward only rent reviews. The effect of this 
legislation would have been to negate the standard clause in most commercial leases that 
rents could only be reviewed upwards regardless of whether the passing rent was justified or 
not. On coming to power the Fine Gael-led government sought to honour their pre-election 
commitment but in April 2014 the then minister for Justice, Alan Shatter, announced that 
they were dropping plans for their abolition when he said; ‘There was substantial concern 
that any legislative scheme involving interference in the contractual relationships of private 
parties would find it extremely difficult to survive a constitutional challenge.’ (The 
Journal.ie 22 April 2014on www.thejournal.ie accessed 2 July 2015). The Fine Gael 
proposal were minimal compared to the measures imposed on Irish landlords during the 
period 1870 to 1903. 
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previous measures enacted but also as to what became of them in the years that 
followed their sale as they sought to come to terms with a different form of wealth 
asset namely capital. 
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Chapter 4: The Anatomy of a deal – The case of the Dopping 
Hepenstall estate 
 
4.1: Introduction 
 
Historiography has ignored the actual day-to-day workings of the various land acts 
and as a result there is a serious lacuna in the understanding of the challenges faced 
by landlords, their advisors and tenant purchasers, particularly in the aftermath of the 
introduction of Wyndham Land Act, 1903. This gap in knowledge has meant that an 
important aspect of life in Ireland in the early years of the twentieth century has 
remained unexplored, as has an appreciation of the efforts required of all parties 
involved in concluding a sale under the terms of the Wyndham Act.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to fill this void by examining on a step-by-step basis how 
land deals were struck, the strategies and tactics employed by landlords, tenants and 
the Land Commission to bring about transactions, and the highly intricate legal and 
financial processes required to affect such a redistribution of land. It will also 
explore the role played by land agents, solicitors and indeed the role played by local 
power brokers such as the Catholic clergy, as well as evicted tenants and their lineal 
descendants. 
 
The methodology employed is that of a case study approach. Key to this has been a 
detailed examination of a number of family and estate papers. The study has 
benefitted from the availability of two significant collections held by the National 
Library of Ireland, namely the Dopping Hepenstall and the Bellew family estate 
papers. The Dopping Hepenstall collection contains well over 2,000 documents 
dealing specifically with the subject under review. Even within such a collection it is 
obvious that gaps exist relating to various stages and the study deals with this by 
substituting material from other collections such as the Bellew and Clonbrook papers 
and a number of contemporary guides such as Walkers, The law relating to land 
purchase in Ireland being the Irish Land Acts, 1903 & 1904, and Fottrells, The Irish 
Land Act 1903 explained. These tomes sold widely in the aftermath of the act’s 
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introduction as landlords, land agents, legal advisors, as well as tenant purchasers 
sought to understand the intricacies of the new legislation.   
  
Despite the efforts of Wyndham to simplify the procedures involved through the 
introduction of the in globo principle and the specification of rent zones, transactions 
were extremely complex and drawn out and required significant expertise, 
particularly from a legal perspective. The Dopping Hepenstall sale illustrates this 
point well in that it took almost ten years from the initial negotiations with tenants to 
the completion of the sales and the payment of the proceeds into the landlord’s bank 
account. During that period, there was a large volume of correspondence and 
meetings between Dopping Hepenstall, his solicitor Bernard O’Grady, and the Land 
Commission. As outlined in chapter 3 much of the delay experienced in completing 
sales was attributed to the lack of sufficient funding being in place. However, this 
case study demonstrates that the bureaucracy involved in the sales process was also a 
major contributor to transactions being drawn out over many years. 
 
Before examining the detail of the Dopping Hepenstall sale it is worth considering 
the underlying essentials of land transactions in the post-Wyndham era. The 1903 
Act provided for the sale of lands under two methods:  the first was by selling the 
entire estate to the Land Commission, and the second method was by selling each 
individual holding to the tenant thereof, with the purchase price being paid directly 
to the landlord by the Land Commission. 
 
Section 6 (1) provided that a landlord could sell his entire estate directly to the Land 
Commission rather than to his tenants. This might arise for several reasons: where 
the estate is in a congested district and a better price could be obtained from the Land 
Commission than what the tenants could afford to pay; where the landlord was 
unable to conclude deals with his tenants due to animosities or past difficulties; 
where the situation is complicated because of claims by evicted tenants or their 
descendants.1   
 
                                                 
1R.A. Walker, The law relating to land purchase in Ireland (Dublin, 1906), p. 17. 
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The second method was by far the most commonly used and was the basis upon 
which the Dopping Hepenstall sales and indeed the other sales examined in this 
study were transacted.  The transactions were financed by the Land Commission by 
means of a loan to the purchaser at an annual interest rate totalling 3.25 per cent, 
made up of 2.75 per cent interest and a sinking fund charge of 0.5 per cent. The price 
paid, represented by the number of years’ purchase of the annual rent, was the 
subject of negotiation between the individual tenants and landlord and so long as it 
came within the rent-related ‘zones’ the Land Commission were obligated to accept 
it. Where judicial rents did not apply, or particularly in the case of vacant lands, the 
price was the subject of direct negotiation with the Land Commission. While the 
above represents the basics of such deals, and is typically the level explained by 
current historiography, the detail involved in arriving at a completed transaction was 
far more circuitous. What follows is a much more comprehensive representation of 
the ‘anatomy of a deal’. 
 
4.2: The Dopping Hepenstall estate 
 
The Dopping Hepenstalls held estates in Longford and Wicklow. The family also 
held a number of residential properties in Dublin City.2 The Doppings were 
originally an English family who settled in Longford in the mid-seventeenth century. 
In 1858, the Rev. L.W. Dopping married Diana Dalyrmple Hepenstall. Her father 
was a landlord of a 1,500-acre estate in Wicklow and was a nephew of the notorious 
Edward Hepenstall, a lieutenant in the 68th Regiment who earned a fearsome 
reputation for cruelty in the Wicklow and south Leinster area during the 1798 
Rebellion.3 He was said to be almost seven foot tall and earned the nickname ‘The 
Walking Gallows’ because of a technique he allegedly practised whereby he could 
hang a prisoner by tying a rope around his neck and throwing him over his shoulder. 
From this union came the double barrel nomenclature and the broader estate.  
 
The family had a somewhat chequered history in the late nineteenth century, 
including a bankruptcy and inter-sibling law suits concerning the distribution of the 
                                                 
2 Landlords in Ireland 1876’. 
3 Desmond McCabe, ‘Hepenstall, Edward Lambert’ in DIB, p. 638. 
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proceeds of a life assurance policy. From various newspaper articles, it seems that 
the family appear to have had less than cordial relations with sections of the local 
community. In 1882, Col. Dopping Hepenstall got into a fight with one of his tenants 
over the latter cutting turf without the former’s permission. It ended up with the 
colonel up to his neck in a bog-hole after confronting the tenant, a Mr Hand.  
Dopping Hepenstall ordered the ten servants who accompanied him to restrain Hand 
and when they refused they were instantly dismissed.4 In April 1904 a number of 
local men were charged with stealing timber from the estate.5 The following 
September the estate bailiff, Robert Gillespie was returned for trial charged with 
pointing a revolver at four local men, two of which, John and Edward Hanlon, were 
the sons of a tenant who had been evicted from the estate in 1885. The report 
referred to the fact that there had been bad blood between the parties for some time.6 
Interestingly in this case the solicitor for the four complainants was C.J.P. Farrell 
who represented the tenants in their negotiations to buy their holdings from Dopping 
Hepenstall. Even long after the sale of the estate local newspapers record several 
instances of cases involving damage to the demesne property.  
 
The landowners in Ireland, 1876, shows the family owning 1,701 statute acres in 
Derrycassan, Co. Longford, with an annual valuation of £1,109, and a further 1,568 
acres (£925 annual valuation) scattered around various parts of Co. Wicklow.7 
 
4.3: Initiating the sales process 
 
The starting point for a deal appears to have varied from situation to situation. In the 
case of the Dopping Hepenstall the process was initiated by a handwritten letter 
dated 6 November 1903 to his land agent, Bernard O’Grady of 14 Nassau Street, 
Dublin, signed by forty-three tenants from his Derrycassan estate in Longford, 
including Peter Hand who was the tenant involved in the previously mentioned 
altercation with Dopping Hepenstall’s father in 1882.8 Interestingly, in this letter the 
                                                 
4 Freemans Journal, 1 July 1882. 
5 Anglo-Celt, 4 Apr. 1908. 
6 Anglo-Celt, 17 Sept. 1904. 
7 Landowners in Ireland, 1876, p. 53 and p. 99. 
8 National census 1901 returns for the townlands of Mullanalaghta and Larkfield in Co. 
Longford; 
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issue of land purchase appears to have been of secondary importance. The main 
point was to seek a rent reduction due to difficult harvest conditions: 
 
We the undersigned tenants on Major Dopping’s, Derrycassan, Larkfield and 
Dring estate beg to represent to you as his agent the loss we have sustained 
arising to the inclemency of the past season. Less than half the hay crop has 
been saved. The potato is but a little over half the average. The same is true 
of the root crop and as is well known the turf or fuel crop is utterly ruined. 
Even this statement does not express nearly all our loss. We beg to request 
that you will make in the rent now called for a reduction in some degree 
proportionate to our losses or as an alternative that Major Dopping will sell 
the lands in Derrycassan, Larkfield and Dring to his tenants on reasonable 
terms and have the rent now claimed added to the purchase money.9 
 
Within fifteen days of the above letter, the issue of land purchase came to the fore as 
a second letter sent directly to Dopping Hepenstall makes clear:  
 
We, the tenants on your property respectfully approach you to ask if you are 
willing to sell to us at a price consistent with your interest and your tenants. 
If so we are willing to offer you 20 years purchase on second term rents, and 
the few 1st term tenants to be specifically dealt with or graded to 2nd term 
with the same number of years purchase. 
 
We would also request you to include the November half year’s rent in the 
purchase, as the present disastrous harvest leaves us unable to pay it.10 
 
The approach here is interesting from a number of perspectives. In the first instance, 
it was made within three months of the passing of the act in August 1903, indicating 
a significant appetite on behalf of the tenants for land purchase. Secondly, the fact 
that such a large number of tenants had signed the letter illustrates that they were 
mobilising themselves. The third aspect is that tenants saw an opportunity to apply 
pressure to a landlord by threatening to withhold rent while at the same time hoping 
to have it capitalised into the purchase price that might be paid, thereby giving them 
an immediate cashflow advantage.11  It is interesting also that none of the tenants 
                                                 
http://www.census.nationalarchives.ie/pages/1901/Longford/Mullanalaghta/Larkfield/15510
08/ accessed, 30 Mar 2017. 
9 Derrycassan tenants to O’Grady, 6 Nov. 1903 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836(8)).  
10 Letter from Derrycassan tenants to Doppping Hepenstall, 21 Nov. 1903 (N.L.I., Dopping 
Hepenstall papers, MS 35836(8)). 
11 The term ‘capitalisation’ in this context means that the arrears of rent would be added to 
the purchase price and that the mortgage to the tenant from the Land Commission would 
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took the lead in stating their case. Clearly there were natural leaders among them as 
subsequently the land agent, O’Grady, identified the aforementioned Peter Hand who 
he describes as ‘one of the principal tenants in Larkfield’.12 It was not until March 
1904 that Christopher Farrell, a Longford-based solicitor, wrote to O’Grady advising 
that he been appointed by the tenants of the Derrycassan estate to represent their 
interests. 13 Farrell was the same solicitor that represented the complainants in the 
previously referred to case in which Robert Gillespie, bailiff on the Dopping 
Hepenstall estate, was tried for firing shots at four young men in Longford in 1904. 
Farrell was also the brother of James Patrick Farrell, the founder of the Longford 
Leader newspaper, and the Irish Parliamentary Party M.P. for South Longford. 
James Farrell raised the issue of the evicted tenants of the Dopping Hepenstall 
Longford estate in parliament on several occasions.14  
 
The appointment of a solicitor to represent tenants’ interests and to communicate 
with landlords seems to have been a regular practice. For example, the tenants of the 
Wicklow estate of Col. Dopping Hepenstall appointed solicitor, J.H. Carroll of 
Church Street, Wicklow to represent them. In the case of the tenants of Lord 
Bellew’s estate, B. Glynn, a solicitor from Galway, was appointed. While hardly a 
statistically representative sample it is interesting to note that the three tenant 
representative solicitors referred to above were all Roman Catholic whereas at that 
time most of the profession were Protestant.15 All the solicitors of landlords 
examined in this study were Protestant.16  
                                                 
cover this amount. An example serves to illustrate the point clearer. Let us suppose a tenant 
was paying an annual rent of say £50 and was in arrears for one year. If he bought his 
holding for 23 times purchase of the passing rent, he would therefore pay £1,150 and this 
would be financed by a mortgage from the Land Commission. In this instance, his annual 
repayments to the land Commission would be £37-6-8 (£1,150 @ 3 ¼ per cent annuity). He 
would still have to pay the landlord £50 for the arrears. If, however, the arrears were added 
to the purchase price making it £1,200 his annual annuity repayment would be £39 but he 
would not have to pay the arrears of £50 thus gaining an immediate cash flow benefit.   
12 Bernard O’Grady to Peter Hand, 16 Nov.1903 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836(8)). 
13 C.P. Farrell to Bernard O’Grady, 26 Mar. 1904 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836(8)). 
14 Hansard, 5, xi, 386 (21 Sept. 1909).  
15 Household census schedule returns. 
http://www.census.nationalarchives.ie/pages/1901/accessed 27 Mar 2017. 
16 Household census schedule returns. http://www.census.nationalarchives.ie/pages/1901/ 
accessed 27 Mar 2017. 
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 As if to highlight the long drawn out nature of these transactions the next 
correspondence in the Dopping Hepenstall collection is dated October 1904. In this 
letter, the solicitor representing the tenants increased their offer to 21.25 years 
second-term rents. He also sought the inclusion of outstanding rents in the price and 
the dropping of civil bill cases for the collection of rent arrears. It is notable in this 
correspondence that reference is made to evicted tenants ‘and the untenanted lands 
be restored to the evicted tenants.’17  Little over a month later Farrell wrote to 
O’Grady that the tenants would accept a reduction of 5 shillings in the pound on 
second-term rents and 7 shillings in the pound reduction in first-term rents.18 
 
Such an approach contrasts with that adopted on the Bellew estate. In this instance 
Sir Henry Grattan Bellew wrote to his solicitor, James Robinson of 119 St Stephens 
Green, Dublin, seeking advice as to what he would likely receive in the event of 
selling the estate to the tenants.  Mr Robinson’s response highlights the impact of the 
various deductions from the headline figures that were often reported in newspapers. 
In Bellew’s case the deductions accounted for over 40 per cent of the total estimated 
sales proceeds. In an example shown in Walker’s Law relating to land purchase in 
Ireland the deductions represented just over 35 per cent of the gross proceeds.19 To 
assist Bellew in deciding whether to sell or not, Robinson estimated that should the 
net proceeds along with the £14,300 provided for Lady Bellew be invested in 
government bonds at 3.5 per cent that it would bring in an annual income of £2,664. 
This would have compared to a net annual rent of £3,780. From this amount would 
of course have to be deducted the cost of collecting the rents and running the estate 
plus the repayment of the loans shown in the table below.20 As will be seen in 
chapter 6, an almost identical approach was adopted by Lord Clonbrock in trying to 
decide whether he should sell or not. 
 
                                                 
17 C.P. Farrell to Bernard O’Grady, 12 Oct.1904 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836(8)). 
18 C.P. Farrell to Bernard O’Grady, 14 Nov.1904 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836(8)). 
19 Walker, The law relating to land purchase in Ireland, pp xxxiii - xxxiv. 
20 J. Robinson to Henry Grattan Bellew, 15 Nov.1904 (N.L.I. Bellew papers, MS 27,290 
(2)). 
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The Dopping Hepenstall approach was reactive as opposed to the more proactive one 
adopted by Bellew. It should be borne in mind, however, that once Dopping 
Hepenstall engaged Bernard O’Grady to act for him, the level of activity 
significantly increased. 
 
Table 4.13. Bellew Estate: Initial estimate of sales proceeds 1904 
 
Estimate prepared for Sir Henry Grattan Bellew of proceeds of 
sale of estate by James Robinson, Solicitor, 119 St Stephens Green, 
Dublin. 
£ 
  
Rents   
1st Term - £2,505.16.7 at 21 1/2 years purchase 53,875.06.06 
2nd Term - £274.16.6 at 25 years purchase 6,870.12.06 
Leaseholds - £849.5.11 at 23 years purchase 19,533.16.01 
Grazing rents - £809.16.0 at 26 years purchase 21,054.16.00 
  101,334.11.01 
Add: Bonus at 12 per cent 12,160.02.11 
Total proceeds 113,494.14.00 
    
Deductions   
Board of Works Charge - Redemption price at 25 years purchase 
£100.3.6 2,506.17.06 
Board of Works Charge - Redemption price at 25 years purchase 
£61.11.2 1,538.19.02 
    
Head rent redemptions   
 - Clonrelagh and demesne - £142.10.6 at 25 years purchase 3,563.02.06 
 - Barneswell Grove - £240.10.6 at 25 years purchase 6,013.02.06 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
 
Estimate prepared for Sir Henry Grattan Bellew of proceeds of sale of 
estate by James Robinson, Solicitor, 119 St Stephens Green, Dublin. £ 
Quit rent redemptions amounting to £33.0.0 at 25 years purchase 825.00.00  
  
Redemption of Tithe Rent charges  
 - Payable to Mr Brown - £8.0.0 at 22 1/2 years purchase 180.00.00 
 - Payable to Lord Clonbrock - £4.12.0 at 22 1/2 years purchase 103.10.00 
 - Payable on Clonstuskert - £40.14.00 at 22 1/2 years purchase 916.13.09 
 - Payable on Moylough - £123.03.08 at 22 1/2 years purchase 2,771.12.06 
 - Payable on Killascode - £33.17.06 at 22 1/2 years purchase 762.03.09 
 - Payable on Castleblaney - £34.03.08 at 22 1/2 years purchase 769.02.06 
    
Loan repayments   
 - Principal due to Mrs Daly 2,843.16.11 
 - Principal due to Lieut. Thacker 4,000.00.00 
 - Principal due to Reps of A Robinson deceased 2,192.08.10 
 - Principal due to Reps of A Robinson deceased 500.00.00 
 - Principal due to Reps of A Robinson deceased 1,150.00.00 
 - Principal due to Rev R Cunningham & another 500.00.00 
    
Amount retained to meet Lady Bellew's contingent annuity of £500 say 14,300.00.00 
    
Amount retained to meet costs of sale including the costs in connection 
with   
the redemption of Head rent, Tithe rent charges, Board of Works and 
ordinary   
charges affecting the Estate say 1,500.00.00 
    
Total deductions 46,900.09.11 
Net proceeds from sale of estate 66,594.14.01 
    
 
Source: J. Robinson to Henry Grattan Bellew, 15 Nov.1904 (N.L.I., Bellew 
papers, MS 27,290 (2)). 
 
133 
 
At an early stage in the process a memorandum of understanding between Dopping 
Hepenstall and O’Grady was prepared.  This document dated 21 March 1906 and 
entitled ‘Memorandum of instructions to B.M. O’Grady Solicitor’ set out the 
landlord’s instructions to his agent regarding the sale of his estate. The document 
deals with each of the Dopping Hepenstall estates in Longford and Wicklow. The 
agreed instructions were that O’Grady was to seek to obtain twenty years’ purchase 
for non-judicial and first-term statutory rent tenants, and twenty-three years for 
second-term rents. The memorandum also set out Dopping Hepenstall’s position 
regarding turbary, sporting and mineral rights. Turbary was to be granted to tenants 
with legal entitlements but in other cases O’Grady was to try and obtain payment for 
it, although there was an underlined proviso stating that ‘if absolutely necessary 
turbary will be given.’ Turbary appears to have been a contentious issue as the 
following extract from a letter from Dopping Hepenstall to O’Grady indicates: ‘She 
[DH’s sister] says that so many now have no turf and can never have it, that there 
will be jealousy if others get it; and she thinks more general satisfaction would result 
if none had turf rights, except those one or two who now have it in fair rent orders.’21 
 
Sporting rights were to be vested in the tenants and in the case of mineral rights these 
were to be allocated to the Land Commission.22 Regarding the latter, section 13 (3) 
of the act provided that ‘the Commission [holds] the exclusive right of mining or 
taking minerals and digging and searching for minerals, on or under the land.’ This 
provision, which did not apply to the extraction of stone or gravel, was important, 
and is the reason why anyone wishing to mine land for minerals today must first 
obtain a licence from the Irish government before doing so.    
 
The document also made it clear that all arrears of rent were to be dealt with 
separately from the sale, and only in exceptional circumstances, were arrears to be 
added to the purchase price. The memorandum also provided instructions regarding 
evicted tenants. These were important for the Wicklow estate where the document 
stated: ‘This estate owing to the fact that there are several hundred acres evicted and 
                                                 
21 Dopping Hepenstall to O’Grady, 26 Mar. 1906, (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
38836 (8)). 
22 Memorandum of instructions to solicitor and land agent, Bernard O’Grady, 21 Mar. 1906 
(N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 35836(13)). 
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lying derelict will probably have to be offered for sale to the Estates 
Commissioners.’ The strategy adopted in such instances was to try and obtain 
tenants who would occupy and eventually purchase these holdings. The inference 
here was that if untenanted land was sold to the Land Commission, the price would 
be less than that for tenanted land. The reference in the letter to ‘several hundred 
acres’ of land previously occupied by evicted tenants suggests that for an estate of 
1,568 acres, evictions had been a significant issue. Unfortunately, the family papers, 
nor indeed contemporary newspapers, shed any light on this aspect of the Dopping 
Hepenstall estate management practices. However, it is clear from several questions 
raised in parliament by James Farrell M.P. relating to the Dopping Hepenstall’s 
Derrycassan estate, that there were numerous evictions there, particularly during the 
1880s.23 Given also the poor relations between the family and the estate 
communities the likelihood was that eviction was a tactic used by the Dopping 
Hepenstalls in dealing with troublesome tenants. 
 
 In a letter that O’Grady wrote accompanying the Memorandum one can detect that 
he is trying to press Dopping Hepenstall into progressing with the sale: 
 
If you still wish me to proceed with negotiations I am strongly of the opinion 
that now is the time before May, and you will therefore see that there is no 
time to spare, at the same time I would beg of you to understand that 
although I have given you my advice, I in no way urge you to sell, though I 
do not believe for one moment that matters will ever get better, and in fact I 
have very serious doubts of my being able to get terms which are in the 
enclosed Memorandum...24 
 
In this same letter, he gives examples of landlords who a year previously were 
negotiating sales based on 22.5 years purchase and who now would be fortunate to 
get eighteen or nineteen years’ purchase. A similar opinion was advanced by Lord 
Bellew’s land agent John Lopedell in a letter to his client in April 1908: ‘Whatever 
price you make now with the tenants will never be reached in the future.’25 Whether 
                                                 
23 In a question to the attorney-general to Ireland, Farrell asked if ‘his attention had been 
brought to the case of James Jordan of Derrycassan, Granard who was evicted by Colonel 
Dopping in 1886…’ Hansard. 5th series, 9 Mar. 1905, vol. 142, col. 926. 
24 B. O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 15 Mar. 1906 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)). 
25 John Lopadell to Sir Henry Grattan Bellew, 14 Apr. 1908 [N.L.I., Bellew papers MS 
27,248 (10)] 
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such views were representative of prices in general or were influenced by the 
headline grabbing prices paid by tenants of the Leinster estate who purchased their 
holdings in 1904 is unclear.26 
 
The document does not state what O’Grady was to be paid or whether he was 
incentivised to achieve or better the targets set-out. In the case of the Bellew estate 
the remuneration of the land agent was agreed at 1 ½ per cent of the sales proceeds. 
27 Walker estimated that an amount of 5 per cent of the gross purchase price was 
usual to cover both solicitor and land agent fees plus other related sales costs when 
dealing with large to medium size estates but a larger percentage might be necessary 
for smaller estates.28 
 
4.4: The sales process 
 
The key element of the process was to try and agree prices with the tenants. While 
influenced by the ‘zonal’ provisions of the 1903 Act and, indeed the combination of 
tenants on particular estates, each sales transaction was, under the terms of the act 
concluded on a tenant-by-tenant basis.  The correspondence in the various estate 
papers examined illustrate this individual negotiation process. Factors that influenced 
the price included the quality of the land, whether arrears were outstanding, whether 
the holding had previously been occupied by an evicted tenant, and the comparative 
prices paid for other estates.  In a letter dated 21 February 1906, O’Grady set out a 
series of price comparisons for similar estates in the Longford area. These 
comparisons are set-out in Table 4.2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Chapter 6 examines the sale of the Leinster estate in detail and particularly the issue of the 
prices paid for land and the associated publicity this received. 
27 Robinson to Sir Henry Bellew, Jan. 1912 (N.L.I., Bellew papers, MS 27290 (2)).  
28 Walker, The law relating to land purchase in Ireland, xxxii. 
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Table 4.14. Dopping Hepenstall: Comparative prices paid for Longford estates 
1906 
 
Estate of 
  
Average price 
2nd Term Rents 
Years purchase 
1st Term Rents 
Years purchase 
J.A. Maconchy 23.2 22.0 
Captain White 23.8 20.7 
Louisa Jessop 23.0 20.0 
 
Source: O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 21 Feb. 1906 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall 
papers, MS 35836 (8)). 
 
Nor indeed were tough negotiation on price the sole preserve of landlord and tenant.  
In a letter dated 24 March 1906, O’Grady, commenting on negotiations with 
individual tenants, made the point: 
 
Should we succeed in arranging terms with the tenants we shall have to go 
through a good deal of the same business with the Estates Commissioners, 
who seem anxious to cut down prices wherever they can, of course on the 
grounds that they do not consider the security sufficient for the purchase 
money proposed.29 
 
To illustrate the point there is a high volume of correspondence between O’Grady 
and the Estates Commissioners regarding the prices they were prepared to pay for 
untenanted lands on the Wicklow estate. An inspection was carried out by a Mr 
Bestall on behalf of the Land Commission. A letter dated 21 February 1907 from the 
Land Commission valued the lands in question as set-out in Table 4.3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 24 Mar. 1906 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)). 
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Table 4.15. Land Commission offer for untenanted lands on the Dopping 
Hepenstall Wicklow estate 1907 
 
Land parcel 
  
Area Price Offered 
Acres Roods Perches £ 
Ballinashinnagh 172 2 32 788 
Brittas No. 1 132 3 9 1,752 
Brittas No. 2 54 3 36 786 
Brittas No. 3 201 2 17 576 
Total 
   
3,901 
  
Source: Land Commission to O’Grady, 21 Feb. 1907, (N.L.I., Dopping 
Hepenstall papers, MS 35836 (11).  
 
O’Grady’s response to this offer was to seek a meeting with the chief secretary to the 
Estates Commissioners, Edward O’Farrell. In a letter to Dopping Hepenstall he says 
that O’Farrell ‘objected to dealing with the matter in that way’.30 By this he meant 
O’Grady meeting him directly to discuss Bestall’s offer. 
 
Despite the rather reluctant start, O’Farrell eventually agreed to put Bestall’s report 
before the Estates Commissioners for reconsideration. O’Grady states in his letter 
that ‘he [O’Farrell] admitted to me, of course privately, that the prices seemed 
low.’31 Some days later O’Grady wrote to Dopping Hepenstall saying that since he 
had not heard back from O’Farrell he had called into the Estates Commissioners 
office. There he discovered that the valuation report was being referred to the 
inspection department but that having spoken to Bestall he was holding firm to his 
valuation and would defend it vigorously. In the circumstances, O’Grady decided 
that the best course of action was to seek a second inspection of the lands.32 
Accordingly, on 13 March, O’Grady wrote to Dopping Hepenstall that ‘the case has 
                                                 
30 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 2 Mar. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)). 
31  O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 2 Mar. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)). The reference to Mr O’Farrell is most likely to Edward O’Farrell who was 
Registrar to the Land Commission and served as estates commissioner for Ireland (1918-23). 
32 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 9 Mar. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)). 
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been referred to Mr Barrington, who is himself a landowner outside Bray and has a 
high reputation of being a good judge of land, so that whatever the results may now 
be I think you will have to abide by it.’33  
 
The wisdom of seeking a second inspection is borne out in a somewhat triumphalist 
letter from O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall dated 21 March 1907: 
 
I went up to the Estates Commissioners yesterday as I heard Mr Barrington 
had sent in his report, and which had only just arrived but I was successful in 
getting it brought before the Commissioners at once and I now enclose a 
letter I received from them this morning offering £4,354 for Ballinashinnagh 
and Brittas, this I am glad to say shows the substantial increase of £453 on 
the prices estimated by Mr. Bestall.34 
 
Interestingly O’Grady states in the same letter that ‘With regard to Mr. Barrington, I 
may now inform you that he is a client of mine, in my opinion, one of the most 
honourable men you could come across’ before adding ‘I do not think you will ever 
get more for the place.’35   
 
The series of correspondence highlights that prices were the subject of hard 
negotiation between the landlord and tenant but even more significantly between the 
landlord and the Land Commission which was assiduously concerned about the 
security underpinning the mortgages provided. It also highlighted that good 
connections and networks into the Land Commission and land valuation circles were 
beneficial. Given this, it is surprising that so many deals were concluded under the 
terms of the act. An interesting footnote also emerges from the correspondence 
which provides an insight into land values over the nineteenth-century. In a post 
script to his letter of 21 March, O’Grady noted that ‘when your grandfather bought 
Ballinashinnagh in 1827 he paid £1,000 for it and that the price [£950] now being 
offered by the Land Commission when coupled with the Bonus hardly moved at all.’ 
 
                                                 
33 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 13 Mar. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)).  
34 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 21 Mar. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)). 
35 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 21 Mar. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)). 
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Quite apart from the negotiation phase of a sale there was also a very large element 
of procedural activity involved. The starting point was the preparation and 
submission by the landlord’s solicitor of what was described as an originating 
application. This was a document that had to be prepared to a format in rules set out 
by the Land Commission. It had to be lodged with the Title Department of the 
Estates Commissioners.  The document set out in summary form the nature of the 
vendor’s title to the lands, details of the tenancies, a 6-inch Ordnance Survey map 
mounted on linen with the lands clearly delineated, and signed off by a qualified 
surveyor.36 Proofing boundaries could be a difficult exercise as the following 
comment from O’Grady reveals: ‘I saw the surveyor today and he has some 
difficulty in identifying the boundaries of the lands out of which you receive Head 
Rents.’37 It also needed to contain details of any annual charges on the estate and a 
schedule of encumbrances of any mortgages or other claims outstanding. Adherence 
to these procedures was paramount to achieving a sale. 
 
The next stage in the formal procedure was for the Land Commission to declare the 
property to be an estate. The 1903 Act introduced the concept of ‘an estate’. In this 
context, it did not mean an estate in the general sense such as the Leinster or 
Clonbrock estate. In the case of the Leinster estate, it was for the purposes of the act 
made up of four individual estates: Maynooth, Kilkea, Castledermot and Athy. In the 
same way, the Clonbrock estate consisted of seven individual estates: Clonbrock, 
Ballydonnellan, Castlegar, Quansbury, Lecarrow, Creggaun and Pallas. All of these 
individual estates related to specific geographic or administrative regions. Obtaining 
a declaration from the Estates Commissioners that they regarded the lands concerned 
as an estate was an important step because only estates could be sold under the act. 
The Estates Commissioners based their decision upon the material contained in the 
originating application, and as the Dopping Hepenstall papers illustrate, this was not 
a simple exercise. In a letter to Dopping Hepenstall of 7 December 1907, nine 
months after prices had been agreed for certain parts of the Wicklow lands, a clearly 
exacerbated O’Grady wrote: 
 
                                                 
36 Walker, The law relating to land purchase in Ireland, p. 6. 
37 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 23 July 1906 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (12)). 
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we were told that ... it had been provisionally declared ‘an Estate’ having 
been up there [the office of the Estates Commissioners] different times, I 
ascertained yesterday, that it has not been provisionally declared ‘an estate’. 
... I requested Mr Mason... to speak to Commissioner Finucane. I went up 
again specifically today and found that he had not done so, I accordingly 
informed him and also Commissioner Finucane’s private secretary that if 
possible Monday, if not certainly Tuesday, I would ask for a personal 
interview with the Commissioner himself as I feel very much this delay after 
both you and I trying to meet them in every way possible.38    
 
While the estate papers do not specifically show when the estate declaration was 
made it clearly was granted as both estates were sold, albeit some years later.  
 
Following the designation of the property as an estate the individual negotiations 
with tenant purchasers got underway in earnest. The Dopping Hepenstall papers are 
rich in correspondence relating to this aspect of the story. As previously mentioned 
tenants showed themselves to be adroit in applying pressure to the landlord by 
withholding rent and seeking to have the arrears included in the purchase price. An 
important step in the process was to conclude deals with tenants and to submit these 
in the form of a Preliminary Agreement to sell, to the Land Commission for their 
consideration. The significance of this was that once approved the Land Commission 
would make payments of interest in lieu of rents and that responsibility for collecting 
rent was transferred to the Commission. The amount paid was usually 3.5 per cent of 
the agreed purchase price. As discussed in chapter 3, while this removed any 
concerns regarding arrears, it did not in all circumstances alleviate the financial 
pressures that many landlords faced. Landlords still had to cover the costs of running 
the estate but in the case of highly encumbered situations they had to cover the 
interest charges which averaged between 4.5 and 5 per cent. Given the long drawn 
out nature of the process, as illustrated in the Dopping Hepenstall case, this imposed 
significant pressures on indebted landlords in particular. This circumstance was 
lessened to some extent by the willingness of lenders to hold off debt collection 
proceedings on the basis that they would, on completion of the sale, be paid back 
their money by the Land Commission out of the proceeds. 
 
                                                 
38 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 7 Dec. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (13)). 
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The declaration that the lands were regarded as an estate also conveyed some 
entitlements on the purchasing tenants in that they could opt to sell on their interest 
in the holding. This is illustrated by the following correspondence from a solicitor 
representing William Buckley, one of Dopping Hepenstall’s Wicklow tenants, who 
wished to sell his interest in acquiring his holding: 
 
I am acting for William D. Buckley a tenant on your Kilmacanogue Estate 
and Mr Buckley is considering the advisability of selling his interest in the 
farm, which is as you are aware the subject of an Agreement for purchase. 
  
It is doubtful whether in the case of a holding the subject of an Agreement, 
the Landlord has the right of pre-emption, but before advising Mr Buckley in 
the matter I would be obliged if you would kindly let me know whether you 
would consent to accept service of the motion and waive any possible pre-
emption rights under the Act.39 
 
Contemporaneously with the submission of the originating application the vendor’s 
solicitor was required to submit to the Land Commission a ‘Form 1 – Notice of 
Intention to Sell Tenancy’.40   This document simply put the Land Commission on 
notice that the landlord intended to sell a tenancy to the tenant. It contained a 
minimum of detail covering the name by which the lands were known, the location, 
the size of the holding, the rent paid and the tenement valuation. It did not set out the 
price to be paid for the holding. The document referred to above is dated 31 March 
1904 yet the sale was not completed until August 1914, over ten years later, 
illustrating the length sometimes taken to conclude a transaction. Once received, the 
Land Commission would arrange for a surveyor to inspect the lands, who would then 
satisfy himself that the tenancy was properly described and that the tenant was 
rightfully in occupation. Following the inspection, the Estates Commissioners, were, 
if satisfied that there was no valid objection to the sale and that it represented good 
security, would provisionally sanction the advance.41 Once the provisional sanction 
was given the real detailed legal work began. If the Dopping Hepenstall case is 
                                                 
39 Shannon Solicitors to Dopping Hepenstall, 29 Nov. 1912 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall 
papers MS 35,847 (14)). 
40 Notice of Intention to Sell Tenancy to Mary Anne Doherty – Form 1 (N.L.I., Dopping 
Hepenstall papers MS 35847 (4)). 
41 Walker, The law relating to land purchase in Ireland, xxxvii. 
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representative then it was an enormous task that required professionalism, dedication 
and tenacity from the parties involved. 
 
4.5: Complications 
 
 In the Dopping Hepenstall case the position was complicated by the existence of a 
number of head leases on the Wicklow and Longford estates. For example, a head 
lease held by Alexander Carroll on lands near Ashford, Co. Wicklow required the 
payment of an annual rent of £74-10-7. This was eventually redeemed by Dopping 
Hepenstall for £1,863-4-7 representing twenty-five years’ purchase. These brief facts 
however hide the tortuous path trodden by the solicitors representing the vendor and 
purchaser. Fortunately for this study, the bill for the vendor’s legal costs was 
disputed by Dopping Hepenstall and as a result they were submitted to the Taxing 
Master of the High Court for adjudication. The submission, forty-three foolscap 
pages itemised 264 interactions including court appearances, meetings and written 
communication between Dopping Hepenstall and Carroll’s representatives. The 
initial negotiations were commenced by O’Grady acting for Dopping Hepenstall in a 
letter dated 10 December 1907 but did not conclude until August 1910. The 
complication in this case was exacerbated by the fact that the head lease was part of 
a wider estate owned by Alexander Carroll on which there were a number of annual 
charges levied by various family members. In order to complete the sale of the 
overall estate he had to effectively resolve Carroll’s problem and cover his costs in 
doing so. In all likelihood, had he not done so he would not have been able to sell 
those lands covered by the head lease. Unfortunately for Dopping Hepenstall he had 
a number of such difficulties with the estate. Another of the head leases was held by 
a Mrs Mullock and a Mrs Adams and various trustees. The difficulties surrounding 
that particular lease were not resolved finally until the summer of 1914 having been 
initiated in early 1906. The resolution of the Mullock Adams head lease required 
Dopping Hepenstall to engage the services of John Leech, who was one of the 
leading senior counsels of the day, to make the case to the High Court to allow the 
transaction to proceed.42   As with the Carroll case, the complexity here was not of 
                                                 
42 Legal opinion of John Leech S.C., 24 Dec. 1910 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35853 (2)). 
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Dopping Hepenstall’s making but required resolution prior to the sale of the estate. A 
review of the documentation relating to the Mullock Adams case again highlights the 
very detailed nature of such transactions involving the swearing of affidavits by 
upwards of ten family members, significant searches of court and land registry 
records for documents such as disentailing deeds, deeds of revocation, abstract of 
title and numerous court applications.  
 
Once the various forms and issues were lodged and agreed with the Land 
Commission, and it was satisfied that the vendor’s title was good, and that the lands 
involved represented good security, a notice was issued by the Estates 
Commissioners of their intention to deal with the landlord. A copy of this notice was 
also issued to any of the parties listed as having an interest in the estate such as 
creditors, family charge beneficiaries and the Inland Revenue. If there were no 
challenges to the published notice the Land Commission would then vest the 
holdings in the purchasing tenants and pay the purchase consideration into the Bank 
of Ireland. This did not mean that vendors received the payment. In fact, the monies 
were retained for a period of twelve months to facilitate any claims to be made 
against the proceeds, including any encumbrances, head rents, tithe charges, quit 
rents, Board of Works charges and so on. The redemption prices for most of these 
charges were specified by regulations set by the Treasury. 43 In the event of a dispute 
arising as to the extent of a particular claim, a notice of motion was prepared by the 
vendor’s solicitor and this was submitted to the Land Court for adjudication. 
 
When the redemption charges were agreed, the examiner, who was a Land Court 
official, would prepare an allocation schedule. This schedule was forwarded to the 
vendor’s solicitor for review. The solicitor would then go before the judicial 
commissioner who made rulings on how exactly the proceeds of sale should be 
distributed. This official also approved the payment of the bonus. On agreement of 
the Allocation Schedule the vendor’s solicitor prepared a Notice of Motion schedule 
that was submitted to the Judicial Commissioner for final sign off. This notice had a 
schedule of payments attached to it which set exactly what payments should be 
made. An accountant of the Land Commission would then prepare bank drafts 
                                                 
43 Walker, The law relating to land purchase in Ireland, xxxix. 
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payable to all certified persons with claims on the estate plus, of course, the vendor 
himself. In the case of encumbered estates, the examiner prepared ‘A final schedule 
of encumbrances’. This schedule was lodged with the Commission and any person or 
entity who was dissatisfied with the way their claim was handled could appeal to the 
judicial commissioner to have their case reviewed. In the Dopping Hepenstall case 
there were no such claims or contentions made, so on 31 July 1914, over ten years 
after initial negotiations began, Bernard O’Grady wrote to Dopping Hepenstall:  
 
I enclose you a notification I received this morning from the Land 
Commission that £10,039 purchase money was placed in credit of this estate 
[Wicklow] yesterday, and I would draw your attention to the last two 
paragraphs with reference to the investment of same in the 2 ½ per cent 
consolidated stock unless application made by you to the contrary within 14 
days.44     
 
The completion of this transaction involved hundreds of documents and interactions 
between several parties. The quantity of documents involved was enormous and 
easily exceeded that which would be the norm for many of the large-scale merger 
and acquisition deals of modern times. It is clear that the transaction was process 
driven and that very sophisticated and elaborate administrative and legal frameworks 
existed. Considering the detail of the administrative processes involved and the 
number of transactions concluded under the 1903 and subsequent acts, the 
achievement of the Land Commission was remarkable. 
 
4.6: Evicted tenants 
 
The issue of evicted tenants had, by 1903, long been a highly emotive issue in Irish 
life. Section xv of the report of the Land Conference 1902 stated: ‘That any project 
for the solution of the Irish Land Question should be accompanied by a settlement of 
the evicted tenants question upon an equitable basis.’45 Section 2 (1) (d) of the 1903 
Act dealt with this request by providing: 
 
                                                 
44 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 31 July 1914 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers MS 
35836 (10)). 
45 The Irish Land Conference, Official report, 3 Jan 1903 (Dublin, 1903). 
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A person who within twenty-five years before the passing of this Act was the 
tenant of a holding to which the Land Law Acts apply, and who is not at the 
date of the purchase the tenant or proprietor of that holding: Provided that in 
the case of death of a person to whom an advance under this paragraph might 
otherwise have been made, the advance may be made to a person nominated 
by the Land Commission as the personal representative of the deceased 
person.46     
 
The evidence of the Dopping Hepenstall estate sale makes it clear that this was a 
significant issue and that the claims of evicted tenants and their lineal descendants 
were taken seriously by the Land Commission. In the Dopping Hepenstall case the 
passing of the 1903 Act appears to have initiated a spate of correspondence from the 
relatives of previously evicted tenants. Even before the act became law, a letter dated 
3 July 1903 from a Thomas Columb of Clanbrassil Street, Dublin was received by 
Dopping Hepenstall asking: ‘May I venture to ask your kind assistance in an 
undertaking I have very much at heart. I wish to purchase the late Catherine 
Columb’s evicted farm of land in Larchfield on your terms.’47 The applicant in this 
case was the son of the evicted tenant who appeared to have prospered given his 
address, the fact that he nominated a solicitor to act for him, and his assertion that he 
was in a position ‘to give cash in advance’. Dopping Hepenstall’s wrote to Columb’s 
solicitor advising: ‘I much regret to say that at present I can hold out no hopes of 
being able to sell or let the two holdings you mention to Mr Thomas Columb – I am 
sure he would make a good neighbour and tenant but I am to some extent committed 
to an assignment I have made for these lands.’48 As an interesting aside to this 
application Dopping Hepenstall in a letter to O’Grady stated: 
  
The tenant you name Columb was a case I specially went into years ago with 
Mrs Columb and the Parish Priest and both agreed that it was not to their 
advantage to be reinstated; her sons are in good situations (shop men) and she 
herself had a good house at a cheap rent.  The holding she claimed was 
                                                 
46 An Act to amend the law relating to the occupation and ownership of land in Ireland and 
for other purposes relating thereto and to amend the Labourers (Ireland) Acts 1903. Section 
2 (1) (d). 
47 Thomas Columb to Dopping Hepenstall, 3 July 1903 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, 
MS 35836 (8)). 
48 Dopping Hepenstall to H. Leechman, 18 Sept. 1903 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, 
MS 35836 (8)). 
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mostly furze bushes and no house. I suppose she only wants it now to sell her 
interest at once, as it is no good to her.49 
 
This comment is revealing in that it shows how a landlord like Dopping Hepenstall 
viewed the motivation for former evicted tenants to reacquire their holdings. 
Interestingly, the 1901 census only lists two Thomas Columbs in the entire country. 
One lived in Westmeath and the other was a 30-year old farmer’s son who lived in 
Sonnagh, Co. Longford, and was shown as unable to read or write. The 1911 census 
however, records a 38-year old Thomas James Columb as a boarder in the home of 
Michael Columb in Derrycassan, Co. Longford. This Thomas Columb’s occupation 
was stated as farmer. In neither census is there a Thomas Columb living in Dublin 
which would imply that his position in life was not as exalted as it might appear. 
 
The papers contain a number of similar requests. For instance, in April 1904 a letter 
from an Anne Hanlon, the widow of Patrick Hanlon who had been evicted from the 
Longford estate some eighteen years previously for the non-payment of one year’s 
rent, stated: 
 
The farm we held contained about 12 acres (Irish). About one half of which 
is in the possession of this landlord, and the remainder is divided between 
two adjoining tenants ... who hold it in the grazing way – My object in 
writing to you is – in case terms of purchase are made between the owner and 
tenants on the above property, that I and my two sons who are living in this 
locality may get the privilege of purchasing our old holding on the same 
terms as may be agreed on by the tenants on the state.50 
  
This would appear to be the same Hanlon family involved in the incident involving 
the Dopping Hepenstall estate bailiff, Robert Gillespie, being charged with firing 
shots at four young men including Edward and John Hanlon. The 1901 census 
records show an Anne Hanlon and her 22-year-old son Edward, living in 
Mullinalaghta, Co. Longford which is a townland close to Derrycassan. 
 
                                                 
49 Dopping Hepenstall to O’Grady, 1 Mar. 1906 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)), 
50 Anne Hanlon to O’Grady, 4 Apr. 1904 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 35836 
(8)). 
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As evidenced in correspondence with O’Grady, Dopping Hepenstall was initially of 
the view that evicted tenants were unlikely to pose a problem for the sale of the 
estate: 
 
The tenants themselves do not desire the re-instatement of evicted tenants. It 
is only the League and as has been done in several other estates ... they may 
probably waive that point, especially as several of them would like 
themselves to eventually get the vacant land; where it adjoins their farms. 
The tenant themselves, I gather would much sooner not have the old and 
worthless people back (worthless in that they failed as farmers after years of 
trials and special forgiveness and advantages).51 
 
 This was despite a letter from O’Grady advising him that the Land Commission: 
‘informed me that they had to reinstate the evicted tenants.’52 In a letter the 
following day, O’Grady cautioned against such an assumption when he wrote: ‘As to 
evicted tenants I quite agree with you but as I mentioned to you yesterday I am afraid 
the Estates Commissioners themselves will refuse to declare the property an Estate 
unless the evicted tenants are restored, especially where their holdings are vacant.’ 53 
The note of caution appears to have had an impact on Dopping Hepenstall because 
some days later O’Grady wrote to him: ‘With reference to the evicted tenants, I 
gather from your letter that you will be willing to buy the interests of the majority of 
them rather than let them back.’54  
 
The reference by Dopping Hepenstall to ‘the League’ (U.I.L.) in the letter cited 
above, highlights the fact that it was active in Longford. A report by the inspector 
general in October 1907 reported: ‘the area which is disturbed owing to anti-grazing 
agitation has increased in size, and the agitation has been carried on with greater 
vigour. The counties of Roscommon, Clare, Longford and Meath and both Ridings 
in Galway are in worse condition than in the month of September.’55 Fergus 
                                                 
51 Dopping Hepenstall to O’Grady, 21 Feb. 1906 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)). 
52 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 21 Feb. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (14)). 
53 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 22 Feb. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)). 
54 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 27 Feb. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)). 
55 Inspector General’s monthly report, Oct. 1907, NA IGCI/12. 
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Campbell described how the U.I.L intimidated Harris Martin who in November 
1907, took the lease on a 57-acre farm grazing farm in the townland of Lismore not 
far from the Dopping Hepenstall, Derrycassan estate.  Martin decided to initiate a 
legal action against the Longford Leader, which he claimed was behind the 
intimidation. The campaign of social ostracism worked in that Martin’s employees 
left and eventually Martin himself was forced to vacate the farm.56 Dopping 
Hepenstalls view of facing down the U.I.L.was echoed by John Lopadell, Lord 
Bellew’s land agent, in a letter in April 1908. Referring to potential trouble on the 
estate he pleaded with Bellew; ‘No matter how annoying it may be, I certainly would 
not give to the League (or the individuals who are working it) the satisfaction of 
upsetting the sale.’57 
 
The approaches of evicted tenants were not restricted to the landlord or his agent as 
the following letter from the Land Commission highlights; 
 
I am directed by the Estates Commissioners to inform you that Richard 
Chapman who they understand was evicted from a holding on the above 
[Wicklow] estate has applied to them to assist in his restoration to the said 
holding which now appears to be in the occupation of Mr Carroll or, in lieu 
thereof, to be provided with another holding.58 
 
Whether requests for reinstatements by evicted tenants were motivated by 
opportunistic reasons as suspected by Dopping Hepenstall or sentimental 
attachments to family holdings is impossible to say at this juncture. It is, however, 
clear from the correspondence that the position and pleadings of evicted tenants was 
taken seriously by the Land Commission and that they were open to approaches 
being made to them as to their reinstatement.  
 
There is little doubt that section 2 (1)(d) of the act was a genuine effort by Wyndham 
to address the problem of evicted tenants and their descendants. However, as 
identified by estate commissioner W.F. Bailey, the 1903 legislation proved too 
                                                 
56 Fergus Campbell, Land and revolution, Nationalists politics in the west of Ireland 1891-
1921 (Oxford, 2005), p. 143. 
57 John Lopadell to Sir Henry Grattan Bellew, 14 Apr. 1908 (N.L.I., Bellew papers, MS 
27,248 (10)). 
58 Land Commission to Dopping Hepenstall, 14 Dec. 1906 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall 
papers, MS 35853 (6)). 
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cumbersome and it required the enactment of The Evicted Tenants Act of 1907 to 
more fully address the particular plight of such claimants.59 Bailey calculated that up 
to the 31 March 1916, 13,656 persons had applied to the Land Commission for 
holdings of evicted tenants. Of these, 7,338 were rejected by the Commissioners 
after enquiry, 2,469 did not apply within the prescribed time, 3,472 were reinstated 
and 377 cases were under consideration.60   
 
4.7: The part played by Catholic priests 
 
The reference to the parish priest in Dopping Hepenstall’s letter to O’Grady of 1 
March 1906 highlighted another recurring theme in land sales, namely the role of 
priests in representing their parishioners. The correspondence also indicated both 
Dopping Hepenstall and O’Grady were willing to engage with them in resolving 
difficulties with tenants. There are numerous references to Fr Michael Corcoran 
parish priest of Gowna, Co. Longford, who interceded on behalf of tenants. He was a 
native of nearby Ardagh and was responsible for the building of the church of the 
Holy Family in Gowna in 1906.61  Similarly, in the case of the Wicklow estate there 
are references to Fr James Dunphy, parish priest of Arklow, who was acted as a 
representative of the tenants. Until his death in 1914, Fr Dunphy spent over fifty-
seven years working in the parish and was prominent in dealing with politicians, 
trade unionists, and other social movements.62  The correspondence suggests that 
they were sufficiently familiar with each other to have informal conversations 
relating to individual tenants such as Mrs Carroll, a Wicklow estate tenant, who was 
in a rent arrears situation, O’Grady noted that ‘Father Dunphy is very much 
disappointed and is sick of her.’63 Another example of this can be seen in a letter 
from Dopping Hepenstall to O’Grady in July 1907 when he wrote: 
 
I sent you by registered parcel post yesterday 34 agreements signed. There 
are several more which Fr Corcoran is today bringing pressure to bear upon 
                                                 
59 Bailey, The Irish land acts, p. 30. 
60 Ibid.  
61 Anglo-Celt, 11 Dec. 2009. 
62 Jim Rees, Split personalities, Arklow 1885-1892 (Wicklow, 2012). 
63 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 20 Oct. 1906 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
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others who would not come in and sign... Fr. C. is much annoyed about it and 
I believe expressed himself strongly today to them. 64 
 
That priests should have been so heavily involved in this area should not come as a 
surprise given their involvement in the Land League in the concluding decades of the 
nineteenth century. Foster estimated that as much as one-third of Land League 
Convention members were priests.65  
 
4.8: Conclusion 
 
The Dopping Hepenstall case illustrates a number of previously unexplored aspects 
relating to how land transactions were conducted following the introduction of the 
Wyndham Land Act 1903. A key feature of such transactions was their 
administrative and legal complexity. Given one of Wyndham’s stated objectives was 
to simplify the processes involved in land sales, it raises a question as to how 
complex transactions must have been under the earlier land acts. The case study also 
highlights how drawn out the whole sale process was. The sale of the Dopping 
Hepenstall estates took almost ten years to complete from the initial approach by 
tenants to the ultimate receiving of cash into his bank account. As will be seen in 
chapter 6 it took a similar period for the sale of the Clonbrock estate in Galway to be 
completed.  A third element relates to the role of the professional advisor in the 
transaction; Bernard O’Grady the land agent and the solicitor, comes across as a 
particularly professional, efficient and well-connected individual in terms of his 
dealings with the Estates Commissioners Office, the Irish Revenue authorities and 
other landlords. His role was vital in bringing about the completion of the sale. Not 
all landlords would have been as well served. 
 
The case highlights the range of issues that could arise in the management of an 
estate, including the collection of rents; dealing with rent arrears situations; 
complexities relating to head leases; internal family disputes and the concluding of a 
transaction to sell the estate. The Dopping Hepenstall story also highlights the 
                                                 
64 Dopping Hepenstall to O’Grady, 21 Jul. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35836 (8)).  
65 R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972, p. 417. 
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complications of having to deal with evicted tenants and the relatives thereof. 
Contrary to earlier perceptions held by Dopping Hepenstall the case highlights the 
fact that the Land Commission took seriously the issue of evicted tenants and the 
claims in several instances of their lineal descendants.  
 
The early and unsolicited approaches of tenants on both the Dopping Hepenstall 
estates show that they were eager to avail of the opportunity to purchase their 
holdings afforded by the Wyndham Land Act. Their actions in combining and in 
appointing professional parties to represent them in negotiations showed a degree of 
determination to become their own masters. They utilised the United Irish League to 
their advantage and were not averse to applying pressure to the landlord by 
withholding rent albeit under the pretext of a bad harvest. While the estates covered 
by the study were not heavily encumbered it does highlight the pressure that could be 
applied to more hard-pressed landlords. 
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Chapter 5: The investment environment in the opening decades of 
the twentieth century 
 
5.1: Introduction 
 
When introducing his Irish Land Bill 1903, George Wyndham expressed the need to 
find a solution to the Irish land question that would enable landlords to sell their 
estates at a price that would allow them to ‘sell without walking into the 
workhouse.’1 To achieve this, he was conscious that the price to be paid, along with 
the controversial bonus, had to be at a level that the capital available if invested at a 
certain rate of interest would yield a net income broadly equivalent to that received 
from the net rentals from an estate. Wyndham did not refer to a specific rate of 
interest that might be used to estimate this net income but many contemporary 
newspapers and guides to the 1903 Land Act referred to a rate of interest of 3.5 per 
cent.2 Section 51 of the act, which dealt with how trustees of estates subject to life 
interests, might invest the proceeds, listed a range of corporate and government 
bonds that might be used. The average yield from such bonds was between 3.25 per 
cent and 3.5 per cent. 3  Section V of the Official Report of the Irish Land 
Conference in 1902 refers to a return of between 3 per cent and 3.25 per cent as the 
appropriate level of return upon which to base the principal calculation.4 The 
following example will make this clearer. Assume a landlord had an annual rental 
income of £10,000 which was subject to annual charges such as mortgages, head 
rents and family charges of £4,000, yielding a net income of £6,000 per annum. To 
achieve the same level of net income after expenditure such as redeeming any 
mortgages, buying out head rents and family charges, the landlord would need to be 
left with net sales proceeds of £171,428 (£6,000 / 3.5 per cent x 100). If he invested 
£171,428 at 3.5 per cent he would generate an annual income of £6,000.  
 
                                                 
1 Hansard 4th series, cxx, 189 (25 Mar. 1903).  
2 Walker, Law relating to land purchase, p. xxxv. 
3 Irish Land Act 1903, section 51, Appendix A, Table D. 
4 The Irish Land Conference, Official Report, 3 Jan. 1903, p. 2. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide an insight into the investment environment 
prevailing in the early years of the twentieth-century, and the investment options 
open to selling landlords as they transitioned from rentiers to investors.  Political, 
civil and social issues aside, the decision faced by landlords as to whether to sell or 
not was of a very high order of magnitude and one which required them to break out 
of a long period of personal financial inertia, and which forced them to consider 
many uncertain economic outcomes. It is one of the recognised principles of 
investment psychology that the fear of loss is much greater than the hope of gain and 
it is likely that this would have loomed large in the thought process of landlords 
when considering whether to sell or not.5 Kahneman and Tversky  described this 
phenomenon as: ‘The basic intuition concerning loss aversion is that losses loom 
larger than corresponding gains.’6 Human nature has not changed that much since 
the early twentieth century so it is safe to assume that the uncertainties that exist 
today in terms of investment behaviours applied equally to Irish landlords in the 
opening decades of that century.  
 
Investment markets are, and indeed would have been in the early twentieth century, 
categorised under four broad headings namely: stock-market investments such as 
bonds, company debentures and direct equities, commercial and residential 
properties, mortgages and finally direct investment in commercial ventures such as 
ranching in north America or the Antipodes. Irish landlords in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century had the advantage of being closely connected with the then 
epicentre of global financial markets, London, and accordingly might have been 
expected to be familiar with the fundamentals of investment. The London Stock 
Exchange was by far the largest and most important financial market in the world. 
The American economist, C.A. Conant, observed in 1904 that ‘Great Britain easily 
                                                 
5 Risk aversion theory in terms of investment is based on the idea that people place a higher 
emotional rating on the fear of making a loss than they do on the expectation of making a 
gain. While investment managers have been aware of this concept for hundreds of years, the 
theory was formalised by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1992 see ‘Advances in 
prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty’in Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty (1992), vol. 5, No. 4, pp 297-323.    
6 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,’Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-
dependent model’ in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, no. 4 (Nov. 1991), p. 
1047. 
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leads the world in the volume of her stock exchange business’.7 A member of the 
New York Stock Exchange, R.M. Bauer, noted in 1911 that ‘The London Stock 
Exchange is the only really international market in the world. Its interests branch 
over all parts of our globe.’8 The growth in stock exchange activity reflected a major 
shift in the wealth structure of Britain. In 1850, financial assets such as stocks and 
shares, mortgages and bank deposits represented 39 per cent of all assets held by 
British people. The remaining 61 per cent consisted of real property such as land and 
buildings. By 1912-13, however, financial assets accounted for over 64 per cent of 
total British wealth.9 
  
Every national British and Irish newspaper contained market news columns, and 
journals such as the Economist (1843), The Financial Times (1888) and the 
Financial News (1884) catered for an ever-growing interest in investment markets. 
The London Stock Exchange had almost 5,000 members by 1903, double the 
number of just ten years earlier.10 Even the relatively small Dublin Stock Exchange 
had eighty-five members dealing in financial securities in 1900 and eighty-eight by 
1914, having had only thirty members some fifty years earlier.11 In the early 
twentieth century membership of exchanges was exclusively male (the first female 
member of the London Stock Exchange was not elected until 1973) and drawn 
mainly from the public school system. 
 
The socio-economic background of Stock Exchange membership meant that many 
Irish landed families such as the FitzGeralds (Leinster estate), the Dillons (Lord 
Clonbrock’s estate), and the Wyndham Quins (Earl Dunraven’s Adare estate) had 
close familial ties with many of the leading players in London financial markets such 
                                                 
7 C.A. Conant, Wall Street and the country, A study of recent financial tendencies (New 
York, 1904), p. 147. 
8 London Stock Exchange, General purposes minutes, 15 May 1911, quoted in Ranald 
Michie, The London Stock Exchange – A History (Oxford, 2004), p. 70. 
9 Michie, London Stock Exchange, p.71. 
10 A ‘member’ is a person or an organisation authorised by the London Stock Exchange, or 
indeed any Stock Exchange, to carry on dealings in financial securities on the exchange. 
Members fall into two main categories either brokers (who act as agents for others) or 
dealers (who act for themselves or their organisation). To be elected a member a person 
must be nominated by a number of other members, must meet certain financial criteria and 
be of good standing. Only members or their organisations can trade on an exchange. 
11 W.A. Thomas, The stock exchanges of Ireland (Liverpool, 1986), p. 55. 
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as Ernest Cassells, Nathaniel Rothschild and Arthur Kinnard. Numerous examples of 
the interaction between the Irish landed gentry and the investment elites pervade 
Lady Fingal’s memoirs, such as her relationship with Ernest Cassells of whom she 
said: ‘He was always wanting to invest money for me. If I had accepted his offers I 
should be very rich to-day.’12 Similarly, she recounted that: ‘We stayed several times 
with the Rothschilds at Tring. Lord Rothschild had always been a friend of mine. 
And the Leo Rothschilds were very kind, asking Maime to hunt from their place, 
Ascott, close by.’13 
 
For many of the less influential or connected Irish landed families, access to 
investment advice was often provided by their professional advisors such as their 
solicitors, accountants or land agents. While the intricacies of investment 
management might have seemed like a black art to many there was no shortage of 
awareness of financial markets or practitioners seeking to provide advice to former 
landlords with money to invest.  
 
For all this sophistication, there was, however, the ever-present concern regarding 
investment, namely the risk / reward trade-off and the inevitable uncertainty that 
accompanies all investment decisions.14 Risk in this context is different to what is 
termed volatility. Volatility refers to the process whereby the value of an investment 
might go up or down over a period depending on market conditions whereas risk 
relates to the permanent loss of value of an investment. Investors should always be 
more concerned about risk than volatility. From the family papers examined for this 
study it is clear that most of the landlords who sold their estates under the Wyndham 
Act choose to invest through either the London or Dublin Stock Exchanges, 
particularly the former. For this reason, this chapter will mainly focus on the 
                                                 
12 Elizabeth, Countess of Fingall, Seventy years young (Dublin, 2009), p. 189. 
13 Ibid., p. 337. 
14 The key investment principle to grasp as regards the ‘risk reward trade-off’ is that the 
higher the level of return sought the higher the level of risk that must be taken on. If we 
assume that there is very little chance of a major sovereign country such as Britain, Germany 
or the US defaulting on their debt then we take that to be the risk-free return on money. 
Thus, if a short dated (i.e. with a maturity date of less than five years) British Government 
bond yielded say 2.5 per cent per annum then this might be said to be the risk-free return on 
money. If an investment offers more return than 2.5 per cent it has a higher level of risk 
attaching to it. The higher the return the higher the risk.    
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investment environment relating to the financial securities traded on these 
exchanges. 
 
5.2: Stock market investments 
 
Any review of the investment market environment during the period 1850 to 1930 
must be looked at in terms of pre-and post- First World War. The changes brought 
about by the war, not just in terms of the economic world order, but in the structure 
of investment markets, were profound. In the aftermath of the war, the balance of 
economic and financial influence shifted clearly westward from Europe and 
specifically London to the United States of America. No more would London be 
regarded as the epicentre of the financial world. 
 
The significant growth in the volume of securities traded on the London Stock 
Exchange from the mid-nineteenth century up to the opening decades of the 
twentieth-century was only one dimension of the seismic changes that were taking 
place in global financial markets. Arthur Balfour observed in 1909 that: ‘the bulk of 
the great fortunes are now in a highly liquid state… They do not consist of huge 
landed estates, vast parks and castles, and all the rest of it.’15 As noted by David 
Cannadine, many of the British aristocracy: ‘saw their economic supremacy 
threatened by this new form of wealth, which was in greater amounts, was in more 
liquid form, was less vulnerable to political exactions, and carried with it fewer 
obligations.’16  As Appendix 5.1 highlights, there was also a major change occurring 
in the type of security being traded in the market. In 1853, for example, of the 
£1,215.2 million of securities listed on the London Stock Exchange almost 76 per 
cent of these represented government or municipal bonds, with only 24 per cent of 
the overall market value being made up of corporate financial instruments such as 
shares and debentures. Of these corporate instruments, almost two-thirds were 
domestic railway stocks. Most were what are known as ‘preferred stock’ which is in 
                                                 
15 Cannadine, The decline and fall, p. 91. 
16 Ibid. 
157 
 
effect a loan stock attracting a specified percentage dividend rather than the 
‘ordinary shares’ that we are more familiar with today.17 
 
By 1903 the value of securities quoted on the London market had risen to just under 
£7 billion. Of this total 39.5 per cent represented government and municipal bonds 
and 60.5 per cent corporate instruments. A further shift occurred in that more than 56 
per cent of the bonds traded were drawn on colonial governments. Even in the value 
of corporate securities traded almost 50 per cent were for overseas entities. London 
was now the prime international financial centre and the Stock Exchange was at the 
centre of this development.  
 
The growth in overseas investment by British, and by extension Irish, investors in 
the period 1860 to 1914 is unparalleled in economic history. In terms of the 
percentage of overall national wealth, which included all land, commercial and 
residential property as well as all other forms of wealth, overseas investment grew 
from 7 per cent in 1850, to 14 per cent in 1870 to 32 per cent by 1913.18 By the start 
of the First World War almost one third of all British wealth was invested overseas. 
No country before or since has ever invested so much of its wealth in overseas 
projects.     
                                                 
17 Shares in companies fall into two broad categories. Today, the most regularly traded form 
of shares is ‘ordinary shares’. These shares may or may not pay a dividend to the holder and 
their value tends to fluctuate with both the market and the company’s fortunes. Such shares 
rank behind all other stakeholders in the event of a company being wound up. Similarly, if a 
company prospers the ordinary shareholders tend to be the main beneficiaries. The other 
class of share is what is referred to as a Preference or Preferred share or even sometimes as a 
debenture. The term preference is derived from the fact that in the event of the winding-up 
of a company the holders of preferred shares rank ahead of ordinary shareholders in 
receiving a pay-out. Preferred shareholders generally receive an annual fixed percentage 
dividend or coupon but tend not to benefit in any capital upside in the value of the company 
unless they are what are called ‘participating preference shares’. Preference shares are in 
effect a loan to a company hence the certificate that proves ownership is often referred to as 
a ‘loan note’. The use of preference shares tends to be influenced by credit markets and what 
are often referred to as ‘balance sheet considerations’. In the nineteenth century and indeed 
at certain periods during the twentieth and even the twenty-first century, when banks were 
reluctant to lend money due to either their own liquidity problems or concerns about a 
particular industry, companies use the ‘preference share route to raise capital. Since the late 
twentieth-century companies have tended more to source funding from capital markets 
rather than through issuing preference shares to individuals or institutions.   
18 Michael Edelstein, ‘Foreign investment, accumulation and Empire, 1860 – 1914’ in 
Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds) The Cambridge economic history of modern Britain, 
vol ii, Economic maturity, 1860 – 1939 (Cambridge, 2010), p. 191. 
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The period from 1860 to 1913 was largely free of either monetary crisis excluding 
the collapse of City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 or the near collapse of Barings Bank 
in 1890 or apart from the Franco-Prussian War of 1872 or the Boer War, of major 
international conflict. It was also a period of strong economic growth domestically 
and internationally, fuelled by the railway boom and the need to provide transport 
infrastructure in many of Britain’s far flung colonies as they sought ways of 
supplying the voracious British market with primary products like food and mineral 
resources. During the period 1865 to 1914 almost 70 per cent of new stock and bond 
issues on the London Stock Exchange went into what is termed ‘social overhead 
capital’ such as railways, docks, tramways, telegraphs and telephones and gas and 
electricity generating companies, 12 per cent related to extractive industries (mining 
and agriculture) with only 4 per cent going into manufacturing industries. 19  
 
Investment and financial markets thrive on this type of political stability and 
economic growth and the period to 1913 was no exception. As happened many times 
before and since when markets enjoy long periods of stability investor appetite for 
risk tends to increase and thus the last decades of the nineteenth-century saw a 
significant increase in stock market investments in higher risk emerging sectors such 
as the oil industry, mining, and emerging technologies like wireless and electricity 
generating companies. Chapter 6 will provide numerous examples of this type of 
investment in the portfolios of Irish landlords.   
 
The emergence of colonial and indeed international bonds provided investors with a 
significantly higher level of return than available from the traditional British consols. 
An example from the Irish Times stock market report column illustrates the range of 
securities available:  
 
The following are the principal changes not mentioned in the table: - 
Argentine 4 p.c. bonds 1897-1900, ¼ to 86 ¾, Brazilian 5 p.c. Railway Guar. 
Recission Bonds ½ 85 ½, Honduras Government Railway Loans, ¼ to 7 ¾, 
Buenos Ayres Great Southern 4 p.c. Extension Shares ½ to 11 ½, Leopoldina 
Pref 1/8 to 10 7/8.20   
   
                                                 
19 Ibid. p. 195.  
20 Irish Times, 22 Feb. 1908. 
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The reasons for the growth in overseas investment during the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century is the subject of debate among economic historians. One 
argument is that the funds were invested abroad because there was little demand and, 
therefore, poor investment returns offered in the domestic market.21 The second 
school of thought was that the higher returns offered particularly by colonial 
governments, which were for all practical purposes guaranteed by the British 
Government, were simply too alluring for investors to resist. 22 It should be borne in 
mind that during this period, British government debt principally funded by the 
issuance of consols was relatively small in amount. In a period of balanced budgets 
there was little demand for funding and it was only in the event of war that there was 
a need to raise finance. As the century progressed, however, this situation would 
change dramatically as successive governments, not just in Britain, but throughout 
the world, succumbed to internal pressures to fund economic expansion and social 
expenditures.  
 
The reason for the growth in overseas investment was down to the levels of return 
available. Edelstein has calculated rates of return from investment in railway 
securities during the period 1870 to 1913. Railway securities accounted for a 
significant portion of all investment both domestic and internationally, in the period. 
Table 5.1 below clearly indicates that over a sustained period the returns available 
overseas were significantly ahead of those from investment in domestic railway 
operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Robert Rowthorn and Stephen Solomon, ‘The macroeconomic effects of overseas 
investment on the UK balance of trade, 1870-1913’in Economic History Review (1991), vol. 
44. pp 654-64. 
22 Edelstein, ‘Foreign investment, accumulation and Empire, 1860–1914’, p. 193.  
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Table 5.16. Realised rates of return on quoted railway securities 1870-1913 
 
Region Equity Debentures 
 Per cent Per Cent 
United Kingdom 4.33 3.74 
Eastern Europe 2.58 5.33 
Western Europe 6.31 5.28 
India 4.97 3.65 
United States 8.41 6.03 
Latin America 8.43 5.33 
 
Source: Edelstein, ‘Foreign investment, accumulation and Empire, 1860 – 
1914’, p. 198. 
  
A similar situation existed with regard to British and colonial bonds. The ten-year 
average yield on Consols for the period 1900 to 1910 was 2.79 per cent and 3.81 per 
cent for the decade 1910 to 1920. 23 The yield on most bonds issued by colonial 
governments well exceeded that available on domestic bonds. Considering that 
virtually all colonial bonds were issued in Sterling, thus avoiding any exchange risk, 
and were effectively subject to a quasi-British Government guarantee, it is easy to 
understand how investors were attracted to this type of arbitrage position.24 Table 5.2 
below shows a small sample for a given day in 1910 of a selection of bonds traded 
on the London Stock Exchange and the real yields thereon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A history of interest rates (New Jersey, 2005), p. 446. 
24 In financial markets arbitrage is the practice of taking advantage of a price difference 
between two or more markets for the same security. Investors in the case of colonial bonds 
could obtain significantly higher return for similar dated bonds with equivalent underlying 
risk factors, in this case a British Government guarantee. The colonial bonds were not 
strictly guaranteed by Britain but it would have seriously undermined confidence in the 
Empire if the bonds were ever defaulted on. Investors were therefore prepared to take on the 
level of risk associated with a moral guarantee and hence their taking up of colonial stocks.  
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Table 5.17. Sample sovereign bond prices on 12th January 1910 
 
Stock 
 
Traded Yield 
Price 
 
£-s-d Per cent 
British 2 1/2 per cent Consol 82-10-00 3.03 
Canadian 4 per cent stock 100-00-00 4.00 
Cape of Good Hope 4 per cent stock 102-00-00 3.92 
Indian 3 1/2 per cent stock 96-05-00 3.64 
Western Australia 3 1/2 per cent stock 98-00-00 3.57 
 
Source: Irish Independent, 12 Jan. 1910. 
 
The point illustrated by the above examples is that a potential vendor of land under 
the Wyndham Land Act could quite easily see that he could beat the benchmark 
yield of 3.5 per cent that underpinned the act’s expectation of return. By taking on a 
higher risk profile, such as that available on corporate debt like that of the yield on 
railway stocks, an even higher level of return could be obtained. In these 
circumstances a vendor under the act who invested in a reasonably diversified 
portfolio of stocks and bonds could reasonably be expected to see an improvement in 
his living standards compared to that received from rent as a landlord and free of the 
distractions or pressures associated with estate management or dealing with 
demanding creditors.  
 
Against these expected yields, however, must be weighted the potential for capital 
loss or indeed gain should the value of the underlying security fluctuate. Such 
considerations in the opening decade were, as stated earlier, against an economic and 
investment background of relative stability for the previous sixty years or so. 
However, what lay in store, over the next ten years, was anything but stable.  
 
The outbreak of war on 4 August 1914 caught financial markets by surprise. Hartley 
Withers, a leading financial journalist and author of the 1910 standard, The meaning 
of money, observed in 1915 that ‘It [the War] came upon us like a thunderbolt from a 
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clear sky.’ 25 Economist, Professor William Kirkaldy, wrote in 1915 that ‘the 
outbreak of war took the financial world by surprise.’26 Many historians have placed 
the First World War in the context of the emerging struggle for economic supremacy 
among the major European powers and saw it as an inevitable consequence of such 
power-plays; financial markets did not, nor one suspects did investors, such as 
former Irish landlords who had sold their estates under the Wyndham Land Act.  
 
As evidenced by the above quotes the outbreak of war engendered great fear and 
uncertainty among investors and for former Irish landlords who held investment 
portfolios it would have been a stressful time. These fears would have been fuelled 
greatly by the suspension of stock exchange activities throughout the world in the 
immediate aftermath of the commencement of hostilities. Fears of a major fall in the 
value of securities resulted in a rush to liquidate share and bond portfolios by 
individuals and institutional investors. To prevent this, stock exchanges and bourses 
across the world suspended dealing and effectively closed. Exchanges in London, 
Paris, Berlin and New York all closed their doors on 31 July 1914. The New York 
Stock Exchange remained closed until late December 1914 and London until 4 
January 1915. 27  
 
When exchanges did eventually reopen, the trade in securities had changed from the 
pre-war days. The price of securities such as government bonds were impacted by 
news from the Front. A military reverse or victory could send values crashing or 
spiralling. The use of options to build up a speculative position in a particular 
security was banned by the Treasury and purchases or sales by overseas investors 
were vetted it also.28   
                                                 
25 Hartley Withers, War and Lombard Street (London, 1915), p. 1. 
26 A. W. Kirkaldy, Credit, industry and the War (London, 1915), p. 245. 
27 Michie, London Stock Exchange, p. 145. 
28 An option is a right to buy or sell a share at a particular price. An option holder pays what 
is called an option premium. An example best illustrates the concept. If a share is trading at 
100 and a person thinks that the share will rise to say 150. The person holding the actual 
share may sell an option to the person who feels the share will rise to 150 for say 10. This 
option entitles the option holder to buy the shares at 150. If the shares subsequently go above 
150 he buys the shares at 150 and he is in profit. If it does not go above 150 he simply lets 
the option lapse and he loses his 10 that he paid for the option. Options are used for people 
who want to take a ‘position’ on a particular security without having to purchase the actual 
share. It enables the option holder to ‘leverage’ his position. In the case of the above 
example let’s say the person wishing to buy the option has £100,000 cash. If he thinks the 
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The war had very profound effects on the nature of securities traded on the London 
Stock Exchange. The key change was that it became a mechanism to fund the war 
effort. To illustrate the extent of this, Britain’s unfunded short-term debt position in 
1913 was £31.5 million whereas by 1919 this had risen to £7,096.7 million.29 Prior 
to the war, Britain’s annual defence budget was £50 million. Following the outbreak 
of hostilities, it was £5 million per day.30  While taxes increased three-fold, only 28 
per cent of expenditure was funded from this source, the remainder coming from 
borrowing. Massive advertising campaigns were run throughout the war appealing 
for people to support their empire. Full page advertisements like that shown in figure 
5.1 were run seeking support for War Loan bonds and these were heavily subscribed 
to. As the review of the portfolios covered in Chapter 6 will illustrate, Irish landlords 
were not slow in responding to the call to buy War Bonds. An indication of the 
support for such issues can be gauged from the fact that in 1913 it was estimated that 
one million people in Britain and Ireland held Stock Exchange traded securities 
whereas by 1918, over 13 million people held securities principally because of the 
purchase of War Loan stock.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
share is going to rise he could simply buy the stock at £100 and thus he would have 1,000 
shares. If the price went to say £175 and he then sold the shares he would make a profit of 
£75,000 (1,000 x 75). If on the other hand, he used the £100,000 to buy options at £10 he 
would have an entitlement to buy 10,000 shares at £150. If the shares subsequently rose to 
£175 as before his profit would be £150,000 (10,000 shares at a profit of £25 per share less 
the cost of buying the option 10,000 by £10). Options can be used to buy shares and are 
termed ‘long’ or to sell shares and are termed ‘short’ options.    
29 Michie, London Stock Exchange, p. 165. 
30 John Steele Gordon, The great game – A history of Wall Street (London, 1999), p. 207. 
31 Michie, London Stock Exchange, p. 174. 
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Figure 4.1 Advertisement for War loan stock from Daily Mail 26 June 1915 
 
 
The Treasury actively discouraged citizens of Great Britain and Ireland from holding 
overseas stocks. The Clonbrock papers, for example, show that there was an active 
campaign by the Treasury to encourage the holders of overseas stocks to sell them 
and repatriate the funds to Britain, and to buy War Loan Stock. In the case of 
investors holding U.S. dollar denominated stock the Treasury requested that: 
  
On and after January 1st, 1916, holders of American (including certain 
Canadian) dollar securities are invited to place their securities at the disposal 
of the Treasury. The Treasury will be prepared to purchase such securities 
which are in their opinion suitable for the purpose in view at the current 
market price the purchase money to be paid at the sellers’ option either in 
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cash or in 5 per cent. Exchequer Bonds falling due 1st December 1920, at 
par.32 
 
The Treasury used the securities bought-in or loaned under this initiative as collateral 
for credit extended by the United States to Britain. Michie has estimated that of the 
$5.4 billion worth of U.S. securities held by international investors prior to the war 
only $1.6 billion was held in 1919.33  
 
The consequence for investors was that investment portfolios grew less 
geographically diversified than heretofore and more concentrated on War Loans, 
whose long-term value was of course dependent on a British victory in the war. The 
financial risk associated with investment portfolios that were heavily invested in War 
Loan stock would at times have been extremely high, particularly when the Allies 
suffered military setbacks such as that received in the Somme offensive. If the 
investment portfolios of Irish landed families examined in this study were 
representative of those of others who sold under Wyndham it must indeed have been 
a time of great concern and anxiety. Not alone were they faced with the personal 
tragedies of war experienced but also at times a very uncertain financial future, for 
had Germany triumphed, British government backed bonds such as War Stock and, 
most likely, Land Bonds would have been worthless.  
 
As chapter 6 will show investment portfolios prior to the First World War were quite 
international in terms of the stocks included. For example, 71 per cent of all new 
issues on the London Stock Exchange during the years 1910 to 1913 were for 
overseas projects and borrowers. This came to an end during the war when access 
was restricted to the British government.34 International fundraisers looked to New 
York thereafter as a source of funding and thus the London Exchange became 
predominantly a domestic market with consequences for how investment portfolios 
were structured. 
 
                                                 
32 Extract from Treasury memorandum published in the London Gazette on 17 and 21 Dec. 
1915 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816 (13). 
33 Michie, London Stock Exchange, p. 168. 
34 Michie, London Stock Exchange, p. 173. 
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A change also occurred in the nature of securities held in portfolios. The period from 
1900 to 1914 saw a major shift away from government-backed bonds to corporate 
debt. In 1913, it was estimated that only 5 per cent of national wealth was in the 
form of British government-backed debt whereas 18 per cent was in corporate debt. 
Because of the amount of War Loan stock issued (£7 billion) and the expansion of 
social spending in the 1920s, British government debt expanded to where the 
securities underpinning this represented 18 percent of overall national wealth. 
National debt in Britain, and, indeed, most other countries, was now regarded as a 
permanent feature of economic life and not influenced by involvement in military 
campaigns.  
 
Viewed from a contemporary perspective, it might be reasonable to see the growth in 
government-backed bond issues as a source of low-risk, income-producing 
investment opportunity. This would not have been the experience for investors in the 
opening decades of the twentieth century. Between 1900 and 1929 the capital value 
of consols declined in value by over 45 per cent. In 1900, consols were priced at an 
annual average of 99.625 whereas in 1929 their average value was 54.375.35 The 
decline was constant during this period and the decline in value is regarded by stock-
market historians as the greatest bond bear market in history.36 Thus, while investors 
in the opening decades of the twentieth century could look forward to an almost 
certain level of income from an investment in consols, it was against a background 
of continual capital decline. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that consols, 
and indeed all bonds issued by the Treasury up to 1917, were perpetual in nature, 
with no fixed maturity date.37 The alternative was to invest in higher yielding 
corporate bonds or equities, all of which came with a significantly higher risk 
profile. This was the securities market environment for Irish landlords as they sought 
                                                 
35 Homer and Sylla, History of interest rates, pp 446-7. 
36 A bear market is one where the value of a security declines continually. The particular 
bear market referred to in this chapter existed from 1896 until 1932. In the period 1896 to 
1931 bond values declined by over 62 per cent. 
37 A perpetual bond is one that does not have to be redeemed by the issuer on a given date. 
This contrasts with a fixed dated bond such as a 10-year bond or one that will be redeemed 
at a specific date. The significance is that with a fixed dated bond the holder knows that on a 
specific date the Treasury will redeem it at par thus protecting the capital value of the bond. 
With perpetual bonds the Treasury do not have to redeem them and will only do so when the 
interest rate being paid is unattractive versus what they could get by redeeming one bond 
and replacing it with a lower yielding one. 
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to invest the proceeds of the sale of their estates. While stock-market securities were 
the main means by which investors sought to obtain an income to maintain or 
increase the capital value of their wealth they were not the only options. The 
granting of mortgages and investment in property, be it commercial or residential, 
were also routes that were available and to which this study now turns. 
 
5.3: Mortgages 
 
In the nineteenth or early twentieth century the idea of a mortgage was much broader 
and varied than it is today. The concept of a mortgage has its origins in ancient 
history. The sacred Talmudic scriptures set out rules for the granting of mortgages 
and these influenced later Greek and Roman rules for their administration. The 
essential features of a mortgage are that there is a borrower, a lender and a formal 
loan arrangement between them setting out the rate of interest, the term of the loan, 
the events of default or the conditions that might lead to the calling in of the loan, 
and an underlying security. Mortgages may or may not relate to the loans advanced 
for the purchase of property and in most cases in the context of this study they did 
not. The property backed twenty-year mortgage that we are familiar with today did 
not come into widespread use in Britain or the U.S. until the mid-1930s with the 
growth in building societies in the U.K. and the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) in the US. 
 
 The granting of mortgages by individuals, or as will be shown later by religious 
institutions who had surplus cash to those who needed to borrow, was a common 
practice in Britain and Ireland throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Up until the mid-nineteenth century banks were prohibited from 
making loans where the security provided was land. Furthermore, banks did not 
normally engage in long-term lending. Therefore, in the absence of a banking system 
capable or unwilling to provide mortgages, this type of lending was in the hands of 
individuals and the terms were dictated by the circumstances of each particular 
case.38 
                                                 
38 For example, the Bank of Ireland was prohibited until 1860 from making loans to 
individuals where the security offered was land or property. The reluctance of banks to lend 
against land based security was due to the complexities associated with the ownership of 
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The development of new economic elites in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries meant that wealthy merchants, professionals and industrialists who had 
surplus funds, became in effect, personal bankers to many landed families whose 
lifestyles required funding beyond their incomes. An example of such an individual 
was Robert Shaw. Shaw was a wealthy Dublin grain merchant in the last decade of 
the eighteenth century. As a successful businessman, he had accumulated significant 
cash reserves. While he invested directly in companies such as Bank of Ireland, The 
Grand Canal Company and many others he was also a prodigious investor in 
mortgages to Irish landed grandees such as the earls of Hillsborough, Glandore and 
Bellmount.39 Shaw advanced loans not just against property but also against salaries 
and pension income and even, in one instance, patent income.40 To rich individuals 
like Shaw, the purpose of granting a mortgage was to achieve a higher return than an 
investment in other assets such as property or deposits.  
 
The attraction of mortgages as an investment vehicle can be seen in the following 
extract from Trollope’s, Last chronicle of Barset, 
 
 ‘Life is always uncertain, Miss Demolines.’ 
‘Your quizzing now, I know. But don’t you feel now, really, that City money 
is always very chancy? It comes and goes so quick.’ 
  ‘As regards the going, I think that’s the same with all money’, said Johnny. 
‘Not with land, or the funds. Mamma has every shilling laid out in a first-
class mortgages on land at four per cent. That does make one feel so secure! 
The land can’t run away.’41 
 
A similar sentiment was expressed by Lord Byron when he said, ‘I shall never rest 
while my property is in English funds; do, for God’s sake, let it be invested in land 
or mortgage although at a present loss.’42 A mortgage secured on a good property or 
landed estate with an honourable borrower could yield well more than what might be 
obtained by placing money on deposit in a bank. While mortgage lending could be a 
                                                 
estates through life interests and the terms of strict settlement. These measures were utilised 
to protect an estate for future generations against the proclivities of a particular owner. 
39 Tony McCarthy, The Shaws of Terenure, p. 27. 
40 Ibid. p.26. 
41 Anthony Trollope, Last chronicle of Barset (London, 1995), pp 285-6.  
42 Leslie Alexis Marchand, Life of Byron (New York, 1957), p. 769. 
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profitable venture for the lender, for the borrower it could often represent the start of 
a slippery slope into ultimate financial ruin. Ferguson estimated that the return on 
rural land in Britain slumped from 3.65 per cent in 1845 to just 2.51 per cent in 1885 
and only rose marginally thereafter. He estimated that the situation in Ireland was 
even worse due to the political pressures that existed.43 In such a situation a 
borrower paying 4 per cent on a mortgage and generating a return from his estate of 
2.5 per cent could see that his financial position was deteriorating, which was a fate 
that befell many landlords as they entered the vortex of debt begetting debt. 
 
Mortgages were used by the landed classes for a variety of reasons. In some 
instances, a mortgage was taken out to fund the building or extension of a country 
house; to finance the purchase of land; as a means of paying family portions to 
second or subsequent sons; to provide a dowry to a daughter on her wedding; to tide 
over a difficult period in the running of the estate such as after a bad harvest when 
tenants were slow in paying rents; or simply to finance an extravagant lifestyle. The 
reasons for borrowing were many but the reason for advancing a mortgage was 
usually singular, namely, to generate a return for the lender. 
 
Mortgage lending was not the preserve of the noveau riche. Habakkuk in his seminal 
work on the estates system, documents numerous cases in Britain where landlords 
granted mortgages to other landlords in what he says was referred to as the landed 
classes ‘Taking in each other’s washing’.44  
 
Two religious organisations that involved themselves in the granting of mortgages in 
Ireland in the late nineteenth century were the Representative Church Body of the 
Church of Ireland (R.C.B.) and St Patricks College Maynooth (St Patrick’s). Under 
the terms of the Irish Church Act 1869 the R.C.B. received a sum of £8,500,000 in 
compensation for the abolition of tithes.45 The compensation received was to be used 
to maintain churches and pay the salaries and pensions of clerics. In 1870, the R.C.B. 
                                                 
43 Niall Ferguson, The ascent of money – A financial history of the World (London, 2009), p.  
237. 
44 Habakkuk, Marriage, debt, and the estates system, p. 251. 
45 The long title of the act was An Act to put an end to the Establishment of the Church of 
Ireland, and to make provision in respect of the Temporalities thereof, and in respect of the 
Royal College of Maynooth, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 42. 
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established a finance committee to manage and invest these funds. This committee 
invested the monies received under the act in a combination of mortgages and an 
investment portfolio of stocks and shares. At its height in 1878 the RCB mortgage 
book stood at £3,811,790 with advances to 120 borrowers at interest rates between 4 
per cent. to 4.5 per cent.46 As Curtis points out, most of the mortgages were to 
‘parochial or diocesan pillars of the church’.47 
 
Under the 1869 Act, St. Patrick’s College received a capital sum of £369,040 in lieu 
of the withdrawal of the previous annual parliamentary grant paid under the 
Maynooth Act of 1845.48 After some initial investments in government and 
corporate bonds it was decided to diversify into mortgages. In the college’s annual 
report for 1872 the finance committee reported: 
 
Such advantageous opportunities for investment on land rarely occur and 
fortunately furnish us with the means of disposing of all our India stock at a 
profit of £3,160 on cost of purchase… the security tendered is above all 
exception and the annual increase of the college revenues consequent on this 
operation would be considerable.49 
 
By 1874 the St Patrick’s mortgage book stood at £273,592 and was generating an 
annual income of £11,720. Interestingly, the entire book was advanced to only five 
individuals which represented a significant concentration of risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46L.P. Curtis, ‘Incumbered wealth: landed indebtedness in post-Famine Ireland’ in The 
American Historical Review, vol. 85, no. 2 (Apr.1980), p. 341. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Terence Dooley, ‘The mortgage papers of St Patrick’s College, Maynooth, 1871-1923 in 
Archivium Hibernicum, vol. 59 (2005), p. 106. 
49 St Patrick’s College Maynooth, Financial report for the year ended 31 Mar. 1872, p. 6. 
Cited in Dooley, Mortgage papers of St Patrick’s, in Archivium Hibernicum, vol. 59 (2005), 
p. 109. 
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Table 5.18. St. Patrick’s College Maynooth mortgage book 1874 
 
 
Mortgage 
  
Mortgage 
amount 
Interest 
rate 
Annual 
Interest 
£ % £ 
Earl of Granard – Longford 92,592 4.25 3,935 
Townley Balfour – Louth 25,000 4.25 1,063 
Myles O'Reilly – Louth 6,000 4.75 285 
A.J.R. Stewart – Antrim 55,000 4.25 2,337 
Lord Cloncurry – Kildare 95,000 4.25 4,100 
Total 273,592 4.28 11,720 
 
Source: The above table has been extrapolated by the author from one shown 
in Terence Dooley, ‘The mortgage papers of St Patrick’s College, Maynooth, 
1871-1923, in Archivium Hibernicum, vol. 59 (2005), p. 109. 
 
While granting mortgages was seen as a profitable investment practice, it was only 
so if the money was repaid or the security lived up to its expected values. Until the 
development in the late nineteenth century of a centralised repository of mortgage 
and charges registration, it was difficult for a lender to ascertain if a property was 
previously charged with other borrowings or not. If it turned out that a property had 
multiple charges a scramble by creditors to establish precedence usually resulted. An 
example of the difficulties that could arise in this regard was seen in the case of the 
mortgage of £55,000 advanced by the trustees of St Patrick’s to A.J.R. Stewart in 
1874. In failing to note the existence of a number of previous mortgages on the 
security, Dooley stated: 
 
In drawing up the arrangements for the loans, there was a certain degree of 
naivety at best and carelessness at worst on behalf of the trustees and their 
legal representatives. Arguably, searches regarding the levels of indebtedness 
on individual estates were not enough; there is, in fact little evidence to 
suggest that they were carried out at all for the earlier loans. Some 
mortgagors were allowed to retain certain deeds that subsequently facilitated 
them in raising loans elsewhere, a temptation that was much too great for 
some to resist as the economic climate waned in the 1880s.50 
                                                 
50 Ibid. p. 113. 
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Hence the character and integrity of the borrower was critical to the lender. As 
Samuel Smiles, the Scottish author and political reform campaigner wrote: 
‘Character is property. It is the noblest of possessions.’51 Those who granted 
mortgages constantly sought to establish the extent of a borrower’s real underlying 
wealth and character. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century nothing conveyed 
this status and character like landownership and title. The investment of the funds 
generated from the sale of the Leinster estate in 1905 illustrates the situation well. Of 
the five mortgages advanced by the trustees of the estate three were lords, 
Tankerville, Hastings and Fitzwilliam, and two were well-established families, the 
Denisons and Duncombe Shaftos, with strong military connections.52  
 
The social status of landlords and the comfort of a good underlying security, namely 
land, meant that the landed classes were ideal targets for those seeking to achieve a 
good return from their surplus cash. This coupled with a relatively relaxed attitude 
towards debt by landlords due to what Habukkuk observed as: ‘the fact that in an 
aristocratic society little social stigma attached to debts, even when they were heavy 
and the result of extravagance.’ provided a ready market for those willing to advance 
mortgages.53 
 
A person providing a mortgage usually took a double security in the form of a charge 
on the estate and secondly a personal covenant or bond from the borrower. The loan 
was provided subject to a formal agreement which set out the rate of interest 
chargeable, the term of the loan, the nature and extent of the security and any event 
that might trigger a recall of the loan such as the death of the borrower or a reduction 
in the value of the underlying security. Unlike modern mortgages that require the 
principal to be repaid over the life of the loan through a process known as 
amortization, mortgages of the type discussed in this study were repaid in a single 
payment or to use the legal term in toto. This was due to two factors: firstly, the 
complexities of land law which mitigated against instalment type payments, and 
secondly and more usually, the inability of the borrower to come up with sufficient 
                                                 
51 Samuel Smiles, Character of debt (London, 1997), p. 6. 
52 Statement of application of funds, (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster papers, D. 3078/2/15/10).  
53 Habakkuk, Marriage, debt, and the estates system, p. 303. 
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capital to repay the loan. A contributor to a House of Commons debate in 1857 on 
the subject maintained that: 
 
Under the present system, the repayment of a mortgage of £10,000 is almost 
an unknown occurrence, which scarcely ever happens to any landowner out 
of his property, or otherwise than some unexpected windfall, or by making 
some arrangements for obtaining a larger sum of money, in order to prevent a 
foreclosure of his estate. 54  
 
 As Habakkuk pointed out it was normal in such mortgage agreements that an event 
such as a national credit crisis or a significant increase in interest rates could result in 
a demand for payment of the mortgage.55  
 
The mortgage document was usually heavily weighted in favour of the lender and 
afforded him significant scope to seek recovery of the debt. Once the borrower 
continued to pay the interest on the loan in full and on time he was usually safe but if 
he failed to meet his interest obligations then serious consequences invariably 
followed. There were a number of legal remedies available to the mortgage provider. 
The main remedy and indeed the ultimate one was foreclosure.56 Lenders were often 
reluctant to foreclose on a mortgage because to do so meant trying to sell an estate, 
an action that was generally met with opposition from the borrower who sought to 
hold on to the family seat. A more usual step was to sue on the personal covenant or 
bond provided by the borrower. A judgement debt once obtained could have very 
serious consequences for the borrower including being imprisoned for non-payment. 
Other measures included applying to the Court of Chancery to appoint a receiver to 
administer the estate and thus discharge the interest and repayment obligations, or 
the appointment of trustees who again would manage the estate for the principal 
purpose of meeting the borrower’s debt obligations.57 An example of this type of 
procedure can be seen in the case of Colonel Henry Denison who was one of those 
individuals whom the trustees of the Leinster Estate granted a mortgage in 1905. In 
May 1916, he was the subject of bankruptcy proceedings. The Times reported: 
                                                 
54 Ibid. p. 337. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Foreclosure is a legal process whereby a lender who is seeking to recover the balance of a 
loan or interest owed can force the sale of the asset used as security or collateral for the loan.  
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/foreclosure accessed 25 May 2017. 
57 Habakkuk, Marriage, debt and the estates system, pp 337-42. 
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The first meeting was held yesterday at Bankruptcy Buildings, of the 
creditors of Colonel Henry Denison, of Onslow Gardens, S.W., against 
whose estate a receiving order was made on May 5th. The petitioning 
creditors were Messers Eldridge and Morris, financiers of Albemarle Street, 
Piccadilly. 58 
 
The consequences for the above petition for the Leinster Estate will be dealt with in 
Chapter 6 and is cited above to illustrate how creditors might seek redress for loan 
default. 
 
The availability of mortgages was largely dependent on the returns available from 
other investments. In times of war, for instance, when governments had a high 
requirement for funding, the yield on bonds tended to rise, which meant that those 
with surplus cash bought these instruments rather than grant mortgages. During the 
First World War, the yield on government-backed War Loans ran at 5 per cent which 
would have proved attractive to investors and made them reluctant to advance 
monies to individuals. Looking to the Leinster papers for evidence of the investment 
logic that would have applied in 1905 the average yield pertaining on consols was 
2.78 per cent whereas the mortgages advanced in the period were attracting a yield 
of between 3.5 per cent and 3.75 per cent.59   
 
While on a different scale to the Leinster estates there is also evidence that Lord 
Clonbrock invested a small portion of his sales proceeds under Wyndham Act in 
Canadian residential mortgages.60  Clonbrook and possibly other vendors under 
Wyndham, were approached by a John McMahon who was a descendant of the earl 
of Leitrim regarding investment in residential mortgages in Vancouver, Canada. 
These investments will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 6.    
 
                                                 
58 The Times, 17 May 1916. 
59 For yields on consols see Homer and Sylla, History of interest rates, p. 446. For details 
regarding the Leinster estate mortgages see statement of application of funds, (P.R.O.N.I., 
Leinster papers, D. 3078/2/15/10). 
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With the decline in land values post-1918 and the development of an institutional 
based mortgage industry the granting of mortgages by individuals gradually ceased 
to exist. 
 
5.4: Investment property 
 
Property is one of the main asset classes that those seeking to obtain a regular 
income and capital appreciation choose to invest in. This author has not found any 
evidence of the wholesale purchase of investment properties either in Ireland or the 
United Kingdom by landlords seeking to invest the sale proceeds from their estates 
under the terms of the Wyndham Land Act. This was initially a surprise as it would 
appear a reasonable assumption that someone from a rentier class who had just sold 
an income producing asset might seek to replace it with an asset with similar 
characteristics albeit with better investment fundamentals and prospects. Closer 
examination of relatively disparate and limited evidence that is available, provides 
some insight as to why Irish landlords broadly shunned this avenue of investment. 
 
There is little evidence relating to the Irish commercial property market in the 
opening decades of the twentieth century. There are however, a number of studies 
relating to the British commercial property market which are pertinent to the 
Ireland.61 The second area of commercial property investment is in residential 
properties purchased for the purpose of renting them. Ronan Lyons of Trinity 
College Dublin has compiled an index of Dublin house prices for the period 1900-
2014.62 These works provide insight into why investment property did not feature in 
the portfolios of Irish landlords in the post Wyndham era. 
 
                                                 
61 Sources referred to include; A study of commercial property yields in central Nottingham, 
1910-23 in; 
http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL_Images/Content_store/Sample_Chapter/9
781405135559/9781405135559_4_004.pdf accessed 9 Sept. 2016; Luke Samy, Indices of 
house prices and rent prices of residential property in London, 1895-1939, University of 
Oxford, Discussion papers in Economic and Social history, no. 134, April 2015. 
62 Ronan Lyons [Department of economics, TCD], A housing price index for Dublin 1900-
2014, Presentation to the Irish Quantitative History Group, Trinity College Dublin, Jan. 
2015.  
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It was surprising to this author why landlords, who were by definition, familiar with 
property markets and the attractions or otherwise of rental income should appear to 
have little interest in investing in commercial property as part of a balanced portfolio 
of investments. Why then did the portfolios examined by this study not contain any 
evidence of their inclusion? 
 
Part of the answer to this question is because leases relating to commercial properties 
were different in the opening decades of the twentieth century than they are today. 
Harvard observed that in 1900, commercial property leases were typically of a long-
term duration such as 99 or 125 year leases.63 As chapter 6 will demonstrate, at the 
time investors were not conscious of the impact inflation could have on their 
investment portfolios. Given that commercial property leases in the early twentieth 
century did not have a mechanism for adjusting the rent over the life of the lease, 
they were regarded as  being akin to perpetual government bonds (consols) and the 
returns reflected this.64 A report prepared by a group of academics in Nottingham 
University showed that between 1910 and 1923 the rental yields on prime 
commercial property in the centre of Nottingham ranged from 4.5 per cent to 6.5 per 
cent whereas the yield on gilts in the same period ranged from 3.1 per cent to 5.30 
per cent. While these rental yields may not apply exactly to the Dublin market the 
likelihood is that they would be reasonably similar for what was in effect two 
provincial British cities.   
 
 
  
                                                 
63 Tim Harvard, Investment property valuation today (London, 2014), p. 10. 
64 The yield on commercial property was similar to that pertaining on consols with a 
relatively modest premium to compensate for the need to manage the property, for example 
to collect the rent etc. The uplift also was necessary to compensate for the fact that property 
was more difficult and costly to sell than stock market traded government bonds.   
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Table 5.19. Nottingham city prime commercial property yields 1910-1923 
 
Year Prime Commercial Gilts Rent Premium 
 
Property Yields Yield to Gilts 
 
per cent per cent per cent 
1910 5.00 3.10 1.90 
1911 5.00 3.20 1.80 
1912 5.00 3.30 1.70 
1913 4.50 3.40 1.10 
1914 6.50 3.30 3.20 
1915 6.50 3.80 2.70 
1916 6.50 4.30 2.20 
1917 6.50 4.60 1.90 
1918 6.75 4.40 2.35 
1919 5.00 4.60 0.40 
1920 5.00 5.30 -0.30 
1921 4.50 5.20 -0.70 
1922 5.50 4.40 1.10 
1923 6.00 4.40 1.60 
 
Source:http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL_Images/Content_s
tore/Sample_Chapter/9781405135559/9781405135559_4_004.pdf accessed 9 
Sept. 2016. 
 
Reflecting on the position in the United States, Gustavus Myers observed: 
 
But fortunes based upon land in cities were endued with a mathematical 
certainty and a perpetuity. City real estate was not subject to the extreme 
fluctuating processes which so disordered the value of rural land. All of the 
tendencies and currents of the times favoured the building up of an 
aristocracy based upon ownership of city property.65 
 
As will be seen later, a similar tendency existed in Britain with a number of 
aristocratic families building enormous portfolios of city properties. 
                                                 
65 Gustavus Myers, History of the great American fortunes (New York, 1937), p. 87. 
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The four portfolios discussed in chapter 6 and indeed several others examined by this 
study show no evidence of interest in acquiring investment property. This study has 
concluded that the most likely reason for this was that many of the landlords who 
sold under the Wyndham Act and the 1909 Birrell Land Act were fixated with the 
certainty of a guaranteed income and were not prepared to take on even the relatively 
low risks associated with good quality investment properties. A similar position 
arose with regard to investment in residential buy-to-let property. There is little 
evidence to suggest that Irish landlords who had sold their estates in the opening 
decades of the twentieth century invested their sales proceeds in Irish residential 
property. This situation is understandable in that since around 1895 the prices of 
houses in Dublin and indeed in the United Kingdom in general had been falling and 
showed little sign of bottoming out. A study of Dublin house prices carried out by 
Ronan Lyons shows that between 1900 and 1911, prices fell by 25 per cent.66 The 
fall in house prices during the period was not a Dublin or indeed an Irish based 
phenomenon in that it was part of what historians refer to as the Edwardian housing 
slump.67 
 
A study carried out at the Oxford University in 2015 into the London residential 
property markets provides insight into the investment environment faced by those 
considering investing in residential property.68 The report shows that London 
residential property prices rose by 17 per cent from 1895 to 1903 and thereafter fell 
by over 36 per cent in the period to 1915.69 There was no single or indeed clear 
reasons for this slump in house prices. Given that it affected cities like London and 
Dublin and, indeed, many others it was not a location specific problem. Wohl has 
argued that it was as a result of the uncertainty surrounding the payment of rents due 
to the low and uncertain income of tenants, particularly at the lower end of the 
                                                 
66 Lyons, A housing price index for Dublin 1900-2014, Slide 30. 
67 Luke Samy,’Indices of house prices and rent prices of residential property in London, 
1895-1939’, University of Oxford, Discussion papers in Economic and Social history, 
no.134, April 2015, p. 9. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. p. 30. 
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housing market.70 Others have argued that it was the declining fiscal position of 
landlords and the imposition of laws that afforded greater protection to tenants from 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century onwards that deterred them from 
investing in property, with the result that there was little buyer activity in the housing 
market.71 Arguably, the decline in investment in property during the early years of 
the twentieth-century was not unrelated to the significant growth in overseas 
investment by British investors in the same period. Given the similar returns 
available from commercial property, with all the potential difficulties of rent voids 
and difficult tenants, compared to stock exchange tradable colonial bonds, it is not 
surprising that they choose the latter. Quite apart from this, it would take a very 
brave investor to enter a market that was showing all the signs of being in a 
protracted bear cycle.  
 
5.5: The impact of inflation on investment 
 
One of the lasting legacies of the Weimar Republic was that it has enshrined in the 
human psyche the economic and, by extension, political consequences of inflation. 
Prior to the hyper-inflation era in Germany, concerns about its effects were largely 
the preserve of academic economists. Inflation was seen as relating only to shock 
events such as wars and other calamities. For instance, looking at inflation in the 
U.K. from the start of the nineteenth century to the 1930’s there were three periods 
of significant inflation growth. These were in the early years of the Napoleonic Wars 
when in a three-year period inflation reached a cumulative 60.5 per cent, the Crimea 
War (1853-56) it spiked by 18.4 per cent and during the period of the First World 
War and its immediate aftermath (1915-1920) when it rose by 63.7 per cent. Apart 
from the first two periods, neither inflation or its inverse, deflation, were of any 
consequence to investors or the ordinary citizens of Britain or Ireland in the opening 
years of the twentieth-century. For example, in the twenty years from 1883 to 1903 
inflation averaged zero per cent per annum. In other words, prices in 1903 were the 
                                                 
70 Anthony Wohl, ‘The housing of the working classes in London 1815-1914’, in Stanley D. 
Chapman (ed.) The history of working class housing; A symposium (Newton Abbot, 1971) p. 
23. 
71 Samy, ‘Indices of house prices and rent prices’ p. 4. 
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same as they were in 1883.72 Hence it is easy to understand how those with money to 
invest in the opening decade of the twentieth century would have looked at the 
nominal return on any proposed investment and not on the all-important real rate of 
return.73  
     
Such an approach is in investment terms a fundamental error and can lead to a very 
significant loss of real value of an individual’s portfolio. Given the changing 
economic environment that was about to take hold, any investor who did not put his 
funds into an asset that protected them from inflation was over the next thirty years 
about to suffer a very significant loss in the real value of their money. Table 5.5 
below illustrates just how pernicious inflation can be on the real value of money.74 In 
stark terms if a landlord sold his estate in 1903 and received net proceeds of £10,000 
and placed the money in a non-interest earning current account he would in real 
terms have lost £6,420 by the end of 1929. On the other hand, had he invested in 
consols he would have received a gross income of £1236 in the 30-year period from 
the investment which would have exceeded inflation by 59.4 per cent.75 This 
summary is between two specific date intervals namely, 1903 and 1933. There were 
periods particularly in the inflationary war years when even an investment in consols 
would not have protected the real value of the investment portfolio e.g. in 1919 even 
allowing for the income received from consols, inflation would, in real terms, have 
eroded 46 per cent of the value of the portfolio. 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 Inflation calculator; http://inflation.stephenmorley.org/ accessed, 21 Sept. 2016. 
73 The nominal rate of return is the actual return received in percentage terms. The real rate 
of return represents the return after allowing for inflation. An example best illustrates the 
situation. Assuming the return on a government bond is 3 per cent in a given year (nominal 
return) and inflation in that year is 2 per cent, the real return is 1 per cent. 
74 What Table 5.5 shows is that in real terms, (meaning the amount of goods a particular sum 
of money will buy at two time intervals.) £100 would buy £100 worth of goods in 1902 
whereas in 1933 it would only be able to buy £35.80 worth of the same goods. Thus, if a 
landlord invested in non-inflation proofed asset such as cash he would have lost 64.20 per 
cent of his investment in real terms.   
75 Unfortunately for investors who followed this approach the capital value of consols 
declined during the 30-year period under review by just under 20 per cent but coupled with 
the income it meant that an investment in consols would have exceeded inflation. However, 
that this only resulted from the deflation that occurred in the 1920s.  
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Table 5.20. UK inflation and consols returns 1903-33 
 
Year Inflation 
Rate 
per cent 
Return 
Consols 
per cent 
Inflation 
Gap 
per cent 
Inflation 
Cumul 
£ 
Gap 
Cumul 
£ 
 
 
1902 
   
100.00 100.00 
1903 0.40 2.75 2.35 99.60 102.35 
1904 -0.20 2.83 3.03 99.80 105.38 
1905 0.40 2.78 2.38 99.40 107.76 
1906 0.00 2.83 2.83 99.40 110.59 
1907 1.20 2.97 1.77 98.20 112.36 
1908 0.50 2.90 2.40 97.70 114.76 
1909 0.50 2.98 2.48 97.20 117.24 
1910 0.90 3.08 2.18 96.30 119.42 
1911 0.10 3.15 3.05 96.20 122.47 
1912 3.00 3.28 0.28 93.20 122.75 
1913 -0.40 3.39 3.79 93.60 126.54 
1914 -0.30 3.46 3.76 93.90 130.30 
1915 12.50 3.82 -8.68 81.40 121.62 
1916 18.10 4.31 -13.79 63.30 107.83 
1917 25.20 4.58 -20.62 38.10 87.21 
1918 22.00 4.40 -17.60 16.10 69.61 
1919 10.10 4.62 -5.48 6.00 64.13 
1920 15.40 5.32 -10.08 -9.40 54.05 
1921 -8.60 5.21 13.81 -0.80 67.86 
1922 -14.00 4.43 18.43 13.20 86.29 
1923 -6.00 4.31 10.31 19.20 96.60 
1924 -0.70 4.39 5.09 19.90 101.69 
1925 0.30 4.43 4.13 19.60 105.82 
1926 -0.80 4.55 5.35 20.40 111.17 
1927 -2.40 4.56 6.96 22.80 118.13 
1928 -0.30 4.47 4.77 23.10 122.90 
1929 -0.90 4.60 5.50 24.00 128.40 
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Table 5.5 Continued 
 
 
Year 
Inflation 
Rate 
per cent 
Return 
Consols 
per cent 
Inflation 
Gap 
per cent 
Inflation 
Cumul 
£ 
Gap 
Cumul 
£ 
1930 -2.80 4.46 7.26 26.80 135.66 
1931 -4.30 4.53 8.83 31.10 144.49 
1932 -2.60 3.76 6.36 33.70 150.85 
1933 -2.10 3.38 5.48 35.80 156.33 
1934 0.00 3.08 3.08 35.80 159.41 
 
 
Source: The inflation figures in Table 5.5 have been sourced from 
http://inflation.stephenmorley.org/. The consols yields have been extracted 
from Homer and Sylla, A history of interest rates, pp 446-7. 
 
As the twentieth century, progressed inflation became more a feature and its 
invidious nature became more obvious to both investors and wealth managers. 
Knowledge of course does not guarantee avoiding the impact on the investment but 
it at least helps in trying to arrange an investment portfolio so as to protect its real 
value. For many, such an awareness came too late and for others it undoubtedly had 
a very profound impact on their wealth status. 76 
 
5.6: Conclusion 
  
Investment environments can be difficult to interpret and read. At times, all can 
appear calm on the surface, but underneath seismic movements can be at play which 
                                                 
76 To highlight this point, it is worth considering the effects of inflation on a 
portfolio over the long term. Based on the performance statistics from the Barclays 
equity / gilt study, 2016 edition the following examples illustrate the impact of 
inflation. £100 invested in a portfolio of UK equities in 1900 would now (2016) be 
worth £2.23 million in nominal terms but only £28,226 in real terms. Alternatively, 
£100 invested in UK gilts in 1900 would be worth £36,458 in nominal terms and 
£454 in real terms. These examples not only show the impact of inflation on the 
value of a portfolio but also the effects of choosing the right asset class to invest in. 
Source http://www.courtiers.co.uk/news/barclays-equity-gilt-study-2016 accessed 29 
Sept. 2016 
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eventually culminate in dramatic gyrations. This was to some extent the situation in 
the opening three decades of the twentieth-century a period when by its conclusion 
the investment landscape had changed forever.  
 
The opening decade was one of relative political and economic calm with little 
evidence of the seismic activity that was occurring beneath the surface as the great 
tectonic plates that underpin investment markets were shifting slowly but inexorably. 
In Europe, these shifts were manifested in the emergence of Germany as a challenger 
to Britain’s economic hegemony, a development that would largely shape the second 
and indeed subsequent decades so dramatically. On a more global scale the shifting 
plates saw the emergence of the USA as the world’s great superpower. 
 
To all but the most astute and observant economic seismologist, these shifts and the 
consequences that would flow from them were in the first decade of the new century 
imperceptible. For investors, such as Irish landlords seeking to invest the proceeds of 
sale of their estates, the investment environment would have presented itself as a 
relatively stable space. The absence of any major international conflicts or economic 
calamities or threats of the same, provided a fertile context for investment markets 
that tend to thrive in such conditions.  
 
Concerns about the pernicious effects of inflation were yet to occupy the minds of 
investors and their advisors, nor were their fears that a government might default on 
its debt obligations. While both bond and property markets were entering a 
prolonged bear market phase, this, as always, only became clear in hindsight. There 
were plenty of opportunities for investors to achieve income returns well in excess of 
those they previously obtained from their estates. Thus, landlords who invested their 
money in the many options that prevailed would most likely have seen an 
improvement in their living standards and while they may have endured moments of 
concern about the underlying capital values on their investments as the bear market 
in bonds continued into the second decade of the century, they at least had the 
comfort of knowing that many of these securities were underpinned by the mighty 
British Treasury. 
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All this was to change with the commencement of hostilities in August 1914. While 
patriotic fervour would undoubtedly have clouded judgement, the fact remained that 
for the first time in history the prospect arose that in the event of a defeat for the 
Allies the value of British government-backed bonds might have been zero. For 
investors holding such financial instruments, including most Dominion bonds, lay 
the spectre that the value of their entire investment portfolio could be wiped out, 
leaving them and their families destitute. For those with home farms such concerns 
were mitigated by the high prices they were achieving for their produce because of 
the war but for those with no other source of income it was a difficult and uncertain 
time. For the first time since the 1850s, inflation became a major issue. In the period 
1915 to 1920 prices rose by over 63 per cent. While income from War loan bonds 
was over 5 per cent per annum it was not remotely sufficient to cover the increased 
cost of living. For those on fixed income such as that derived from Government 
bonds this would have been a major issue. 
 
Despite being a decade of economic depression marked by high unemployment, 
significant long-term deflation, high interest rates and a continuing decline in 
Britain’s economic pre-eminence, the 1920s were good from an investment 
perspective. Deflation meant that money not only retained but increased its value in 
real terms due to the 27.7 per cent fall in prices over the thirteen years between 1920 
and 1933.77 The attempt by Britain to protect the value of Sterling by maintaining 
the Gold Standard (eventually abandoned in 1931) meant that interest rates remained 
at consistently high levels (more than 5 per cent) throughout the decade meaning that 
depositors received significant real returns on their funds. Investment returns in the 
decade were very positive. The nominal value of UK equities rose by over 61 per 
cent in the period 1920 to 1928 and even allowing for the stock-market crash of 
October 1929 the value of equities increased by 18.6 per cent in nominal terms and 
over 100 per cent in real terms due to the high level of deflation. Throughout the 
decade, the average dividend income from UK quoted equities was in excess of 5 per 
cent per annum. Those who held gilts fared even better with the nominal value of 
gilts rising by 26.7 per cent between 1920 and 1930 and 120.4 per cent in real terms 
                                                 
77 Inflation calculator; http://inflation.stephenmorley.org/. accessed 21 Sept. 2016. 
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while yields averaged over 4.6 per cent per annum.78 For those landlords who 
negotiated their way through the war years and its immediate aftermath and who had 
their money invested in either equities or gilts the 1920s would have witnessed a 
considerable rise in their living standards both in terms of income and underlying 
capital growth. 
  
In overall terms, however the opening decades of the twentieth-century were 
turbulent from an investment perspective. The long drawn out bear market in bonds 
and property, the war and the ravages of inflation and its counterpart deflation meant 
that there were few safe havens for their monies. While annual income yields more 
than the 3.5 per cent suggested by Wyndham when introducing his 1903 Bill were 
generally available throughout the period, it was the diminution in capital value that 
would have caused most concern.79 However the value of the asset they sold, 
agricultural land, also suffered a serious decline and in many instances, would have 
been unsaleable particularly in the post-war period. For landlords who stuck with 
bond portfolios, the subsequent decades saw even greater declines in real value, but 
for those who held the bulk of their investment in equities the future was brighter. 
Regardless of the course of action taken, they would never again experience the 
certainty of an estate that produced a regular income flow. Uncertainty was the key 
feature of the investment environment which they now operated in. 
                                                 
78 The performance figures quoted in this section are drawn from the Barclays Equity Gilt 
study 2016. This study which has been published annually since 1955 is the definitive work 
used by investment managers to benchmark their performances over the years. It provides 
statistics showing the performance of equities and gilts markets since 1900. 
79 Taking the period 1903 to 1930 as a reference point the value of an all gilt portfolio would 
have fallen by 35.4 per cent in nominal terms and by 60 per cent in real terms. An all-equity 
portfolio would have fared better, rising 4 per cent in nominal terms but declining 20 per 
cent in real terms. See Barclays equity gilt study 2016, pp 74-6. 
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Chapter 6: Managing the money 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In his 1956 examination of the power elites of American society, Charles Wright 
Mills observed that: 
 
People with advantages are loath to believe that they just happen to be people 
with advantages. They come readily to define themselves as inherently 
worthy of what they possess; they come to believe themselves ‘naturally’ 
elite; in fact, to imagine their possessions and their privileges as natural 
extensions of their own elite selves.1   
 
While the previous three decades had done much to dispel the feeling of elitism 
amongst Irish landlords it is hard not to imagine that a sense of advantage still 
prevailed as they entered a new epoch where family fortunes were more impacted 
with events in international financial markets than weather conditions and the actions 
of recalcitrant tenants. 
 
Investment markets, however, have little regard for ‘advantage’ and even less for 
‘background’. Long term success in investment requires an astute awareness of the 
economic environment, the fundamentals underpinning individual securities and an 
adherence to rigid disciplines regarding when to buy and sell. Anything else depends 
on serendipity, overwhelming belief in the abilities of the investment advisor or an 
innate gambling instinct.2 Which category Irish landlords fell into will emerge from 
the pages of this chapter as it unfolds. 
 
David Cannadine, in examining the decline of the British aristocracy, adopted what 
he termed the perspective of the ‘parachutist not the truffle hunter’.3 This chapter 
applies the opposite approach in that understanding is sought through the 
examination of a small number of cases where significant documentary evidence 
                                                 
1 C. Wright Mills, The power elite (Oxford, 2000), p. 14. 
2 This opinion is being put forward by the author based on over 40 years’ experience 
working in investment markets.  
3 Cannadine, The decline and fall, p.7. 
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exists to make clear the investment strategies adopted. While there are dangers in 
generalising from such a small sample, secondary research and anecdotal evidence 
would suggest that the investment approaches adopted by the families examined was 
not too dissimilar to that adopted by many other selling landlords.4  Given that the 
wealth management practices of Irish landlords have received so little attention in 
Irish historiography it is hoped that this study may encourage other historians to 
examine in greater detail the financial affairs of individual families and, in this way, 
build up a wider and more representative picture of how they managed the money 
received from the sale of their estates.  
 
The cases chosen represented a range of estate types from large ones, such as those 
of Leinster and Clonbrock, to relatively small ones like Coolgreany and the Dopping 
Heppenstall Wicklow and Longford estates. They are representative in terms of the 
abilities of the individuals charged with managing the funds and the legal structures 
adopted to protect inter-generational family interests.  
 
Building on the information provided in the previous chapter, the cases examined 
also highlight numerous similarities in terms of how the proceeds were invested, 
including the rapidity with which the funds were committed to the market; the nature 
of the assets invested in or not invested in; the focus on generating income; and the 
almost total disregard for the impact of inflation on the value of the portfolios. They 
also demonstrate common traits about the administration of the investment estates, 
particularly regarding who the key influencers and advisors were, and notably the 
role of solicitors and stockbrokers in the process.  
 
6.2 The decision to sell 
 
The cases examined highlight the fact that similar processes were involved in 
considering whether to sell an estate or not. This involved undertaking an exercise 
like that undertaken by the Bellew and the Dopping Hepenstall estates and examined 
in Chapter 4, whereby an estimated sales consideration figure was calculated so as to 
                                                 
4Olwen Purdue, The big house in the north, pp 106-8, provides details of investment 
portfolios for Col. Nugent and the earl of Caledon’s portfolio in 1913 which are similar in 
content and structure to those examined in this chapter. 
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ensure that this sum if invested at 3.25 per cent would yield an income equivalent to 
the net rental earned from the estate. In the case of the Clonbrock estate this exercise 
was undertaken by the estate’s accountant, George Mahon. The paper prepared by 
Mahon in 1905 provides an insight into the evaluation process facing potential 
vendors and provides a benchmark in this study for measuring future financial 
performance of the Clonbrock investment portfolios. Mahon’s report also gives 
insight into the cost of operating an estate such as that of Lord Clonbrock. Table 6.1 
below summarises Mahon’s estimate of what capital sum would be required by 
Clonbrock from the sale of his estates should he wish to obtain an equivalent income 
to his previous rents. The calculations were predicated on two key underlying 
assumptions. Firstly, that he could obtain an investment return of 3.25 per cent and 
secondly, were he not to sell, that the gross annual rents could be maintained at the 
prevailing level of £9,861 per annum. This latter assumption may have been 
optimistic given the pressure for downward rent revisions and the likelihood of rent 
strikes orchestrated by the U.I.L and uncollectable arrears in the event of Clonbrock 
not being willing to sell to his tenants. Mahon’s conclusion was that in order to 
secure a net income equivalent to what he then received (while discharging all 
capital demands on the estate), Clonbrock needed to secure a sum of £234,644 from 
the sale. Mahon advised that this sum would represent 23 ¾ years purchase of the 
gross rental figure of £9,861, which would have been high in relation to the average 
paid up to that date by the Land Commission for land. However, when the Bonus is 
subtracted it equated to a more modest 21 ¼ times purchase, which is more in 
keeping with the average metric used by the Estates Commissioners and was 
therefore a more reasonable target for Clonbrock. The Leinster estate papers do not 
provide evidence of a similar exercise being carried out but given the professional 
way the estate was administered it is likely that a similar review was undertaken. 
 
Given the similarity in the format of the review for the various estates examined the 
likelihood is that it followed a template prescribed in a contemporary guide book or 
even newspapers. Walker’s, The law relating to the land purchase in Ireland, uses a 
very similar format to that used by the Bellews, Clonbrock and Dopping Hepenstall 
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estates so it is safe to assume that similar reviews were undertaken by many other 
landlords.5 
 
Table 6.21. Estimate of purchase price required to maintain income level of 
Clonbrock Estate 1905 
  £ £ 
Gross rental (less abatements allowed of say, £200)  9,861 
Deduct Outgoings   
 - Quit rents 48  
 - Tithe rent charges 338  
 - Board of Works instalments  785  
 - Maintenance and improvements - Average over 3 years 614  
 - Head rent  336  
 - Suck drainage repayment instalments & Maintenance rate 112  
 - General District Poor Rate on farms 100  
 - Salaries to bailiffs & herds of commonage 84  
 - Interest on family charges 645  
 - Sundries & incidental expenditure 50  
 - Agents fees 420  
  3,532 3,532 
Net rental  6,329 
Cash invested at 3 1/4 per cent to yield £6,328 would amount 
to   194,707 
    
Add: Capital sums required to cover   
 - Tithe rent charges 4,087  
 - Quit rent (25 years’ purchase) 1,104  
 - Board of Works Loans to be repaid 8,940  
 - Family Charges. Capital Sums   
      - Hon. Mrs D'ealtry 5,000  
     - Hon. Lady Nanney 5,000  
     - Col. Hon. R.V. Dillon 5,000  
     - Hon. Helen Dillon 500  
 - Head rent of Bolebane (say 25 years’ purchase) 10,307  
 £ £ 
  39,938 39,938 
Cash required from sale of estates  234,645 
    
This equates to 23 3/4 years purchase of Gross Rental of 
£9,861   
 
Source: G. Mahon to Clonbrock, 18 Aug. 1905 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 
35,721.3).  
                                                 
5 Walker, The law relating to land purchases in Ireland, xxxiii. 
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6.3 Sale of estates 
 
In the case of the Leinster Estate, the sale was completed within months of the 1903 
Land Bill having been passed. Given the prominence of the family, the facilitation 
by the administration of an early sale established a strong precedent that acted as an 
encouragement to other landlords and tenants to avail of the provisions of the 1903 
Land Act.6 Thus, in November 1903, less than three months after the passing of the 
Wyndham Act, the Leinster estate was sold to its tenants. It is possibly revealing that 
the Leinster estate was also the first major aristocratic estate to sell land under the 
1895 Ashbourne Act allowing Lord Frederick FitzGerald, to say: ‘that it was 
something of a coincidence’ that they were the early movers under both land acts.7 
The significance of the early sale was not lost on the wider public as the following 
comment reveals. In a letter from Charles Johnson in 1905 to Lord Frederick 
FitzGerald, he wrote: ‘you very wisely took advantage of the governments’ desire to 
make a big show for their Act at an early date.’8   
 
While newspapers covered the sale extensively, the Leinster estate papers contain 
little material relating to the transaction compared to those of the Clonbrocks and 
Dopping Hepenstalls, such as correspondence with the Estates Commissioners or the 
various stakeholders in the sales process.  
Johnson’s letter suggests that the sale was fast tracked in order to promote the new 
land purchase measures. The sale was the subject of numerous reports in local and 
national newspapers during the period September to November 1903.9 The price 
paid by the tenants of approximately 24 ½ times rents attracted much attention from 
various quarters. William O’Brien speaking at a U.I.L. meeting in Cork castigated 
the Leinster tenants: 
 
We had already had an example on the Leinster Estate how the same earth 
hunger, which made men ready to pay any price for grabbed lands in the past, 
                                                 
6 Dooley, The decline and fall of the dukes of Leinster, pp 122-3. 
7 Irish Times, 26 Sept. 1903. 
8 Charles Johnson to Lord Frederick FitzGerald, 31 Jan. 1905 (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster Estate 
papers, SM23: MIC 541 – D3078/2/15/9 Reels) 
9 Kerry Weekly Reporter, 19 Sept. 1903, Kilkenny People, 26 Sept. 1903, Nationalist and 
Leinster Times, 26 Sept. 1903, Ulster Herald, 10 Oct.1903, Leinster Express, 31 Oct. 1903. 
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might very easily tempt the richer and more selfish men to consent to prices 
that would be crushing for their poorer neighbours.10  
 
The Freeman’s Journal expressed a similar view when it commented that the tenants 
who had agreed these terms for the purchase of their holdings were those ‘with heaps 
of money made in business and others who had splendid situations’.11 This sense that 
the big and progressive farmers and local shopkeeper farmers had forced a deal 
through and that their less wealthy fellow tenants would just have to accept it was 
evident in the remark of one such tenant following a meeting on the Castledermot 
estate:‘it’s all very well for the big bugs around Athy to give twenty-five years’ 
purchase but it’s different with us.’12 A similar sentiment was expressed by D.J. 
Cogan, M.P. when he noted that: ‘the wealthier and stronger tenants rushed the sale 
to the disadvantage of their poorer neighbours.’13 
 
Another transaction that attracted similar adverse comments regarding the prices 
paid by tenants for land was that of John Redmond’s estate in County Wexford. 
Redmond concluded the sale in October 1903 making it one of the first to be 
completed under the 1903 Act which had only been enacted in August that year. 
Redmond received 23 times the annual rent for first term rents and 24.5 times for 
second term rents. The criticism was loud and fierce from both media and political 
circles and centred on Redmond letting his personal interests cloud his political 
judgement. The Irish Daily Independent and Nation newspaper called for his 
resignation as leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party and the incident was to cast a 
shadow over the remainder of his political career.14  
 
That such situations could arise was due to Section 19 of the 1903 Act which was 
often referred to as the in globo principle whereby if three-quarters of the tenants in 
number and rateable value terms, agreed to purchase their holdings, the Estates 
Commissioners could order the remainder to purchase on the same terms. This was 
                                                 
10 Weekly Irish Times, 26 Sept. 1903. 
11 Freemans Journal, 17 Sept. 1903. 
12 The Nationalist and Leinster Times, 19 Sept. 1903. 
13 Freemans Journal, 6 Oct. 1903. 
14 For a full account of the sale of the Redmond estate see Patrick Cosgrove, ‘The 
controversy and consequences of John Redmond’s estate sale under the Wyndham Land Act, 
1903’ in The Historical Journal, vol. 55, 1 (2012), pp 75-96. 
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one of the more controversial aspects of the 1903 Land Bill as it made its way 
through parliament and effectively amounted to compulsory purchase on the tenant 
side. It was designed to overcome the bureaucratic difficulties associated with 
recalcitrant tenants who could stall the sale of an estate. The sale of the Leinster 
estate using the in globo principle was a clear indication to other estates that the 
Land Commission would not be deterred by obstructive tenants.  
 
Purchasing tenants, however, were not slow in responding to such criticisms judging 
by the number of letters written to various newspapers. In a letter to the editor of the 
Irish Times one tenant went into significant detail as to the reasons for agreeing to 
pay a purchase price of 25 years rent. In the first instance, the fact that the sale was 
handled so quickly meant that there was a significant saving, for had it run on for a 
further year then it would have been, in effect, a further year added onto the purchase 
price. He pointed out that the landlord had already reduced rents without the tenant 
having recourse to a judicial review, and that this reduction coupled with the saving 
brought about by the reduced annuity meant that he was paying almost 50 per cent 
less than he did on rents prior to the sale. The letter writer argued that the 
improvements made to his holding such as the erection of buildings, fences, gates 
and drainage works were all paid for by the landlord whereas on another farm he 
rented from a different landlord the tenant paid for all such works.15 It is interesting 
to compare the circumstances of the tenants of the Leinster estate with those on the 
Clonbrock estate in terms of the time to conclude a deal for the sale of their holdings. 
By the time the Clonbrock tenants acquired their holdings in 1914 the Leinster 
tenants were over ten years into their purchase arrangements and had the benefit of 
lower annual outgoings and principal repayments over that period. It should, 
however, be noted that the trustees of the Leinster estate were anxious to sell under 
the Wyndham Act whereas Lord Clonbrock was reluctant to do so, at least in the 
early years following the acts introduction. 
 
In contrast to the Leinster estate, the sale of the Clonbrock estate was a long and 
arduous process. Starting with a meeting with the parish priest of Ahascragh, County 
Galway, Rev. P.J. Shanagher, in August 1905 the sale did not complete until the eve 
                                                 
15 Irish Times, 5 Oct. 1903. 
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of the First World War in 1914.16 A complicating factor regarding the Clonbrock 
estate was the fact that it consisted of so many disparate holdings scattered around 
the various townlands of east Galway, such as Ballydonnellan, Castlegar, 
Quansbury, Lecarrow, Clonbrock, Creggaun and Pallas. A further complication was 
the fact that several of these estates were settled or at least partly settled, giving rise 
to greater legal complexities.  
 
A similar drawn-out process arose in the case of the Dopping Hepenstall estates in 
Longford and Wicklow where the sale also took over ten years to conclude. A 
comment made in 1907 by the solicitor to the Dopping Hepenstall estate, Bernard 
O’Grady, highlights the change in attitude of the Estates Commissioners in 
processing claims compared to the period when the Leinster estate was sold: ‘the 
Estates Commissioners are now very particular about having every little parcel of 
land clearly identified … Altidore will give us a great deal of trouble in this 
respect.’17 By contrast the sale of the 5,797 acre Brookes Estate in Coolgreany, 
County Wexford, was concluded by December 1904.18 In this instance, Charles 
Hamilton who was land agent to the duke of Leinster, was a trustee along with Lord 
Monck of the Brookes Estate, which may suggest that Hamilton had contacts in the 
Estates Commissioners office and was capable of expediting a sale. Like the Leinster 
papers there is little to suggest a high volume of correspondence between Hamilton 
and the Land Commission regarding the sale. 
 
6.4 Investment trends and traits  
 
Even within the relatively small sample of estates covered by this study there are a 
range of trends and traits that emerge. The first was the speed at which the 
investments were made following the sale of the estate. In the case of the Leinster 
Estate, which generated proceeds of £766,647 (£84 million in today’s value), and 
which represented a huge investment portfolio, were fully invested within twelve 
                                                 
16 Rev. Shanagher P.P. to Clonbrock, 12 Aug. 1905 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 
35,721.3). 
17 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 4 Dec. 1907 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35,873.2). 
18 H.F. Marttey, to Charles Hamilton, 3 Dec. 1904, Hamilton papers (in private possession). 
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months of receipt of funds.19 In the case of the Coolgreany estate, the sale proceeds 
of £61,000 were applied in the purchase of various stocks by the trustees Charles 
Hamilton and Lord Monck within days of receipt.20 Much of the Clonbrock proceeds 
were invested even prior to their receipt. This was possible because all the sales took 
place after the enactment of the 1909 Land Act and the estate availed of a facility in 
the act (section 26) to instruct the Land Commission to invest certain of the 
unencumbered sales proceeds in various stocks pending final payment. Section 26 of 
the 1909 Land Act recognised that there might be delays between when a sale had 
been agreed and the ultimate payment of the sales proceeds, and allowed for these 
funds to be invested in specific quoted securities. This facility enabled vendors to 
obtain the income from the securities but exposed them to market fluctuation risks. 
From the Land Commission’s perspective, it meant that they did not have to pay 
interest on the outstanding sales proceeds. Furthermore, sellers wishing to avail of 
this facility under Section 3 of the Act had to do so at a discount which could be as 
high as 10 per cent.21  Similarly, in the case of the sale of the Dopping Hepenstall 
Wicklow estate in August 1914, investments were being made within days, in stocks, 
by the family stockbrokers, Barton, Copland & Hamilton, of 4 Foster Place, 
Dublin.22 
 
The speed with which the investments were made showed an urgency in putting the 
funds to work earning interest. This may have been the advice given to vendor 
landlords by their solicitors. The rush to invest would be contrary to present day 
practice whereby the beneficiaries of windfall gains such as those selling property, 
companies, beneficiaries of wills or even lottery winners would be advised to place 
the funds on deposit and only after due consideration to commit to investment.23 
 
                                                 
19 ‘Inflation calculator’ 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/resources/inflationtools/calculator/index1.
aspx accessed 20.40 Accessed 8 Nov. 2016. 
20 Contract notes 19 Dec. 1904 from Bruce, Symes and Williams, Stockbrokers of 37 Dame 
Street, Dublin.  Hamilton papers (in private possession.). 
21 Statement explaining meaning of election to take Land Stock or cash for purchase money 
and probable results of such election. 11 Mar.1910 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,721.5). 
22 Various contract notes from Barton, Copland & Hamilton, Stockbrokers, (N.L.I., Dopping 
Hepenstall papers, MS 35,873.2). 
23 Based on the author’s own experience of over 40 years in managing client investments. 
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A notable trend from the cases examined was that in all instances almost the entire 
net proceeds, after encumbrances had been discharged, were invested. There is little 
documentary evidence to show monies were left aside to cover expenditures on 
lifestyle type purchases such as cars or renovations to properties. However, there is 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that many landlords who sold their estates under the 
Wyndham Act did spend large sums on lifestyle type purchases. The marquis of 
Sligo who sold almost his entire estate under the Wyndham Act spent a considerable 
portion of the proceeds renovating Westport House and installing heating and 
electricity to light and heat the twelve bathrooms he added.24 Similarly the Butlers of 
Ormonde spent a significant sum in the electrification of Kilkenny Castle. Following 
the sale of their estate under the 1903 Act, Mark Bence Jones told the story of how 
his uncle Reginald purchased a Mercedes limousine with silver flower vases in the 
passenger compartment following the sale of his estate.25 Mayo landlord, Sir Henry 
Moore of Moore Hall, who received £19,000 in bonus payment from the sale of his 
estate, is said to have ‘squandered it in a few months living like a millionaire in 
Canada’.26 There are many such stories but of the cases examined there was little 
sign of extravagant spending. Again, one cannot but come to the conclusion that 
selling landlords were cognisant they were exchanging one inter-generational family 
asset for another and while they were prepared to live off the income, just as they did 
with rent, they did not countenance treating the capital as something to be sold off to 
finance a particular lifestyle. In that context, the individual landlords and trustees 
responsible for managing the sales proceeds acted very responsibly. 
 
In three of the four examined cases the role played by family trusts as a mechanism 
for protecting wealth for future generations is also evident. The uses of such 
mechanisms were more common in the nineteenth and early twentieth century than 
they are today. This was a throwback to the influence of primogeniture and the view 
that property was to be protected and passed down through generations. The 
existence of a trust was a powerful tool in protecting wealth from the profligacy of 
family scions. 
 
                                                 
24 Mark Bence Jones, Twilight of the ascendancy (London, 1987), p. 117. 
25 Ibid. p. 118. 
26 Ibid. 
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Finally, another characteristic that emerged from the investment portfolios examined 
is the preponderance of income-producing securities and the absence of any form of 
inflation protecting investments. This trend would appear to have been universal in 
that even cursory reviews of other portfolios bear it out. This meant that the 
portfolios examined contained a fundamental design flaw that would ensure few if 
any of the families involved would enjoy long-term financial security. 
 
6.5 Investment of sales proceeds 
 
While common investment trends existed, there were also very different investment 
strategies adopted. It is clear also that as time moved on the strategies changed in the 
light of circumstances or as new opportunities arose. 
 
The most unorthodox approach was the one adopted by the trustees of the Leinster 
estate. The trustees in this case, Lord Frederick FitzGerald and Lord Kinnaird, were 
experienced in both estate management and banking practices. Lord Frederick, the 
brother of the late 5th duke of Leinster, was the 6th duke in all but name in that he 
administered the estate following the death of his brother, Gerald, in 1893 up until 
his own death in 1924. Lord Kinnaird was a cousin of the FitzGerald family, a 
leading London banker, a high-profile football player and official and Lord High 
Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. This formidable 
duo oversaw the administration of the estate, its sale and the investment of the 
proceeds thereof.     
 
At the time of the 1903 Land Act the Leinster estate consisted of five separate estates 
located at Maynooth, Kilkea, Athy, Castledermot and Kildare. It had disposed of its 
Rathangan estate (and part of its Maynooth lands) under the Ashbourne Act in 1895. 
The proceeds realised for the Ashbourne sales totalled £258,020 and much of this 
was used to reduce debt on the then existing estate.27 Consequently, there was no 
external debt on the estate when it was sold in 1903. The sale generated a total 
consideration of £766,647. After provision for family charges of £40,000, 
                                                 
27 Sales and conveyance of lands, undated, (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster Estate papers, SM231Mic 
541, D30 78/2/15/16/1 Reel 15). 
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redemption of various charges, for example, tithes and Board of Works loans of 
£39,125 and costs associated with the sale of £22,815, the sale resulted in net 
proceeds of £664,707. To put this in context the gross sales proceeds adjusted for 
inflation would in today’s terms (November 2016) equate to just over £84 million.28 
 
Lord Frederick and Lord Kinnaird swiftly invested these proceeds so that by July 
1905 the Trust’s accountants, Johnsons Long & Co., could provide a full statement 
of application of funds which showed a fully invested portfolio. (see Table 6.2)29   
 
The investment portfolio is unusual by any standards of portfolio management 
theory in that despite its size there is little if any meaningful diversification provided, 
no inflation protecting securities and no proportionality in terms of investment size.30  
The key feature of the portfolio is the investment of £603,000 in personal mortgages. 
Mortgage lending was not unusual in the nineteenth and early twentieth century; 
however, the scale of the investment in this form of security was unusual. Over 90 
per cent of the sales proceeds were loaned to five individuals, a strategy which, 
regardless of their individual credit worthiness or character, represents a wholly 
unacceptable concentration and level of risk, particularly when the returns obtained 
were the equivalent or, in a number of cases, less than the returns available from 
highly liquid, tradeable sovereign debt.31 In the case of one of these mortgages a sum 
of £298,000 or almost 45 per cent of the net proceeds was advanced to the 7th earl of 
Tankerville. This represented an unwise concentration of risk in one single 
individual and is at this remove, impossible to countenance or understand. Given the 
yield obtained, i.e. 3.5 per cent, it is inexplicable to this author why such a high risk / 
reward profile was placed on the portfolio. The surviving family papers provide no 
clues as to why such a large sum was advanced to Tankerville. 
 
                                                 
28 ‘Inflation calculator’ 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/resources/inflationtools/calculator/index1.
aspx   Accessed 8 Nov. 2016.  
29 Statement of application of funds, July 1905 (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster Estate papers, 
D.3078/2/15/10) 
30 This opinion is offered based on the author’s almost forty years’ experience of investment 
markets and personal wealth management. 
31 Sovereign debt is government guaranteed debt. 
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The next highest advance by the trustees, representing over 18 per cent of the overall 
portfolio was advanced to Lord Hastings. Albert Edward Delaval Astley (1882-
1956) became the 21st Baron of Hastings, on the death of his father in September 
1904. The family owned substantial estates in Norfolk and owned several top 
racehorses, one of which won the Epsom Derby and another the St. Leger.32 Lord 
Hastings was a lieutenant colonel in the 7th Hussars and served in the First World 
War.33  The timing (1904-05) of the mortgage to Lord Hastings might suggest that it 
was for the purpose of discharging death duties following the death of the 20th Baron 
Hastings.  The third highest advance was to Robert Charles Duncombe Shafto of 
Whitworth Park, Durham. The Duncombe Shaftos were a prominent but untitled 
family who had an estate in Cumbria. Robert Charles’s father had been a member of 
parliament for Durham in the nineteenth century.34 Robert Charles (died in 1909) 
was the Recorder for Newcastle, a position that would have afforded a reasonable 
degree of social status.35 Like the FitzGeralds, the family lost a son in the First 
World War. Captain Thomas Duncombe Shafto was killed in the Dardanelles.36 A 
sum of £41,000 was advanced to Lord Fitzwilliam. This was William Charles de 
Meuron who was the 7th earl Fitzwilliam whose birth, according to Dooley, was 
veiled in controversy.37 It was rumoured that he was a changeling who had been 
introduced to the Fitzwilliam line to rid it of inherited epilepsy which in the context 
of the FitzGerald family was ironic in that the 6th duke, Maurice FitzGerald, suffered 
from epilepsy which resulted in him being institutionalised in Craighouse Asylum in 
Edinburgh from 1909 until his death in 1922.38  The Fitzwilliams sold most of their 
Irish estates under the terms of the Wyndham Act so the advance may have been of a 
temporary nature to tie the family over until the sales were completed. In any event 
by the time of the 6th duke’s death in 1922 the loan had been repaid.  
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Earl of Dunraven, Past times and pastimes, i, p. 186. 
33 Taken from; https://www.pinterest.com/pin/21251429471797347/ Accessed 22 Apr. 2017. 
34 Dooley, Decline and fall of the dukes of Leinster, p. 136. 
35 The Times, 26 Aug. 1909. 
36 The Times, 14 May 1915. 
37 Dooley, Decline and fall of the dukes of Leinster, p. 136. 
38 Michael Estorick, Heirs and graces: the claim to the dukedom of Leinster (London, 1981), 
p. 148. 
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Table 6.22. Leinster estate of application of sales proceeds at July 1905 
 
Security Type £-s-d % 
Invested in mortgages     
 - Loan to Lord Tankerville @3 1/2% 298,000-00-00 44.83% 
 - Loan to Mr Duncombe Shafto @3 3/4% 82,500-00-00 12.41% 
 - Loan to Col. Henry Denison @ 3 3/4% 59,000-00-00 8.88% 
 - Loan to Lord Fitzwilliam @ 3 3/4% 41,000-00-00 6.17% 
 - Loan to Lord Hastings @ 3 1/2% 122,500-00-00 18.43% 
  603,000-00-00 90.72% 
      
Stocks purchased     
 - Dublin Corporation 3 1/4% 9,225-01-00 1.39% 
 - Belfast City 3% stock 8,635-11-00 1.30% 
 - Belfast Corporation Stock 3 1/2% stock 10,125-08-06 1.52% 
 - Bank of Ireland 11 1/2% stock 6,213-16-05 0.93% 
 - Natal inscribed 3 1/2% stock 3,960-19-11 0.60% 
 - Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland 5% 
stock 7,872-18-00 1.18% 
 - Great Southern & Western Railway 4% Guar. 
Stock 1,910-02-03 0.29% 
 - Caledonia Railway 4% stock 5,883-11-00 0.89% 
 - Bristol Corporation 3 1/2% stock 3,035-13-06 0.46% 
 - Lagos 3 1/2% inscribed stock 2,898-16-00 0.44% 
 - Cape 3 1/2% stock 1,945-01-00 0.29% 
  61,706-18-07 9.28% 
      
Total Value of Investments Made 664,706-18-07 100.00% 
 
Source: Statement of application of funds, Jul. 1905, (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster 
Estate papers, D.3078/2/15/10). 
 
Of perhaps most interest was the mortgage of £59,000 (equivalent to £6.5 million in 
today’s value) advanced to Col. Henry Denison. Little is known of Denison other 
than that he appears to have mixed in good social circles in London. The Times 
reports him as attending various funerals such as that of Lady Albertha the 
marchioness of Blanford and that of Sir William Pitcairn Campbell.39 According to 
The Times, Denison was declared bankrupt in 1916: 
                                                 
39 The Times, 12 Jan. 1932; The Times, 27 Sept. 1933. 
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The first meeting was held yesterday, at Bankruptcy Buildings of the 
creditors of Colonel Henry Denison of Onslow Gardens, S.W., against whose 
estate a receiving order was made on 6 May. The petitioning creditors were 
Messer’s Eldridge and Morris, financiers of Albemarle Street, Piccadilly. 
Mr E. Leadham Hough, Senior Official Receiver, who presided, said that 
according to the debtor’s statements, under the will of a cousin who died in 
1873 he became entitled absolutely – subject to the life of the testator’s 
widow who died in 1886 – to Babworth Hall and Eaton estates near Bedford. 
In 1887, he married and executed a marriage settlement under which 1,000 
acres of the Babworth Hall estate were settled on trust for his wife and 
children, with a first life interest to himself. He lived at Babworth Hall until 
1906 and afterwards at Eaton Hall. He sold the Eaton Hall estate in March 
1914. In 1890, he had mortgaged both estates for £50,000 most of which 
went to pay a bank overdraft. Four years ago, he created a second mortgage 
of £15,000. The sale of the Eaton Hall estates was sufficient to reduce the 
mortgages to £33,000. 
 
The debtor who did not admit that he was insolvent estimated his unsecured 
liabilities at £7,000. He attributed his financial difficulties to the depreciation 
of land and to the war.40 
 
What is interesting in the above report is that Denison exhibited all the traits of a 
financially reckless person long before he ever sought a mortgage from the trustees 
of the Leinster estate. Why the trustees would advance £59,000 to a person with a 
financial profile as Denison at a rate of return (3.75 per cent) equivalent to that 
obtainable from a tradeable sovereign backed security, is again inexplicable. It is 
unclear from the family papers if the Leinster estate did or did not receive a 
repayment of the loan. Certainly, by 1922 the mortgage did not exist.41  
The decision to grant a mortgage to Denison is all the more surprising given the 
evidence from the family papers that the trustees had significant experience in 
granting mortgages prior to the sale of the estate in 1903. For example, in 1902 a 
report prepared by a land valuer in respect of a proposed advance of £10,000 to 
Thomas Ruttledge showed a high level of due diligence carried out on the underlying 
securities which related to the borrower’s estates in Galway and Mayo. The due 
diligence work carried out involved the valuer visiting the estates, examining the 
                                                 
40 The Times, 17 May 1916. 
41 Investment portfolio 8 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster Estate papers, D3078/1/3/73-Mic 
541[SM:23]) Reel 4. 
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leases in detail, and carrying out a review of the costs of operating each estate. The 
report concluded with the valuer stating: 
 
In my opinion the estates are ample security for a loan of £10,000 by the 
Trustees of the Lady Alice Fitzgerald [trust] as a first charge and I advise the 
said trustees that they can with safety lend said sum on said security.42 
 
The family papers provide no evidence as to whether a similar due diligence exercise 
was carried out regarding the mortgages granted in 1903 and 1904.  
As Table 6.2 shows less than 10 per cent of the net sales proceeds were invested in 
marketable securities. This is an extremely low figure and is significantly at variance 
with other investment portfolios examined by the author. Why this should have 
happened is unclear in that no written investment strategy document as might be 
expected for such a large portfolio seems to have survived. However, by 1922 the 
portfolio shows a much higher quoted investment component (53.5 per cent) than the 
1905 one.  
 
Apart from the relatively small investment in traded securities (9.28 per cent), an 
unusual feature is the low number and value of overseas stocks included. There were 
only five overseas bonds accounting for £17,722 or just 2.68 per cent of the overall 
portfolio. This is again contrary to the other portfolios examined and to the broader 
investment trend outlined in chapter 5. This was unusual given that one of the 
trustees, Lord Kinnaird, was prominent in London financial circles and  
would have been aware of current investment trends. By 1922, however, this had 
been altered when the portfolio contained a significantly higher element of overseas 
stocks. 
 
Assuming, that all those who borrowed from the former Leinster estate honoured 
their interest obligations, the 1905 portfolio should have generated an annual income 
of £23,650. This would have compared to a pre-sale gross annual rental income of 
approximately £31,278.43  Deducting from this gross rental figure the costs of 
                                                 
42 Valuation and report re Thomas Ruttledge, 2 Mar. 1902 (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster Estate 
papers, SM23: MIC 541- D 3078/2/15/15 Reel 15). 
43 The estate papers show rentals between 1899 and 1903 running at an average of £31,278. 
(P.R.O.N.I., Leinster Estate papers, SM23:Mic541: D3078/2/15/16/1 Reel 15).   
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operating an estate, such as agent’s fees, Board of Works charges, rates, the estate 
would not have been materially worse off than it was prior to the sale.  
Subsequent correspondence between the trustees and Henry Mallaby Deely, the 
Carton and Kilkea demesnes, which were retained by the family were expensive to 
maintain and by the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, the evidence 
suggests that the home demesnes were incurring losses in the region of £8,000 per 
year.44 
 
By contrast, the investment approach adopted by the trustees of the Coolgreany 
estate in County Wexford was more conventional. The Coolgreany estate was owned 
by Sir George Brookes and was in 1887 the scene for what became known as the 
Coolgreany evictions which saw over sixty families evicted. In related disturbances, 
a tenant, John Kinsella was killed by the party sent to enforce these evictions. 
George Brooke was part of a well-known Dublin wine merchant family who lived in 
Somerton House in Castleknock, County Dublin. Brooke was reputed to have led an 
expensive lifestyle involving lavish entertaining, keeping a string of top quality 
hunting horses and sending his eight sons to top class English schools to be 
educated.45 It may have been these proclivities that resulted in the estate being held 
in trust rather than in the direct ownership of Brooke but such was the case and the 
two trustees were Charles Hamilton who was the land agent to the estate and Lord 
Monck.46 
 
Out of total proceeds of £61,503, and after costs of £1,158, a payment of £1,076 to 
Sir George Brooke and various other disbursements, there was £56,038 available to 
the trustees for investment. They invested the available funds within two or three 
                                                 
44 Henry Mallaby-Deeley (1863-1937) was a wealthy London based financier who famously 
acquired the duke of Bedford’s, Covent Garden estate for £2.75 million in 1913: see The 
Sphere, 27 Dec. 1913. He was elected an M.P. for Harrow in 1910 and held a seat until 
1923. He was knighted in 1922. Under a resettlement of the Leinster estate in 1919, it was 
provided that if Edward FitzGerald succeeded to the dukedom that Mallably-Deeley would 
acquire Edward’s life interest in the estate. On the death of Maurice, the 6th duke, in 1922, 
Mallably-Deeley stepped into Edward’s shoes and became entitled to his life interest in the 
estate. For a fuller account of this transaction see Dooley, Decline and fall of the dukes of 
Leinster, pp 196-210. 
 
45 Bence Jones, Twilight of the ascendancy, p. 132; Pauric J. Dempsey. ‘Brooks, George 
(1849-1926) in Dictionary of Irish biography, i (Cambridge, 2009), pp 871-2. 
46 Hamilton papers (in private possession). 
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days of receipt through Bruce Symes & Co. Stockbrokers of Dame Street, Dublin. 
Hamilton was the most active of the trustees; he had dealt with this firm in a private 
capacity for a number of years. The portfolio was made up entirely of income 
generating securities with railway stocks accounting for 55 per cent, dominion bonds 
38 per cent and cash representing 7 per cent.47 
 
Table 6.23. Coolgreany estate trust investment portfolio December 1904 
 
Security Purchase Investment 
 
Price Amount 
 
£ £ 
      
Canadian Pacific Railway 4% Pref Stock 102 7/8 10,390-12-03 
New South Wales 3 1/2% 1924 Stock 96 3/8 7,730-01-00 
Grand Trunk Railway Co. 4% Debenture stock 107 15/16 9,811-17-06 
Cape of Good Hope 4% 1916/36 stock 104 3/8 8,370-01-00 
Ontario & Quebec Railway 5% Debenture stock 136 5/8  2,760-01-09 
Cape of Good Hope 4% 1916/36 stock 104 3/4 5,250-01-00 
Fishguard & Rosslare Railway Co. 3 1/2% Guar. 
Stock 101  1/16 7,919-12-06 
Balance uninvested – Cash   3,805-10-09 
Total portfolio   56,037-17-09 
 
Source: Hamilton papers (in private possession). 
 
The portfolio with an average yield of 3.8 per cent would have generated £2,100 in 
income. Under the terms of a resettlement agreement of 30 May 1907 between the 
trustees and Sir Roger Brooke, the latter was to receive £1,000 per annum for the 
remainder of his life and any income above this amount earned by the portfolio.48 
Thus, Brooke would have received almost £2,000 per annum (the equivalent of 
£220,000 in today’s value) from the trust. This would have been in addition to 
                                                 
47 Hamilton papers (in private possession). 
48 Hamilton papers (in private possession). 
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income derived from his one-third share in the family wine merchanting business, 
and fees received from his role as a director, and indeed governor of the Bank of 
Ireland. Despite this it was not sufficient to fund his lifestyle and in February 1911 
he was forced to sell his Somerton residence in Dublin’s Castleknock to pay off 
mounting debts.49   
 
As in the case of the Leinster estate, the existence of the family trust would have 
provided some protection to the Coolgreany estate beneficiaries in that Brooke 
would only have had access to the income and not the capital of the fund. The 1907 
resettlement agreement provided that 
 
After Sir George Brooke’s death, and subject to contingent jointure for Lady 
Brooke, and a sum not exceeding £8,000 for the younger children … the fund 
is settled on Mr George Brooke’s for life.50 
 
George Brooke predeceased his father, having died in action in northern France in 
October 1914 at the age of thirty-seven.51 The family records do not contain any 
documentation relating to the portfolio on the death of Sir George Brooke in 1926 
so, unlike the Leinster and the Clonbrook portfolios, it is not possible to assess how 
the Coolgreany investments performed. On the assumption that the trust remained 
intact it would have held up reasonably well in terms of nominal capital value in that 
all the stocks included in the portfolio were still quoted in 1926 and most were at 
valuations similar to that in 1907. As with the other portfolios examined in this study 
the absence of any inflation protecting investment would have meant that there was a 
decline in value in real terms. 
 
The sale of the Dopping Hepenstall Wicklow estate in July 1914 generated 
approximately £10,000.52 The evidence from the papers examined suggests that the 
investment of the sales proceeds was made in a less systematic way than the three 
other cases examined. In this way, it may well be more representative of other estates 
                                                 
49 Dempsey. ‘Brooks, George (1849-1926)’ in DIB, pp 871-2.  
50 Hamilton papers (in private possession.) 
51 Dempsey. ‘Brooks, George (1849-1926) in DIB, pp 871-2. 
52 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 14 July 1914 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers. MS 
35,836.10). 
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that did not have the benefit of investment expertise or trustees. In a letter from 
Dopping Hepenstall’s solicitor, Bernard O’Grady, in July 1914 confirming that the 
Land Commission had placed £10,039 purchase money to the credit of the estate, 
O’Grady suggested that they meet the following Tuesday ‘so that you may consider 
what application if any should be made as to the investment of the money.’53 
Dopping Hepenstall responded: ‘I wrote to Mr Mc Clintock (Public Trustee) who 
kindly offered to help me with advice on investment questions and should hear from 
him in a day or two.’54 O’Grady’s reply may imply that he was not pleased with this 
course of action: 
 
I am in receipt of yours of today that you have been advised to put the 
purchase money herein on deposit in the Bank. Of course you are aware that 
the deposit rate of interest is much less today than it was a few days ago 
when I suggested that you should mention it to the Public Trustee whom you 
were to consult; however, I have no doubt that he and you have fully 
considered it, accordingly I shall on Monday, the 10th instant., make 
application to have the money put on deposit unless I hear from you to the 
contrary by that morning.55  
 
The nature of these exchanges is interesting from at least two perspectives. Firstly, 
the letters between Dopping Hepenstall and O’Grady are written within days of the 
commencement of the First World War, yet they are so normal and apparently 
oblivious to the consequences that were to follow and a far cry from ‘the lamps are 
going out all over Europe’ comment of Sir Edward Grey, Britain’s foreign secretary, 
on 28 July 1914. They are also interesting, in that they point to the need for selling 
landlords to develop a new network of contacts to advise them on how to invest the 
proceeds.  
 
Dopping Hepenstall did not invest the proceeds until March 1915 when he purchased 
£10,000 worth of 3 ½ per cent war stock 1925-28 via his Dublin stockbroker.56 This 
                                                 
53 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 31 July 1914, (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers. MS 
35,836.10). 
54 Dopping Hepenstall to O’Grady, 4 Aug. 1914, (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers. MS 
35,836.10). 
55 O’Grady to Dopping Hepenstall, 8 Aug. 1914, (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 
35,836.10). 
56 Completed application form and cheque 19 Dec. 1914 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, 
MS 35,873.2). 
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investment represented the entire proceeds of the sale of his Wicklow estate. While 
understandable from a patriotic perspective, and, indeed even from an income 
generating perspective, it does not display any awareness of the risks of 
concentrating investment in a single security regardless of the nature thereof. Had 
Britain lost the war, Dopping Hepenstall would have lost everything as it would have 
been unlikely that Germany would have honoured this debt. 
 
The family papers for the period include a large amount of newspaper clippings 
relating to various stock market advice pieces. For example, a cutting from the Daily 
Mail of Tuesday, 20 April 1915 gives advice to readers on identifying high yielding 
stocks.57 The article identifies several such stocks, mostly dominion bonds, which 
paid out a coupon in excess of 4 per cent per annum. The presence of such clippings 
would imply that Dopping Hepenstall was seeking to educate himself in the ways of 
investing. 
 
Judging by the volume of correspondence and handwritten notes in the family papers 
it is evident that Dopping Hepenstall had an interest in stock market investment. 
Records show him dealing in several stocks during the period February to May 1917 
such as Japanese Imperial 4.5 per cent bonds and Central Argentine Railway stock.58 
Unlike some of his contemporaries, the family papers point to an interest in 
purchasing ordinary shares rather than income producing preference shares. Many of 
the newspaper clippings come from what are referred to in the wealth management 
business as ‘tip sheets’. For example, a clipping from The London Opinion, dated 13 
January 1917, referred to a company called Fraser and Chalmers, which it 
recommended as ‘a share suitable for capital appreciation and information which has 
come to hand strengthens the good opinion we had formed on this well managed 
undertaking.’59 Dopping Hepenstall acted on this tip as a subsequent letter with the 
London broker, The British Foreign & Colonial Corporation illustrated: 
 
According to our records you desire us to advise you when we think it is in 
your interest to make a profitable exchange. We observe you have a profit on 
your Fraser & Chalmers shares, and although we think it possible that a 
                                                 
57 Newspaper clippings, various dates, (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 35,873.2). 
58 Various contract notes (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 35,873.2). 
59 Newspaper clipping, 13 Jan. 1917 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 35,873.2). 
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higher price may be seen we would not dissuade you if you were disposed to 
realise.60 
 
 The family papers show numerous examples of Dopping Hepenstall engaging in 
relatively short term trading in stocks. Many of these stocks are relatively exotic in 
nature such as the Brieh Rubber Estate Limited and Sablas (North Borneo) Rubber 
Limited. Post 1918 however evidence of share dealing is minimal and by 20 March 
1921, Dopping Hepenstall appears to have sold his War Stock when he deposited 
£9,871 in his Bank of Ireland account.61 This coincided with a decision by him to 
leave Ireland and move to England following his marriage to Amy Maude Worsley 
Tottenham. 
 
The difference between Dopping Hepenstall and the other landlords examined by 
this study, who sold their estates, was that he did not put together an investment 
portfolio but rather focussed on a single holding (3 ½ % war loan stock), 
complimented by short term dealing in other shares. A further difference was that he 
had largely converted his portfolio to cash by early 1921, prior to his move to 
England. Unlike the other estates, Dopping Hepenstall did own properties in Dublin, 
a city residence at 73 Harcourt Street and investment properties in Sandymount and 
Dalkey. These properties appear to have come into the family’s possession in the 
nineteenth century through various marriage settlements. It is not known when or if 
these properties were sold but if held, the likelihood is that in present day terms, the 
Dopping Hepenstall family would be the wealthiest of the four vending families 
covered by this study despite the proceeds being received for the sale of their estate 
being much less relative to the others. This assertion illustrates the benefit of 
including in a portfolio inflation protecting assets such as investment properties. 
 
If Lambert Dopping Hepenstall was a novice at investment, albeit an enthusiastic 
one, the same could not be said of the 4th Lord Clonbrock. By the time his estate was 
sold in 1914 Luke Dillon had considerable experience in dealing with stockbrokers 
and buying and selling stocks and shares. The Clonbrock estate papers shows him 
                                                 
60 British Foreign & Colonial Corporation to Dopping Hepenstall 7 Sept. 1917 (N.L.I., 
Dopping Hepenstall papers, Ms 35,873.2). 
61 Bank lodgement receipt, 20 Mar. 1921 (N.L.I., Dopping Hepenstall papers, MS 35,873.2). 
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acting as trustee in no less than eight trusts, most of which were pertaining to 
members of the Dillon and Blake families. Many of these trusts were of a substantial 
nature in terms of the underlying assets. The Grattan Bellew Trust, when established 
in 1886, had £20,000 to invest in stocks.62 The Saltoun Trust in 1907 had a share 
portfolio of over £6,000 and was two years later able to advance £7,500 to the 
beneficiaries of the trust to purchase a property at 3 Hereford Gardens, Westminster, 
London.63 64 By the time Clonbrock sold his estate in 1914 he had an established 
network of financial advisors in Dublin and London as well as good working 
knowledge of how investment markets operated.  
 
The complexities associated with how the sales proceeds of the Clonbrock estate 
were distributed makes it difficult to get an overall picture as to how the funds were 
used. Depending on whether the individual estates were settled or not determined 
how the funds were handled. Proceeds of sale were placed in various trusts and were 
referred to under various names. These included The Residuary Trust, The Annuities 
Trust, The Clonbrock Settled Estates Trust and one called the Cloughagalla Trust. In 
addition, a large portion of the sales proceeds were vested in the name of Lord 
Clonbrock himself. The existence of these trusts makes it difficult to determine the 
overall picture as valuations were not prepared for all. However, what is clear is the 
type and quantity of investments that were placed in each trust and who advised as to 
the securities to be purchased or sold. 
 
The estate records examined indicate that investment advice, came mainly from the 
estates solicitors, Maunsell and Browne, and the stockbroking firm of Goodbody 
Webb of Dame Street, Dublin. The latter was introduced to Lord Clonbrock by 
Maunsell. Occasionally, a London stockbroking firm, Bertrams, were asked for 
advice regarding specific stocks but the main body of advice appears to have come 
from Jonathan Goodbody and Maunsell.  
 
                                                 
62 Bertram Stockbrokers to Luke Dillon, 8 June 1886 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 
35,809.1). 
63 Handwritten note from Lord Clonbrock for the file, undated (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, 
MS 35,809.2).  
64 Lady Saltoun to Clonbrock, 16 Feb. 1909 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,809.3). 
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The proceeds were invested almost exclusively in stock exchange quoted securities. 
There is no evidence, either by way of purchase contracts or in the probate 
documentation prepared on the death of the 4th Baron in 1917, or the 5th lord in 1926, 
to suggest that there was any investment in property, private companies or the 
purchase of precious metals such as gold. There was a small investment made in 
mortgages based on Canadian residential properties but this was by way of a 
personal contact and in any event, was insignificant in the context of the overall 
portfolio value.  
 
Given that all the sales took place after the enactment of the 1909 Land Act, 
Clonbrock availed of section 26 of the 1909 Act. Section 26 provided that: ‘Where 
an estate is vested in the Land Commission by a vesting order made by them, the 
purchases money may be paid into Bank of Ireland and invested in like manner as if 
the estate had been sold to persons other than the Land Commission’65 The effect of 
this provision was that where a sale had been agreed but funds had not yet been paid 
over, the landlord could request that the funds be invested rather than retained in a 
cash deposit. Sellers wishing to avail of this facility had to do so at a discount which 
could be as high as 10 per cent.66 Clonbrock availed of this facility and hence when 
the consideration in respect of the sale of the Ballydonnellan estate was paid over the 
following stocks were transferred instead of cash (the prices shown are the cost 
prices): 
• Argentine Government Railway Guarantee 4 per cent 
Rescission Bonds 
£4,919-8-6 
• Atcheson Topeka Santa Fe Railway 4% Adjusted Bonds £4,921-1-0 
• Chicago Milwaukee & St Paul Railway 4% General 
Mortgage Gold Bonds 
£3,989-7-0 
• Baltimore & Ohio RR 4 ½% 20 years Convertible Gold 
Bonds 
£3,961-18-6 
• Buenos Ayres Western Railway 4% Debenture stock £4,999-2-4 
• North Western Railway 4% Preference stock £4,998-19-8 
                                                 
65 Irish Land Act 1909, section 26.  
66 Statement explaining meaning of election to take Land Stock or cash for purchase money 
and probable results of such election. 11 Mar. 1910 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 
35,721.5).  
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These were all railway stocks which to some extent reflects the investment practice 
of the time. None of the stocks are ordinary shares and are instead income based 
bonds. This illustrates the point made in an earlier chapter that investors were 
preoccupied by income rather than capital appreciation. In structuring a portfolio in 
this way, it is unlikely to protect it from the ravages of inflation particularly where 
the income is being drawn-down to fund living expenses. The holdings also 
highlighted the interest in overseas stocks. In this case five of the six stocks are in 
companies operating in the Americas. Even by the standards of the time this is an 
extremely high exposure to overseas markets. A final observation is the size of each 
holding i.e. £4,000-5,000. As will become obvious when the broader portfolios are 
examined the main means of achieving diversification appears to have been to 
purchase many stocks rather than fewer but larger holdings. While such an approach 
might provide some protection against stock specific risk it afforded no protection 
against market risk. The approach adopted by Clonbrock of spreading risk in this 
way was in marked contrast to that of the trustees of the Leinster estate who made 
large investments in a small number of mortgages to individuals. 
 
The 4th Lord Clonbrock was personally involved in how the sales proceeds were 
invested. Like Dopping Hepenstall the family papers suggest that he read ‘stock tip 
sheets’ and these papers show he requested information from various providers of 
information relating to specific stocks and even French government and municipal 
bonds. Notably, while he engaged with his solicitor and stockbroker he did not at 
any stage grant them power of discretion to invest his available funds and instead 
dealt with his broker on an advisory basis.67 In the case of any of the trusts 
established following the sale of the estate such as that for the payment of annuities 
to various members of the Dillon family, the investments had to comply with 
directions set down by the Public Trustee.68 
                                                 
67 Power of discretion meant that the stockbroker would have had authority to buy and sell 
shares on behalf of the client without having to obtain his consent for each transaction. An 
advisory relationship meant that while he could advise the client on particular stocks he 
could not buy or sell without the client’s express consent. 
68 A Public Trustee is a statutory office established in Britain and Ireland under the Public 
Trustee Act 1906. The statutory roles include acting as a trustee to a deceased’s estate in the 
event of there being no executor appointed, administering the estates of people who are 
declared wards of court and acting as a trustee where the appointed trustees are unable or 
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Clonbrock showed himself to be a discerning investor as evidenced when dealing 
with an investment opportunity in Vancouver residential mortgages. While he did 
invest up to £5,596 in the project this was small relative to the overall investment 
and clearly the promoter was hoping that he would have invested more.69 In a letter 
dated 25 July 1914 it was recommended that he invest up to £50,000 in this 
mortgages scheme.70 The person behind the project was Gilbert Mahon who was 
introduced to Luke Dillon by his brother, John Mahon who was also a brother of 
William Mahon who acted as land agent for the Clonbrock estates. In a 
memorandum to Clonbrock, Mahon wrote: 
 
For those who can run no risk, and are entirely dependent upon income, I 
recommend well secured 3 to 5-year mortgage loans secured on city real 
estate and yielding about 6%. These mortgage loans are made up to about 
50% of the value of the site and the buildings which are both given as 
security for the loan. These loans form a sound investment, and range 
roughly from £500 to £10,000.71  
    
The nature of the documentation setting out this investment opportunity suggests that 
the scheme was being proposed to many potential investors, so it is likely that other 
vendor landlords were approached. While the scheme was within the law, the 
expectation of return was overstated, and the risks involved understated. The lure of 
a 6 per cent return for no risk would have proved attractive to many potential 
investors. However, the correspondence between Clonbrock and Mahon reveals 
caution being applied, particularly with regard to whose name the mortgages were 
held in.72 A note made by Clonbrock dated December 1913 shows how he used his 
                                                 
unwilling to act. An additional duty and the one most relevant to trusts established by vendor 
landlords such as Clonbrock, was to maintain a list of approved stocks that might be 
purchased by trustees. This list was not exhaustive and the Clonbrock papers show several 
instances whereby the trusts solicitors, Browne & Maunsell, applied to the Public Trustee for 
approval regarding a particular stock.  
69 Account book entry, 31 Mar. 1914 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816.8). 
70 Gilbert Mahon to Clonbrock, 26 Jul. 1914 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816.8). 
71 Memorandum John Mahon to Clonbrock, undated (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 
35,816.8).  
72 The papers show that Mahon wanted to hold the mortgages in his own name for reasons of 
administrative convenience whereas Clonbrock insisted and secured the mortgages in his 
name.  
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social network to get views on particular investments. In this note, which relates to 
the Vancouver mortgage proposal, he wrote:  
 
Saw C La Touche at the Club who explained that his objection to investing in 
Canadian mortgages at present was that there was a fear of a ‘slump’ in 
Canadian affairs, and unless one was able to watch what was going on, or had 
someone on the spot in whom one had implicit confidence…. He also did not 
like mortgages being in another name. [he] said that one could trust Gilbert 
M [ahon] so that objection is removed.73 
 
The utilisation of social networks highlights the connections between the former 
social elites in the same way that Clonbrock’s, engagement with W.F. Baily albeit 
fruitless, throws light on the interactions between the upper echelons of the landed 
class and high-ranking government officials.  
 
Clonbrock’s reservation regarding investment in the Canadian mortgage market was 
shown to be well-founded as subsequent correspondence from Mahon revealed. In 
May 1915, he wrote: ‘I have looked over your mortgages and regret to find that the 
big one in Vancouver – No. 197 Pike – is somewhat slow.’74 In a letter in December 
1916 Mahon wrote again regarding the same mortgage: ‘The mortgagor 
acknowledges that he cannot pay up interest and we took a quit claim deed.’75 By 
1918 the position had clearly worsened when Mahon reported: ‘I am afraid we have 
had bad luck in Vancouver, but I believe the foreclosure securities have a tangible 
value and will sell when times are normal again.76 While the 4th Lord Clonbrock did 
not see much of a return on his Vancouver mortgage investment, his son did, as the 
mortgages were sold in 1921 for approximately the same amount as the original 
investment.  
                                                 
73 Handwritten note by Lord Clonbrock dated December 1913 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, 
MS 35,816.8). The reference to C La Touche most likely refers to Christopher Digges La 
Touche of the famous banking family. Christoper was joint managing director of Arthur 
Guinness & Co. from 1902 until his death in late 1914. As managing director of Guinness, 
he was a highly-regarded figure in Dublin business circles as evidenced by the following 
description by one of the company’s barley suppliers, Herbert Hunter, ‘My impression was 
of a man of great abilities and drive, in outlook progressive.’ Quoted in Michael Mc 
Ginley’s, La Touche family in Ireland (Dublin, 2004), p. 322. As such it is not surprising 
that Clonbrock would have sought his advice. 
74 Gilbert Mahon to Clonbrock, 21 May 1915 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816.8).  
75 Gilbert Mahon to Clonbrock. 28 Dec. 1916 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816.8). 
76 Gilbert Mahon to Clonbrock, 8 Aug. 1918 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816.12). 
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Clonbrock was a diligent manager of his investments. He, and subsequently his son, 
Robert, maintained detailed records of the securities held recording such details as 
the cost price, the date purchased and the dividends and the dates these were 
received. The dividend books only commence in 1914 which suggests that there 
were few personal holdings prior to the sale of the estates other than the stocks held 
in the aforementioned trusts of which Clonbrock was a trustee.  He bought and sold a 
large volume of stocks up to the period of his death in May 1917 when his estate was 
valued at £199,534.77 Whether by accident or design the estate being valued below 
£200,000 meant a saving in death duty, as the rate chargeable below this figure was 
at 11 per cent whereas above was levied at 12 per cent.78 The death duty chargeable 
on the overall estate was just under £22,000 representing a significant outflow of 
funds and highlighting the impact of death on an estate. Given that the 5th Baron was 
to die in 1926, when a further £32,000 in death duty was incurred, it is easy to see 
the severity of the impact of this tax.  
 
The deaths of the patriarchs of the Dillon family afford an opportunity to examine 
how the Clonbrock estate was structured post its sale in 1914 in terms of the legal 
structures employed to protect the estate, the nature of the family’s investment 
portfolios and a benchmark for measuring performance. Coupled with available tax 
returns for a number of years they allow for an analysis of what economic life was 
like for the Clonbrocks in the post Wyndham era.  
 
The probate papers and related workings provide several insights into the investment 
process. Firstly, in keeping with the approach adopted by trustees of the Leinster and 
Coolgreany estates and the Dopping Hepenstall estate, it is apparent that all the 
estimated sales proceeds of over £213,000 received in 1914 were fully invested in 
financial securities. Secondly the heavily settled nature of the estate had a major 
                                                 
77 Browne & Maunsell to 5th Baron Clonbrock, 26 July 1917 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 
35,816.14). 
78 The scale of rates of death duties was based on a band system. The rates applying on the 
Clonbrock estate following the death of the 4th Lord in 1917 were based on those set out in 
Section 54 of the Finance Act (1909-10) 1910 [10 Edw, 7. Ch.8]. Under this section estates 
valued between £100,000 and £200,000 were taxed at 10 per cent. whereas those valued at 
between £200,000 and £300,000 had a rate of 11 per cent applied. By having the estate 
valued at £199,534 as opposed to £200,001 gave rise to a saving of just over £1,000. 
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influence in how the sales proceeds were allocated and held. Thirdly the investment 
trends identified in Chapter 6 were evident in how Clonbrock invested the sales 
proceeds. 
 
The value of the 4th Lord Clonbrock’s estate at the time of his death in May 1917 for 
death duty purposes was £199,534.79 By far the largest element of this was five 
investment portfolios of stocks and shares, four of which were in trusts and the fifth 
in the name of Lord Clonbrock himself. Details of these portfolios are set out in the 
tables below. The first of these pertains to stocks held in the name of Lord Clonbrock 
himself. These were his own personal property, and were not subject to any ‘settled 
estate’ claims. This portfolio which was valued by Goodbody Webb for probate 
purposes at £48,313 consisted of a portfolio of nineteen individual securities with the 
largest holdings invested in war loan stock. 
  
                                                 
79 The value of the estate was shown as £199,534 which should have included all properties 
such as investment portfolios, real property and various heirlooms and personal chattels. The 
family papers do not provide a breakdown of this and the original probate valuations are not 
available. Based on an analysis of the various investment portfolios these come to a total 
valuation of £211,780. The difference may be accounted for because of the values ascribed 
to several the financial securities. In the absence of definitive prices, the study used the 
nominal value of the stock which may in the case of certain bonds e.g. Irish Land Bonds, be 
overstating their value. In any event, it is not felt that the differences are overly significant in 
the context of the portfolios or the overall picture that emerges.  
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Table 6.24. Valuation of personal holdings of 4th Lord Clonbrock 12 May 1917 
 
Security Price Valuation 
 
£ £ 
Anglo Argentine Tramway Co. 4% Debenture Stock 70 2,100 
Buenos Ayres Pacific Railway Co. 5% Debenture Stock 82 1/4 2,475 
City of Montreal 4 1/2% 84 2,520 
Cunard Steamship Co. Preference Stock 83 3/4 2,914 
Calcutta Electric Supply Co. 5% Cumul Preference 
stock 4 1/8 2,475 
Canadian Pacific Rly. Co. Preference Stock 76 4,560 
Dunlop Rubber Co. Preference Shares 6% 20 1/7 2,025 
Eastern Telegraph Co. Ordinary Shares 138 4,140 
Consolidated Goldfields Preference Shares 7/8 2,100 
Gaslight & Coke Preference Shares 73 2,190 
Hudson Bay Preference Shares 4 2/5 3,700 
Westminster Electric Supply Ordinary Shares 5 5/8 1,688 
War Loan Stock 5% (1920) 94 3/5 2,831 
War Loan Stock 5% (1921) 94 3/5 5,066 
Irish Land Stock 2 3/4% 55 1/2 3,973 
War Loan Stock 5% 94 3/5 497 
French 5% Rentas Bonds 82 525 
Province of Buenos Ayres Funding Certificate 85 172 
Province of Buenos Ayres 3 1/2% Bonds 47 1/4 2,362 
Total Value 
 
48,313 
   
Source: Valuation by Goodbody Webb, Stockbrokers for probate purposes 12 
May 1917 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816.14). 
 
The largest of the Trust portfolios was the Clonbrock Settled Estate portfolio which 
had an estimated value of £83,490. As a settled trust under the trusteeship of John 
Shawe Taylor and Clonbrock’s brother-in-law, Lord Crofton, Clonbrock was not 
entitled to ownership of the assets included but, as in the case of George Brookes and 
the Coolgreany trust, he was entitled to the income derived from the investments and 
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during his life. This income was paid into his account with Bank of Ireland, 
Ballinasloe. As with Clonbrock’s personal account there are a relatively large 
number (eighteen) of individual holdings in this portfolio, the largest of which is an 
Exchequer Bond with an estimated value of £12,500. Again, this is in stark contrast 
to the Leinster estate trust 
 
Table 6.25. Valuation of Clonbrock settled estate Trust at 12 May 1917 
 
Security Price Nominal 
  £ Value 
    £ 
Great Northern Railway, Ireland 4% Consolidated Pref Stock   100 
Great Northern Railway, Ireland Ordinary shares   100 
Exchequer 5% Bond 1922   12,600 
New South Wales 4% Inscribed stock   6,000 
New Zealand Consolidated 4% Stock 1929   6,000 
Tasmanian Government Stock 4% Inscribed Stock   6,010 
Queensland 4% Inscribed Stock 1940/50   6,000 
Canadian Pacific Railway 4% Debenture stock   5,394 
Swedish 3 1/2% Bond 1890   3,263 
Madras Southern Mahratta Railway 4% Debenture 1938   3,000 
Madras Southern Mahratta Railway 4% Debenture 1936   2,000 
Great Western Railway 5% Consolidated Pref. Stock   2,500 
Central Argentine Railway 4% Debenture Stock   8,300 
War Loan 3 1/2% Stock   10,000 
Cape of Good Hope 3 1/2% Consolidated Pref. Stock   5,224 
Bank of Ireland Inscribed Stock   2,220 
War Loan 5% Stock   3,429 
War Loan 5% Stock   1,350 
Total Value   83,490 
   
Source: Statement of securities held in portfolio as at 12 May 
1917 (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816.14).  
   
Another portfolio that was subject to a trust was the Clonbrock Residuary Trust. The 
family papers do not provide any evidence of what the purpose of this trust was but 
as with the Clonbrock Settled Trust the income on the investments was paid directly 
to Lord Clonbrock. Again, the portfolio contained eighteen individual securities with 
the largest single holding being an Irish Land Bond with a nominal value of £7,160, 
although in reality the value of this security might well have been half of that value 
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given the unpopularity of land bonds as an investment. The portfolio, which had an 
estimated value of £45,033, contained many of the same stocks as the other trust 
portfolios. 
 
Table 6.26. Valuation of Clonbrock residuary estate trust at 12 May 1917 
 
Security Price Nominal 
 
£ Value 
  
£ 
Anglo Argentine Tramway Company 4% Debenture Stock 
 
3,000 
Buenos Ayres Pacific Railway Company 5% Debenture Stock 
 
3,000 
Cunard Steamship Company Preference Shares 
 
3,500 
Calcutta Electric Supply 5% Cumulative shares 
 
600 
Canadian Pacific Railway Company Pref Shares 
 
6,000 
Dunlop Rubber Company Preference shares 6% 20 1/7 2,000 
Consolidated Goldfields Preference Shares 7/8 2,400 
Gaslight & Coke Preference Stock 73 3,000 
Hudson Bay Preference Shares 4 2/5 800 
War Loan Stock 5% 
 
4,394 
Land Bonds 2 3/4% 1933 
 
7,160 
Midland Great Western Railway Consolidated Stock 
 
5,150 
Midland Great Western Railway 5% Preference Stock 
 
250 
Great Northern Railway Stock 
 
100 
CONSOL’s 
 
614 
French 5% Rentas Bonds 
 
525 
Province of Buenos Ayres Funding cert 
 
178 
Province of Buenos Ayres 3 1/2% Bonds 
 
2,362 
Total Value 
 
45,033 
   
Source: Statement of securities held in portfolio as at 12 May 1917 (N.L.I., 
Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816.14). 
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A smaller trust known as the Annuities Trust, which was used to pay annual settled 
payments to Clonbrock’s three daughters, had an estimated valuation of £29,800 and 
was made up of just five individual securities. 
 
Table 6.27. Valuation of Clonbrock annuities trust at 12 May 1917 
 
Security Price Nominal 
 
£ Value 
  
£ 
Argentine Gov. Railway Recission Bonds 
 
5,900 
Buenos Ayres Western Railway Company 4% Debenture 
 
5,196 
North Eastern Railway Company 4% Preference Stock 
 
4,894 
War Loan 5% Stock 
 
4,543 
War Loan 5% Stock 
 
9,267 
Total Value 
 
29,800 
   
Source: Statement of securities held in portfolio as at 12 May 1917 (N.L.I., 
Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816.14). 
  
 The final trust portfolio was called the Cloughagalla Trust and consisted of only two 
holdings and had a value of £5,144 on the 4th Lord’s death. The income on this trust 
was paid to Lady Clonbrock. 
 
Table 6.28. Valuation of Cloughagalla trust at 12 May 1917 
 
Security Price Nominal 
 
£ Value 
  
£ 
Canada 4% Registered Stock 1940   4,969 
War Loan 5% Stock   175 
Total Value   5,144 
 
Source: Statement of securities held in portfolio as at 12 May 1917 (N.L.I., 
Clonbrock papers, MS 35,816.14). 
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Consolidating the five Clonbrock portfolios into a single one reveals the following 
breakdown by investment category. 
 
Table 6.29. Breakdown of Clonbrock portfolio by investment category as at         
12 May 1917 
 
Security Valuation Valuation 
 
£ % 
International Bonds 109,150 51.54% 
War Loan Stock 41,552 19.62% 
UK Corporate & Treasury Bonds 33,697 15.91% 
Irish Stocks 10,420 4.92% 
Irish Land Bonds 11,133 5.26% 
Ordinary Shares 5,828 2.75% 
Total 211,780 100.00% 
 
Source: This table has been derived from an analysis of the previously shown 
Clonbrock portfolios at the time of the 4th Lord’s death in May 1917.  
 
The above analysis shows the extremely small investment in equities or ordinary 
shares (2.75 per cent) and the preponderance (97.25 per cent) of income producing 
stocks and bonds. Given the rapid rise in inflation occasioned by the First World 
War, this had serious consequences for the value of the portfolio. Between the sale of 
the estates in 1914 and the end of 1917 inflation in Britain and Ireland totalled 55.8 
per cent which meant that in real terms the purchasing power of a portfolio valued at 
£200,000 would have fallen by 55.8 per cent or £111,600.80   
 
With a weighting of 51.54 per cent the portfolios also reflected the strong attraction 
of high yielding international bond-type investments, be they of a sovereign, 
municipal or corporate nature. In 1917, £64,000 or 30.2 per cent of the total 
portfolios were invested in railway stocks. Almost 20.0 per cent of the total of the 
                                                 
80 The inflation figures have been sourced from http://inflation.stephenmorley.org accessed 
20 Oct. 2016. 
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portfolios was invested in war loan stock. The other noticeable feature was the 
relatively small holding of just under 5 per cent in Irish securities.  
 
The question arises as to how such portfolios would have performed in terms of 
generating income compared to what might have earned from Clonbrock’s landed 
estate. The existence of super tax returns for the year 1916-17 provides a good 
insight.81 In a report (see Table 6.1 above) prepared by Lord Clonbrock’s 
accountant, George Mahon, in 1905, in anticipation of the sale of the estate, it was 
estimated that gross rentals from the estate were £9,861, which after the payment of 
various charges produced a net income of £6,329. Relative to this, the investment 
income figure of £8,036 declared in his super tax returns for 1916-17 was far in 
excess of this figure.82 Thus, Clonbrock’s income from investments far exceeded the 
net rental income previously generated from his estate. The full tax return for the tax 
year 1916-17 is shown in Appendix 6.1 and provides data on how his financial 
affairs were in the year in question. The tax year chosen is appropriate for a number 
of reasons but particularly because it was the first full year where Clonbrock was 
almost totally reliant on the income derived from his investments. It was also the last 
year of his life, and before death duties would take almost £22,000 from the value of 
the estate.  
 
Assuming that the Clonbrock estate was representative of many former Irish landed 
estates up to 1918 the initial years following the sales must have been good for their 
owners. Freed from the pressures of dealing with recalcitrant tenants, pressures from 
creditors, the uncertainties and vicissitudes of running a landed estate and having the 
comfort of knowing that all one had to do was open an envelope and deposit yet 
another dividend cheque into one’s bank account, life from a financial perspective 
and setting aside the political developments around the third Home Rule crisis, the 
life of the newly conceived rentier class was superior to the life of a landlord. This 
situation might very well have continued for many years except for the ravages of 
                                                 
81 Super tax was introduced in the Finance Act 1914, Section 3, as a means of raising money 
for the War effort. Super tax was in addition to Income tax which was levied at 1s-3d in the 
pound. Super tax was paid on all income over £2,500 and was on a graduated scale starting 
at 5d in the £ and topping out at 1s-4d for incomes over £8,000 per annum.  
82 Super Tax return to the inspector of taxes for tax year 1916/17, (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, 
MS 35,819.10). 
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inflation, death duties, bad investment decisions and human proclivities undermined 
or destroyed entirely the value of their wealth. While each individual family case 
was undoubtedly unique there were however, universal factors that impacted on all. 
  
6.6 Investment performance 
 
The measuring and assessing of performance requires a benchmark or other 
reference point. In the case of an investment portfolio the benchmark is usually the 
original investment objectives set by the owner of the funds when setting it up. 
These objectives might include protecting the capital value, obtaining a specified 
level of capital growth or generating a particular level of income from the portfolio. 
While there is nothing in any of the family papers examined that set out precisely 
these objectives it is a reasonable assumption based on the structure of the portfolios 
that the key objectives were capital protection and income generation. The 
measurement of performance requires a meaningful timeframe which should be 
sufficiently long to even out short-term fluctuations in markets. For example, it 
would be meaningless for long term portfolios such as those examined in this chapter 
to measure performance daily, weekly or monthly. In the case of the Leinster and the 
Clonbrock portfolios the deaths of family patriarchs do allow us examine investment 
performance over an extended period. 
 
This research shows that all the portfolios examined would have generated annual 
incomes in excess of the net rental income figures generated prior to the sale of the 
estates. Assuming all other factors remained equal, this would have meant that the 
individuals involved would have had a higher income levels in the initial years than 
they did previously. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
222 
 
Table 6.30. Estimated surplus of annual investment income over net rental 
income for four estates 1904-18 
 
Estate 
Annual 
Gross 
Rents 
Annual 
Estate 
Costs 
Annual 
Net 
Rents 
Annual 
Investm
ent 
Income 
Surplus 
Investm
ent 
Income 
£ £ £ £ £ 
Estate Leinster 32,220 11,277 20,943 23,720 2,777 
Clonbrook Estate 9,861 3,532 6,329 8,036 1,707 
Dopping Hepenstall 
Estate 480 150 330 350 20 
Coolgreany Estate 2,735 957 1,778 2,100 322 
 
Source: The data used in compiling this table has been extracted by the 
author from the family papers of the four estates examined 1904-18. 
 
Before examining the effects of inflation on the portfolios, their performance in 
terms of capital appreciation and protection will be examined. The opportunity to do 
this was afforded by the deaths of the family patriarchs, the 6th duke of Leinster in 
1922 and the 4th and 5th lord Clonbrocks in 1917 and 1926 respectively. In the case 
of the Clonbrock estate, estate duties impacted with the death of the 5th baron 
Clonbrock, Robert Edward Dillon, at the age of fifty-eight in November 1926.83 His 
death, without issue, ended the Clonbrock title and without a male line meant the 
unravelling of the various settled estate trusts and the distribution of the remaining 
estate to the three daughters of the 4th baron. According to a valuation carried out by 
the family’s solicitors, Mecredy & Son, on December 1926 the 5th baron’s estate was 
provisionally valued at £153,384 although to this figure had to be added an amount 
to cover the value of heirlooms and as yet unsold estate lands. If it is assumed these 
unascertained sums to be relatively small the value of the estate had fallen by 
£46,150 from £199,534 on the death of the 4th baron in 1917. Approximately 
£22,000 of this would have been due to the death duties arising on his death and the 
remainder appears to have resulted from a fall in the value of investments. Table 
                                                 
83 Irish Times, 3 Nov. 1926. 
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7.11 below provides a breakdown of the estate for probate purposes following the 
death of Robert Dillon in 1926. 
 
An estate of this size in 1926 would have attracted death duty at a rate of 21 per cent 
resulting in a liability of £32,210.84 This meant that over £54,000 or roughly quarter 
of the original sales proceeds of the Clonbrock estates had been used to pay estate 
duties in the ten years since the estate was sold.  
 
The Clonbrock case highlights a number of important factors that can impinge on 
family wealth when represented by investment portfolios rather than a real asset such 
as land.  
 
Firstly, how a prudent and diligent family who displayed no extravagance in their 
lifestyles can see their fortune seriously undermined by a failure to protect that 
wealth from inflation. Secondly it shows how wealth erosion can be happening while 
living standards and income levels are well ahead of earlier expectations. And 
thirdly, it illustrates how bad luck in the form of the death of two family patriarchs in 
relatively quick succession can have a major impact on the value of a family’s 
wealth through liability to death duties.     
 
A footnote to the Clonbrock case study was that in 1976 the Irish Times reported that 
following the sale of Clonbrock House to a local developer the auction of its 
furniture, art works and silverware generated £185,000 in sales.85 A subsequent sale 
in Sotheby’s, London of a sword belonging to Napoleon, which had been a family 
heirloom since 1833, generated a further £50,000.86 While the investment portfolio 
put together so painstakingly by the 4th Lord Clonbrock, and nurtured by his 
successor, may have proved vulnerable in the face of inflation the contents provided 
a worthy buffer and albeit some sixty years later secured more than the sale of the 
28,000-acre estate ever did, albeit on a non-inflation adjusted basis. The Clonbrock 
portfolios, while still worth £121,174 following the death of the 5th baron in 1926, 
                                                 
84 Finance Act 1926, Schedule 4, Scale of rates of Estate Duties – 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1926/35/enacted/en/html accessed 21 Oct. 2016. 
85 Irish Times, 3 Nov. 1976. 
86 Irish Times, 13 Nov. 1976. 
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would have suffered from the ongoing decline in bond values and the high 
international bond component (over 51 per cent in 1917 – per Table 6.9) would have 
been negatively impacted by the stock market crash in 1929 as would the value of 
war loan stock conversion of June 1932 (see footnote 109).87 Terence Dooley 
describes how Clonbrock House: ‘After 1929, the house was emptied of its servants, 
and as farming had been severely affected by the developments of the 1920s, there 
was no more money to spend on its upkeep.’88     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
87 The value of £121,174 was arrived at by taking the value of the portfolio on the death of 
the 5th baron in 1926, £153,384, (see Table 6.11) and subtracting the death duty paid on his 
death, £32,210. 
88 Terence Dooley, Clonbrock: history of a big house, 
http://www.aughty.org/pdf/clonbrock_history_bighouse.pdf accessed 23 Apr. 2017. 
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Table 6.31. Statement of property passing on death of 5th Baron Clonbrock on 
1 Nov. 1926 
 
  Deceased was absolutely entitled to: £-s-d 
1 Securities domiciled in Irish Free State 9,884-10-00 
2 Securities domiciled in England 11,880-00-06 
3 Two policies of insurance  1,500-00-00 
4 Cash in hands of solicitor 734-14-02 
5 Cash in hands of Gilbert Mahon 87-05-04 
6 Value of first moiety of Vancouver mortgage No. 189 120-00-00 
7 Refund of Income Tax from England 246-10-00 
8 Value of heirlooms - Value unascertained at present TBA 
9 Apportionment of income on securities in which he had  
  a life interest. 1340-00-00 
10 Personal effects - not valued yet say 20-00-00 
11 Value of live-stock and outside effects 4,828-14-09 
12 Value of interest in 'Annuities Trust'  12,866-03-01 
13 Value of interest in 'Cloghagalla Trust'  2,245-04-01 
14 
Value of real estate not subject to 'Clonbrock Settled 
Trust' 436-00-00 
    46,189-01-11 
   
  £-s-d 
  Deceased was tenant for life of  
     
1 Value of life interest in 'Annuities Trust' 12,866-02-01 
2 Value of life interest in 'Cloughagalla Trust' 2,245-04-01 
3 
Value of life interest in Real Estate not subject to 
'Settled Trust 436-00-00 
4 Value of life interest in 'Residuary Trust' 21,043-02-02 
5 Cash in hands of solicitor 744-13-02 
6 Cash in hands of Gilbert Mahon 74-15-10 
7 Value of first moiety of Vancouver mortgage No. 189 120-00-00 
8 Value of securities in 'Clonbrock Settled Trust' 69,665-4-10 
9 
Value of Clonbrock Settled and unsold estates - Value 
to be determined TBA 
    107,195-02-02 
     
  
Total value of Estate - Subject to values being 
determined for (8) & (9) above 153,384-02-02 
 
Source: Statement of property passing on death of Robert Dillon, 5th Baron 
Clonbrock, (N.L.I., Clonbrock papers, MS 35,804.10). 
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In the case of the Leinster estate the death of Maurice FitzGerald, the 6th duke, in 
February 1922, at the age of thirty-five, also facilitates an examination of the 
changes in the make-up of the portfolio that had taken place since 1905. The estate’s 
investment portfolio was valued for probate purposes at the date of the 6th duke’s 
death at £675,668 compared to £664,707 in July 1905. This increase in value would 
suggest that it did not incur a loss on the Denison mortgage (£59,000) or on any of 
the other loans advanced. This is said on the basis that there was little if any scope 
for capital appreciation in the 1905 portfolio and as the income derived from the 
portfolio was used to fund the running of the Maynooth and Kilkea houses and other 
family expenses, had a large capital loss been incurred one would expect to see a 
reduction in the value of the portfolio rather than an actual increase. In real terms, 
however, the value of the portfolio would have reduced due to the high inflation 
rates experienced in the War years. 
 
While the overall value did not vary much in nominal terms, its structure did change 
quite significantly in that quoted securities represented 53.5 per cent of the overall 
portfolio value of £675,668 while mortgage loans constituted 46.5 per cent 
(previously over 90 per cent).  The stock portion of the overall portfolio, the full 
details of which are set out in Appendix 6.2, makes for interesting reading. The 
portfolio comprises of forty-nine individual holdings, the largest was a 4% national 
war bond with a value of £45,258. Reflecting the desire for income, the portfolio 
consists entirely of income generating stocks with little or no capital appreciation 
potential or protection against inflation. As Table 6.12 shows 65.4 per cent of the 
stocks were either British government or U.K. municipal bonds and a further 13.56 
per cent was in dominion bonds. The portfolio also contains a high level, 19 per cent, 
of British and empire railroad stocks. Railroad stocks were a staple of investment 
portfolios at the time. This was because they constituted such a large part of the 
stock-market indices. For instance, in 1900, 62.8 per cent of the value of all stocks 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange were railway stocks. While not as 
significant as in the case of the New York Exchange, railway stocks were a 
substantial component of the London Stock Exchange. In 1913, they constituted 37 
per cent of the index, 31 per cent in 1920 and 20.5 per cent in 1933. By comparison 
bank stocks which are now one of the largest components on the London Stock 
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Exchange made up just 2.3 per cent of the overall index in 1920.89  Railway stocks 
were popular in portfolios in that they were regarded as offering a secure and 
predictable rate of return. The reason for this was that following the appreciation and 
subsequent fall in railway stocks in the 1850s there was a significant amount of 
consolidation in the sector. Many of the small local railway companies merged so 
that by 1920 there were only four major rail companies in Britain i.e. Great Western, 
London and North Eastern, London Midland and Scottish Railway and Southern 
Railways. These four were to become one in 1948 when all were merged into British 
Rail. In the opening decades of the twentieth century railway stocks were attractive 
in that they were what investment managers term ‘cash cows’.90 This was due to the 
fact that they had already developed the rail network and paid for their rolling stock 
so there was little requirement for major capital expenditure with the result that they 
generated large amounts of cash which could be used to pay dividends to their bond 
holders. Rail travel peaked in 1914 when there were just over 1 ½ billion passenger 
journeys taken in Britain. As the century progressed, however, the growth in road 
transport for goods, bus travel for people and an increase in motor cars all placed 
pressure on the railway companies and their profitability declined. By 1925 rail 
passenger journey numbers were below 1 ¼ billion and by 1940 below 1 billion. It 
was almost 100 years later in 2013 before rail passenger traffic breached its 1914 
record. 91  With declining numbers and a need to replace rail networks and rolling 
stocks, the rail companies entered a period of sustained financial decline. For 
investors who held on to railway stocks during the nineteen twenties and thirties it 
was a period of inexorable decline and capital and income erosion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 Michie, London Stock Exchange, p. 320. 
90 A ‘cash cow’ is a stock where the underlying company generates large cash surpluses 
which are available for distribution to shareholders. 
91 ‘Rail passenger and freight travel trends’, http://www.raildeliverygroup.com/about-
us/publications.html   Accessed 12 Nov. 2016.  
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Table 6.32. Leinster estate quoted securities portfolio at 8 Feb. 1922 
 
Security Type Valuation Percentage 
 
£ % 
War Loan Stock 124,994 34.60% 
UK Gov. Bonds 81,528 22.57% 
UK Municipal Bonds 29,875 8.27% 
Railway Stocks 68,565 18.98% 
Overseas Bonds 48,982 13.56% 
Corporate Bonds 7,282 2.02% 
Total 361,226 100.00% 
 
Source: Portfolio valuation at 8 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster estate papers, 
D3078/1/3). 
 
The sovereign and municipal bond element of the portfolio would for the remainder 
of the 1920s have suffered a marginal decline both in real and nominal value (minus 
5 per cent) as deflation prevailed throughout the decade. The 1930s would have seen 
a capital appreciation as bonds enjoyed a bull run rising in value by just over 29 per 
cent in the ten years up to 1939. There was a further increase during the early years 
of the 1940s before a slow but inexorable decline which has lasted to the present day. 
For example, a portfolio of sovereign bonds in 1922 would have declined in nominal 
terms by over 67 per cent by 1974 which to date has marked the low point in bond 
values. In real terms the decline in value between these two dates would have been 
93 per cent.92  
The mortgage element of the portfolio showed several significant changes between 
1905 and 1922, (see Table 6.13 below.) In the first instance the money committed to 
this area declined by £288,551 or 48 per cent. The only mortgage that remained from 
the 1905 portfolio was that to Lord Hastings which at £118,000 was the largest loan 
outstanding. The Hastings mortgage had reduced by £4,500 in the intervening 17 
years.  
 
                                                 
92 Barclays equity gilt study 2016, pp 77- 8. 
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Table 6.33. Leinster Estate mortgage portfolio as at 8 Feb. 1922 
 
Borrower 
Mortgage 
Interest 
Rate 
Annual 
Income 
 
 
£ % £ 
The Viscount Astor 35,000 5.50% 1,925 
Hon.R.A. Gough of Calthorpe 100,000 5.50% 5,500 
Reginald Foster 9,000 6.00% 540 
Lord Hastings 118,000 5.50% 6,490 
Major Margesson 11,000 5.50% 605 
Lady E.G. Shelly Rolls 15,200 5.50% 836 
Lady E.G. Shelly Rolls 12,000 5.50% 660 
Capt. R.A. Vansittart 14,249 4.50% 641 
Total  314,449 
 
17,197 
 
Source: Investment portfolio 8 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster Estate papers, 
D3078/1/3/73-Mic 541[SM:23]) Reel 4. 
 
Handwritten notes on the estate papers indicate that two of the mortgages shown 
above were repaid, Lady Shelly Rolls in March 1923 and Viscount Astor in August 
1923, with further reductions in the Vansittart mortgage. The interest rate averaged 5 
per cent which was 1 ½ per cent higher than those mortgages in the 1905 portfolio. 
This reflected the increased interest rates prevailing and was equivalent to the return 
prevailing on U.K. war loan stock which was guaranteed by the British government 
and was tradeable on the stock exchange so the question arises as to why the trust 
would have continued to lend such large sums of money to individuals. 
 
The portfolio as structured in February 1922 generated approximately £31,600 
(£25,574 following death duties and a deduction for family charges) in income 
which was significantly ahead of the £23,650 generated by the 1905 version. While 
this was positive the fact that the cost of living had more than doubled between 1905 
and 1922 mean that the portfolio’s purchasing power had deteriorated significantly 
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in real terms during the intervening period.93 The advent of a period of sustained 
deflation would have improved matters in that between 1921 and 1934, prices fell on 
average by 28 per cent. However, the portfolio suffered its first major capital 
reduction as a result of the imposition of death duties following the death of Maurice 
FitzGerald, the 6th duke of Leinster in 1922.  
 
A death duty liability of £108,846 (£5.6m in today’s value) was levied on the 
estate.94 In addition, £20,000 had to be raised from the sale of investments to provide 
for settlements made by the late duke to various beneficiaries.95 These charges and 
deductions resulted in a permanent diminution in the value of the portfolio and its 
income generating potential. Coupled with the rapacious effect of inflation, the fall 
in the value of railway stocks and the conversion of war loan stock in 1932 the value 
of a once great fortune would have significantly diminished as the century 
progressed.96 
 
                                                 
93 The Barclays UK cost of living index rose from 106.7 in 1905 to 221.4 in January 1922, 
see Barclays equity gilt study 2016, p, 73. 
94 Henry J. Nix to Lord Frederick FitzGerald, 23 May 1923 (Charles Hamilton family papers 
in private possession). 
95 Henry J Nix to Lord Frederick FitzGerald, 14 Apr. 1923. (Charles Hamilton family papers 
in private possession) 
96 In June 1932, the British government announced that it was going to redeem the 5% war 
loan stock at par on 1 December 1932. Under the terms of the measure announced by 
Neville Chamberlain, chancellor of the exchequer on 30 June 1932, holders of the 5% war 
loan stock would have their holdings redeemed at par value on the 1 December 1932 or if 
they wished they could convert to a newly issued 3 ½% war loan stock that was to be issued. 
The background to the move by the chancellor was that in the wake of Britain abandoning 
the Gold Standard in September 1931 interest rates fell dramatically from around 6 per cent 
to 2.5 per cent by June 1932. British bank deposit interest rates were ½ per cent (The Times, 
2 June 1932). Newly issued British treasury bonds were being issued at close to 3 per cent. 
In such an environment, the 5 per cent interest being paid on the £2 billion overhang of 
outstanding war loan stock was extremely costly for the British government and it decided to 
act. Introducing the measure Mr Chamberlain stated: ‘The War Loan at 5 per cent was out of 
relation with the yield of other Government securities and moreover, that the maintenance of 
the old war time rate attaching to so vast a body of stock and hanging like a cloud over the 
capital market was a source of depression and hindrance to the expansion of trade.’ (The 
Times, 1 July 1932). The Times opined ‘The scheme which is a financial operation of 
unparalleled magnitude and will annually save £30 million gross and £23 million net, was 
received with enthusiasm when announced by Mr Chamberlain and Lord Hailsham in 
Parliament last evening.’ (The Times, 1 July 1932) From the government’s perspective the 
scheme was a massive success with holders of £1,921 million worth [out of a total of £2,087 
million] of 5% war loan stock converting to the new 3 ½% issue: see Charles Poor 
Kindleberger, A financial history of Western Europe, (London, 1985), p. 388.) For holders of 
the stock however it meant a 30 per cent reduction in the income previously received. 
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While questions might be raised regarding the investment strategy adopted by the 
trustees of the Leinster estate, there can be little doubt that the trust’s very existence 
was to have a profound positive effect in protecting the family assets from the 
profligacy and financial recklessness of the 7th duke, Edward FitzGerald, who 
assumed the dukedom on the death of his brother Maurice in 1922. Even before he 
succeeded to the title he had sold his life interest in the estate to the English 
financier, Sir Henry Mallably Deeley. The story of Edward is outside the scope of 
this study other than to say that had the trust not existed and had the 7th duke had 
unrestricted and unfettered access to the family fortune it is likely that it would have 
been squandered entirely in a dramatic and rapid manner.97 Acknowledging as much 
the 7th duke said: ‘My road to ruin was the gay road – the road of mad parties, 
reckless friends and lovely women.’98 A positive impact the life of Edward had for 
the family’s fortune was its longevity. His death in 1976, some fifty-four years after 
succeeding to the title, meant that the estate was spared from death duties up to that 
date by which time the twin impacts of poor investment decisions and inflation had 
most likely reduced its value to relatively low levels. 
 
The story of the Leinster estate illustrates the impact of an inappropriate investment 
strategy in the face of a changing economic environment. The focus on income and 
the absence of investments likely to provide any form of long term capital 
appreciation which would provide a hedge against inflation was an egregious error 
which over time would lead to the gradual erosion of the family’s wealth.   
 
6.7 Measuring the impact of inflation 
 
To illustrate the above contention the study developed a financial model based on the 
Leinster estate to highlight the corrosive nature of inflation. The model uses as its 
base the Leinster portfolio as it was after the death of the 6th duke in 1922. The 
author acknowledges that the model is theoretical in nature and that it ignores a 
range of variables which could have had a bearing on the value of the portfolio. 
These include movements in capital values such as the values of the various portfolio 
                                                 
97 For an account of the life and times of Edward FitzGerald, 7th duke of Leinster, see 
Dooley, Decline and fall of the dukes of Leinster, pp 211-30. 
98 Sunday Despatch, 10 Feb. 1957. 
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holdings such as happened following the conversion of 5% war loan stock to 3 ½ % 
war stock in 1932, the failure of one or more of the mortgage borrowers to repay 
their loans, a requirement for drawings in excess of the assumed annual amount to 
fund unexpected expenditures or indeed a decision to reduce annual drawings. Nor 
does the model take any account of the impact of increased income tax liability on 
the estates income requirement. This latter point may have been a significant issue as 
the century progressed as income tax was the major funding source for the nascent 
welfare state and tax rates became more regressive for high earners, particularly for 
those with what was known as ‘unearned income’. UK top marginal tax rates started 
at 5 per cent in 1907, rose to 50 per cent in 1919 and culminated at 97 ½ per cent in 
1945, a situation immortalised in the line ‘nineteen for you and one for me’ from The 
Beatles 1966 hit ‘Taxman’.99 The situation in Ireland was much like that prevailing 
in the UK.  Consequently, many high earners restructured their income so that they 
received some of it in the form of capital, thus at least deferring income tax until a 
more suitable juncture.100 For instance, the owners of businesses might have deferred 
dividend pay-outs and retained the funds in the company thus increasing the value of 
their investments without paying income tax on this increase in their wealth. In the 
case of the Leinster estate and indeed many others who sold their properties under 
the Wyndham Act this was not an option as the income on their portfolios was 
necessary for them to fund day-to-day expenditures and few had the luxury of 
deferring income and were thus subject to the full rigours of a worsening taxation 
regime. This lack of financial flexibility was reflected in correspondence between the 
trustees of the Leinster estate and Sir Henry Mallaby Deeley in the 1920s and 1930s, 
highlighting that the estate was relatively impoverished and was in constant need of 
contributions from the financier who held the life interest in the estate following the 
succession of Edward FitzGerald to the dukedom.101   
 
The financial model as presented does, however, highlight how a significant 
portfolio could be completely eroded over a relatively short period by a combination 
                                                 
99 The song Taxman appeared on the Beatles 1966 album Revolver. The song written by the 
band’s George Harrison, was an attack on the Super Tax imposed on high earners by the 
Harold Wilson led Labour government in the 1960s. 
100 A.B. Atkinson, ‘Income tax and top earners over the twentieth century’ in Hacienda 
Publica Espanola/ Revista de Economia Publica, Vol. 168-1/2004: p. 132. 
101 Dooley, Decline and fall of the dukes of Leinster, pp 196-210. 
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of the unprotective nature of the fixed income securities contained therein and the 
corrosive and invidious effects of inflation.  
 
While the specifics of the model used in this instance relate to the Leinster estate’s 
finances they could equally relate to any vendor who invested the sales proceeds in 
fixed income securities. Evidence from other estates such as the Headfort, Caledon 
and Mac Geough Bonds indicate that similar investment profiles existed in these 
cases.102    
 
Following the death of Maurice FitzGerald in February 1922 the Leinster estate 
portfolio was, valued at £675,675. After death duties of £108,846 and disbursements 
of £20,000 to meet family charges the net estate was £546,829 (£24,115,159 in 2016 
values). The portfolio as constituted generated an annual income of £25,574 
(£1,127,813 in 2016 values). This is what is shown under Column D in Table 6.14 
and is referred to as ‘nominal income’. The assumption underpinning the model was 
that the trustees wanted to maintain this 1922 level of real income into perpetuity. 
To do this, the yearly ‘nominal income’ figure needs to be adjusted for the effects of 
the cumulative inflation / deflation figure shown in Column B, the resultant value is 
what is termed ‘real income’ and is shown in Column E. The difference between the 
annual real income and nominal income is what is referred to under Column F as the 
‘income variance’ value. In those years where deflation prevails this income variance 
is positive and where inflation is dominant the variance will be negative. This 
income variance is added or subtracted to the value of the portfolio each year to 
generate the ‘revised capital’ figure shown under Column G. 
 
Table 6.14 shows a summarised version of Appendix 6.3 in that it reflects ten yearly 
intervals rather than the annual statistics shown in the appendix. Based on the 
previously outlined assumptions the key conclusion from Table 6.14 is that the 
Leinster estate which was valued at £546,829 post the death of the 6th duke in 1922 
was by 1978 gone. This was not as a consequence of profligacy on behalf of the 7th 
duke but due to the pressures of maintaining an unsustainably high level of real 
                                                 
102 Mooney, The changing fortunes of the Headfort estates, pp 55-63; Purdue, Big House in 
the north, pp 105-9.  
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income, the absence of securities capable of providing capital appreciation and above 
all the impact of inflation. It is perhaps ironic that the model shows the family’s 
investment portfolio finally exhausting itself at the same time as Edward FitzGerald, 
the 7th duke of Leinster was to take his own life in 1976.   
 
Table 6.34. Impact of inflation/(deflation) on Leinster estate portfolio 1922-1978 
 
  
  
Column 
A 
Column 
B 
Column 
C 
Column 
D 
Column 
E 
Column 
F 
Column 
G 
Period 
  
Inflation 
Rate 
Cumul. 
Inflation 
Nominal 
Capital 
Nominal 
Income 
Real 
Income 
Income 
Variance 
Revised 
Capital 
  % % £ £ £ £ £ 
1922 
  
546,829 
   
546,829 
1922 – 1931 -28.50 -28.50 
 
255,740 294,561 38,821 585,650 
1932 – 1941 32.30 3.80 
 
255,740 307,220 51,480 637,130 
1942 – 1951 28.30 32.10 
 
255,740 227,353 -28,387 608,743 
1952 – 1961 37.80 64.90 
 
255,740 122,065 -133,675 475,068 
1962 – 1971 47.50 112.40 
 
255,740 36,008 -219,732 255,336 
1972 – 1978 97.90 210.30 
 
133,271 -122,065 -255,336 0 
Total 
   
1,411,971 865,142 -546,829 
 
 
Source: The figures summarised in Table 6.14 come from Appendix 6.3. 
Fuller details of how the data in this Table were collated are set out in the 
notes accompanying Appendix 6.3. 
 
While the overarching consequence was the total dissipation of the portfolio over a 
fifty-six- year period, Table 6.13 also highlights other aspects of the family’s 
fortunes which would also be relevant to other former landlord families who invested 
in similar portfolios. The data shows that between 1922 and 1940 the impact of 
deflation meant that the real return from the portfolio exceeded the nominal return 
meaning, that the difference could be either added to the portfolio (as the model 
assumes) or spent thus providing the beneficiaries with an improved standard of 
living during this 18-year period. Apart from the two years either side of the 
outbreak of the Second World War, when inflation spiked at 10.9 per cent (1939) 
and 12.7 per cent (1946), the impact of inflation was relatively low. It was only from 
the late 1960s to the late 1970s that inflation significantly gained momentum 
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sweeping all non-appreciating assets before it.103 Periods of high inflation are usually 
accompanied by high interest rates which in turn have a negative impact on the 
capital values of fixed income securities. 
   
While the model is theoretical and in the absence of corroborating evidence such as 
portfolio valuations or correspondence relating to the investments could be deemed 
to be counterfactual, the anecdotal evidence relating to the family’s current financial 
position would suggest that the vast funds generated through the sale of their estates 
in 1903 (£84 million in today’s terms) have largely been dissipated.  
 
This contrasts with that of American millionaire William Rockefeller. Ferdinand 
Lundberg in his America’s 60 great families cites an example from the same era that 
provides a stark contrast to the Leinster experience. Lundberg states that William 
Rockefeller, brother of John D. Rockefeller left $50,000,000 in 1922, stipulating that 
a portion of income be divided among four children and fourteen grandchildren and 
that the principal itself be reserved for his great-grandchildren. From 1922 to 1937 
the children and grandchildren drew income of $9,514,834 from the estate, which 
increased in value by $13,947,361 in the fifteen-year period. Lundberg stated that it 
was expected that upwards of fifty great-grandchildren were likely to inherit an 
estate valued at between $75,000,000 and $100,000,000 after the payment of income 
to children and grandchildren.104 The value of the estate ultimately turned out to be 
$102,000,000 before taxes when finally liquidated.105 The difference between the 
two estates was that the Rockefeller portfolio consisted principally of direct equities 
and in particular holdings in various US oil companies and in the Amalgamated 
Copper Mining Company which he had founded in the late 1890’s. Despite the 1929 
stock-market Crash these companies continued to prosper and provide investment 
returns significantly more than inflation and continue to do so to this day.     
 
One of the rules of investment is that performance should not be judged with the 
perspective of hindsight which of course always affords 20:20 vision. For example, 
it would be hard to find any adult in Ireland today who ‘did not see the 2007 
                                                 
103 Barclays equity gilt study 2016, p.52. 
104 Ferdinand Lundberg, America’s 60 families (New York, 1938), p. 49. 
105 New York Times, 5 Aug. 1937. 
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property cash coming’; yet few at the time saw it and even fewer did anything about 
it. Similarly, judging the decisions of those charged with deciding how best to invest 
the proceeds from the sale of their estates can be both unfair and cruel in its 
judgements at a 100 year remove. While the concept of inflation was understood at 
the time, investors who had not seen its malign influence for over 40 years could 
well be forgiven for paying little heed to it in formulating their investment plans.  
In terms of concluding this section on the impact of inflation on the investment 
portfolios of those landlords who sold their estates under the Wyndham Land Act it 
is perhaps appropriate to quote a remark attributed to Vladimir Lenin: ‘The way to 
crush the bourgeoisie is to grind them between the millstones of taxation and 
inflation.’106 The evidence examined by this study would contend strongly that this 
is a ‘truism’. 
 
6.8: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described what were in many respects the obsequies of the final 
days of the landed gentry who once dominated every aspect of Irish life. The 
succeeding generations occupied not a world defined by privilege and entitlement 
but one requiring skill, talent and industry. 
 
By the last quarter of the twentieth century the perfect storm that had erupted in the 
early decades of the nineteenth century and which brought wave after wave of 
political, social, technological and above all economic change had finally abated and 
the landscape had changed utterly. In the end, it was not fire or bullet that did for the 
Irish landed class but rather the cold draught of economic reality. Afforded a second 
chance of economic survival by George Wyndham, many failed to capitalise on the 
opportunity to start again and build new empires in a dramatically changing world. 
Few displayed any real initiative in developing opportunities by using their cash to 
invest in business or other commercial opportunities. Like the ‘worthless and lazy 
servant’ in the parable of the Talents many took the easy option and effectively 
buried the money that was given to them leading to a metaphorical (or in some cases 
                                                 
106 There has been considerable debate among academics as to whether Lenin did make the 
above statement with many arguing that it was derived from a number of articles by John 
Maynard Keynes or even in Henry George, Progress and poverty, in 1879. 
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an actual) life of ‘wailing and grinding of teeth’ if not for them then for their 
descendants. 107    
 
While landlords could be forgiven for seeing themselves as an isolated and cursed 
group who faced challenges from every quarter the reality is that those who perished 
economically, whether it be from leading lifestyles they could not afford, bad 
investments or poor or no strategic decision- making had only themselves to blame. 
The Wyndham Act afforded them a second, and as it turned out for many, a final 
chance to start again.  
 
Some like the 4th Marquess of Headfort did seek to develop new income streams 
through investing part of the proceeds from the sale of their estates in forestry and 
arbori-cultural activities and even the granting of licences for fishing beats that ran 
through their demesnes.108  Or Sir John Keane of Cappoquin House, Co. Waterford 
who also invested in forestry of his remaining acres but who built a saw mill to 
process the raw timber while at the same time developing a tree-nursery business.109 
These were the exceptions however. 
 
As in the past, many spurned the opportunity given to them. Just like when they 
failed to recognise the dangers associated with sub-division of their estates or the 
opportunities provided by technological developments resulting in the opening of 
new supply markets in the New World. Irish landlords in the nineteenth century 
might well have followed the example of William Scully and improved their 
economic situation by joining many of their tenants on ships to the Americas or the 
Antipodes and brought their skills, experience and resources to bear on establishing 
economically viable farms there. 
 
Similarly, it might seem surprising that landlords did not invest more in urban 
investment properties, commercial or residential. It was not as if the virtues of such 
                                                 
107 The Revised English Bible, St Matthew’s Gospel 25:1-46 (Oxford, 1989).  
108 Mooney, The Headfort Estates, p. 67 
109 Symes, Glascott , Sir John Keane and Cappoquin House in the time of war and 
revolution (Dublin, 2016), p. 27. 
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investments were unknown. In 1907, Gustavus Myers wrote regarding investment in 
US city property that 
 
… fortunes based upon land in the cities were indued (sic) with a 
mathematical certainty and a perpetuity. City real estate was not subject to 
the extreme fluctuating processes which so disordered the value of rural land. 
All of the tendencies and currents of the times favoured the building up of an 
aristocracy based upon ownership of city property. 110  
 
What held for the great U.S. cities held for many British and Irish cities also. Proof 
that some British aristocratic families did see the opportunity in city real estate is 
evidential. Many of the wealthiest landed families in Britain today owe their status 
and fortune to city property particularly in London. Families like the Grosvenors 
who own 300 acres in Mayfair and Belgravia, the Cadogans owning fifty acres in 
Chelsea, the Howard de Waldens possess 92 acres in Marylebone and the Portmans 
own 110 acres around the Oxford Street and Marble Arch districts. While these are 
the wealthiest of the wealthy there are many other individual families who own 
smaller less salubrious properties worth fortunes throughout the length and breadth 
of Britain. There are few equivalents in Ireland, bearing testimony to the missed 
opportunities presented in the opening decades of the twentieth century. One can 
only imagine what amount of property £617,000 (Leinster) could have purchased in 
Dublin in 1903 or what Clonbrock could have bought with his £213,242 in 1914. It 
was such a natural fit with their previous circumstance, their investment objectives 
and their skills and mindset that it is difficult to understand why they did not 
capitalise on the opportunity. 
 
If the portfolios examined in this chapter are representative of the wider population 
of estates, it is evident that selling landlords paid little or no heed to the expressed 
wish of the Irish Land Conference’s request that ‘for the benefit of the whole 
community, it is of the greatest importance that income derived from sale of property 
in Ireland should continue to be expended in Ireland.’111 While patriotism was 
manifest in the widespread inclusion of War Loan Stock in portfolios it clearly did 
not extend to investment in Ireland. 
                                                 
110 Myers, History of the great American fortunes, p. 87. 
111 Report of the Land Conference held at the Mansion House, Dublin, 1902-1903, p. 5. 
239 
 
 
Who then were the ultimate economic beneficiaries of the Wyndham Land Act? In 
the early years, landlords benefitted from higher than expected income returns from 
their investments enabling them to enjoy a higher standard of living than their 
previous rents afforded. However, in the long term, landlords suffered from their 
focus on income generating stocks and their lack of initiative and many succumbed 
to financial oblivion. 
 
Purchasers also derived financial benefits from the fact that the annuities paid to the 
Land Commission were lower than the rents previously paid. They benefitted also 
from the big rise in farm produce prices brought about by the First World War and 
they gained significantly from a halving of the annuities following the passing of the 
1933 Land Act.112 All this was, however, against a background that as the twentieth 
century progressed, Irish agriculture deteriorated and the ownership of land in many 
cases condemned people to a life of continuing drudgery and economic misery a 
situation that existed up Ireland’s entry to the European Economic Community in 
1973.113 
 
In those early years following the passing of the 1903 Act, Irish ratepayers were the 
only real losers as funding costs rose and the government, under the act’s guarantee 
provisions, deducted these overruns from the contributions to local authorities. 
Following the enactment of the 1909 Act these shortfalls were met by the British 
treasury. The British government enjoyed some short-term benefit while annuities 
were repaid, and they secured higher tax revenues from the investment income of 
landlords and death duties from dead landlords. Ultimately, it was the Irish 
government in the post Anglo-Irish economic war scenario that was the biggest 
winner. In return for a once off settlement of £10 million paid to the British 
government, an amount this author estimates at almost £115 million of debt was 
                                                 
112 Irish Land Act, 1933 no. 38 of 1933. Section 12 of this act reduced the annuity for those 
who purchased their holdings prior to 1923 by 50 per cent. 
113 Ireland joined the then European Economic Community (E.E.C.) on 1 Jan. 1973. Irish 
agriculture was a major beneficiary of the Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.). The C.A.P. 
benefitted farmers by paying them subsidies on farm outputs with the intention of 
maintaining minimum levels of output. As a predominantly agricultural country in the 1870s 
Irish farmers benefitted significantly from E.E.C. membership.  
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written off.114  In addition to the debt write-off the Irish government continued for 
many years to receive annuity payments of £1.5 million from Irish farmers. 
 
                                                 
114 Advances of £125.5 million were made in respect of land purchases between 1870 and 
1923 (Report of the Irish Land Commission for year ended 31 March 1935). To this amount 
should be added approximately £10 million in bonus payments under the 1903 and 1909 
Acts making total advances of £135.5 million. Assuming a ½ per cent sinking fund 
repayment of principal per annum would infer that a maximum of £10 million of principal 
was repaid in this way leaving a debt due of £125.5 million, in 1932 when DeValera, 
Taoiseach, withheld the annuities. 
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Conclusion 
 
Here, traveller, scholar, poet, take your stand 
When all those rooms and passages are gone, 
When nettles wave upon a shapeless mound, 
And saplings root among the broken stone, 
And dedicate – eyes bent upon the ground, 
Back turned upon the brightness of the sun 
And all the sensuality of the shade – 
A moment’s memory to that laurelled head. 
 
William Butler Yeats 
Coole Park, 19291 
 
In a contribution to a 2013 collection of essays relating to the Irish land question, 
Barbara Solow said of  her 1971 book The land question and the Irish economy, 
1870-1903 that  ‘my work aimed to turn orthodoxy on its head.’2 How much of her 
aim was achieved might be debated but she did introduce a different perspective to 
the study of Irish landlordism and in so doing encouraged others such as William 
Vaughan to test some of her claims in specific and local contexts and in that way 
provided a broader and more balanced view of Irish landlords and their estate 
management practices in the nineteenth century than had heretofore been the case. In 
this context, the real merit of her work was that she broke a stereotypical image of 
landlords, opened up new avenues of research and encouraged historians to look at 
the subject through different lenses. Since then, however, few historians have 
travelled down the path of looking at the Irish landlord class from the economic 
perspective opened by Solow. 
 
This study did not have as its aim anything as ambitious as turning orthodoxy on its 
head. It did, however, seek to redress the lack of attention shown by historians to this 
aspect of Irish historiography, by bringing an economic focus to the study of Irish 
landlordism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, specifically by focusing 
on how the estate and personal financial management practices of landlords, as well 
                                                 
1 Daniel Albright (ed.), W.B. Yeats, the poems (London, 1990), p. 293. 
2 Barbara L. Solow, ‘The Irish land question in a wider context’ in Fergus Campbell and 
Tony Varley (eds), Land questions in modern Ireland (Manchester, 2016), p. 77. 
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as external economic and political influences, undermined their positions in the 
nineteenth century; by examining the motivations of George Wyndham in bringing 
forward the 1903 Act, and analysing its financial provisions and how these were 
engineered to facilitate the largest transfer of land in Ireland since those resulting 
from the conquests of the seventeenth century. Furthermore, this is a pioneering 
study in understanding the workings of a sale of a landed estate, highlighting the 
complex and drawn-out nature of the negotiations and the legal processes involved. 
It examined the investment environment faced by landlords in the opening decades 
of the twentieth century as they transitioned from landlords to rentiers, and, most 
significantly, it examined how landlords managed the money received from the sale 
of their estates. In so doing, the author, with the benefit of forty years’ experience 
working in finance and stockbroking, engaged with a wide range of previously 
untapped sources such as tax returns, death duty declarations, portfolio valuations 
and investment papers. This work has hopefully opened new avenues for 
investigation for others who might see this area as a rich vein worthy of exploration 
and in this way a more comprehensive and nuanced picture of Irish rural life and 
society can emerge. 
 
As stated in the introduction of this work, the author was encouraged to pursue this 
study in order to seek answers to a series of questions beginning with: why was it 
necessary to have the Wyndham Land Act? The search for an answer to this question 
involved looking at a wide range of landlord practices and experiences with regard to 
how they managed their estates and how the wider economic and political influences 
impacted on their lives. The first observation that needs to be made is that the 
evidence makes it clear that it would be wrong to treat landlords as a homogeneous 
group in terms of how they managed their estates or their personal finances. They 
were not all ‘the same lavishly expensive, devil may-care class’ observed by Michael 
Davitt, nor were they all ‘made of good stuff’ as observed by one contemporary 
source in 1903.3 Nor were they all heavily indebted as suggested by Wyndham when 
introducing his 1903 Land Bill.4 Of the five sample estates examined in this study 
                                                 
3 Michael Davitt, The fall of feudalism in Ireland or the story of the Land League Revolution 
(London, 1904), p. 33; The Irish Landowners Convention, The case of Irish landlords 
(Dublin, 1903), p. 5. 
4 Hansard 4, cxx, 205 (25 Mar. 1903). 
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only one, the Bellew estate, had any external debt and that was at a relatively low 
level. Exercising caveats for this lack of what Ó Gráda called ‘homogeneity’, the 
study has drawn conclusions regarding landlords’ role in their own decline.5 This 
thesis would argue that landlords played a major part in their own downfall and 
allowed themselves become ‘peripheral players’ in Irish land affairs long before the 
introduction of the Wyndham Act in 1903.6 The decision made by many in the late 
eighteenth century to grant long leases to middlemen had serious negative 
consequences in that it meant they did not share in the strong economic growth and 
the subsequent dramatic increase in rents that occurred from the 1780s up to 1815, 
and worse still they had to deal with the legacy of sub-division as a consequence of 
serious over-letting by these intermediate landlords. Their insistence on maintaining 
lifestyles equivalent to some of their wealthier English counterparts in terms of 
house building, family settlements, and oftentimes lavish and extravagant 
entertainments had two impacts. Firstly, it led to many of them becoming heavily 
indebted and secondly distracted them from the serious and complicated business of 
running a landed estate in the nineteenth century. While often criticised for their 
failure to invest adequately in improving their estates, this thesis contends that given 
the external forces that were to emerge, particularly in the final three decades of the 
nineteenth century, and the poor economic returns obtainable from agriculture, this 
was, in fact, a wise decision, albeit one that was due mainly to either having little to 
invest or choosing to invest elsewhere such as in maintaining expensive lifestyles.   
 
While being critical of their estate management practices, lifestyles and personal 
inertia it should also be acknowledged that the external economic and political forces 
they faced were of an extremely high order of magnitude. The decline of Irish 
landlordism needs to be seen in a wider international context which saw the decline 
of most of Europe’s former landed elites such as the British aristocracy, the Prussian 
Junkers, the Russian Pomeshchiks, the Polish Sziachtas and the French landed 
nobles.  The decline of these elites was brought about by a dramatically changing 
environment driven by political and social imperatives but more than anything else 
economic forces. These forces, unleashed by a rapidly industrialising world brought 
                                                 
5 Ó Gráda, Ireland a new economic history, p. 123. 
6 Vaughan, Landlords and tenants, p. 240. 
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profound change to political power bases, philosophies and attitudes, all to the 
disadvantage of the landed classes. Even more directly they turned the market for 
agricultural products from local to global, a development which from the 1870s 
onwards fundamentally altered the foundations underpinning landownership, not just 
in Ireland, but across the world. Power had passed and there would be no renaissance 
for the former landed elites.  
 
The politicisation of ‘the land question’, particularly from the 1870s onwards, when 
it became a key driver in the policy of constructive unionism adopted by successive 
British governments, had a profound effect on the economic well-being of landlords. 
The land reforms introduced as a result of this policy, commencing with the 
Landlord and Tenant Act, 1870, seriously undermined the rights of landowners, and 
this had several negative consequences: the judicial rent review process introduced 
in the Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1881 gave rise to significant reductions in their rental 
incomes which effectively made land unsaleable; it further deterred lenders from 
advancing loans to landlords and in many cases influenced lenders to call them in. 
For heavily indebted landlords, this left them with little room to manoeuvre. Coupled 
with these developments, the pressures associated with recurring agrarian agitation 
had a devastating impact on the financial and mental well-being of landlords, a 
circumstance that contributed in no small measure to their willingness to avail of the 
generous terms of the 1903 Land Act. 
 
The second aim of this study concerned itself with George Wyndham’s motivations 
in introducing his 1903 Land Act, its financial provisions, and its operation. 
Historians such as Fergus Campbell and Patrick Cosgrove have seen Wyndham’s 
motivation in introducing the act in terms of him wanting to head off the U.I.L.-led 
agitation or the compulsory purchase campaign waged in Ulster by Thomas Russell. 
Others such as F.S.L. Lyons, Paul Bew and Philip Bull have seen it as part of the 
policy of constructive unionism adopted by successive British governments since 
1870. There is a validity to both schools of thought but there is also a third 
possibility which this study sees as having equal, if not more prominence, and that 
was that Wyndham’s motivations were greatly influenced by his own political 
ambitions. Wyndham came from a class where there was a presumptive claim that its 
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members were born to govern.7 By birth, upbringing, education, marriage and 
connection with social networks Wyndham was an integral part of that class. As 
someone who was described as ‘the most gifted young man of his generation’ and 
who at a very young age was part of influential intellectual, artistic and political 
circles, it would not be difficult to see him having great expectations in terms of his 
career.8 His deep relationship with his political sponsor and personal mentor, Arthur 
Balfour, gave him the means of fulfilling these ambitions and his appointment as 
chief secretary to Ireland gave him the opportunity. Wyndham knew that solving the 
Irish land question would be extremely helpful in furthering his political career. He 
also knew that in doing so he would be winning the favour of his prime minister and 
friend, Arthur Balfour, who as the following extract from his letter to king Edward 
VII illustrates, saw this resolution as vital; ‘This [1903 Land Act] is a very far 
reaching measure …that will settle for all time the Irish land difficulty.’9 Without the 
support of Balfour and Charles Ritchie, the chancellor of the exchequer, the bill 
would never have even reached the floor of the House. Wyndham’s cousin, Wilfred 
Scawen Blunt, bore witness to this contention when he recorded in his diary: ‘Even 
within forty-eight hours of his bringing it [1903 Land Bill] forward in the House, all 
seemed lost, and it was only the splendid support given by Arthur Balfour that had 
carried the day, as I understood him, by a single vote against Chamberlain’s 
opposition.’10 This study contends that while the legislation will forever bear 
Wyndham’s name, Balfour’s fingerprints were indelibly etched into it. 
 
Wyndham was aware of the importance of Ireland to the Empire and the high stakes 
he was playing for, as the following letter to his mother written the night before the 
1903 Bill was introduced; ‘The future of Ireland, and my future, for what it is worth, 
turns on what happens tomorrow.’11 This study contends that for a man with big 
political ambitions, the challenge and the opportunity of resolving the intractable 
                                                 
7 Ellenberger, Constructing George Wyndham, p. 490. 
8 Ridley and Percy, The letters of Arthur Balfour, p. 12. 
9 Cited in C.B. Shannon, Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland, 1874-1922 (Washington, 1988), p. 
123. 
10 W.S. Blunt, My diaries (2 vols. London, 1920), ii, pp 46-7. 
11 J.W. Mackail and Guy Wyndham, Life and letters of George Wyndham (2 vols. London, 
undated but c.1920), i, p. 82. 
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Irish land problem, with its implications for the broader Irish question, would have 
been too much to resist. 
 
Historians (Dooley and Cosgrove) have contended that the Wyndham Act and its 
subsequent amending legislation failed to achieve the objective of settling the Irish 
land question. They are correct in this contention but it needs to be seen against the 
background of the enormous disruption to normal political and social life brought 
about by the First World War and the War of Independence. Similarly, criticisms of 
the act’s failure to address the landless and evicted tenants is based on a rather literal 
interpretation of ‘solving the Irish land question’ and largely ignores the reality of 
political discourse. This study argues that a fair criticism of the 1903 Act, and its 
amending legislation, is that they missed an opportunity to fundamentally address 
the real problem of Irish agriculture which was the issue of the prevalence of small 
uneconomic holdings. Dealing comprehensively with the landless and evicted 
tenants’ demands by breaking up the large grazing farms would have exacerbated 
this problem even more, as became obvious after independence.12 Furthermore, this 
study would argue that Wyndham addressed the wrong problem, in choosing to deal 
with land reform rather than agricultural reform. 
 
Historians have underestimated the significance of the 1902 Irish Land Bill and the 
impact its failings and shortcomings had on the successful 1903 Land Bill. The 
criticism levelled by Redmond that the 1902 Bill had been introduced ‘without 
consultation’ can be argued as one of the reasons why Wyndham grasped at the 
Shawe Taylor proposal for a Land Conference shortly afterwards.13 The widespread 
support for the 1903 Bill was due in no short measure to Wyndham’s taking on 
board the criticisms and shortcomings of his earlier bill.   
 
The Wyndham Act was structured to meet the demands of various parties: landlords, 
tenants, the Treasury and simultaneously both public and political opinion. It was 
designed to address a conundrum that would encourage landlords to sell, tenants to 
                                                 
12 Terence Dooley and Tony McCarthy, ‘The 1923 Land Act: Some new perspectives’ in 
Mel Farrell, Jason Knirck and Ciara Meehan (eds), The formative decade, Ireland in the 
1920s (Dublin, 2015), p. 143.  
13 Hansard 4, cv, 1058 (25 Mar. 1902). 
247 
 
buy, and the British taxpayer to finance the project. The 1903 legislation was, 
therefore, grounded in the doctrine of realpolitik which meant that its provisions 
should be viewed as a package of measures rather than a standalone piece of 
legislation. Much of the criticism that has been levelled at the act does not take this 
into account. The act became a victim of its own success. The willingness to engage 
with the act by both landlords and tenants in a situation where finance was limited to 
£5 million per annum for the first three years inevitably led to significant delays and 
backlogs in completing transactions. However, as a consequence of the strong take-
up, the Treasury subsequently made significantly greater funds available thus 
justifying this approach. Similarly, criticisms of the evicted tenants’ provisions, 
while rhetorically convincing, ignored the practical reality that reinstating these 
former tenants or their descendants would in many cases have meant removing 
incumbent tenants which was not a realistic option. A failure, however, to include 
provisions addressing the emotive issue of evicted tenants in the act would have 
invariably resulted in stout opposition from the I.P.P. and the failure of the bill to 
pass. While the number of evicted tenants that were reinstated was relatively small 
the evidence examined by this study indicates that the Land Commission took their 
representation seriously.     
 
Historiography has given Wyndham little credit for what this study sees as a major 
achievement and that was in creating a market in Irish land at a time when none 
existed. By providing finance to those wishing to purchase, a framework in which to 
conclude transactions and incentives to both buyers and sellers, the legislation broke 
the logjam in the market for land that had prevailed since the 1890s. In so far as was 
practical, given the enormous political upheavals of the second decade of the 
twentieth century, the 1903 Land Act was largely successful in achieving its 
objective of resolving the Irish land question in that, apart from completing the 
transfer of 9.2 million acres of land, involving 256,735 individual holdings and at a 
cost of £82.2 million, it also reduced the scale of the problem to such an extent that 
subsequent Free State governments felt enabled to deal with what problems 
remained rather than being overwhelmed by the scale of the task they faced.14    
                                                 
14 Report of the Irish Land Commission for the year from 1 Apr. 1934 to 31 Mar. 1935 
(Dublin, 1936), p. 10. 
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The thesis’s third and final aim was to examine how landlords went about managing 
their wealth in the period after the sale of their estates. Given that this represented 
new ground there was little expectation of what the findings might be. From the 
estate records examined, it is evident that there were clear and common trends in 
terms of the way investment portfolios were constructed so as to ensure sufficient 
income was generated and capital was protected. Portfolios were made up primarily 
of fixed income government, municipal and railway company bonds with a 
smattering of resource company debenture stocks. There was little evidence of 
investment properties, ordinary shares or private company investments, with the 
consequence that portfolios were unprotected in periods of inflation. While not an 
issue in the initial decades following the sale of the estates, this was a fundamental 
investment flaw that would result in the long- term erosion of the value of the 
portfolios. While former landed families had to live with the consequences of this 
error this study would attribute blame more to the financial advisors than to their 
clients.   
 
The exception to the above trends was the case of the Leinster estate, particularly in 
the period from 1903 to 1922. During that period, the portfolio consisted almost 
entirely of personal mortgages advanced to a relatively small number of private 
individuals. This approach is difficult to understand given the level of return 
obtained, which was only marginally ahead of that available from highly liquid 
sovereign debt. The fact that institutions such as Scottish Widows were calling in 
loans from landed elites such as the duke of Devonshire makes this investment 
strategy even more puzzling.15 By the time of the death of Maurice FitzGerald, the 
6th duke of Leinster in 1922, the portfolio was somewhat rebalanced in favour of 
quoted investments but still retained a high exposure to personal mortgages. The 
reason for adopting this structure remains a mystery to this author. 
 
Some vendors freed from the pressures of presiding over a struggling estate took to 
the casinos of Monte Carlo or the other great hedonistic centres of the world and 
lived up to the reckless and feckless image of many of their class. The Countess of 
                                                 
15 Cannadine, The landlord as a millionaire, p. 87. 
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Fingall recounted an episode involving an unnamed ‘hitherto impoverished Irish 
peer’ who encountered George Wyndham in a casino in Monte Carlo. According to 
the countess, while Wyndham was walking through the casino he came across the 
former Irish landlord at the centre of a group of gamers, the lord shouted out to 
Wyndham while pointing to a pile of notes and chips ‘George, George! The 
Bonus!’.16 Bence-Jones tells of similar stories of profligacy such as that of Sir Henry 
Moore who having received £19,000 by way of Bonus from the sale of his Mayo 
estate, managed to squander it in a matter of months living the high life in Canada 
and ended up living out his days in the English seaside town of Worthing. 17    Most, 
however, entered the uncertain world of financial and investment management. To 
landlords like Clonbrock or the trustees of the Leinster estate, these were familiar 
albeit unsettling places. To others, who had never previously needed to venture into 
such territory, it must have been a very daunting place indeed. The evidence 
uncovered by this study would suggest that most relied on their solicitors or land 
agents to act as their guides as they sought to understand the world of stockbroking, 
mortgage lending and wealth management.  
 
While the new rentiers enjoyed the benefit of regular income, a situation which 
improved during the deflationary 1920s, the capital value of their portfolios was 
being seriously and irreversibly undermined by the secular bear market in 
government bonds, the decline in railway stocks, the stock market collapse of 1929, 
and, as the 1930s dawned, the most malign influence of all, inflation. As had been 
the case in their landlord days, many showed the same inertia in the face of the 
changing investment environment. The failure to put in place properly diversified 
portfolios which included not just income generating securities but capital growth 
stocks, and more importantly, investment property, was a serious error of judgement 
not just by the former landlords but by their advisors. Investment alternatives did 
exist at the time but the evidence suggests that few availed of these and instead 
choose to follow blindly the conventional wisdom, with disastrous consequences for 
their long-term wealth. 
                                                 
16 Pamela Hinkson, Seventy years young, Memories of Elizabeth, Countess of Fingall 
(Dublin, 2009), p. 282. 
17 Mark Bence-Jones, Twilight of the ascendancy (London, 1987), p. 130. 
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The end date of this study, 1933, meant that it did not trace the fortunes of those 
landlords who sold their estates under Wyndham to their conclusion. This opens a 
whole area for future study and investigation. Questions such as whether they 
adopted their portfolios to changing investment environments that prevailed after 
1933, how were the portfolios affected by taxation policies, death duties, family 
charges and the exigencies of financial markets, did the portfolios support future 
generations of the families and if not did they develop new sources of income, will 
hopefully be addressed in the future. Similarly, more micro studies into individual 
estate families will ensure that the picture painted of Irish landed families in the post-
Wyndham era will fill a broader canvas. 
 
* * * * * 
 
In November 1997, the then newly appointed Secretary of State for International 
Development in the Tony Blair Labour government, Clare Short, wrote to Kumbirai 
Kangai, the Zimbabwean Minister for Agriculture stating: 
 
I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special 
responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new 
government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial 
interests. My own origins are Irish and, as you know, we were colonised, not 
colonisers. 18 
 
This quote highlights the change that had taken place in British government thinking 
with regard to land reform in the ninety-four years since George Wyndham 
introduced his 1903 Irish Land Bill to Parliament and in so doing provided Irish 
landlords with a dignified exit from their predicament and a lifeline to a decent 
financial future. Their white Zimbabwean equivalents were not so fortunate. Many 
were subjected to wholesale land expropriations and for some even worse fates as 
Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF government made good on their promise of land reform. 
In these circumstances the Irish landed classes can consider themselves fortunate in 
that all they lost was their acres. 
                                                 
18 Letter dated 5 Nov. 1997 from Clare Short to Kumbirai Kangai, http://www.the 
guardian.com/politics/2013/aug/11/freedomofinformation.zimbabwe. – Accessed 30 Dec. 
2016. 
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* * * * * 
 
It is doubtful if Irish landlords would have considered themselves fortunate or if they 
appreciated the generous terms afforded to them by the Wyndham Act. It is hard not 
to see them as anything other than a retreating and defeated caste. The sustained 
economic pressure particularly since the late 1870s, the constant threat and indeed 
impact of agrarian agitation from an increasingly-confident tenantry and a sense of 
desertion by the system to which they had pledged their allegiance all contributed to 
their sense of isolation and foreboding about the future. Caught in a vice of financial, 
psychological and political pressures, it is little wonder that they retreated either into 
their own worlds or left Ireland’s shores for what they would have seen as greener 
pastures. This sense of isolation and hopelessness can be seen in a statement made 
by Lord Lansdowne when commenting on the Riverstown ranch wars in County 
Sligo in 1908: 
 
it is not only the local importance of these events, it is the profound 
discouragement of those who remain loyal to our cause in Ireland, who see 
themselves deserted, and who, after all, being ordinary human beings, if they 
are deserted long enough will begin to feel they are playing a losing game 
which is scarcely worthwhile to go on playing. 19 
 
A similar sense of bitterness and abandonment can be seen in a piece of verse written 
by Hilda Blennerhasset, a niece of the Knight of Glin: 
 
 He was an Irish landlord 
 Loyal to King and true 
 Fought in England’s battles, 
 Fought in vain right through. 
 
 Now he is robbed and plundered 
 Turned out of house and land 
 All by the British parliament 
 Urged on by the rebel band. 
 
 The man who shot the landlord, 
 The man with the blackened face, 
                                                 
19 The Times (London), 21 Nov. 1908, quoted in Patrick Cosgrove The Ranch War in 
Riverstown, Co. Sligo (Dublin, 2012), p. 37. 
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 The man who houghed the cattle 
 Is the man to take his place.20 
 
Mark Bence-Jones who, as an insider, has chronicled the demise of the Irish landlord 
class has argued that: 
 
For most landowning families, the Wyndham Act was in the long term a 
disaster, though it provided a short-term solution to their financial problems. 
All too many of them were left with a demesne which was not a self-
supporting unit; the money from the tenanted land was all too frequently lost 
through badly invested or spent as income when it should have been treated 
as capital.21 
   
The decline of Irish landlordism was as a consequence of economic circumstance. 
The manner of the demise was, however, due to political and social factors. Unlike 
their equivalents in the north of Ireland who continued up until the early 1970s to 
play a prominent part in social and political life, southern landlords ceased to have 
any part to play in independent Ireland.22 Their lack of professional skills, enterprise 
and their cultural orientation meant that, had they even wanted to, they were not 
welcome in the power circles dominated by the newly-emerging ruling Catholic 
middle class of the 1920s and 1930s. 
 
Few could have predicted the dramatic events that were to unfold or how the 
fortunes God’s Elect were to change, from that summer’s day in June 1815 when 
filled with pride they read of their hero’s victory at Waterloo, to the depressed days 
of the 1930s when they were without power, influence or status and, in many 
instances, wealth. 
 
                                                 
20 Mc Ginley, The La Touche family in Ireland, p. 242. 
21 Bence-Jones, Twilight of the ascendancy, p. 132. 
22 Purdue, The big house in the north, p. 237. 
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Appendix 1.1 Projected impact of judicial rent reductions on selected estates 
1880-1910 
 
Estate Description 1851-80 
First-
term 
Second -
term 
Third-
term 
  
Average Rent rent rent 
   
Reduction reduction reduction 
   
20.70% 19.30% 9.20% 
  
% % % % 
 
Rents 100.0 79.3 64.0 58.1 
 
Taxes -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 
 
Management -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 
Ashtown Improvements -13.0 -13.0 -13.0 -13.0 
 
Interest 
    
 
House costs 
    
 
Total costs -28.0 -28.0 -28.0 -28.0 
 
Profit 72.0 51.3 36.0 30.1 
 
Rents 100.0 79.3 64.0 58.1 
 
Taxes -16.0 -16.0 -16.0 -16.0 
 
Management -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 
Clonbrock Improvements -11.0 -11.0 -11.0 -11.0 
 
Interest -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 
 
House costs -16.0 -16.0 -16.0 -16.0 
 
Total costs -50.0 -50.0 -50.0 -50.0 
 
Profit 50.0 29.3 14.0 8.1 
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Appendix 1.1 continued 
Estate Description 1851-80 
First-
term 
Second -
term 
Third-
term 
  
Average Rent rent rent 
   
Reduction reduction reduction 
   
20.70% 19.30% 9.20% 
  
% % % % 
 
Rents 100.0 79.3 64.0 58.1 
 
Taxes -14.0 -14.0 -14.0 -14.0 
 
Management 
    
Crofton Improvements -14.0 -14.0 -14.0 -14.0 
 
Interest -39.0 -39.0 -39.0 -39.0 
 
House costs -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 
 
Total costs -84.0 -84.0 -84.0 -84.0 
 
Profit 16.0 -4.7 -20.0 -25.9 
 
Rents 100.0 79.3 64.0 58.1 
 
Taxes -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 
 
Management -7.0 -7.0 -7.0 -7.0 
Erne Improvements -8.0 -8.0 -8.0 -8.0 
 
Interest 
    
 
House costs -21.0 -21.0 -21.0 -21.0 
 
Total costs -46.0 -46.0 -46.0 -46.0 
 
Profit 54.0 33.3 18.0 12.1 
 
Rents 100.0 79.3 64.0 58.1 
 
Taxes -13.0 -13.0 -13.0 -13.0 
 
Management -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 
Hall Improvements -9.0 -9.0 -9.0 -9.0 
 
Interest -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 
 
House costs 
    
 
Total costs -37.0 -37.0 -37.0 -37.0 
 
Profit 63.0 42.3 27.0 21.1 
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Appendix 1.1 continued 
Estate Description 1851-80 
First-
term 
Second -
term 
Third-
term 
  
Average Rent rent rent 
   
Reduction reduction reduction 
   
20.70% 19.30% 9.20% 
  
% % % % 
 
Rents 100.0 79.3 64.0 58.1 
 
Taxes -7.0 -7.0 -7.0 -7.0 
 
Management -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 
Hodson Improvements -7.0 -7.0 -7.0 -7.0 
 
Interest 
    
 
House costs 
    
 
Total costs -20.0 -20.0 -20.0 -20.0 
 
Profit 80.0 59.3 44.0 38.1 
 
Rents 100.0 79.3 64.0 58.1 
 
Taxes -15.0 -15.0 -15.0 -15.0 
 
Management -4.0 -4.0 -4.0 -4.0 
Inchiquin Improvements -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 
 
Interest -26.0 -26.0 -26.0 -26.0 
 
House costs 
    
 
Total costs -51.0 -51.0 -51.0 -51.0 
 
Profit 49.0 28.3 13.0 7.1 
 
Rents 100.0 79.3 64.0 58.1 
 
Taxes -13.0 -13.0 -13.0 -13.0 
 
Management -14.0 -14.0 -14.0 -14.0 
Murray Improvements -27.0 -27.0 -27.0 -27.0 
Stewart Interest -7.0 -7.0 -7.0 -7.0 
 
House costs 
    
 
Total costs -61.0 -61.0 -61.0 -61.0 
 
Profit 39.0 18.3 3.0 -2.9 
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Appendix 1.1 continued 
Estate Description 1851-80 
First-
term 
Second -
term 
Third-
term 
  
Average Rent rent rent 
   
Reduction reduction reduction 
   
20.70% 19.30% 9.20% 
  
% % % % 
 
Rents 100.0 79.3 64.0 58.1 
 
Taxes -11.0 -11.0 -11.0 -11.0 
 
Management -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 
Ranfurly Improvements -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 
 
Interest 
    
 
House costs -14.0 -14.0 -14.0 -14.0 
 
Total costs -36.0 -36.0 -36.0 -36.0 
 
Profit 64.0 43.3 28.0 22.1 
 
 
The above appendix has been prepared by the author using core data extrapolated 
from a study undertaken by W.E. Vaughan of nine estates for the period 1851 to 
1880. (W.E. Vaughan, Landlords and tenants in mid-Victorian Ireland (Oxford, 
1994), pp 277-8.). Using Vaughan’s average expenditure data for the period 1851 to 
1880, the author has assumed the percentage levels across the various cost headings 
remained fixed in absolute terms. Taking rent for the same period as a base index of 
100 and adjusting these by the judicial rent reductions estimated by Bailey (William 
Frederick Bailey, The Irish land acts. A short sketch of their history and development 
(Dublin, 1917), p. 20.). 
 
In preparing the original cost estimates, Vaughan acknowledged that he may not 
have captured all expenditure so the position could have been worse than that shown 
above. Also no allowance has been made for non- payment of rent thus the profit 
figures for each estate might be considered optimistic. 
 
258 
 
The significance of the data, however, lies not in the specific numbers but rather the 
trend of declining profitability.
Appendix 5.1 Value of securities on the London Stock Exchange 1853-1920 
 
 
1853 
 
1893 
 
1903 
 
1913 
 
1920 
 
 
£m % £m % £m % £m % £m % 
Government / Municipal stocks 
          
 - British Government stock  853.6 70.24% 901.6 18.40% 1,102.2 15.79% 1290.1 13.51% 5753.2 34.71% 
 - Colonial Government stocks 69.7 5.74% 1,031.5 21.05% 1,411.4 20.23% 2034.4 21.30% 3094.7 18.67% 
 - Total Government / Municipal Stocks 923.3 75.98% 1,933.1 39.46% 2,513.6 36.02% 3,324.5 34.81% 8,847.9 53.38% 
           
Corporate Stocks 
          
 - UK Railway stocks 193.7 15.94% 854.8 17.45% 1,104.6 15.83% 1217.3 12.75% 1259.5 7.60% 
 - Overseas railway stocks 31.3 2.58% 1,564.2 31.93% 1,977.8 28.34% 2929.8 30.68% 3888.4 23.46% 
 - Financial stocks 13.1 1.08% 199.5 4.07% 440.5 6.31% 609.1 6.38% 715 4.31% 
 - Utility stocks 24.5 2.02% 140.3 2.86% 200.1 2.87% 435.8 4.56% 465.7 2.81% 
 - Industrial stocks 21.9 1.80% 172.6 3.52% 690.9 9.90% 917.6 9.61% 1269.9 7.66% 
 - Resource stocks 7.4 0.61% 34.6 0.71% 50.8 0.73% 116.4 1.22% 129.8 0.78% 
 - Other stocks 
          
Total corporate stocks 291.9 24.02% 2,966.0 60.54% 4,464.7 63.98% 6,226.0 65.19% 7,728.3 46.62% 
Total nominal value of quoted securities 1,215.2 100.00% 4,899.1 100.00% 6,978.3 100.00% 9,550.5 100.00% 16,576.2 100.00% 
 
Source: The data used in the above table was extrapolated by the author from Ranald Michie, The London Stock Exchange, a history 
(Oxford, 2004), p. 88.
260 
 
Appendix 6.1 Super-tax annual return for year end 5 April 1917 for Luke 
Dillon, 4th baron Clonbrock 
 
Tax 
   
Schedule Income source £-s-d £-s-d 
A Income from trade or profession  Nil 
  
 
 
B Income from property 
  
 
(Income determined by Poor Law 
valuation of 
  
 
land and buildings less 1/8th  
  
 
 - Demense & buildings  967-14-00 
 
 
 - Outside land & buildings 98-01-00 
 
 
 - Dalystown Wood & buildings 57-16-00 
 
 
 - Rent received  132-15-04 
 
  
1256-06-04 1256-06-04 
C Income from the occupation of land 
  
 
(Income determined by the full Poor 
Law valuation 
  
 
of land but not buildings) 
  
 
 - Demesne 1010-15-00 
 
 
 - Outside Lands 48-13-00 
 
 
 -Dalystown Wood 28-03-00 
 
  
1087-11-00 1087-11-00 
    
D Investment Income 
  
 
 - Dividend income from investment 
portfolios 
 
8036-02-11 
    
E Wife's income 
 
200-00-00 
    
 
Income before charges & allowances 
 
10,580-00-03 
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Appendix 6.1 continued 
 
Tax 
Schedule Income source £-s-d £-s-d 
 
Particulars of charges on income 
  
 
 - Hon Helen Dillon 300-00-00 
 
 
 - Hon Louise Dillon 300-00-00 
 
 
 - Hon Katherine Dillon 300-00-00 
 
 
 - Lady Clonbrock - pin money 200-00-00 
 
 
 - Hon R.E. Dillon 300-00-00 
 
 
 - Hon Lady Mahon 50-00-00 
 
 
 - Interest on cash lent by Hon Helen 
Dillon 20-00-00 
 
 
 - Head rent 38-03-00 
 
 
 - Tithe rent charges 24-15-10 
 
 
 - Quit rent 4-02-10 
 
 
 - Board of Works - Suck River 
drainage charge 40-09-02 
 
 
 - Board of Works - Suck River 
maintenance charge 28-03-03 
 
  
1605-14-01 (1,605-14-01) 
    
 
Allowance for insurance premiums 
paid 
 
(28-06-08) 
    
 
Income for Super Tax purposes 
 
8,945-19-06 
 
Source: Super Tax return to the inspector of taxes for tax year 1916/17 (N.L.I., 
Clonbrock papers, MS 35,819.10). 
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Appendix 6.2 Leinster estate quoted investment portfolio as at  
8 February 1922 
 
Security Price Valuation 
 £ £-s-d 
War Loan stock 3 1/2% 90 1/8 32,801-07-05 
War Loan stock 5% 
93 
5/16 34,210-06-05 
Victory Bonds 4% 83 7/8 12,707-01-03 
Exchequer Bond 5 1/4% 1925 
102 
1/8 40,850-00-00 
Funding loan stock 4% 1960-90 79 3/8 40,481-05-00 
National War Bonds 1928 4% 97 3/4 45,258-05-00 
India 2 1/2% Bond 41 1/2 10,582-10-00 
India 3% stock 49 1/2 892-17-01 
India 3 1/2% stock 58 1/2 3,824-08-11 
India 3 1/2% stock 58 1/2 2,790-17-09 
Guaranteed 3% stock 56 1/2 197-15-00 
Essex County 6% Redeemable Stock 1940-60 
103 
1/2 10,350-00-00 
London County 3 1/2% stock 66 1/2 1,104-18-03 
Canada Dominion 4% Registered Stock 1940-60 79 1/2 3,180-00-00 
Canada Dominion 4% Registered Stock 1940-60 79 1/2 88-04-10 
Cape of Good Hope Consolidated 4% stock 1929-49 69 1/2 1,390-00-00 
Hong Kong Gov 3 1/2 Inscribed stock 1918-43 66 1/2 3,038-19-01 
Natal 3 1/2% Consolidated Stock 1934-44 71 1/2 2,960-00-01 
New Zealand 3 1/2% stock 73 1/2 1,842-01-03 
Queensland Gov 4% stock 1940-50 72 1/2 413-00-10 
Queensland Gov 4% stock 1940-50 72 1/2 4,590-18-07 
South Africa Union of Consolidated 4% stock 1943-63 72 1/2 3,625-00-00 
Southern Nigeria (Lagos) Gov 3 1/2% inscribed stock 63 1/2 1,270-00-00 
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Appendix 6.2 continued 
 
Security Price Valuation 
 
£ £-s-d 
South Australia Gov 4% inscribed stock 1940-60 70 1/2 2,153-00-08 
Tasmanian Gov 4% Inscribed stock 73 1/2 4,410-00-00 
Western Australian Gov 3 1/2% inscribed stock 1920-
35 75 1/2 1,935-16-10 
Bank of Ireland stock 
211 
3/4 7,264-09-11 
Belfast Corp 3 1/2% Redeemable stock 1935 71 1/2 2,574-09-08 
Bristol Corp 3 1/2% Redeemable stock 64 1/2 1,935-00-00 
London Corp 5% stock 1945-65 92 3/4 13,912-10-00 
Caledonia Railway company 4% Convertible preference 
stock 56 2,800-00-00 
Caledonia Railway company 4% Convertible preference 
stock 57 3,420-00-00 
Cardiff Railway Company 3% Debenture stock 52 3/4 1,582-10-00 
Fishguard & Rosslare Railway 3 1/2% Guar. Pref. stock 62 3/4 3,137-10-00 
Great Eastern Railway Consol. 4% Irredeemable stock 66 3/4 1,401-05-00 
Great Southern & Western Railway Ireland 4% 
Preference stock 56 8,230-06-04 
Great Southern & Western Railway Ireland Guar 
Preference stock 62 1/4 996-00-00 
Great Western Railway 5% rent charge stock 89 3/4 1,081-09-09 
Great Western Railway 5% debenture stock 93 3/4 1,457-16-03 
Great Western Railway 4 1/2% debenture stock 83 3/4 2,840-16-00 
Great Western & Great Central Railway 3 1/2% Guar. 
Stock 63 3/4 1,912-10-00 
Hull & Barnsley Railway - 2nd Debenture stock 70 3/4 4,971-12-00 
London Brighton & South Coast Railway 5% Guar. 
Stock 85 1,705-19-00 
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Appendix 6.2 continued 
 
Security Price Valuation 
 
£ £-s-d 
London Brighton & South Coast Railway 5% Pref. 
Stock 79 3/4 1,993-15-00 
London & South Western Railway 4% Consol. Pref. 
stock 66 1/2 1,995-00-00 
London & South Western Railway 5% Consol. Pref. 
stock 92 3/4 15,953-00-00 
Madras & Southern Mahratta Railway 4% Debenture 
stock 61 1/4 3,062-10-00 
Metropolitan Railway 3 1/2% Preference stock 56 1/2 3,955-00-00 
Midland Railway 2 1/2% perpetual stock 42 1/2 2,655-18-03 
Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland 5% 
pref.stock 60 3,420-00-00 
Cash (Irish Land Commission) 
 
18-03-03 
Total value of securities of quoted securities 
 
361,226-04-08 
 
 
Source: Probate valuation of quoted securities at 8 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I., 
Leinster estate papers, D3078/1/3). 
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Appendix 6.3 Model to demonstrate the impact of inflation / (deflation) on the 
Leinster estate portfolio 1922-1978 
 Column Column Column Column Column Column  
 A B C D E F  
Year Inflation Cumul Nominal Nominal Real Income Revised 
 Rate Inflation Capital Income Income Variance Capital 
 % % £ £ £ £ £ 
1922 -9.5000 -9.5000 546,829 25,574 28,004 2,430 549,259 
1923 -1.7000 -11.2000  25,574 28,438 2,864 552,123 
1924 2.3000 -8.9000  25,574 27,850 2,276 554,399 
1925 -2.2000 -11.1000  25,574 28,413 2,839 557,238 
1926 1.1000 -10.0000  25,574 28,131 2,557 559,795 
1927 -5.6000 -15.6000  25,574 29,564 3,990 563,785 
1928 -0.6000 -16.2000  25,574 29,717 4,143 567,928 
1929 -0.6000 -16.8000  25,574 29,870 4,296 572,224 
1930 -7.2000 -24.0000  25,574 31,712 6,138 578,362 
1931 -4.5000 -28.5000  25,574 32,863 7,289 585,650 
1932 -3.4000 -31.9000  25,574 33,732 8,158 593,808 
1933 0.0000 -31.9000  25,574 33,732 8,158 601,967 
1934 0.7000 -31.2000  25,574 33,553 7,979 609,946 
1935 2.1000 -29.1000  25,574 33,016 7,442 617,388 
1936 2.7000 -26.4000  25,574 32,326 6,752 624,139 
1937 6.0000 -20.4000  25,574 30,791 5,217 629,356 
1938 -2.5000 -22.9000  25,574 31,430 5,856 635,213 
1939 10.9000 -12.0000  25,574 28,643 3,069 638,282 
1940 12.7000 0.7000  25,574 25,395 -179 638,103 
1941 3.1000 3.8000  25,574 24,602 -972 637,131 
1942 -0.5000 3.3000  25,574 24,730 -844 636,287 
1943 -0.5000 2.8000  25,574 24,858 -716 635,571 
1944 1.0000 3.8000  25,574 24,602 -972 634,599 
1945 1.0000 4.8000  25,574 24,346 -1,228 633,371 
1946 0.5000 5.3000  25,574 24,219 -1,355 632,016 
1947 3.2000 8.5000  25,574 23,400 -2,174 629,842 
1948 4.9000 13.4000  25,574 22,147 -3,427 626,415 
1949 3.5000 16.9000  25,574 21,252 -4,322 622,093 
1950 3.2000 20.1000  25,574 20,434 -5,140 616,953 
1951 12.0000 32.1000  25,574 17,365 -8,209 608,744 
1952 6.3000 38.4000  25,574 15,754 -9,820 598,923 
1953 1.1000 39.5000  25,574 15,472 -10,102 588,822 
1954 4.0000 43.5000  25,574 14,449 -11,125 577,697 
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Appendix 6.3 continued 
 
 
Column  
A 
Column  
B 
Column 
 C 
Column 
 D 
Column  
E 
Column  
F  
Year 
Inflation 
Rate 
% 
Cumul 
Inflation 
% 
Nominal 
Capital 
£ 
Nominal 
Income 
£ 
Real 
Income 
£ 
Income 
Variance 
£ 
Revised 
Capital 
£ 
1955 5.8000 49.3000  25,574 12,966 -12,608 565,089 
1956 3.0000 52.3000  25,574 12,199 -13,375 551,714 
1957 4.6000 56.9000  25,574 11,022 -14,552 537,162 
1958 1.8000 58.7000  25,574 10,562 -15,012 522,150 
1959 0.0000 58.7000  25,574 10,562 -15,012 507,138 
1960 1.8000 60.5000  25,574 10,102 -15,472 491,666 
1961 4.4000 64.9000  25,574 8,976 -16,598 475,068 
1962 2.6000 67.5000  25,574 8,312 -17,262 457,806 
1963 1.9000 69.4000  25,574 7,826 -17,748 440,058 
1964 4.8000 74.2000  25,574 6,598 -18,976 421,082 
1965 4.5000 78.7000  25,574 5,447 -20,127 400,955 
1966 3.7000 82.4000  25,574 4,501 -21,073 379,882 
1967 2.5000 84.9000  25,574 3,862 -21,712 358,170 
1968 5.9000 90.8000  25,574 2,353 -23,221 334,948 
1969 4.7000 95.5000  25,574 1,151 -24,423 310,525 
1970 7.9000 103.4000  25,574 -870 -26,444 284,082 
1971 9.0000 112.4000  25,574 -3,171 -28,745 255,337 
1972 7.7000 120.1000  25,574 -5,140 -30,714 224,622 
1973 10.6000 130.7000  25,574 -7,851 -33,425 191,197 
1974 19.1000 149.8000  25,574 -12,736 -38,310 152,887 
1975 24.9000 174.7000  25,574 -19,104 -44,678 108,209 
1976 15.1000 189.8000  25,574 -22,965 -48,539 59,670 
1977 12.1000 201.9000  25,574 -26,060 -51,634 8,036 
1978 8.4000 210.3000  25,574 -28,208 -53,782 -45,746 
    2,403,956 -1,219,829 -3,623,785  
  
 Description of data contained in columns   
       
Col. A  
 
Annual inflation rate (Source: Barclays equity gilt study 2016). 
Col. B  Cumulative inflation rate  
Col. C  This was the value of the Leinster estate following the death of the  
  6th Duke in February 1922 and after the payment of death duties and 
  family charges.   
Col. D  This represents the 'base nominal annual income' from the portfolio. It 
  is based on an investment return of 4.677 per cent per annum. 
Col. E  The numbers in this column are calculated by adjusting the 'nominal  
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  annual income' for the cumulative effect of inflation / deflation  
Col. F  This column represents the nominal income in column E adjusted for the  
  cumulative inflation figure shown in column C,   
Col. G  Column F minus column E.  
Col. H  The adjustment to the value of the portfolio arrived at by adjusting 
  for the income variance figure in column G. 
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